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FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT 
INTRODUCTION 
This report constitutes a -first attempt to develop 
comparative themes emerging from the ten country monographs 
and from the various meetings and discussions which took 
place during the year and a half of the study project. The 
experts prepared preliminary drafts of the following 
chapters which were extensively discussed during a meeting 
held in Cambridge on the 2nd and 3rd of August 1988. As it 
became evident that a certain degree of disagreement between 
the experts was unavoidable and that the redrafting of the 
final comparative document by a single author would be too 
time-consuming and, in any case, reflect predominantly the 
opinion of the author, it was finally decided that the 
authors of the single chapters would redraft them taking 
into consideration the discussion which took place in 
Cambridge. The table of contents of this final synthesis 
report is: 
Section 1: The History and Recent Sources of Irregular Forms 
of Employment by E. Mingione, University of 
Messina. 
Section 2: Old and New Areas of 'travail au noir' by E. 
Mingione, University o-f Messina, with a 
contribution by R. F'ahl, University of Kent. 
Section 3: Report on travail au noir. The Role of Contracts 
and Types of Activity by Ph. E-iarthelemy, 
University of Ai;-: en F'rovence, with a contribution 
by R. F'ahl, University of Kent. 
Section 4: The Role of the Market and Exchange by F. 
Miguelez, University of Barcelona. 
Section 5: The Role of the State and Economic and Social 
Cohesion by F. Miguelez, University of Barcelona, 
and A. Wenig, University of Hagen. 
Section 6: The Impact of 1992 by A. Wenig, University of 
Hagen. 
Section 7: Conclusions by R. Pahl, University of Kent. 

SECTION I 
THE HISTORY AND RECENT SOURCES OF 
IRREGULAR FORMS OF EMPLOYMENT 
By : Enzo Mingione, U n i v e r s i t y of Messina 
SECTION 1: THE HISTORY AND RECENT SOURCES OF IRREGULAR FORMS 
OF EMPLOYMENT 
by Enzo MINGIONE, University of Messina. 
1. The history of the social regulative system as a frame­
work in which to understand irregular forms of 
employment. 
Irregular forms of employment are defined by the regulatory 
system. 'Travail noir' dees not exist in a totally non­
regulated and permissive context. However, the same kind of 
working arrangement may be perfectly regular according to 
the regulatory system of one country, but irregular 
according to the system in another. In this sense the 
historical origins of what we now call "irregular forms of 
employment" should be considered in connection with 
historical developments in regulative systems at a national 
and local level (differences in effectiveness of regulations 
due to the specific socio­economic traditions of different 
localities). Child labour is an interesting example. It 
cannot be called 'travail noir in Western European 
countries before the second half of the nineteenth century 
('¿hen at different times and in different ways it was banned 
by law. But not all forms of working activities undertaken 
by children are prohibited. In many countries domestic work 
or washing neighbours' cars or mowing the lawn for petty 
cash ii permitted. In some cases certain activities within 
fami i/ economic ventures (family help in the retail trade 
and agricultura) are also tolerated. In these cases 
children's activities are not shown in official statistics 
but they are not. strictly "travail au noir'. 
Thus the historical matrix of irregular forms of 
activities is connected with regulative systems­ We are able 
to make approximate comparisons "regarding the presence, 
diffusion or decline of irregular forms of employment 
because the regulative systems have developed historically 
along similar lines, although maintaining national·, and local 
differences which largely explain the present range in the 
extent of certain phenomena. If we follow the parallel 
history of regulatory systems. we can establish a set of 
■accie—hi stori cal parameters for understanding the roots and 
various incidence of irregular forms of employment in 
different European contexts. 
1. Western industrialized societies have matured their 
regulative characters through a very long phase from 
approximately the 1880s to the late 1960s. During this time 
a growing regulative pattern has arisen around the 
operational systems of the large fordist factory (and 
increasingly offices and chain-stores) and the welfare state 
(see Lash and Urry 1987 for an account of these developments 
in France, the UK and Germany). 
2. This roughly "linear" process has been interrupted at 
times by critical emergency situations when due to dramatic 
events, like wars or persistent serious economic crisis, it 
has not been possible to enforce the regulative system, a 
situation reflected in a temporary sharp increase in 
irregular/illegal activities (black market, travail noir, 
etc.). In many cases these dramatic events have also been 
occasions to reshape and renew the regulative patterns. 
3. The combination of the development of a fordist-welfarist 
system and the parallel slow decline in traditional forms of 
activities, like peasant farming or petty trade or 
persistently labour-intensive building or traditional local 
manufacturing, have compelled these areas to become 
increasingly "irregular", in the sense that they could not 
survive if they complied fully with the developing 
regulative system (by paying taxes, respecting wage rates, 
obeying safety regulation and being totally accounted for in 
national statistics, and so on). Conversely in some? 
situations the pre-industri al craft corporative regulations 
(mainly in terms of strict barriers and controls to entry) 
have been incorporated in the industrial regul¿ttive systems 
in order to facilitate social integration of large groups of 
artisans and protect them from unregulated competition. 
This also favours a tendential expansion of irregular forms 
of activities as soon as the number of potential workers 
with the capacities of doing the job but without the legal 
requirements (for instance moonlighters) increases. 
4. Eieginning in the late sixties, the f or di st-wel far i st 
regulative svsitem has began to show signs of crisis for 
different reasons that we shall try to discuss briefly later 
on. This has produced a new wave of irregular forms of 
employment dif erent from the one; determined by the 
combination between the des'el opinent, of the regulative system 
and the persistence of traditional forms of activities. 
We shall not devote much attention to the temporary 
waves of 'travail noir' originated by exceptional historical 
events (point 2) but discuss the two historical processes 
outlined in points 3 and 4 as these are the most important 
sources of the presence and recent diffusion of irregular 
forms of employment. In the final part of the section we 
shall see how different national and local historical 
combinations of 3 and 4 have become important in determining 
the differences between countries and localities. 
It is worth mentioning the fact that this picture does 
not take into account criminal organizations as an 
additional historical source of "travail noir". In this 
regard, organizations which already existed in Southern 
Italy or in the Marseille region expanded dramatically when 
they became the focal points of the international drug 
business. This i s an area which is particularly difficult to 
estimate and to investigate; nevertheless it is important to 
mention the fact that criminal activities do not only 
generate directly illegal forms of employment but that they 
are likely to multiply through side activities, like 
investment in building or the effects of "protection" 
rackets in petty trade. 
2. Historical developments in the regulative system and the 
transformation of traditional forms of work into 
irregular ones 
This is not the place in which to analyse the origins of the 
regulative system and the ways in which it functions. These 
have in fact developed along different lines although, as a 
rule, a fairly similar system has arisen in all cases. It is 
based on the figure of the mass employee working in large 
industrial and tertiary-sector enterprises, on formal job 
registration and the complete control over self-employed 
actis'ities, and on the growth in comprehensive welfare 
services to complement increased consumer spending by the 
mass employee. What must be underlined, on the other hand, 
Are the specific ways in which the development of the 
regulative system together with the parallel survival of 
traditional working activités, highly labour-intensive and 
with a relatively low and stagnant labour productivity, led 
to these activities being transformed into huge areas of 
irregular work. Furthermore, the general decline of these 
traditional economic activities has often involved a 
decrease in these particular forms of irregular work and in 
some cases a growing irregularity in methods of employment. 
There are two obvious general aspects to this combination of 
•factors. First, traditional kinds of work are not subject to 
the full control of the various regulative systems. The 
reason is that they are not very concentrated and involve a 
large degree of unpaid family labour and various 
combinations of non-standard activities such as fixed-period 
or casual jobs, the exchange of work skills and the exchange 
of personal services between employer and employees. 
Second, traditional activities are unable to comply with the 
norms fixed by the regulative system like paying the minimum 
guaranteed wage, respecting trade-union practices and 
government safety regulations and paying taxes, because they 
start off at low and inadequate levels of income. In fact, 
the more the regulative system develops in line with 
increases in labour productivity in the highly concentrated 
industrial sectors and with the growing need for tax revenue 
to finance the welfare state, the more traditional 
activities - if they survive - are compelled to become even 
mare irregular and/or seek complementary sources of income. 
The above-mentioned combination of factors is to be found 
especially in the agricultural activities of less developed 
regions, that is, those regions unable to develop modern 
forms of family farming which use advanced technology and 
exploit the family's work skills to the full. However, in 
these regions the same can be said of the building industry, 
traditional local manufacturing, the retail trade and 
private services to individuals and families as, for 
example, in public commercial concerns and tourism. This 
type of combination is characteristic of Southern Italy, 
Spain, Greece, Ireland and some areas of Southern France. 
Speaking more generally, a combination of this kind 
characterizes several services to families and paid house-
work in particular. Full compliance with the growing 
regulation of work is not only difficult to enforce in a 
sector which is still greatly fragmented (the employers are 
families) but it also causes the cost of labour to rise 
above what many potential employers can afford to pay. As a 
consequence, even in the countries of central-northern 
Europe irregular employment persists in this sector, at 
least as long as there is a supply oi workers willing to do 
the work under such conditions. In every country, these 
workers are increasingly foreigners from poor Third-World 
countries or 'second-job' workers who look on such work as a 
way of supplementing their main income or obtaining a 
temporary income while awaiting other opportunities. 
The converse historical picture is one in which 'black 
work' does not arise in those locations and branches of 
industry where up until the end of the sixties labour 
productivity increased more than the average, parallel 
financial and industrial concentration is relatively high 
and where we are dealing with industries financed or-
dì recti y run by the state. 
3. Irregular work beyond the crisis in the fordist-welfare 
system 
The immediate historical sources of almost all the new forms 
of irregular work which have drawn the attention of 
academics and political commentators in recent years can be 
traced to several important socio-economic transformations 
starting at the end of the sixties and extending throughout 
the seventies. The most notable symptoms of this 
transformation are two: what has been called flexible 
accumulation and, in particular, the search by manufacturing 
industry for more flexible and less expensive forms of 
labour than full-time guaranteed jobs for blue and white-
collar workers, difficult to lay off for large industrial 
concerns; a phase of tertiarization which is no longer based 
on expanding the big public and private welfare 
bureaucracies but rather on the proliferation of a highly 
diversified myriad of forms of employment, sometimes linked 
to one another and sometimes of a local, atomized and 
disparate kind. 
In terms of a source for irregular forms of employment, 
the second phenomenon is the most widespread and important 
even though more attention has often been devoted to the 
first and, in particular, to subcontracting, to the re-
emergence of industrial work in the home and to the renewed 
importance of small enterprises or microfirms based on non 
standardized flexible working arrangements. 
The two phenomena are however connected: in the 
vertical disintegration' of large industrial concerns we 
find the hiving off of office work and services supplied to 
firms, that is, the detaching and subcontracting of service 
activities ranging from consultancy to cleaning and 
maintenance. In addition, both phenomena may be linked to 
the crisis in the regulative system of fordist-Welfare type 
societies. In this sense, an interpretation of the present 
phase as the 'end of organized capitalism' (Lash and Urry, 
1987) or as that of 'disorganized capitalism' (Offe, 1987) 
appears obvious. As is also obvious the fact that in this 
phase working practices are spreading which are not 
traditional but equally irregular or which evade the means 
for regulation developed in the preceding decades. As an 
attempt at simplification, we could say that whereas the 
regulative system is devised for a series of more or less 
standard jobs, both flexible industrialization and the new 
forms of tertiary activity open up an area of opportunities 
and demand for employment that may be described as 
'fragments of work', more or less casual, part-time, for a 
fixed period and of varying intensity and recompense. In 
this perspective, no system for regulating working 
activities is able to totally contain the growing pressures; 
consequently figures everywhere show that forms of irregular 
work which are however new compared to jobs in the 
traditional sectors are on the increae again. The on paper 
more tolerant. regulative systems like that in England as 
regards part-time jobs and work in the home or those which. 
are more effective and better financed, as i n Germany, show 
a greater ability to contain the pressure for the spread and 
sharp increase of these forms of irregular employment; but 
this is true only in part. In some branches of services the 
pressure is difficult to hold back like, for example, in 
domestic and mechanical repairs or in personal services. 
Multiple job-holding and casual work are on the increase in 
every industrialized country. As a rule, they are not easy 
to 'regularize' or only at the risk α-f soffocating the new 
paths towards economic growth taken in industrialized 
countries or of increasing state bureaucracy beyond 
convenient levels or what is economic. 
The interconnection between the development of 
regulative systems and their subsequent crises, on one side, 
and important social transformations in their specific 
1 ocal/national patterns, on the other, should also be 
stressed. Urbanization and the emergence of a mode of 
consumption which is largely standardized and based on the 
spending of monetary income have been central factors in the 
development of existing patterns of regulation. The more or 
lass radical decline in traditional forms of self-
provisioning in rural contexts has been the other side to 
this complex process of transformation. In contrast, an 
articulated and locally diversified mix of de-urbanization, 
the diffusion of a variety of suburban and small-city 
settlements and the increasing importance of new kinds of 
self-provisioning (using modern means, like computers, do-
it-yourself tools, light tractors for vegetable gardening, 
etc.) and new diversified forms of consumption patterns (for 
instance, the dual trend established by the parallel 
increase in standardized supermarkets and chain-stores and 
in small specialized shops which only ten years ago were 
apparently becoming extinct) has contributed to the crisis 
of regulative systems and to the diffusion of irregular 
forms of employment. 
From still another point of view, it should be noted 
that the specific historical patterns of istitutional 
regulation have been largely promoted by or on behalf of 
strong social groups as a way of safeguarding their 
sectional interests. This is evident in the speci f ic'norms 
for regulating the labour market and job entry promoted in 
order to favour different segments of the workforce and 
categories of economic operators. We have already mentioned 
the strict. protection of craft workers in Central Europe, 
mainly based on corporative barriers and control of entry 
into an occupation, as one of the present sources of 
irregular employment. The same occurs in a different way in 
the Italian case where artisans have not been protected by 
barriers to entry but rather through privileges and more 
flexible rules, mainly an advantageous fiscal and social 
security system which differs radically from that applying 
in industry. This has also contributed to the diffusion of 
irregular forms of employment in that an increasing number 
of economic operators, in no way definable as artisans, have 
opted for this particular system in order to benefit from 
its flexible conditions. 
A different but equally important set of examples 
emerges from the patterns of istitutional regulations 
cjoverning labour markets and working conditions with regard 
tc workers who are not strictly Fordist in at least two 
different, ways. The combination òf relatively low wages and 
a loose control over working times and potential second jots 
has contributed to widespread irregular moonlighting in 
Southern Europe among school-teachers, civil servants, local 
government employees, bank clerks and others. In many cases 
the complementarity has been so pronounced as to be 
interpreted as an hidden agreement between employers and 
employees: the former turn a blind eye on the practice of 
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moonlighting; the latter renounce claiming salaries 
comparable to those of equal occupational categories in 
other industrialized countries. In the seventies, high 
rates o-f inflation, the crisis and fragmentation in 
employment, and the increasing burden of direct taxation on 
wage-earners help to make moonlighting increasingly 
advantageous and widespread. 
In a different area, at least in the case of Italian 
agricultural day-labourers and of Greek building workers, 
the historical strength of the workers in an unusual labour 
market characterized by permanent alternation of employment 
and unemployment, has been reflected in relatively higher 
but still largely insufficient unemployment benefits. In 
general, these have to be complemented during the year by a 
period of regular employment, necessary in order to qualify 
■for benefit, and a period of continuative and/or occasional 
black-market work (sometimes even agreed on between worker 
and employer at the moment of hire). In contrast, the 
Fordi st workers that managed through their 'core' role 
within the trade-union movement to gain reasonable cover 
against unemployment (not a recurrent but rather ari 
exceptional' condition at least during the Fordist age 
proper) through wage-comparable benefits (or in the Italian 
case the '"Scassa integrazione'S' system) were automatically 
excluded from access to informal activities. As an 
unexpected effect of the regulative system, exclusion has 
hit the unemployed who, presumably, are more in need of a 
complementary income and of naw work experience, but not 
those already in employment. When discovered or denounced, 
the latter risk only having to give up their second job 
whereas the former loose their unemployment benefit, which 
represent-s a substantial part of the household's income. 
With regard to the specific historical processes 
through which this increase in a new type of irregular work 
arises, we will mention four cases which contribute jointly, 
but. in varying degrees, to the expansion of this area: 
.1. the semi-pri vati zation of welfare services and the need 
to decentralize welfare programs and make them more 
di f f er en t i at ed ; 
2. the emergence of a highly Disparate and atomized demand 
for 'personalized services' to families and individuals; 
3. the growing interest of industry and firms in 
reorganizing into long lines of vertical disintegration and 
chains of subcontracting, in order to make production 
generally more flexible and to heighten the capacity for 
innovation and adaption to specific situations and market 
fluctuations. Moreover, this trend is interrupting the 
traditional connection between financial concentration and 
the concentration of production. Whereas the concentration 
of financial operations is continuing to increase to the 
gigantic levels of the multinational 'conglomerates', 
production is being deconcentrated along various different 
lines, the example of Benetton being one of the most 
interesting due to its radical nature; 
4. the impact from the spread of light technology which 
provides new opportunities for carrying out jobs and opens 
up new areas to service activities ­ examples are DIY tools, 
personal computers, video recorders, small programmable 
electonic machine­tools for making personalized products and 
so on ■ 
The technological factor is often overestimated. Never­
theless it plays a very important complementary role in 
permitting labour processes to be reorganized. The move is 
away from the clear prevalence of a rigid system of fixeo 
JODS and towards the spread of flexible 'working fragments" 
both in manufacturing industry (consider the inexpensive 
electronic machines for producing knitwear in the home) and 
to an increasing extent in office work and tertiary 
activities (for instance, the opportunités for working at 
home using personal computers). 
4. National and local differences within a historical 
perspective 
National and local differences in the types and presence of 
irregular work may be explained by starting from the 
specific interaction of the two processes underlying the 
present situation. These are traditional 'black work' and 
the new pressures towards irregular forms of labour arising 
from the crisis, in the broad sense, in the f ordìst­wel f are 
regulative system and from the new phase of tertiar ization 
and flexible industrialization. 
The case of Italy is particularly interesting because 
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it presents, from all points of view, very high persistent 
levels of irregular work even when compared with less 
industrialized countries like Portugal, Ireland and Greece. 
The explanation for the Italian syndrome can be summed up as 
follows. The growth of the Italian economy has given birth 
to very high levels of polarization between the slowly 
declining but still surviving traditional sectors in both 
the South and the North-East and Centre, on the one hand, 
and the highly concentrated industrial complex in the North-
West on the other. The strains caused by the conflict 
between the fordist-welfare regulative system and a vast 
area of surviving traditional activities have been 
considerable, particularly in the period from 1955 to 1965. 
Also, such pressures have been favoured by the presence of 
a large extent of traditional irregular work and the 
practical ineffectiveness of the regulative system 
(widespread tax evasion, persistence of small firms, 
irregular activities and so on). It is also important to 
point to the hyper-concentration and growing rigidity of the 
highly concentrated industrial complex. The Fiat Mirafiori 
factory in Turin was a true monument to this trend with 
about 70,000 workers and white-collar staff concentrated on 
a single site. . The consequence was that the Italian 
regulative system was thrown into crisis almost a decade in 
advance of the other industrialized countries in the second 
half of the sixties instead of during the seventies. The 
industrialization in the NEC with its strong tendencies to 
vertical disintegration, subcontracting and informal 
coordination of firms constitutes one aspect of the 
phenomenon. The other is the precociously new and the old 
vocation for working fragments and irregular work on the 
part of the network of social, personal and family services, 
complemented by a welfare system undergoing increased 
modernization but subject to drastic reductions in 
efficiency at local and sector levels. 
If we look at England, however, we can identify in the 
early el i mi nati on of historically traditional tensions the 
origin of a regulative system that is more tolerant towards 
non-standard forms of labour such as work in the home or 
diffent kinds of part-time employment. The high 
concentration in industrial production enforced de-
industrialization and decentralization of industry to take 
place mainly through transfers to foreign countries rather 
than through internal restructuring, at least up to the 
second half of the seventies. The comprehensive and 
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centralized welfare system is, on the other hand, the 
principal factor behind the new tensions connected with 
irregular work in the sense that the immediate historcal 
sources lie in the partial dismantel 1 ing of the system, in 
the new services required and in the most disparate and 
fragmented ways of providing them. 
In the countries of central-northern Europe (Germany, 
Holland and Denmark) what must be emphasized is the 
efficiency and also the particular severity of their 
regulative systems. It has enabled them to contain the 
spread of irregular activities to a certain extent and 
subsequently to limit them to some areas of the economy and 
society such as personal and family services. 
In Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland (and also in 
Southern Italy and several agricultural regions in Southern 
France and in mountain districts) irregular work has assumed 
its particular features above all through the mixing (but 
late compared to the general model in the case of Italy) of 
traditional with newly emerging forms. We still find today 
in these areas mixes comprising agriculture, tourism, black 
work in building and manufacturing in the home. In these 
cases the shift of irregular work and fragments of work 
towards the tertiary sector is slower and less pronounced 
than in others, though it is also present as the main 
'historical trend'. 
France and Eielgium, on the other hand, display 
historical features that are generally intermediary between 
those described above. In many respects they resemble the 
English mode] but are less radical both in terms of the 
early elimination of traditional forms and of the growth of 
a comprehensive welfare state. What this means is that the 
regulative system has developed in a way which is formally 
more tolerant than, for example, the Italian system but less 
effective than, say, the one in Germany. Furthermore, 
although irregular work is much less widespread than in 
Italy and mixed with traditional elements to a lesser degree 
than in Spain, it is neither as small in scale nor as 
confined to a few service activities as in the countries of 
central-northern Europe. 
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SECTION II 
OLD AND NEW AREAS OF "TRAVAIL AU NOIR" 
BY : Enzo Mingione, U n i v e r s i t y of Messina, wi th a c o n t r i b u t i o n 
by Raymond Pani, U n i v e r s i t y of Kent 
IZ) 

SECTION 2: OLD AND NEW AREAS OF 'TRAVAIL AU NOIR' 
by Enzo MINGIONE, University of Messina, with a 
contribution by Raymond PAHL, University of Kent. 
1. Introduction 
Irregular forms of employment vary greatly in Europe 
depending on different socio-histori cal trends, local 
characteristics and legal, regulative and political systems. 
Their presence or diffusion are not exclusively typical of 
only certain socio-economic sectors nor do they reflect a 
single and unilateral historical transformation. On the 
demand side, three broad and complex socio-economic 
processes are generally associated with the presence or 
diffusion of irregular forms of employment (the supply side 
will be taken into consideration in the next section): 
i) modes of decline of traditional labour processes; 
ii) trends towards flexible arrangements in 
rnanuf actur ing; 
iii) trends towards tertiarization and expansion of 
personal, household and economic services (to firms) 
in the age of the late or post-welfare state. 
Only the third of these three processes accounts for 
any substantial part of irregular employment in most 
European countries, despite variations in local and national 
opportunities and arrangements. The innovative character of 
irregular employment, both in its strictly technological 
content (the use of new technologies in the labour process 
or its inclusion in the production process of new 
technologies) and in organizational terms, is inevitably 
controversial. In general, it seems that irregular 
employment is more likely to be associated with labour-
intensive work processes But this is not very revealing, 
since technology and organizational innovation and light, 
low-cost technologies are widely diffused and nave an impact 
on all sectors of society. 
2. Irregular work in declining and traditional sectors. 
Agriculture 
Forms of irregular employment in agriculture are found in 
some European countries (Southern Europe and Ireland) for 
two contrasting reasons: the relatively high and increasing 
level of underemployment of agricultural workers (both self-
employed and wage-workers) in regions which have not 
developed adequate forms of family capitalist farming; and 
the very high peaks of temporary demand for cheap unskilled 
labour during the short summer season. The latter occur in 
the same regions due to their economic weakness, which has 
prevented the diffusion of technological solutions to the 
problem, as well as to some agronomic features 
(Mediterranean crops like citrus, olives or fruit and 
vegetables are more seasonal and labour-intensive than 
continental products like grain, cow's milk ana so on). 
The relative decline of agricultural income in these 
less developed regions, only partially offset by an 
increasing intervention of the state and of the community 
through subsidies and transfers, has traditionally forced 
both small farmers and underemployed agricultural workers to 
look for other complementary part-time work which in many 
cases has been of an irregular kind. Building, the retail 
trade and street trading, tourism and in some cases 
industrial homework and traditional manufacturing have been 
and are the economic basis of this kind of complementary mix 
in Southern Italy, a large part of Spain, Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece, parts of the South and mountain regions in France. 
These forms of irregular work are declining in parallel with 
the decline in the rate of agricultural underemployment and 
in some areas with the feminization and ageing of 
agricultural workers (women and the elderly are less likely 
r.o complement low agricultural income with irregular working 
activities). In these regions, the presence of irregular 
employment and of part-time sei f-employment complemented by-
work outside agriculture remains essential for the survival 
of agricultural production, which otherwise would completely 
disappear under present market conditions. 
In addition, the other aspect of agriculturally induced 
irregular employment - temporary work during the peak season 
-·- is slowly declining; out it is worth mentioning that the 
relative working conditions are also deteriorating. For this 
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reason, in general, a local labour supply is no longer 
available even in regions of high unemployment (Southern 
Italy, Spain and Greece) and foreign migrants (illegal or 
with a tourist or student visa) may be irregularly employed 
in this kind of seasonal work. 
Building 
Building, broadly speaking, i.e. including home repairs and 
restructuring, provides an important context for irregular 
forms of work. It is worth distinguishing the complete 
construction of residential houses from repair and 
restructuring activities. Irregular forms of work are common 
and are everywhere on the increase in the second area, while 
they are in general decreasing in the first, concentrated 
mainly in the same regions where we find relatively high 
rates of agricultural employment. Here building has remained 
highly labour-intensive (in Italy and Spain the use of 
concrete or other technologies was prohibited by law for a 
long time in the pre-war period) and is traditionally 
characterized by a very high rate of irregular employment 
encouraged by a persistent local surplus in the supply of 
unskilled and semiskilled labour. In some situations, the 
decline in 'travail Qoi^r ' on large building sites following 
the slowdown "both in urban development and in the rate of 
economic growth during the seventies, has been compensated 
for by a substantial wave of sei f-bui Iding, restructuring 
and the building of second holiday homes. Thus we have a 
transformation from organized 'travail noir' as wage-work to 
more complex, temporary and irregular forms of 'travail 
n o :t r . 
In Spain, the recent transformation of a part of 
irregular building employment into sei f-empioyment is 
largely connected with the consolidation of the co-operative 
movement within the sector. 
In Italy and even more so in the Greece, building 
workers make a living by alternating periods of seasonal 
official employment, sufficient to obtain social insurance 
and unemployment benefit, and periods of unemployment in 
which they cumulate benefits and irregular working 
activities, sometimes occasional and sometimes continuative 
even on those sites where they were previously hired on an 
official basis. 
uther traditional areas 
Irregular employment is present in other traditional 
activities which may be declining or undergoing 
revi talization through recent transformations (these forms 
are also more diffused in the less developed regions). Among 
the declining areas there are local traditional 
manufacturing activities which are either disappearing or 
being integrated into new subcontracting systems, depending 
on the specific branches involved. For instance, local food 
or agricultural transformation industries tend to disappear 
or decline, while textiles, clothing and tailoring may 
become part. of the flexible production process in a 
reorganized manufacturing system. 
Petty trade, traditional services - particularly 
tourism - also provide opportunities for irregular 
employment in these same regions. Such services may be 
declining (petty trade particularly) or expanding 
(traditional tourist services) and the degree of regulation 
and irregularity may vary widely according to the local or 
national situation. The rapid expansion in Greek tourism 
offers an example of this increasing complexity, on the one 
hand through the parallel increase in official formalized 
circuits (hotels, restaurants, etc.) and in recognized 
household and village hospitality and small family ventures 
and, on the other, with the growing irregular seasonal 
employment of young foreigners who now come from other more 
industrialized countries. 
3. Flexible employment in European manufacturing: new and 
old forms of irregular employment. 
Contrary to the expectations created by the great attention 
paid to restructuring and flexible employment in 
manufacturing, nowhere in Europe do irregular forms of work 
appear particularly concentrated in this sector. Neither is 
irregular manufacturing employment increasing particularly 
rapidly in any European context. On the contrary, in some 
regions like North-East and Central Italy (the so called 
Third Italy or NEC model) where irregular employment in 
manufacturing was important in the late sixties and early 
seventies, these forms now appear to be declining markedly. 
In general , 'travail au noir' in manufacturing is not 
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very diffused in countries where competitive restructuring 
trends have led to subcontracting outside the country, as in 
the case of Germany, Holland, Denmark, to a different and 
more controversial extent England, and, in some branches of 
industry, also France. It is worth mentioning that whilst 
flexible irregular Spanish workers in the manufacturing 
sector are to be found in their own country, their German 
counterparts work in Hungary or Taiwan. 
Although irregular work is not particularly 
concentrated in manufacturing, there are local cases of a 
large and persistent presence of industrial !:Cñ!i^ Íi Ër! 
noir': examples include the shoe industry in the Valencia 
region, the glove industry in downtown Naples (a 'ghost 
industrial system which produces 2-3 million pairs of gloves 
a year) and illegal garment and clothing ateliers using 
exclusively migrant labour (Pakistani, Yugoslav and Turk) in 
the Paris region. 
The fact that 'travaü au noir^ exists and that it is 
illegal depends on not only local historical factors in 
particular industries and on recent patterns in 
restructuring, but also on the regulative and enforcement 
processes and on the degree of capital concentration. Great. 
Britain appears to have less irregular forms of 
manufacturing employment partly because capital is more 
highly concentrated than in, say, Italy or Spain and also 
because the legislation regulating industrial homework and 
part-time employment is more flexible and 'tolerant' than in 
other countries. However, capital concentration has now 
become much less connected with the concentration of 
productive and labour processes through various new 
organizational patterns, the most famous of which is the 
Benetton model. This has developed to become a multinational 
industrial empire, although still based on a very dispersed 
and diffuse productive organization (small and middle-sizeJ 
subcontractors, homeworkers, etc.) with a parallel dispersed 
distribution system (boutiques and shops oriented to local 
tastes throughout the world!. This is not inevitably 
reflected in a particularly high rate of 'travail au noir', 
since these new forms of financial coñceñtFation with 
dispersal of production/distribution are better able to 
incorporate, exploit and create opportunities for irregular 
employment than the traditional model of concentration in 
Fordist-sty]e factories. 
The same warning against mechanical interpretation 
applies in the case of subcontracting systems: they do not 
17 
automatically lead to a high rate of irregular employment 
and they are likely to differ widely from place to place 
and branch to branch, even within the same country. 
Manufacturing is particularly subject to formalization 
versus inf ormaiization trends within relatively short 
periods of time. The take-off of 'made in Italy' which led 
to diffused industrialization in the NEC area in the late 
sixties was presumably characterized by high levels of 
irregular employment. However, after a while many forms of 
'travail au Q°.i r ' disappeared in the wake of the model's 
international "success and the increasing severity of the 
Italian fiscal system. In recent years parts of the 
subcontracting system, like the shoe industry in the region 
of the Marches, damaged by increasing international 
competition may have reverted back - at least in part - to a 
greater use of irregular employment. 
Contrary to experience in the USA and the Pacific 
Basin, the development of electronic industries in Europe 
does not seem to have directly produced a high rate of 
informal 'travail au noir'. 
4. Tertiarization and irregular employment 
As anticipated, services are the economic area where 
irregular forms of employment are more widespread and in 
-some cases expanding in every European country, but with 
inevitable variations. There are three different processes 
which affect the diffusion of -irregular forms of employment 
in services: 
a; industrial restructuring, especially reorganization 
involving vertical disintegration in which consultancy, 
accounting and marketing, legal and technical assistance, 
cleaning snd other services are progressively hived off from 
the firm/factory; 
b) the expansion of a highly stratified and dispersed demand 
for personal and household services to which it is 
increasingly difficult to respond through both state and 
mar ket-or i ented standardi ζed-concentrated uni ts. 
c) the increasing fiscal problems faced by different welfare 
state systems, which are becoming increasingly privatised 
and which end up by unintentionally favouring further 
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expansion in irregular forms of employment (baby­sitters 
instead of public child­care; hospital cleaning contracted 
out to a private firm employing 'travedi Qoi_r ' ; etc.). 
Irregular forms of employment in the services are 
generally polarized between highly qualified jobs (like, for 
example, in high technology, accounting, law, professional 
consultancy undertaken as irregular second job­holding) and 
very low­skilled and badly paid jobs (for example, cleaning 
and other personal services to households). 
'Travail nair.' i­n industrial and economic services is 
more dlTTused iñ Italy where the process of 'vertical 
disintegration is highly developed as a result of the 
specific legal and fiscal context. This is apparently 
extremely complicated and not very permissive but in 
practice is highly tolerant. Irregular forms of employment 
are less widespread in both contexts of efficient regulation 
and enforcement as in Germany or in those like Britain which 
display more tolerance towards flexible forms of employment. 
Personal and household services are also an important 
source of various kinds of irregular employment. The 
strategic response to this kind of problem is usually a 
combination of more self­provisioning and an increase in 
■clfY­fi.* nciir ' . In certain cases the two responses may be 
connected: the development of self­provisioning skills in, 
say, household or car repairs also gives rise to the 
opportunity for irregular second­job activities for cash. 
Multiple job­holding appears to be the kind of potential 
irregular work which emerges in this context and perhaps 
this explains some of its recent increase in many EEC 
countries. Unfortunately, data on irregular multiple job­
holding, disaggregated for each branch~of"the economy, do 
not exist in Europe ­ with the exception of Italy (official 
ISTAT estimates) where the available data confirm this 
hypothesis. 
This is also an area where traditional forms of 
'travail au nai r' are likely to persist or die out very 
sl5wTy:~ the best example are hourly paid maids. The number 
of irregular jobs in this area is bound to increase inasmuch 
as the general cost of labour is increasing and 
opportunities for employment of this kind are linked to the 
reciprocal advantage which both employer and employee derive 
from irregular conditions. This happens when the employer 
¿j'vi'ï 'in ■■■;'.:<<.. ι. ·' I f.ec'M i t / μ etymon!.: . W M I , ■ ι · sumi.· > .­<:=,'.·:■.», ·.« Ι'»υ 
on wages while the employee saves on social security­
contributions and income tax, yet may still be covered by 
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the social insurance of his/her spouse or first job. In 
contrast, co­resident full­time domestic workers have nearly 
disappeared in some countries, while in those where entry is 
relatively easy« for example Italy, Spain and Greece this 
kind of irregular, if not illegal work, is increasingly done 
by migrants from the Third World. In Greece, unlike Italy 
¿\r\ú Spain, foreign migrant workers without a work permit 
(that is, the large majority) are paid less than half the 
minimum salary paid to Greek workers doing an equivalent 
j ob.. 
The third area is necessarily connected with the 
different history of welfare programs in each country and 
with their real local impact on the actual provision of 
welfare. Irregular forms of employment become more diffused 
in social contexts where the welfare state has developed 
later and in a less efficient and comprehensive form. 
5. 'Travail au noir' and socio­economic innovation. 
In part, irregular, if not illegal, forms of employment are 
connected with experiments in socio­economic innovation ane 
new professions and with the spread of new kinds of work 
tools and technologies (from DIV equipment to the 
introduction of personal computers and office automation). 
It should be remembered that a period of innovation is 
usually short­lived: after a while the degree of 
■irregularity tends to decrease as the experimental take­off 
phase leads to one of successful application (often there is 
a combination of success and formalization for some 
activities and failure and disappearance for others). With 
its pattern of diffused industrialization, the Third Italy 
provides an example of this process of comprehensive 
economic innovation mainly in the reorganization of 
manufacturing, where a high level of irregular employment 
during the take­off stage later gives way to a much lower 
level, Further examples may be found in yarious European 
urban contexts in the field of software consultancy and 
videoclip or film production and distribution. 
In contrast, it is much more difficult for­ trie 
trans­Formati ons produced by the diffusion of new light tools 
and technologies in household repairs and homework 
activities to achieve regularization. 
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SECTION III 
RAPPORT A L'ACTIVITE ET TRAVAIL AU NOIR 
By : Philippe Barthélémy, Univers i té d 'Aix-Marseil le I I I 

Les travailleurs au noir ont dans l'opinion publique une image qui 
change du tout au tout en fonction des contextes. Ils sont parfois admirés pour 
leur débrouillardise, ils sont parfois condamnés pour leur propension à voler 
des emplois aux chômeurs et à concurrencer déloyalement les entreprises régulières. 
Qu'ils soient immigrés clandestins et la population s'insurge contre 
leur présence irrégulière pour les uns, contre l'attitude de leurs employeurs 
pour les autres ; qu'ils soient chômeurs et la réprobation est unanime ; qu'ils 
soient titulaires d'emplois multiples et on accuse les cumulards ; qu'ils 
soient fonctionnaires dans leur emploi principal, et c'est toute la fonction 
publique qui est immédiatement vouée aux gémonies ; qu'ils soient entrepreneurs 
individuels ou salariés, chômeurs ou retraités, actifs ou inactifs, nationaux 
ou étrangers, on trouve avec autant de facilité une longue liste de griefs à 
leur encontre ou une série impressionnante de qualificatifs moins hostiles 
ou d'épithètes franchement sympathiques. 
Pour éviter l'écueil des opinions toutes faites, ce chapitre se 
propose d'analyser la contribution réelle des travailleurs au noir à l'activité 
économique. Pour mener à bien cette problématique, la démarche adoptée repose 
sur l'examen de l'adéquation entre travailleurs au noir et activités réalisées 
au noir. Qui sont-ils réellement et que font-ils ? 
Il va de soi qu'entre les auteurs d'une part et les activités d'autre 
part, un faisceau de relations et d'interconnexions plus ou moins complexes 
imprime à l'analyse une dimension davantage systémique que cloisonnée. Aussi, 
est-ce à dessein que ce caractère composite sera mis en valeur dans chacun de 
nos développements. 
En prenant comme critère de partition, l'activité principale des 
travailleurs au noir, trois groupes de personnes peuvent être isolés selon que 
les individus concernés sont actifs occupés, chômeurs ou inactifs. Dans le 
premier cas, la problématique est celle de la pluri-activité, qu'elle soit 
réalisée dans les secteurs secondaires et tertiaires (§1) ou dans l'Agriculture 
(§2) ; dans le deuxième, celle de la place des chômeurs sur le marché du travail 
informel (§3) ; dans le troisième cas, celle du rôle des étudiants, des retraités 
et plus généralement de tous les inactifs qu'ils aient travaillé auparavant, 
qu'ils soient trop jeunes pour avoir un emploi officiel ou qu'ils n'aient 
jamais eu l'intention de se porter demandeur d'emploi (§4). pour que cette 
analyse synthétique de l'offre de travail au noir soit complète, une mention 
particulière doit être réservée aux travailleurs immigrés clandestins. Tel sera 
donc l'objet de nos derniers développements (§5). 
§1 : LA PLURI-ACTIVITE DANS LES SECTEURS SECONDAIRE ET TERTIAIRE 
La question des emplois multiples est au centre de l'analyse du 
travail au noir car statistiquement, les exemples d'actifs occupés qui ont paral-
lèlement à leur emploi principal une activité secondaire ne manquent pas. Cette 
question est pourtant très complexe à analyser car il y a des cas où activité 
secondaire rime avec activité déclarée officiellement et des cas où activité 
secondaire est synonyme d'emploi occulte ou clandestin. Faire la part des choses 
est d'autant moins aisé que les situations d'emploi tertiaire, ou même quater-
naire, ne sont pas des aberrations ou des hypothèses d'école. 
Pour insister davantage, il convient de ne pas confondre pluri-
activité et travail au noir, même si des présomptions d'absence de déclarations 
des emplois secondaires tombent sous le sens. 
A titre d'argumentation, deux prises de position méritent d'être 
signalées : pour ALDEM et SARA : "il n'y a aucune donnée disponible sur la 
détention de seconds emplois clandestins, en revanche avec des taux marginaux 
d'imposition élevés comme en Grande-Bretagne, la fraude fiscale comme la 
détention d'un second emploi (sous-entendu illégal), deviennent évidemment 
des solutions attrayantes" (*). 
Pour A. SMITH, qui fait allusion à une étude irlandaise (non citée) , 
60% des irlandais détenteurs de deux emplois paient des impôts sur les revenus 
correspondant, 40% de ces personnes bénéficient· d'une assurance sociale et 
50% des emplois secondaires sont connus des employeurs principaux (**). 
Une deuxième remarque liminaire concerne la définition de l'activité 
secondaire. Aucun consensus se semble se dégager sur ce point comme en témoignent 
(*) J.D. ALDEN and S.K. SAHA : "An Analysis of Second Jobholding in the EEC", 
Regional Studies, Vol 12, 1978, page 640. 
(**) Adrian SMITE : "The Informal Economy", Lloyds Bank Review, July 1981, p. SP, 
les exemples concrets suivant : 
Dans le cas de la Grande-Bretagne, l'enquête auprès des ménages 
(General Household Survey) propose la question suivante aux personnes interrogées 
"exerciez-vous une deuxième activité la semaine dernière ?". Cette question est 
beaucoup plus précise et nettement plus restrictive que celle qui est posée 
dans l'enquête sur les budgets familiaux (Family Expenditure Survey) : "Exercez-
vous une deuxième activité ?". La traduction de ces différences en terme 
d'effectifs est, comme on pouvait s'y attendre, que le nombre de personnes ayant 
une activité secondaire est plus élevé dans la deuxième enquête que dans la 
première comme le montre le tableau ci-dessous (*). 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
FES 
6,9 Ζ 
7,5 % 
7,5 1 
8,3 Ζ 
7,6 % 
7,3 Ζ 
GHS 
3,1 Ζ 
3,1 Ζ 
3,5 Ζ 
4,0 Ζ 
3,0 Ζ 
3,0 Ζ 
Dans le cas de l'Irlande, une étude de RYAN a retenu comme critère 
du cumul de deux emplois la notion de rémunération. Si la deuxième activité 
permet de réaliser un gain brut supérieur ou égal au quart du gain brut tiré 
de l'emploi principal, elle relève du champ de l'emploi multiple. Dans le cas 
contraire, l'activité n'est pas comptabilisée. La conception de RYAN est l'une 
des plus restrictives de toutes celles que l'on peut recenser. 
En revanche, dans le cas des Pays-Bas, la question posée par les 
enquêteurs suscite des réponses qui traduisent une conception extensive du 
phénomène de pluri activité : "exercez-vous une deuxième activité rémunérée, 
ou travaillez-vous pour vous-même ou dans l'entreprise de votre mari ou de vos 
parents ?". 
(*) Source : Jeremy ALDEN : "Holding two Jobs : an Examination of Moonlighting", 
in Szuart HENRY ed : Informal Institutions, St Martin's Press, New-York, 
1981, page 44. 
Pour avoir des données homogènes, et donc des sources d'analyse et 
d'interprétation comparables, il faut se référer aux normes proposées par 
l'enquête sur les forces de travail dans la Communauté. La difficulté qui 
apparaît est ici plus originale. Lorsque les pays-membres sont tenus de poser 
des questions sur la deuxième activité, certains d'entre eux comme la. France ou 
le Danemark, n'ont pas satisfaits à leurs obligations ; lorqu'il est devenu 
facultatif de poser ces questions, des pays comme l'Irlande, les Pays-Bas et 
le Luxembourg ont pris la décision de ne plus les inscrire dans leur enquête 
nationale. En fin de compte, les données sont hétérogènes, les séries sont 
discontinues et un immense flou caractérise les informations disponibles. 
Observer de telles carences ne doit pas nous conduire à nous abstenir 
de présenter quelques estimations, fussent-elles peu comparables et disparates. 
En effet, quels que soient les pourcentages d'actifs titulaires de plusieurs 
emplois des caractéristiques structurelles assez fixes sont susceptibles d'être 
mises en évidence. 
POURCENTAGE D'EMPLOIS CONSIDERES COMME 
UNE DEUXIEME ACTIVITE ENTRE 1975 ET 1979 (*) 
RFA 
ITALIE 
PAYS-BAS 
BELGIQUE 
LUXEMBOURG 
ROYAUME-UNI 
IRLANDE 
1975 
1,9% 
2,7% 
2,1% 
2,7% 
3,7% 
1,6% 
3,6% 
1977 
1,9% 
2,9% 
2,2% 
2,5% 
3,6% 
1,6% 
3,2% 
1979 
1,7% 
2,0% 
-
2,1% 
-
1,5% 
— 
(*) Source : Jeremy ALDEN et Richard SPOONER : Personnes ayant plus d'un emploi, 
O.S.CE., Eurostat, Luxembourg, 1982, page 26. 
ITALIE : NOMBRE DE PERSONNES AYANT PLUSIEURS 
EMPLOIS (*) 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1 377 000 
1 158 000 
1 067 000 
1 167 000 
1 127 000 
988 400 
1 003 000 
ESPAGNE : IMPORTANCE DES EMPLOIS MULTIPLES (**) 
1979 
1985 
Nombre de personnes 
317 700 
871 000 
Pourcentage de la popu-
active (1979) et de la 
population active 
employée (1985) 
2,5% 
8,8% 
(*) Source : Vicenzo PATRIZI : "Measures of Concealed Employment : Pitfalls and 
Insights", Economia e Lavoro, Vol 20, n°2, 1986, page 103. Nous avons procédé 
à quelques calculs sur les données du tableau original afin de présenter des 
estimations en termes d'effectifs. ■ 
(**) Source : estimation de 1979 
Antonio GARCIA de BLAS y Santos M. RUESGA BENITO : "Mercado de Trabajo y 
economia oculta en Andalucía", Cuadernos del Instituto de Desarrollo Regional, 
Sevilla, 1985, page 154. 
estimation de 1985 
Secretaria General de Economia y Planificación, Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas : Condiciones de vidas y trabajo en Espana, Madrid, Septiembre 
1986, page 79. 
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ROYAUME-UNI : IMPORTANCE DE LA PLURIACTIVITE (*) 
1 
1975 
1977 
1979 
1981 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Effectifs 
703 000 
779 000 
814 000 
836 000 
pourcentage de la population 
employée 
1,6% 
1,6% 
1,5% 
2,1% 
2,4% 
3,0% 
3,3% 
3,5% 
3,5% 
Nous avons pris la précaution d'informer le lecteur de la nature très 
approximative des statistiques présentées. Il convient en particulier d'insister 
sur le fait que ces données recouvrent pour la plupart des emplois multiples 
estimés à partir des enquêtes périodiques sur la population active et l'emploi. 
Lorsque les questionnaires sont construits pour déceler la pluri-
activité réelle, c'est à dire celle qui incorpore les activités secondaires non 
déclarées, les estimations sont majorées, parfois de façon importante. On a 
ainsi une explication des écarts que l'on ne manque pas d'observer régulièrement 
entre les résultats des études locales où les enquêteurs connaissent parfaitement 
le profil de la population interrogée et ceux des enquêtes à échantillon national 
réalisées par les organismes statistiques officiels. 
(*) Source R.E. PAHL : "Notes towards a more precise understanding of the dimen-
sions and dynamics of the Black Economy in Britain and Ireland", document 
de travail, DGV, Brussels, april 1588. 
Dans le cas de l'Italie, l'ISTAT a procédé à une investigation très 
poussée de la pluriactivité et les nouveaux chiffres sont approximativement le 
double de ceux des premières séries publiées. 
Ainsi, il n'est pas inintéressant de comparer les estimations effec­
tuées avant et après approfondissement des techniques de sondage (cf : tableau 
Italie, page 5 et tableau Italie, ci­dessous). 
ITALIE : Nombre de personnes ayant plusieurs 
emplois (séries révisées) 
(*) (**). 
1980 2 332 000 
1981 2 433 000 
1982 2 611 000 
1983 2 796 000 
1984 2 873 000 
1985 3 036 000 
1986 3 102 000 
Ces estimations globales étant présentées, quelques caractéristiques 
plus détaillées de la pluri­activité peuvent à présent être mises en évidence. 
Une brève analyse des principales tendances nationales précédera une synthèse 
adaptée à la Communauté dans son ensemble. 
­ En ESPAGNE, les emplois secondaires semblent davantage des emplois 
temporaires et occasionnels que des emplois réguliers et permanents. Les 
travailleurs qualifiés qui effectuent à titre principal une activité intellec­
tuelle ou de bureau, seraient plus incités à avoir en parallèle une seconde 
activité que les personnes moins qualifiées ou qui ont une profession plus 
manuelle. Les différentes catégories socio­professionnelles n'exercent pas 
de façon homogène des activités multiples rémunérées. Rapportés à la population 
'*) SouAce : G. MAUBERTI PEPULLA, C. PASCARELLA and C. ABBATE : "New; E¿titmtz¿ 
o¿ thz Employed Population ¿n thz National Account* ­ Methodological Conczpti 
and Rziatti", 1STAT, rzbHsxoKy 1987. 
**) En comparant cz tablzau avzc czliU. dz la pagz 5, on pzut appn.zcA.ZK, pouh. ¿zi> 
αηηζζλ comnunzA, IZÓ ícafvU zntAz Izi deux ÒÍKÍZA d' ZÁtÃjnation. AÄJusi, dz 
19S0 à 19&3 lZÁ zcatvU ¿ont­lti xzÁpzctlvzmznt dz 1.165.000 ; 1.306.000 ; 
1.622.000 zt 1.793.000 ρζΛΛοηηζλ. Il ¿out notzi quz ce¿ zcan£¿> ne cA.o¿!><!>znt 
ραΛ qu' en valzuH, ab¿oluz¿, ­LÍA ¿'élzvznt ααό-ά-c en VOIZUAA xzlativzA. 
active employée à plein temps de chaque catégorie, les taux de participation, 
pour l'année 1985 étaient les suivants : employeurs et directeurs de société : 
8,8%, professions libérales : 14,5%, employés : 8,6%, ouvriers : 7,8%, et 
autres professions : 9,7%. Contrairement à une idée reçue, les ouvriers espa-
gnols auraient proportionnellement une propension plus faible que les autres 
catégories socio-professionnelles à exercer une deuxième activité. 
Les activités réalisées au titre du second emploi sont par ordre 
décroissant d'importance : l'aide à l'entreprise ou au commerce familial : 33,3%, 
une activité à plein temps en tant que salarié : 25,5%, une activité occasion-
nelle pour compte d'autrui : 12,7%, une activité occasionnelle pour compte 
propre : 11,5% eç une activité à domicile : 4,6%. Le solde, soit 12,6%, 
correspond à des activités secondaires de nature diverse. En précisant davantage, 
les personnes titulaires de faibles revenus oeuvrent à titre secondaire en tant 
que travailleurs indépendants, les tâches qu'ils accomplissent relevant de 
l'entretien des logements, de la vente à domicile et plus généralement des 
services rendus aux particuliers. Les personnes dont le revenu principal est 
plus important et qui oeuvrent à titre secondaire, exercent plutôt leur deu-
xième activité en tant que salariés, leurs emplois sont donc permanents plus 
qu'occasionnels. Tel est le cas du personnel administratif tant du secteur 
public que du secteur privé et des professionnels libéraux. Les revenus que 
ces derniers obtiennent sont jugés très rentables, même si le nombre d'heures 
effectuées reste limité. 
Si le critère de partition de la population est le revenu au lieu 
d'être la catégorie socio-professionnelle, on observe entre pluri-activité et 
revenu mensuel de l'emploi principal une relation en forme de U. C'est une 
façon différente d'exprimer la même chose à savoir que les plus pauvres et les 
plus riches oeuvrent davantage à titre secondaire que les personnes qui dispo-
sent de revenus médians. Etant qualifiées, les personnes à revenu élevé sont 
vraisemblablement en position de force sur le marché des seconds emplois : c'est 
la demande qui parait motrice. Recherchant une activité complémentaire, fût-elle 
mal rémunérée, les personnes dont le revenu principal est inférieur à la moyenne, 
sont en position relative de faiblesse-sur le marché des seconds emplois : c'est 
une offre quasi-illimitée de travail au sens de LEWIS ou de FEI et RANIS qui 
rencontre une demande limitée. Les taux de participation en fonction des 
revenus traduisent ces propositions d'explications· (*) 
(*) Source du tableau : Secretaria General..., op. cit. page 81. 
REVENU MENSUEL DE L'ACTIVITE 
PRINCIPALE 
- de 25 000 pesetas 
25 000 à 50 000 p. 
50 000 à 75 000 p. 
75 000 à 100 000 p. 
100 000 à 150 000 p. 
150 000 à 200 000 p. 
+ de 200 000 p. 
TAUX DE 
1 
PARTICIPATION AUX 
EMPLOIS MULTIPLES 
12,7% 
9,9% 
7,1% 
5,7% 
11,3% 
14,3% 
12,7% 
Notons enfin qu'une partie des heures supplémentaires effectuées 
par les salariés dans leur propre entreprise n'est pas déclarée. Ce phénomène, 
particulièrement sensible dans les entreprises de petite taille, repose sur une 
communauté d'intérêt entre firmes et salariés. Ceux-ci profitent de la situation 
en ne déclarant pas une partie de leurs revenus, celles-là échappent partielle-
ment aux charges fiscales et sociales inhérentes aux heures de travail marginales. 
Au ROYAUME-UNI, la répartition par sexe des titulaires d'emplois 
multiples montre que le taux de participation des femmes est plus important 
que celui des hommes. 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Femmes 
3,4% 
3,9% 
4,1% 
4,4% 
Hommes 
2,8% 
2,9% 
3,0% 
2,9% 
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La répartition par statut professionnel fait apparaître clairement 
que le pourcentage de travailleurs indépendants ayant un deuxième emploi est 
beaucoup plus élevé que celui qui concerne les salariés. 
POURCENTAGE DE SECOND EMPLOI EN FONCTION 
DE L'ACTIVITE PRINCIPALE 
1981 
1983 
1985 
1987 
T r a v a i l l e u r s indépendants 
3,0% 
3,4% 
4,7% 
4,8% 
s a l a r i é s 
2,0% 
2,2% 
3,1% 
4,2% 
Le travail indépendant caractérise en outre de plus en plus la 
deuxième activité, qu'elle soit réalisée par des personnes dont l'activité 
principale relève du travail indépendant ou du salariat. Ainsi, entre 1981 et 
1987, le pourcentage des seconds emplois qui relèvent du travail indépendant 
est passé de 26,6% à 32,5%. PLus du quart des salariés travaillent à titre in-
dividuel dans leur seconde activité, le pourcentage correspondant étant de 
62,2% pour les travailleurs indépendants en 1987. 
La répartition en fonction du nombre d'heures de travail effectuées 
dans l'emploi principal, montre des caractéristiques différentes selon le 
sexe : pour les femmes, il y a une relation inverse entre nombre d'heures 
et deuxième activité ; pour les hommes, il n'y a pas de relation très typée 
même si une tendance opposée apparaît dans les estimations (*). 
(*) Ci : Stephen SMITH : Britain's Shadow Economy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
6, pace 47. 1986, g 47 
1 1 
Nombre d ' h e u r e s de t r a v a i l 
dans l ' e m p l o i o f f i c i e l 
­ 30 h e u r e s 
30­35 h e u r e s 
35­40 h e u r e s 
40­45 h e u r e s 
45­50 h e u r e s 
+ 50 h e u r e s 
Taux de p a r t i c i 
emplo is mult 
Hommes 
4,8% 
4,3% 
5,1% 
4,5% 
5,9% 
3,8% 
i p l 
p a t i o n aux 
es 
Femmes 
5,5% 
3,4% 
3,4% 
2,8% 
ε 
ε 
Une p r o p o r t i o n i m p o r t a n t e des d é t e n t e u r s d ' e m p l o i s m u l t i p l e s son t 
des c a d r e s e t de.s p r o f e s s i o n n e l s l i b é r a u x . On r e t r o u v e i c i un comportement 
dé j à o b s e r v é dans l e cas de l ' E s p a g n e , à s a v o i r une l i a i s o n e n t r e f o r t degré 
de q u a l i f i c a t i o n e t demande é l e v é e de t r a v a i l s u r l e marché des deuxièmes 
emplois . 
A t i t r e d ' e x e m p l e , s i l ' o n c l a s s e l e s emplo is m u l t i p l e s dé t enus pa r 
l e s hommes en f o n c t i o n de l ' a c t i v i t é p r i n c i p a l e occupée , on e s t c o n d u i t 
à o b s e r v e r que 10% des pe r sonnes qui t r a v a i l l e n t à t i t r e p r i n c i p a l dans 
l ' é d u c a t i o n , l e b i e n ­ ê t r e e t l a s a n t é ont une a c t i v i t é s e c o n d a i r e , l e p o u r ­
c e n t a g e s ' é l è v e même à 11% pour ceux qui e x e r c e n t une a c t i v i t é dans l e s 
domaines l i t t é r a i r e s , a r t i s t i q u e s e t s p o r t i f s . Pour t o u t e s l e s a u t r e s p r o f e s ­
s i o n s , l e s p o u r c e n t a g e s d ' e m p l o i s m u l t i p l e s v a r i e n t e n t r e 2% e t 4% ( * ) . 
Ces que lques c o n s i d é r a t i o n s nous i n v i t e n t à p e n s e r q u ' i l y a u r a i t 
deux t y p e s de p l u r i ­ a c t i v i t é . Dans l e p remie r c a s , l e s t r a v a i l l e u r s u t i l i s e n t 
dans l e u r seconde a c t i v i t é l e s compétences q u ' i l s o n t a c q u i s e s dans l e u r 
emploi p r i n c i p a l . Les q u a l i f i c a t i o n s sont é l e v é e s ou s p é c i f i q u e s e t l e s revenus 
ob tenus dans l e s a c t i v i t é s s e c o n d a i r e s s o n t à l a mesure de l ' i n t e n s i t é de l a 
(*) Source : Stephen SMITH, op. ait. page 49 (tableau 6­4, colonne Z) 
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demande qui s ' ad res se à ceux qui exercent ces professions fortement appréciées 
sur l e marché des emplois secondai res . Dans l e second ca s , l e s a c t i v i t é s 
secondaires sont d i f f é r en t e s des a c t i v i t é s p r inc ipa les car la demande de 
t r ava i l est i n s i g n i f i a n t e ou n u l l e sur l e marché des emplois m u l t i p l e s . Les 
seconds emplois sont a lo r s exercés dans des a c t i v i t é s néce s s i t an t peu de q u a l i ­
f i ca t ion ou pour c e r t a i n s dans une a c t i v i t é dont les compétences nécessa i r e s 
ont été acquises sur l e t a s . On peut t r è s bien imaginer un " learn ing by doing" 
des t i t u l a i r e s d 'emplois m u l t i p l e s . 
Pour terminer sur l e Royaume­Uni, on peut mentionner une étude 
de BROWN, LEVIN, ROSA et ULPH où les conséquences f i s ca l e s de la p l u r i ­ a c t i v i t é 
ont é té estimées (*) . 
Sous l es hypothèses que la somme de tous les revenus des seconds 
emplois représente 0,8% de la somme de tous les revenus des emplois pr incipaux, 
et que les 2/3 des revenus obtenus grâce aux a c t i v i t é s mul t ip les ne sont 
pas déc la rés , la pe r t e d'impôt pour l e Trésor e s t évaluée à 1% des r e c e t t e s 
globales de l ' impôt sur l e revenu. I l convient tou tefo is de remarquer que les 
d o u b l e ­ a c t i v i t é s ne s e r a i e n t probablement pas ce q u ' e l l e s sont s i tous les 
revenus é t a i en t déc l a ré s . Tous les travaux r e l a t i f s à la l i a i s o n entre offre 
de t r ava i l e t f i s c a l i t é i n s i s t e n t en e f fe t sur la r a t i o n a l i t é des cont r ibuables 
qui les pousse à trouver l a quan t i t é maximale de t r a v a i l q u ' i l s sont p r ê t s à 
fourn i r , compte tenu des taux marginaux d ' imposi t ion en vigueur . 
­ En ITALIE, l ' impor tance du phénomène e s t considérable ca r , selon 
l e s régions , de 15% à 20% des personnes employées occupent une deuxième a c t i v i t é 
à p le in temps. La place de la s o u s ­ t r a i t a n c e es t e s s e n t i e l l e e t les e n t r e p r i s e s 
sont les p r inc ipa le s b é n é f i c i a i r e s de ces embauches car e l l e s contournent les 
textes qui protègent les t r a v a i l l e u r s employés à t i t r e p r i n c i p a l . Les t i t u l a i r e s 
d'un second emploi sont pour l e u r par t déjà assurés socialement et les revenus 
q u ' i l s gagnent en t r a v a i l l a n t , souvent à domicile, l eu r permettent de compenser 
la f a i b l e s s e r e l a t i v e de leur s a l a i r e p r i n c i p a l . 
Entre l eu r première a c t i v i t é e t l eur second emploi, i l y a généra­
lement une r e l a t i o n t r è s é t r o i t e q u ' i l · s ' ag i s se d'une a c t i v i t é manuelle ( f a b r i ­
cat ion de jouets , d ' a r t i c l e s de q u i n c a i l l e r i e , de produi ts t e x t i l e s , d ' a r t i c l e s 
(*) C.V. BROWN, E.J. LEVIN, P.J. ROSA and D.T. ULPH : "Tax Evasion and Avoidance 
ση Earned Income : some Survey Evidence", Fiscal Studies, Vol 5, n°Z, 1984, 
pages 1 à 22. 
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de c o n f e c t i o n ) ou d ' u n e a c t i v i t é i n t e l l e c t u e l l e ( c o m p t a b i l i t é , c o n s e i l s j u r i -
d iques e t f i s c a u x ! ! . . . , l e çons p a r t i c u l i è r e s ) . 
La deuxième a c t i v i t é se d é r o u l e géné ra l emen t a p r è s l e s h e u r e s 
o f f i c i e l l e s de t r a v a i l , p e n d a n t l e s week-ends e t l e s j o u r s de " c o n g é - m a l a d i e " (*) 
Une ment ion p a r t i c u l i è r e e s t tou jours f a i t e , dans l a l i t t é r a t u r e , 
pour l e s f ene t i c n n a i r e s . Ceux-c i a u r a i e n t p a s s é avec l ' E t a t une s o r t e de 
" c o n t r a t i m p l i c i t e " au sens de l a t h é o r i e c o n t e m p o r a i n e de l ' e m p l o i au terme 
d u q i e l l e s s a l a i r e s s o n t r e l a t i v e m e n t modes tes mais l ' h o r a i r e de t r a v a i l e s t 
b loqué de 8 h e u r e s du ma t in à 2 h e u r e s de l ' a p r è s - m i d i ( " o r a r i o u n i c o " ) . Les 
f o n c t i o n n a i r e s ont a i n s i l a p o s s i b i l i t é d ' e x e r c e r t o u t e s l e s a p r è s - m i d i s 
une deuxième a c t i v i t é . 
I l f a u t i n s i s t e r s u r l e f a i t que l e s t r a v a i l l e u r s qu i occupent deux 
emplois en I t a l i e l e f o n t de façon p l u s s t r u c t u r e l l e eue c o n j o n c t u r e l l e . 87,6% 
de ceux qui cnt un second emploi permanent o n t éga lement u n e a c t i v i t é p r i n c i -
p a l e p e r m a n e n t e . Par c o n t r e , l a durée hebdomadai re du t r a v a i l p r i n c i p a l e s t 
i nve r semen t r e l i é e au taux de p a r t i c i p a t i o n à une a c t i v i t é s e c o n d a i r e . 
DISTRIBUTION DE LA POPULATION QUI A UNE 
ACTIVITE SECONDAIRE EN FONCTION DE 
LA DUREE HEBDOMADAIRE DU TRAVAIL 
DANS L'ACTIVITE PRINCIPALE (**) 
Moins de 10 h 
I0h à 19h 
20h à 29h 
30h à 39h 
40h à 49h 
50h à 59h 
60h e t + 
A c t i v i t é p r i n c i 
1,4% 
4,7% 
8,7% 
11,7% 
52,1% 
12,4% 
9,7% 
p a l e popul a t i en a y a n t une 
a c t i v i t é s e c o n d a i r e 
22,1% 
30,4% 
18,4% 
11,4% 
10,6% 
4,2% 
2,9% 
(*) Quand une absence est inférieure à trois jours, le travailleur ne subit vas 
d'amputation de son salaire et est en outre dispensé de produire un certificat 
médical. Cf : Gabriele GAETANI d'ARAGONA : "The Hidden Economy : Concealed 
Labor Market in Italy", Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche et 
Commerciali, Anno 28, n°Z, marzo 1981, page 27Z. 
(**) C.E.N.S.I.S. : L'occupazione occulta. Caratteristiche delle partecipazione 
al lavoro in Italia, C.E.N.S.I.S., Roma, 1976, page 45. 
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Le modèle "italien" de pluri-activité, celui qui a fait dire à 
NANNEI qu'il y avait coexistence "d'un secteur productif avancé, de niveau 
européen, et un secteur paléo-capitaliste" (*), est aujourd'hui en train de se 
modifier à une allure très rapide. 
Dans les années 70, l'agriculture offrait la majorité des emplois 
secondaires et la majorité des travailleurs qui exerçaient un second emploi ; 
dans les années 80, la plupart des emplois secondaires se trouvent dans les 
services et le "moonlighter" type est un salarié qui exerce sa deuxième activité 
en tant que travailleur indépendant. 
Dans les années 70, les titulaires d'emplois multiples étaient 
principalement des personnes pauvres, qui exerçaient à titre secondaire, et 
souvent à domicile, une activité manuelle ; dans les années 80, le moonlighting 
des cadres se développe, une demande de personnes qualifiées dans le domaine 
des services apparaît sur le marché des emplois multiples. 
Dans les années 70, les travailleurs qui oeuvraient à titre secon-
daire étaient employés avec des salaires de misère par des petites entreprises, 
elles-mêmes sous-traitantes de grandes firmes ; dans les années 80, les gens 
acquièrent des besoins nouveaux, les goûts se modifient, les femmes abandonnent 
leur place traditionnelle dans les travaux ménagers et dans l'activité à façon 
à domicile, leurs activités multiples sont au confluent de leur désir d'accroitre 
leur consommation et de leur contrainte de revenu principal. 
Dans les années 70, le travailleur multiple était salarié dans son 
deuxième emploi ; dans les années 80, il devient entrepreneur individuel. 
Ces mutations sociales ne se traduisent pas forcément par une décrois-
sance des activités multiples, elles se manifestent par une modification de leur 
nature et par un rapprochement de ses formes avec celles qu'elles revêtent 
dans la plupart des autres pays européens. 
- Dans les autres pays de la Communauté, les activités multiples 
ont peut-être fait l'objet de moins de développements. 
En France, l'enquête-emploi, source d'information statistique majeure 
sur le marché du travail, privilégie l'activité principale. Seule une annexe 
(*) Alessandra NANNEI : "L'économie souterraine en Italie et ses effets pervers 
sur la statistique", Problèmes économiques, n°1690, septembre 1980, page 32. 
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étudie les activités secondaires, mais uniquement pour les inactifs et les 
multiactifs agricoles. 
En Allemagne Fédérale et en Belgique, la majorité des personnes 
qui travaillent au noir sont des salariés. Ils relèvent donc par définition 
d'une approche en terme d'emplois multiples. Ce qui différencie ces deux pays, 
c'est la motivation qui pousse le marché des emplois multiples à se développer. 
Dans le cas de -l'Allemagne Fédérale, l'argument le plus répandu est 
celui de la réglementation à laquelle les firmes sont soumises, dans le cas 
de la Belgique, c'est celui de la fiscalité sur les personnes. A la lumière de 
ces propositions d'explication, il semble que l'offre soit motrice en Allemagne 
Fédérale et que ce soit la demande en Belgique. 
Aux Pays-Bas, où le travail au noir concernerait 1 200 000 personnes 
soit environ 12% de la population active, pour une activité au noir correspondant 
à 100 000 emplois à plein temps, les personnes employées et qualifiées auraient 
un taux de participation plus élevé aux activités secondaires que les personnes 
employées et moins qualifiées (*). Ce résultat irait dans le sens de ce qui 
est constaté dans les autres pays-membres de la Communauté. 
En conclusion, le modèle communautaire de pluri-activité dans les 
secteurs secondaire et tertiaire peut être résumé par un tableau à double 
entrée, où apparaissent les degrés de qualification des travailleurs et les 
motivations de la pluri-activité. Lorsque la fiscalité est déterminante, l'ini-
tiative revient généralement aux travailleurs qui développent une stratégie 
de participation axée sur le travail indépendant. Ils proposent leurs services 
à des donneurs d'ouvrage qui les embauchent à un prix fixé pour une prestation 
déterminée. Lorsque la réglementation est la motivation principale, c'est 
souvent l'entreprise qui prend l'initiative de l'embauche, et la modalité adoptée 
varie selon les contextes : soit celle du salariat (heures supplémentaires, 
sous-traitance), soit celle du partenariat entre firme et travailleur indépen-
dant (contrats de recherche, services informatiques ou de traduction, travail 
à domicile). 
Les travailleurs qualifiés sont de plus en plus nombreux à avoir 
des activités multiples, en particulier les cadres et les professions libérales. 
(*) Robert VAN ECK and Brugt KAZEMIER : "Features of the Hidden Economy in the 
Netherlands", Paper presented at the IARIW Meeting, Roma, august 1987, 
page 37 en particulier. 
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Ils sont désormais recherchés pour leurs compétences propres alors 
que c'était le quasi-monopole des travailleurs manuels qualifiés il y a une 
décennie. Les travailleurs qui ne disposent pas des qualifications requises 
pour être demandés par des firmes ou appelés par des ménages doivent, pour leur 
part, se spécialiser dans une profession différente de la leur, s'ils veulent 
obtenir un deuxième emploi. 
Le modèle européen est donc caractérisé par des modalités à géométrie 
variable ; c'est moins un clivage fondé sur les pays qu'une partition en fonction 
de critères objectifs qui permet de le décrire. 
Notons, pour terminer, que globalement les personnes qui exercent 
plusieurs activités ont un deuxième emploi très lié à leur première activité. 
La profession est généralement la même, fût-ce pour être appliquée 
à une activité relevant d'une branche différente. 
Nous avons pris la liberté d'isoler la pluri-activité dans l'agri-
culture des emplois multiples dans l'industrie et les services. Même si des 
paysans réparent à titre secondaire des machines agricoles ou aident leurs 
voisins à construire leur résidence secondaire, les activités agricoles sont, 
à nos yeux, spécifiques car les pointes saisonnières y ont une place essentielle. 
Dans ces conditions, les emplois multiples des agriculteurs comme 
l'embauche de travailleurs saisonniers dans l'agriculture, apparaissent davantage 
rythmés par la nature des activités agricoles que par des considérations purement 
économiques. 
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§2 : LA PLURI-ACTIVITE DANS L'AGRICULTURE 
L'enquête sur la structure des exploitations agricoles dans la 
Conmunauté donne une série d'informations sur la pluri-activité dans l'agriculture 
pour 10 pays (*). Les données disponibles concernent aussi bien les exploitants 
que leur conjoint et les autres membres de leur, famille. 
• 
ALLEMAGNE Féd. 
FRANCE 
ITALIE 
PAYS-BAS 
BELGIQUE 
LUXEMBOURG 
ROYAUME-UNI 
IRLANDE 
DANEMARK 
GRECE 
Exploitants agrico 
(**) 
43,1% 
32,5% 
29,4% 
19,3% 
32,5% 
18,9% 
24,6% 
24,9% 
34,0% 
39,5% 
les conjoints 
7,1% 
25,4% 
16,6% 
1 ,1% 
8,9% 
3,8% 
18,0% 
29,6% 
30,7% 
9,0% 
autres 
26,5% 
33,1% 
38,0% 
5,0% 
12,2% 
2,2% 
22,1% 
45,6% 
0,0% 
28,7% 
Si l'analyse de ce tableau montre des disparités importantes d'un 
pays à l'autre tant pour les exploitants agricoles que pour leur conjoint et 
les autres membres de leur famille, c'est en raison du caractère très global 
des estimations proposées. Avec une approche plus détaillée, ces données sont 
amendées et une attitude "européenne" des exploitants agricoles peut être 
dégagée. 
(*) Eurostat : Structure des exploitations : enquête de 1983 : principaux 
résultats, Eurostat, Luxembourg, pages 52 et 53. Des résultats sont proposés 
pour 10 pays, l'Espagne et le Portugal étant exclus de l'analyse. 
(**) Proportion d'exploitants agricoles ayant une autre activité lucrative. 
(*f) Proportion de conjoints d'exploitants agricoles ayant une autre activité 
lucrative. 
(**) Proportion d'autres membres de la famille de l'exploitant agricole ayant 
une autre activité lucrative. 
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En premier lieu, la proportion d'exploitants qui ont une autre 
activité lucrative décroit lorsque la taille des exploitations mesurée en 
hectares s'accroît. Une relation de même nature est par ailleurs observée lorsque 
la variable dévient la dimension économique de l'exploitation. Ce dernier 
calcul a pour objet de tenir compte des disparités de taille d'exploitation 
en fonction de la nature des activités agricoles qui y sont réalisées (élevage, 
céréales, maraîchage, viticulture, etc.). 
Sans que les sens de variation ne soient altérés, deux pays semblent 
avoir un comportement atypique de par l'importance des autres activités lucra-
tives des exploitants : la France et le Danemark. Dans le cas de la France, 
20% des exploitants agricoles dont l'exploitation dépasse 50 ha déclarent avoir 
une autre activité lucrative et 29,3% de ceux qui ont une exploitation dont 
la taille exède 40 unités de dimension économique ont le même comportement. Dans 
le cas du Danemark, les pourcentages correspondant sont respectivement de 27% 
et de 23,4%. 
Si, en second lieu, on tient compte du temps de travail passé sur 
l'exploitation, on observe une relation fonctionnelle compatible avec les pré-
cédentes. Pour tous les pays, les autres activités lucratives baissent lorsque 
le temps passé sur l'exploitation agricole s'élève. Là encore, la France et 
le Danemark sont dans une situation atypique, non pas en raison d'une tendance 
inversée, mais en raison de l'importance considérable des exploitants qui 
passent 100% du temps nécessaire sur leur exploitation et qui ont en parallèle 
une autre activité lucrative (22,3% des exploitants en France et 19,2% au 
Danemark). 
Pour tenter d'expliquer les particularités des exploitants agricoles 
français et danois, quatre propositions peuvent être avancées : il se peut tout 
d'abord que les questionnaires qui ont été proposés en France et au Danemark 
ne soient pas exactement compatibles avec ceux qui ont été proposés dans les 
autres pays. On sait, en effet, que les exploitants-agricoles peuvent avoir 
des autres activités lucratives de deux nature : des activités complémentaires 
et des activités annexes (principales ou accessoires). Le cas des activités 
complémentaires est intéressant car il se réfère à tout ce qui est lié à la 
valorisation de la production agricole (être membre d'une coopérative, d'un 
groupement d'achat, etc.). C'est en France quelque chose de fréquent, en parti-
culier pour les gros exploitants. 
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La deuxième explication concerne plus particulièrement les effets 
pervers de la politique agricole, qui sont susceptibles de fausser les statis-
tiques. Dans le cas de la France, par exemple, deux régions ont un taux de pluri-
activité très supérieur à la moyenne nationale : le Languedoc-Roussillon et 
l'Alsace. Les viticulteurs languedociens et alsaciens qui bénéficient d'aides 
importantes conservent leur statut d'exploitant-agricole, même si leur activité 
principale n'est plus dans l'agriculture. 
La troisième explication concerne plus spécifiquement le Danemark 
où, quelles que soient les dimensions économiques des exploitations, le taux 
d'exploitants pluri-actifs est très supérieur aux moyennes européennes. En 
présence d'une agriculture très mécanisée et d'une productivité globale des 
facteurs élevée, le temps dégagé par les exploitants-agricoles pour s'adonner 
à des activités annexes peut être important. 
Enfin, il ne faut pas sous-estimer un autre effet pervers dû aux 
statistiques : le nombre de salariés agricoles qui possèdent en compte propre 
une exploitation. Ces derniers sont comptabilisés comme exploitants alors qu'ils 
ont simultanément (et souvent pour un revenu supérieur) le statut de salariés. 
En faisant le rapport salariés agricoles sur population salariée, on trouve 
pour les pays de notre échantillon, les proportions suivantes : Italie 7,7%, 
Danemark 2,3%, Irlande 2,1% et France 2,0% ; les autres pays ayant une part 
de salariés agricoles négligeable, moins de 1,2% (*). Sous l'hypothèse que les 
salariés agricoles italiens et irlandais sont proportionnellement moins nombreux 
que les salariés agricoles danois et français à être simultanément exploitants, 
on a une tentative d'explication supplémentaire de l'anomalie constatée. 
Si l'on envisage la pluriactivité des conjoints des exploitants, 
on observe également de grosses disparités entre les pays, disparités expliquées 
par la nature principale ou secondaire des autres activités lucratives. La 
France est ici le seul cas atypique car 26,5% des conjoints seulement exercent 
à titre principal leur seconde activité, la moyenne européenne étant supérieure 
à 63%. L'explication de cette anomalie réside dans le modèle de l'exploitation 
familiale qui est largement dominant en France, le conjoint a une activité 
d'appoint en tant qu'aide familiale ou·en tant que personne classée inactive (**). 
(*) Nos calculs ont été fait à partir des Statistiques de la population active 
OCDE-,. Paris, 1983. Pour l'Espagne et le Portugal, les pourcentages sont 
respectivement 9% et 7, 7% 
'(**) Elisabeth REGNIER : "La pluriactivité en agriculture en 1981", Archives 
et Documents, n°159, avril 1986, page 15. 
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En terminant par les activités lucratives des autres membres de 
la famille, on est amené a constater d'une part qu'elles concernent principale-
ment des jeunes de moins de 25 ans qui n'ont pas encore quitté le foyer familial 
et d'autre part qu'elles sont effectuées à titre principal par plus de 87% des 
jeunes européens. Là encore, le pourcentage plus faible qui caractérise la 
France (56,2%) est expliqué par le mode de production très familial dont ce 
pays a la particularité. 
S'agissant, pour finir des activités lucratives effectuées par 
les pluri-actifs agricoles, les mêmes professions significatives sont toujours 
recensées, qu'il s'agisse des agriculteurs exploitants, de leur conjoint ou 
des autres membres de leur famille : ouvriers, salariés agricoles, exploitants-
agricoles sur une autre exploitation et inactifs. 
Dans le cas de l'Espagne, les tendances relevées par MIGUELEZ LOBO 
ne contredisent pas les principales conclusions qui viennent d'être dégagées (*) 
Notons toutefois d'une part que parmi les activités lucratives des 
paysans espagnols, la place du tourisme semble particulièrement importante et 
d'autre part que le travail à temps partiel dans l'agriculture est une forme 
d'emploi qui a tendance à connaître un développement rapide. 
Ces deux dernières remarques nous invitent à critiquer la dichotomie 
de présentation entre pluriactivité agricole et pluriactivité non-agricole. Il 
n'y a pas deux modèles séparés mais plutôt une zone frontière à l'intérieur de 
laquelle des actifs agricoles travaillent à titre secondaire dans les secteurs 
non agricoles et des actifs non-agricoles oeuvrent à titre accessoire dans 
1'agriculture. 
Il arrive parfois que la zone frontière forme à elle seule un modèle 
spécifique d'activité où les productions agricoles et non agricoles s'imbriquent 
de telle façon qu'il n'est pas possible d'isoler clairement ce qui relève de 
l'une ou l'autre activité productive. 
(*) rauito MIGUELEZ LOSO : "Thz ln(¡oxmal Economy ¿n Spain", documznt dz fvavall 
O.G. I/, I9tt. 
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La situation observée dans les iles grecques illustre parfaitement 
ce modèle car on note une véritable symbiose entre agriculture et tourisme. Les 
insulaires délaissent les cultures traditionnelles au profit d'une production 
agricole dont la finalité est entièrement dévolue à la satisfaction des besoins 
des touristes (kiwis, avocats, ...) 
Pour que les mêmes personnes puissent produire des biens agricoles 
et accueillir les touristes en leur vendant, au noir, leur production, des 
cultures nécessitant une main d'oeuvre importante en période estivale ont été 
abandonnées au profit de cultures - éventuellement moins productives - mais 
permettant aux habitants d'exercer leur double activité. 
Sans forcément que cela conduise à un effet d'éviction entre productions 
les cas de paysans qui vendent directement leurs produits sans transiter par les 
circuits officiels de distribution ou de personnes qui offrent des logements 
chez l'habitant, sont de plus en plus nombreux. Il suffit d'arpenter les routes 
européennes pendant les mois d'été pour mesurer l'étendue de cette pluriactivité 
saisonnière. 
En conclusion, la pluri-activité dans l'agriculture est un phénomène 
général, lié étroitement à la taille économique des exploitations, aux traditions 
locales et à la nature saisonnière des activités. Il va de soi que les actifs 
agricoles qui ont une activité secondaire l'exercent en priorité pendant les 
périodes calmes : l'agriculture est excédentaire en main d'oeuvre durant ces 
périodes et la pluri-activité des agriculteurs s'exerce avec une intensité 
maximale. A l'inverse, l'agriculture est globalement déficitaire en main d'oeuvre 
pendant les périodes de récolte, de vendanges ou de cueillette. La pluri-activité 
concerne alors les actifs non agricoles qui sont embauchés dans l'agriculture 
à titre de travailleurs saisonniers, le plus souvent en n'étant pas déclarés (*) 
(*) A titre de pure illustration, on peut faire allusion à une production 
agricole qui n'existerait pas s'il n'y avait pas de travail au noir. On a 
calculé que dans le département du Vaucluse (sud de la France), le prix de 
vente sur les marchés de gros d'un kilo de cerises ne couvrait pas le coût 
du ramassage d'un kilo de fruits si, compte tenu de la productivité moyenne 
d'une personne qui cueille, cette dernière était rémunérée selon les normes 
fiscales et sociales en vigueur 
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Parvenu au terme de cet examen de la double­activité des personnes 
employées, les situations respectives des chômeurs et des inactifs doivent 
être tour à tour analysées, c'est à cette tâche que nos prochains développements 
sont consacrés, 
§3 : LE TRAVAIL AU NOIR DES CHOMEURS 
S'il est difficile de prendre une position manichéenne sur ce sujet 
très controversé, la thèse selon laquelle les chômeurs sont placés dans une 
situation moins favorable que les personnes employées pour travailler au noir 
parait la plus facile à défendre. 
A l'appui de la thèse opposée, on trouve des arguments théoriques 
et des myriades d'articles de journaux, mais si dans leur contexte, les théories 
économiques ont une signification, les articles de presse sont destinés à 
frapper les imaginations et à simplifier la réalité d'une façon souvent outran­
cière. 
Comment accepter des arguments aussi stupides que ceux que l'on 
rencontre parfois ? Il y a χ millions de travailleurs au noir, il y a y millions 
de chômeurs, donc en l'absence de travailleurs au noir, le nombre de chômeurs 
serait égal à (y­x) milliers de personnes ! Ce genre de syllogisme rélève 
de la manipulation de l'opinion et il ne faut accorder aucun crédit aux journa­
listes qui écrivent ou qui laissent publier des raisonnements aussi primaires 
et fallacieux. 
Toutes les enquêtes sur le travail au noir des chômeurs montrent 
que les emplois qu'ils occupent relèvent davantage des petits boulots occasionnels 
que des emplois à plein temps. Il n'y a pas de concurrence entre demandeurs 
d'emplois stables et chômeurs travaillant au noir, par contre, sur le marché 
des petites activités occasionnelles pour compte d'autrui, les chômeurs indem­
nisés qui ne souhaitent pas perdre leurs allocations pour obtenir en échange 
un emploi précaire peuvent entrer en concurrence avec des jeunes qui recherchent 
une première expérience professionnelle, fût­elle temporaire, mal rémunérée 
et à horaires réduits. 
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Les cas de chômeurs indemnisés qui ont une activité rémunérée 
accessoire sont assez fréquents dans tous les pays membres. En France, une marge 
de liberté est accordée aux chômeurs, en Allemagne Fédérale, les chômeurs ont 
la possibilité de travailler, mais les revenus qu'ils obtiennent sont imposables 
à des taux marginaux très dissuasifs. 
Evoquer de telles possibilités légales n'est pas suffisant pour 
induire que les chômeurs qui le désirent peuvent avoir une petite activité. 
Les études qui ont été faites expriment l'idée inverse, à savoir 
que les chômeurs forment le groupe le moins favorisé pour accéder à des petits 
boulots de cette nature. La majeure partie des activités informelles est le 
fait de personnes employées qui bénéficient de l'infrastructure matérielle et 
des relations nécessaires à la "signature" d'un contrat de travail au noir. 
Une personne sans emploi ne bénéficie pas de l'environnement adapté 
pour travailler au noir. Elle ne rencontre pas de collègues de travail, de 
fournisseurs, de clients ; elle ne peut pas emprunter à son employeur, avec 
ou sans son assentiment, le matériel requis pour ses activités occultes. Un 
chômeur qui n'a jamais travaillé au noir pendant sa période antérieure d'activité 
aura d'immenses difficultés pour s'insérer dans un réseau de petits boulots. Un 
chômeur qui avait l'habitude de bricoler pour le compte d'autrui avant son 
passage au chômage pourra, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, mieux "résister" ; 
sa clientèle au noir préexistant à son chômage. 
L'idée maitresse du travail au noir des chômeurs consiste à poser 
que le chômage peut réactiver des réseaux en sommeil mais pas créer des réseaux 
ex nihilo. 
Si l'on recense les statistiques disponibles force est de constater 
que ce phénomène caractérise tous les pays membres. 
- En France, une enquête sur les chômeurs de longue durée dans la 
région lilloise montre que 61% des personnes qui travaillaient au noir avant 
de devenir chômeuses continuent à pratiquer ce type d'activité avec une intensité 
supérieure ou égale. Sur celles qui n'avaient pas d'activités multiples avant 
leur chômage, 29% seulement ont commencé à travailler au noir une fois qu'elles 
ont eu perdu leur emploi (*). 
(*) R. FOUDI, F. STANKIEWICZ et N. VANEECLOO : "Les chômeurs et l'économie 
informelle", in Travail noir, productions domestiques et entraide, Cahiers 
de l'Observation au Changement Social, Vol 17, CNRS, Paris, 1982. 
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- Au Royaume-Uni, l'étude menée par PAHL et WALLACE sur l'ile de 
Sheppey aboutit à une conclusion de même nature : "Ceux qui ont un emploi dans 
le secteur formel sont mieux placés pour trouver des activités supplémentaires, 
aussi bien dans le secteur formel que dans le secteur informel. Ceux qui sont 
chômeurs ont moins d'opportunité qu'il s'agisse de trouver un emploi dans le 
secteur légal ou illégal ; en outre, la crainte de perdre leurs allocations-
chômage ne les incite pas à accepter du travail" (*). 
- Au Pays-Bas, l'enquête sur le travail au noir réalisée par VAN ECK 
et KAZEMIER débouche sur des assertions voisines (**). Les opportunités d'obten-
tion de revenus dans le secteur informel sont d'autant plus importantes que 
les revenus perçus dans le secteur formel sont élevés. A contrario, les chômeurs 
qui n/ont d'autres revenus officiels que leurs allocations ne peuvent gagner 
au noir des sommes conséquentes. 
- En Belgique, GINSBURGH et PESTIEAU mettent en évidence une argumen-
tation qui va dans le même sens dans la conclusion de leur recueil de textes 
sur l'économie informelle : "En utilisant une approche macroéconomique, GEEROMS 
et MONT montrent que l'augmentation du chômage ne semble pas influencer 
l'évolution du travail au noir ; dans leur enquête GINSBURGH, PERELMAN et 
PESTIEAU ne décèlent pas de participation plus importante au travail au noir 
de la part des chômeurs et des inactifs que du reste de la population. Il y a 
là des conclusions similaires, fournies par deux approches complètement indépen-
dantes et basées sur des prémisses différentes" (**). 
(*) Raymond E. PAHL : "Does Jobless mean Workless ? Unemployment and Informal 
Work", Annals of the American Academy of Social Science, September 1987, 
page 46. 
(**) Robert VAN ECK and Brugt KAZEMIER : "Features of the Hidden Economy in 
the Netherlands", Paper presented at the IARIW Meeting, Roma, august 1987. 
(**) Victor GINSBURGH et Pierre PESTIEAU : "Conclusions", in l'Economie infor-
melle, éditions Labor, Bruxelles, 1987, pages 184. 
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­ En Italie, MINGIONE précise que le travail régulier des chômeurs 
en tant que salariés ou en tant que travailleurs indépendants est pratiquement· 
inexistant ; s'agissant des activités informelles exercées de façon occasionnelle 
certains chômeurs seraient concernés mais les revenus obtenus ne formeraient 
qu'une infime partie des revenus informels, les titulaires d'emplois multiples 
en étant les principaux bénéficiaires (*). 
­ Pour quatre pays (Allemagne Fédérale, Royaume­Uni, Canada et Etats­
Unis), O'HIGGINS a estimé l'économie souterraine en fonction de variables 
indépendantes : le PNB, le chômage et les prix (**). Alors que les tailles 
respectives des secteurs formels et informels sont parfaitement córreles, il 
n'y a pas de corrélation claire entre chômage et économie souterraine. On peut 
en déduire, avec les réserves dues à la méthode, que les titulaires d'emplois 
multiples ne déclarent pas tous les revenus de leur deuxième activité et que 
les chômeurs ne participent pas de façon significative à la croissance du 
secteur informel. 
Pour terminer sur ce point, nous pouvons relever deux phrases de la 
conclusion d'une étude consacrée à l'emploi caché dans les pays de l'OCDE : "Les 
chômeurs, en particulier ceux qui sont sans emploi depuis longtemps, ont un 
niveau de qualification ou de formation relativement faible et n'ont guère 
de relations sociales. Ils semblent donc particulièrement mal placés pour 
trouver un emploi dissimulé" (*!*)■ 
Parallèlement à ces situations nationales, il importe de considérer 
le statut du chômage dans les différents pays­membres pour mieux appréhender 
le travail au noir des chômeurs. Dans les pays nord­européens où le niveau 
des allocations­chômage est globalement important, le risque d'être dénoncé ou 
(*) Enzo MINGIONE : "Preliminary literature exploration on Informal work divided 
into significant typologies : the case of Italy", document de travail, D.G. V, 
March 1987. 
(**) Michael O'HIGGINS : "The Relationship between the Formal and Hidden 
Economies : an Exploratory Analysis for four Countries", in Wulf GAERTNER 
and Alois WENIG eds, The Economics of the Shadow Economy, Springer Verlag, 
Berlin, 1985, pages 127 à 143. 
(*¿) O.E.C.D. : Employment Outlook, (chapter III, Concealed Employment), O.E. CD., 
Paris, September 1986, page 77. 
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surpris par les services de contrôle ad hoc est particulièrement lourd de consé­
quences. Perdre le bénéfice d'une allocation, c'est dans ce cas perdre l'équi­
valent d'un revenu principal et peu de chômeurs s'engagent dans le travail au 
noir, indépendamment du degré de facilité plus ou moins grand de trouver un 
emploi clandestin. 
Dans les pays sud­européens où, toujours globalement, le niveau des 
indemnités est plus modeste, les chômeurs ont, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, 
moins à perdre en cas de dénonciation ou de contrôle ; ils sont donc davantage 
incités à se porter offreurs de travail au noir (*). 
Notons enfin.que le chômage dans un pays quelconque n'est pas un 
concept qui recouvre une réalité uniforme. En fonction de paramètres comme le 
sexe, l'âge, la durée du chômage, la fréquence des passages au chômage, 
l'efficacité de la recherche d'emploi, etc. les motivations face au phénomène 
du travail au noir peuvent revêtir toute la palette des intensités. Dans un 
environnement aussi complexe, il ne faut pas oublier qu'en dépit des clivages, 
fussent­ils indispensables à l'analyse, la décision de se porter offreur de 
travail au noir est purement personnelle. 
Si les chômeurs sont globalement moins "favorisés" que les actifs 
employés pour avoir une activité parallèle, on peut isoler deux groupes au sein 
de la population qui travaille au noir en fonction du degré d'intensité de leur 
participation. Il y a ceux, majoritaires, qui ont une activité souterraine 
Czttz partition Nord/Sud nz ¿lgnl(,lz ραλ quz tout, IZA chômzuiA alznt de¿ 
compoitzmzntA homogznzA. A tüUiz d'zxzmplz, IZA "tsiavalllzulA" ItallznA 
qui bíné&lclznt dzA pKZAtatlonA de la "CoAAa Intzgnjxzlonz Guadagni" zt qui 
pzAcolvznt au molm t0% dz IzuA ΑΟΙΟΙΛΖ antírlzuA. pAznnznt un gxoA KlAquz 
en travaillant au noln.. Ce filAquz ZAt ¿vldzmmznt {¡onction dz l'Impoitancz 
dzA contKôlzA. 
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accessoire qui leur rapporte des revenus faibles ou insignifiants et qui tra-
vaillent au noir de façon intermittente. 
Il y a ceux minoritaires, qui font de leurs activités clandestines 
une véritable profession. Des traces de telles situations sont visibles dans 
certaines études où l'on observe une variance très élevée dans le nombre d'heures 
de travail effectuées au noir par les chômeurs. Ceci est en particulier le cas 
dans certaines régions d'Italie ou d'Espagne (*). 
Parmi les facteurs explicatifs des handicaps qu'ont les chômeurs 
pour travailler au noir et en retirer des revenus substantiels, nous avons 
jusqu'ici privilégié des variables propres aux chômeurs eux-mêmes : ils sont 
exclus de la société, ils craignent de perdre leurs allocations, ils ne béné-
ficient plus de l'infrastructure que leur apporte bon gré, mal gré leur entre-
prise. A ces facteurs purement"internes", il convient d'ajouter des explications 
"externes" qui tiennent à l'environnement économique et social des chômeurs. 
On peut à cet égard développer trois cas de figure en fonction du 
degré d'adéquation entre offre et demande de travail au noir. Sous l'hypothèse 
provisoire que les coûts de recherche d'information sont faibles tant pour les 
chômeurs que pour les donneurs d'ouvrage, la première situation est celle d'un équi-
libre sur le marché du travail au noir des chômeurs. Les chômeurs qui le désirent 
trouvent au taux de salaire au noir d'équilibre des travaux à effectuer. A 
l'image de ce que l'on observe dans le modèle néo-classique, les chômeurs qui 
n'acceptent pas de travailler au noir au taux de salaire au noir courant, sont 
des chômeurs qui volontairement refusent de travailler au noir. Dans ce premier 
modèle, le chômage au noir des chômeurs est un chômage volontaire, ce chômage 
caractérise le plein emploi sur le marché du travail au noir des chômeurs. 
La deuxième situation exprime un rationnement des chômeurs qui veulent 
travailler au noir. En cas de chômage massif, la réduction des revenus de tous 
les agents - chômeurs ou pas - conduit les donneurs d'ouvrage à réduire leur 
demande de travail. Par la combinaison traditionnelle d'un effet de substitu-
tion (le bricolage pour compte propre remplace la demande de prestations au noir) 
et d'un effet revenu (contrainte pour les donneurs d'ouvrage) les demandeurs 
(*) Cf Raffaele DE GRAZIA : Le travail clandestin, BIT, Genève, 1983, page 17. 
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de travail réduisent l'embauche au noir des chômeurs. Ces derniers, qui ne 
trouvent pas de débouchés, sont contraints de rester inactifs. Dans ce deuxième 
modèle, le chômage au noir des chômeurs est un chômage involontaire qui traduit 
un rationnement de l'offre sur le marché du travail au noir des chômeurs. 
La troisième situation serait celle d'un rationnement des donneurs 
d'ouvrage, les chômeurs qui seraient prêts à travailler au noir auraient en face 
d'eux une demande quasi­illimitée de travaux à réaliser et le taux de salaire 
au noir des chômeurs serait élevé. On peut imaginer un seuil ou une limite à 
cette flexibilité à la hausse du taux de salaire au noir, celui qui résulterait 
des démissions volontaires des personnes employées qui préféreraient le statut 
de chômeurs travailleurs au noir à celui de personnes employées, fût­ce avec 
une activité multiple. Marché du travail officiel et marché du travail au noir 
sont, dans toutes les hypothèses évoquées, interdépendants (*). 
Il va de soi .que l'hypothèse d'absence de coûts d'information doit 
maintenant être levée. Quelle que soit la situation sur le marché du travail 
au noir des chômeurs, les coûts de recherche sont extrêmement élevés, en 
particulier pour les chômeurs qui ne disposent plus des occasions de contact 
avec des donneurs d'ouvrage. Les coûts de recherche d'information sont tellement 
plus élevés pour les chômeurs que pour les personnes employées, que toutes 
les enquêtes se rejoignent pour montrer que la participation aux activités au 
noir est plus importante pour les actifs employés que pour les chômeurs. 
Que l'on soit sur un marché du travail au noir en équilibre ou en 
déséquilibre, les pluriactifs sont toujours "favorisés" par rapport aux chômeurs, 
Telle est la conclusion principale de ces développements sur le travail au noir 
des chômeurs. 
(*) Trois modèles théoriques développent, chacun dans leur contexte., propre, une 
argumentation comparable : 
Jean­Pierre GIRAN : "Analyse théorique de l'ajustement déguisé", in Jean­
Pierre GIRAN et Roland GRANIER : Politique de l'Emploi, Economica, Paris, 
1983, pages 199 à 213. 
Dieter C ASSEL et Ulrich CICHY : "The Shadow Economy and Economie Policy in 
East and West : a Comparative System Approach", in Sergio ALESSANDRINI and 
Bruno DALLAGO eds : The Unofficial Economy, Gower, Aidershot, 1987, pp 127 à 
146. 
Β. CONTINI, M. GALEOTTI and F. CUGNO : "Inflation and the Irregular Economy . 
a Dynamic Analysis", Metro economica, vol Z8, n°l, 1986, pp 67 à 84. 
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§4 : LE TRAVAIL AU NOIR DES INACTIFS 
Il peut paraître curieux a priori d'insérer les inactifs dans un 
chapitre dévolu à l'activité, mais la curiosité s'estompe rapidement lorsque l'on 
se rappelle que c'est à l'activité cachée que ces développements sont consacrés. 
L'un des premiers catalyseurs des études sur le travail au noir a 
d'ailleurs été l'examen des taux d'activité, en particulier, en Italie. "Le cas 
de l'Italie est particulièrement déconcertant, non pas parce que le déclin de 
la population active agricole est bien marqué, mais plutôt parce qu'il est plus 
mar hé que l'absorption de la population active dans les secteurs non agricoles... 
il y a donc des raisons pour suspecter que les cas d'inactivité enregistrés par 
les statistiques ne correspondent pas à de l'inactivité réelle, mais plutôt 
à une activité occulte" (*). 
De fait, sous l'impulsion d'organismes non gouvernementaux qui les 
premiers ont cherché à mesurer l'activité réelle, l'ISTAT a modifié à plusieurs 
reprises son enquête trimestrielle sur la population active avec l'intention 
d'identifier certains actifs qui jusque là échappaient aux enquêteurs. A titre 
d'exemple, en 1977, l'ISTAT à modifié le questionnaire de son enquête pour 
mieux appréhender les cas d'activité cachée. Le résultat de la restructuration 
de l'enquête a été de faire passer le taux d'activité italien de 35,9% (moyenne 
de l'année 1976, ancienne série) à 38,9% (moyenne de l'année 1977, nouvelle 
série). La population active de 1977 a ainsi été rehaussée de 1.552.000 personnes, 
passant de 20.055.000 (1977, ancienne série) à 21.607.000.(1977, nouvelle série). 
La même année - 197 7 - le CERES a effectué pour le compte du CISL 
(l'un des principaux syndicats italiens) une enquête visant à déterminer l'am-
pleur du travail au noir. Le taux d'activité estimé par le CERES s'élève 
à 44,7% ! Par rapport aux statistiques officielles, il y a adjonction de 
1.410.000 personnes âgées de 14 à 29 ans, de 600.000 personnes âgées de 30 à 
49 ans et de 1.260.000 personnes âgées de plus de 50 ans ! 
(*) Giorgio FUA : "Employment and Productive Capacity in Italy", Banca Nazionale 
del Lavoro, Quaterly Review, September 1977, pages 222 et 22Z. 
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Ainsi, des chômeurs, des personnes à la recherche d'un premier 
emploi, des retraités, des personnes au foyer, des étudiants et des titulaires 
d'une pension d'invalidité auraient une activité économique. Il faut, par 
ailleurs, se rappeler que les nouvelles séries du PIB calculées par l'ISTAT, 
ont fait passer le PIB, pour l'année 1986, de 766.920 milliard de lires à 
894.362 milliard de lires ! 
Le travail au noir des inactifs semble assez important en Espagne, 
pays pour lequel on dispose d'estimations détaillées pour l'année 1979 (*). 
CATEGORIES 
PLURI ACTIVITES 
ACTIFS MARGINAUX 
CHOMEURS 
INACTIFS 
- personnes au foyer 
- étudiants 
- handicapés 
- retraités 
- autres 
POPULATION COMPTEE A 
PART 
TOTAL 
EFFECTIFS 
317.700 
183.300 
min 201.400 
max 600.000 
776.100 
255.300 
277.800 
43.100 
145.200 
54.700 
23.600 
1.502.100 
% POPULATION ACTIVE 
2,5% 
1,4% 
min 1,6% 
max 4,8% 
6,0% 
0,2% 
min 11,7% 
max 14,9% 
En Belgique, 15% des retraités seraient des travailleurs au. noir, ils 
effectueraient en moyenne 34 heures de petits travaux rémunérés par mois (**). 
(*) Source : Antonio GARCIA de BLAS y Santos M. RUESGA BENITO : "Mercado de 
trabajo y economia oculta en Andalucia", Cuadernos del IDR, Sevilla, 1985, 
page 154. 
(**) Source : Victor GINSBURGH, Sergio PERELMAN et Pierre PESTIEAU : "Le travail 
au noir", in Victor GINSBURGH et Pierre PESTIEAU eds, : L'économie infor-
melle, éditions Labor, Bruxelles, 1987, page 42. 
Une autre estimation citée par DE GRAZIA fait référence aux affirma-
tions d'un inspecteur des lois sociales : "l'occupation illégale des pensionnés 
peut sans exagération être évaluée à 100 000 emplois par jour" (*). 
Au Royaume-Uni, une enquête sur le travail des enfants a montré que 41% 
des garçons et 38% des filles âgés de 11 à 16 ans avaient un emploi, principale-
ment dans l'agriculture et dans des petites activités de service (livraison 
de journaux, petits boulots dans les hôtels). Eu égard à leur âge, 4 enfants sur 
5 sont employés illégalement (**). 
En France, 9% des retraités, soit 579.400 personnes exerçaient une 
activité rémunérée en 1977. Grâce à des données de l'enquête emploi, on a pu 
calculer par tranches d'âge le taux d'activité des retraités (***). 
30-49 ans 59,0% 
50-54 ans 40,0% 
55-59 ans 26,0% 
60-64 ans 12,0% 
65-69 ans 10,0% 
70 ans et plus .... 4,7% 
total 9,0% 
Il convient de tenir compte de plusieurs facteurs explicatifs dont 
le niveau très faible de certaines retraites et la présence d'environ 50% d'ex-
ploitants agricoles dans le total des retraités qui exercent une activité rému-
nérée (5 ans d'activité suffisent pour obtenir la pension de retraite du régime 
agricole). 
(*) Raffaele DI GRAZIA : Le travail clandestin, BIT, Genève, 1983, page 17. 
(**) Cf : Raymond E. PAHL : "Notes towards a more precise understanding of the 
dimensions and dynamics of the Black Economy in Britain and Ireland", Document 
de travail, D.G. V, april 1988, page 5. 
(***) Source : Philippe SEGUIN : Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d'enquête 
sur la situation de l'emploi et le chômage, documents de l'Assemblée Nationale 
n° 1180, Journal Officiel, Paris, 22 juin 1979, page 297. 
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A ce tour d'Europe des divers pays membres, il conviendrait d'ajouter 
des données plus détaillées relatives à des régions ou à des villes particulières. 
Dans des pays comme l'Italie, l'Espagne ou la France par exemple, 
le travail à domicile de personnes comptabilisées officiellement comme des 
inactifs a pu être analysé par type d'activité, par sexe, par région, etc.. 
C*»tte forme d'activité qui concerne principalement les femmes revient pour les 
entreprises donneuses d'ouvrage à domicile à se décharger d'une partie de leurs 
coûts de production en les transférant sur les travailleurs. Le travail à 
domicile est un mode de production en expansion aussi bien dans les activités 
traditionnelles (textile, confection, articles en cuir, horlogerie, jouets) que 
dans le secteur des services ou dans celui des fabrications qui utilisent de 
la technologie de pointe (informatique, fabrication de puces, matériel électri-
que, optique de haute précision) (*). 
Qu'il soit l'oeuvre de jeunes ou de retraités, de femmes au foyer 
ou de personnes handicapées, le travail au noir des inactifs est une forme d'ac-
tivité occulte très répandue, en particulier dans les pays du Sud de l'Europe 
où les estimations de son importance relative dépassent largement celles des 
personnes actives employées qui ont des emplois multiples. En Andalousie, par 
exemple, 9,2% des inactifs auraient une activité parallèle alors que le pour-
centage de pluri-activité ne serait que de 2,5%. Dans les pays du Nord de 
l'Europe, à l'inverse, la pluri-activité est la forme dominante, le travail au 
noir des inactifs relevant proportionnellement d'une modalité moins répandue. 
Les estimations des revenus obtenus par les inactifs dans le cadre 
de leurs activités rémunérées montrent qu'il s'agit avant tout de revenus d'ap-
point, servant à compléter les retraites qui sont parfois très faibles, les 
bourses qui ne sont pas suffisantes et plus généralement les revenus des ménages. 
Destinée principalement à compléter un autre revenu, la participation 
des inactifs prend plus la forme de petits travaux occasionnels que celle 
d'activités salariées à temps complet. Même si la fréquence du travail au noir 
est élevée, le nombre annuel d'heures de travail réalisées est limité à 
l'exception de certaines régions qui ont une tradition de travail à domicile 
(textile en Catalogne, bonneterie en Italie centrale, maroquinerie dans le Tarn.. 
(*) Cf : Caria LIPSIG-MUMME : "La renaissance du travail à domicile dans les 
économies développées", Sociologie du travail, Vol 25, n°Z, 198Z, pages 
313 à 333. 
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Aux facteurs explicatifs qui viennent d'être présentés, il convient 
d'ajouter une variable institutionnelle dont l'origine est à rechercher dans 
les traditions culturelles : il s'agit des taux d'activités des femmes. 
En compulsant les statistiques relatives aux pays-membres, on est 
surpris d'observer que les taux d'activités des femmes s'étalent entre 27,4% 
pour l'Espagne et 58,7% pour le Danemark (*). Même si les critères retenus pour 
appartenir à la population active varient d'un pays à l'autre, on ne peut pas 
justifier de tels écarts par des considérations purement statistiques. 
La tentation est alors grande de faire l'hypothèse que les femmes, 
en particulier dans les pays méditerranéens, ont une activité parallèle rémunérée 
au noir. A titre d'illustration, le travail à temps partiel, forme d'activité 
souvent prisée par les femmes, est un vecteur d'emploi très fréquent dans l'Europe 
du Nord et peu répandu dans les pays comme la Grèce ou l'Espagne. Les femmes 
grecques ou espagnoles qui souhaitent travailler à temps partiel sont alors 
contraintes d'exercer leur activité de façon souterraine par incapacité quasi-
juridique de l'effectuer officiellement. 
(*) Taux d'activité dzA ^zmmzA danA IZA payA dz la Communauté en 1985 : CIOAAZ-
mznt pan. ordrz décrolAAant. 
Oanzmark 58,7? 
Royaume Uni 47,9% 
Francz 4"5,7% 
Portugal 42,8% 
AU. Fédéralz 40,6% 
Bzlglquz 35,9% 
Saurez : Europz Soclalz, ConvnlAAlon dzA CommunautzA EuropéznnzA, Olrzctlon 
Généralz dz l'Emploi, dzA A^alreA SoclaZzA et de l'Education, Luxembourg, 
1988, pagz 101. 
Luxembourg 
Grzcz 
PayA-BOA 
Irlandz 
ItaJUz 
EApagnz 
34,4% 
34,2% 
34,1% 
32,6% 
32,4% 
27,4% 
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En résumé, le travail au noir des inactifs est loin d'être une forme 
bénigne d'activité au noir, en Europe, même si les revenus obtenus sont faibles 
par rapport aux revenus principaux des inactifs. Les activités réalisées par 
les inactifs relèvent de la palette des activités susceptibles d'être effectuées 
au noir, mais les pays du Nord et les pays du Sud ne sont pas concernés par le 
phénomène avec la même intensité. En Espagne, en Italie, en France et vraisem-
blablement en Grèce et au Portugal il est de tradition que les inactifs aient 
des activités annexes rémunérées ; dans les autres pays européens et sans pour 
autant être marginales ces activités n'y ont ni la même place, ni les mêmes 
enjeux. 
§5 : L'IMMIGRATION CLANDESTINE 
Si, de manière implicite, tous nos développements s'appliquaient 
à une population nationale, il convient maintenant de lever cette hypothèse en 
examinant une dernière catégorie d'offreurs de travail au noir : les immigrés 
clandestins. 
Par définition, le dénombrement de ces travailleurs est difficile 
à opérer car les opérations de régularisation sont rares, espacées et rien ne 
permet de supposer que tous les travailleurs immigrés clandestins acceptent de 
se présenter aux autorités compétentes ou savent qu'une procédure de régulari-
sation est en cours. 
En adoptant d'emblée une perspective communautaire, trois groupes 
de pays peuvent être isolés : ceux qui ont une tradition d'accueil des popula-
tions étrangères, la France en particulier, ceux qui ont un passé d'émigration 
comme l'Italie ou l'Irlande et ceux qui demeurent sur la longue période à l'écart 
des mouvements migratoires importants comme les pays du Bénélux. 
Par rapport à leur population totale, les pays européens ont des 
proportions de résidents étrangers régulièrement implantés qui varient fortement 
d'un pays à l'autre. Le Luxembourg possède le ruban bleu de l'implantation 
étrangère (24%) et les pays méditerranéens ontla lanterne rouge (moins de 1% 
pour l'Espagne, le Portugal, la Grèce et l'Italie). Entre ces deux extrêmes, 
on trouve deux groupes de pays : un ensemble de trois pays d'une part (Belgique, 
Allemagne Fédérale et France) dont le pourcentage s'échelonne entre 6 et 9% 
et un groupe de quatre pays d'autre part (Pays-Bas, Danemark, Royaume-Uni et 
Irlande) dont la présence étrangère représente de 2 à 4% de l'ensemble des 
résidents. 
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En retenant une autre grille de lecture la part de la population 
résidente étrangère en provenance des pays­membres de la Communauté peut être 
isolée. Pour quatre pays, les étrangers "européens" sont majoritaires : le 
Luxembourg (92,7%), l'Irlande (76,1%), la Belgique (65,0%) et l'Espagne (59,0%). 
Pour les autres pays, les étrangers non membres de la Communauté 
représentent plus de 50% des populations totales (*). 
Ce bref détour dans les statistiques officielles sur les immigrés 
réguliers a eu pour objet de fixer un cadre de référence à l'intérieur duquel le 
problème du travail au noir des immigrés clandestins se pose avec plus ou moins 
d'acuité. 
Les écarts de revenus et de niveaux de vie entre pays de la Commu­
nauté d'une part et entre pays membres et reste du monde d'autre part incitent 
des travailleurs à entrer clandestinement dans le pays qui offre à leurs yeux 
les atouts les meilleurs. Il s'agira de la proximité géographique (les yougosla­
ves en Italie), de la proximité culturelle (immigration en provenance des 
anciennes colonies) ou de l'existence de réseaux simultanément clandestins et 
organisés (les turcs en Allemagne Fédérale). 
Sur un plan quantitatif, le dénombrement des travailleurs immigrés 
clandestins pose des problèmes évidents. A titre d'exemple et compte tenu des 
précautions inhérentes à des estimations de cette nature, on a pu évaluer cette 
population dans plusieurs pays­membres. En Italie, on évoque une fourchette 
comprise entre 300 000 et 1 000 000 de personnes, l'ISTAT pour sa part avance 
le chiffre de 515 000. En Grèce, les informations disponibles font état de 
100 000 personnes. En France, l'opération de régularisation menée en 1981­1982 
a permis de recenser 123 500 personnes, le nombre d'étrangers qui ne se sont 
pas présentés aux organismes chargés de la régularisation restant évidemment 
inconnu. En Espagne, 1'institution caritative "Caritas Espagnole" a publié une 
estimation comprise entre 300 000 et 460 000 personnes. 
*) Ces donnézi Aont extralteA de : Europe Sociale, CommlAAlon dzA CommunautzA 
Ρ;ι»ηηιίονΐΜθΛ lutomhniihn. 1988. oãjâe l9. 
v i^C/O U.LTI.HK.I03 g u r u . \^W\A*S^-*S* *.«_ . — ~ r — 
Européennes, Luxembourg, 1988, page 19 
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Il est intéressant de noter que les pays méditerranéens, tradition-
nellement pourvoyeurs de main-dOeuvre immigrée, deviennent depuis une ou deux 
décennies des pays d'accueil. Ainsi, l'Espagne est devenue un pays d'immigra-
tion pour les ressortissants de ses anciennes colonies.(Amérique du Sud et 
Guinée Equatoriale en particulier) ; ce mouvement est également perceptible 
en Italie où l'on rencontre des tunisiens en Sicile, des yougoslaves dans les 
régions de Trieste et Gorizia, des ressortissants de Somalie, d'Ethiopie et 
de Libye dans le Latium. En Grèce, on a une population de travailleurs qui 
viennent des pays de l'Est (polonais, yougoslaves, roumains) et des pays du 
moyen-orient (palestiniens, libanais, etc.). 
Les emplois occupés par les immigrés clandestins sont généralement 
mal rémunérés et physiquement pénibles. En France, les travailleurs employés 
dans la confection à Paris one une auree quotidienne de travail supérieure à 
12 heures pour un salaire horaire inférieur de moitié au salaire minimum légal. 
En Allemagne Fédérale, l'enquête menée par Gunter WALLRAFF sur les travailleurs 
clandestins turcs décrit avec de nombreux détails le manque d'hygiène, la 
pénibilité, l'insalubrité et le danger des tâches accomplies. Les salaires 
versés sont d'une part très faibles et d'autre part inférieurs à ce qui est 
annoncé par les trafiquants de main-d'oeuvre lors de l'embauche des travailleurs 
immigrés (*). 
En Italie, les séries publiées par l'ISTAT fournissent une ventilation 
par secteurs des emplois occupés par les travailleurs immigrés clandestins : 
10% travaillent dans l'agriculture ; 2% dans l'industrie ; 8% dans le bâtiment 
et les travaux publics ; 30% dans les services marchands et 50% dans les services 
non marchands. 
En France, la ventilation par secteur d'activité n'est pas tout à 
fait la même car 30% travaillent dans le bâtiment, 20% dans les commerces et 
la restauration et respectivement 10% dans l'agriculture, les services domes-
tiques, le textile, l'industrie et l'artisanat. 
;*) Gunter 0/ALi.RAFF : Tête de turc, la découverte, ParlM , 1986, [titre original 
Ganz unten, Kiepenheuer und (jJltAch Verlag, Köln, 1985). 
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En Grèce, les immigrés clandestins saisonniers occupent généralement 
un emploi dans l'agriculture ou le tourisme alors que les immigrés clandestins 
permanents occupent des emplois plus diversifiés dans toutes les branches de 
l'économie. 
Dans tous les pays-membres, on observe une spécialisation par branches 
des immigrés clandestins. En Italie, les tunisiens sont embauchés dans l'agri-
culture, les philippins et les égyptiens dans l'industrie, les yougoslaves dans 
les petits ateliers de fabrication de produits textile, les jeunes filles du 
Cap Vert sont employées comme domestiques (*)· 
En France, les yougoslaves et les pakistanais travaillent dans le 
textile, les marocains dans l'agriculture, les ressortissants du Sud-Est asiatique 
dans la restauration et le textile, les tunisiens dans le commerce et la restau-
ration. 
Si, comme on l'a vu, il y a des filières d'introduction dans les 
divers pays-membres, de véritables réseaux d'emplois contribuent à tisser ces 
spécialisations par nationalité. En France, on observe des réseaux bien organisés 
dans la confection, en Belgique, il y a des groupes structurés dans le bâtiment, 
en Allemagne Fédérale, on a décrit des filières pour les travaux de nettoyage, etc, 
Dans la plupart des pays-membres, des textes répriment l'emploi des 
immigrés clandestins, mais les rapporteurs des commissions chargées d'examiner 
l'application de ces textes soulignent tous l'extrême difficulté qu'il y a à 
détecter les infractions. 
Pour au moins trois pays, la France (circulaire du 11 août 1981), 
l'Espagne (loi organique du 24 juillet 1985) et l'Italie (loi du 26 juillet 1987), 
des procédures de régularisation ont été entreprises visant à assainir la 
situation d'une part et à assurer aux travailleurs étrangers réguliers une 
parité de droits sociaux avec les travailleurs nationaux. Si un certain nombre 
d'étrangers en ont été bénéficiaires, les régularisations réellement effectuées 
sont loin d'atteindre ce qui était espéré par les législateurs. 
(*) C¿ : Claudio CALUARUSÖ : "l'Immigration Mégalz en Italie", Problèmes 
Economiques, n°2041, 23 septembre 1987. 
(S) 
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Si l'on veut résumer en quelques lignes la situation des travailleurs 
immigrés clandestins, force est de constater d'une part que tous les pays-membres 
ne sont pas placés à la même enseigne et d'autre part que les écarts de niveau 
de vie expliquent les phénomènes migratoires. 
Si le cas des travailleurs clandestins originaires de pays-membres 
(grecs dans les Pouilles, portugais en Galice et en France, espagnols en France) 
devait disparaître de lui-même avec la libre circulation des personnes, celui 
des immigrés originaires de pays non membres de la Communauté pose un problème 
social d'envergure que les textes prévoient généralement mais que leurs modalités 
d'application laissent souvent irrésolu. 
CONCLUSION 
Dresser en conclusion un bilan des activités au noir exercées par les 
européens, n'est pas une chose aisée car l'Europe est faite d'une mosaïque de 
cas particulier au lieu d'être caractérisée par un ensemble de comportements 
homogènes. A titre de pure tentative, quelques lignes directrices peuvent 
cependant être dégagées en conservant à l'esprit qu'il s'agit d'un résumé. 
En premier lieu, il ne semble pas y avoir de concurrence entre chômeurs 
et travailleurs au noir en matière d'emplois. Les emplois occupés au noir sont 
à temps partiel, occasionnels et précaires ; les emplois recherchés par les 
chômeurs sont à temps complets et permanents. 
En second lieu, les chômeurs sont moins bien placés que les personnes 
employées pour travailler au noir en en retirant des ressources substantielles. 
Etre exclu du marché du travail officiel ne signifie pas être présent et accepté 
sur le marché du travail au noir. 
En troisième lieu, la théorie duale du marché du travail s'adapte 
parfaitement bien à l'analyse de la plùri-activité non agricole. D'un côté, 
il y a des personnes qualifiées et bien rémunérées qui ont une double activité 
car les compétences qu'elles possèdent sont demandées pour elles-mêmes sur le 
marché "primaire" de la double activité. D'un autre côté, il y a les personnes 
moins bien rémunérées qui profitent des relations qu'elles peuvent avoir dans 
leurs activités professionnelles pour se porter offreuses de travail sur le 
marché "secondaire" de la double activité. La conjonction de règlements adminis-
tratifs contraignants et d'une fiscalité marginale dissuasive fait que ces 
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actifs occupés trouvent généralement des activités annexes. 
En quatrième lieu, les qualifications acquises dans les activités 
professionnelles principales servent généralement de passeports pour participer 
aux activités au noir. Ceux qui ont la "malchance" de ne pas être dotés des 
compétences demandées dans les petits boulots, sont contraints de se reconvertir 
avant de pouvoir exercer une activité complémentaire. 
Enfin, les immigrés clandestins sont contraints de travailler au 
noir pour survivre. Alors que les pays méditerranéens et l'Irlande étaient tra-
ditionnellement des pays d'émigration, ils sont aujourd'hui et à des degrés 
divers, des pays,d'immigration. Dans ce contexte, le problème de régularisation 
des travailleurs déjà installés et de contrôle de l'immigration pour les clan-
destins potentiels est devenu un problème européen. 
A quelques variantes près, pour ces cinq points, tous les pays 
européens sont logés à la même enseigne. Le seul élément notable de différen-
ciation est à rechercher dans les activités au noir des inactifs. La partition 
adéquate est alors Nord-Sud, les pays méditerranéens ayant une tradition plus 
tournée vers ces activités que les pays anglo-saxons. Les rémunérations obtenues 
étant, quelles que soient les latitudes, des revenus d'appoint et non des 
ressources principales. 
Avec des listes d'activités voisines et des modalités de participa-
tion assez peu différenciées, on peut conclure ce chapitre en formulant la pro-
position qu'il y a bien un modèle européen d'adéquation entre travailleurs 
au noir et activités souterraines. Ce modèle s'adapte à chacun des 12 pays 
de la Communauté, fût-ce avec des intensités variables pour tenir compte des 
spécificités régionales, des traditions locales et des opportunités individuelles 
En matière de travail au noir, les décisions de participation relèvent toujours 
des individus, même si en fonction des contraintes il y a des participants 
effectifs, des participants potentiels et des personnes qui préfèrent ne pas 
participer. 
* * * 
* * 
* 
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THE ROLE OF THE MARKET IN IRREGULAR WORK 
The problem to be dealt with in this section is to determine whether or not market 
features can have a significant influence on the existence of irregular work, and if so, the 
extent to which they may influence its internal diversification. Our definition of the market 
will immediately show that, if there is such influence, its forms may vary widely between 
different EEC countries and between the various regions within each country. This 
definition will moreover allow us to advance hypotheses about possibly substantial 
market changes resulting from a more politically unified Europe, with respect to not only 
the legal changes to come into effect in 1992 but also the real process of unification, if 
indeed such a process exists. 
1. The Market and its Territorial Diversification. Hypotheses on Irregular Work 
Goods and Services Market 
As an economic factor, the market should be considered in two ways or in terms 
of two related entities. We shall thus firstly consider the goods and services market —the 
exchange of goods and services between enterprises— and its possible influence on 
irregular work. The existence of the market implies competition, and this competition is 
essentially conditioned by two factors. The first of these factors is the size of the 
particular market concerned, since international, national or local levels, of exchange 
determine the possibilities or "needs" enterprises may have to turn to wholly or partly 
irregular labour supplies in order to maintain their competitiveness. In this context, the 
market is not simply defined by supply and demand exchange between enterprises (or 
individuals), but also by government norms and behaviour with respect to the creation or 
maintainence of various degrees of protectionism, state support sheltering certain export 
producers or sectors from foreign competition, etc. National differences thus play an 
important role, since protectionisl laws and stale aids may have undergone changes over 
the years. There are also important differences between regions, since in certain ¿ones 
traditional production in sectors like textiles, footwear and toy-making may have 
provoked the government to accord preferential treatment to some regions and not others, 
or the banking system may be more disposed to investing in certain zones and in certain 
products than in others. 
In addition to these different dimensions, there are also different intensities of 
exchange, ranging from situations of oligarchy to open competition. In theory, the greater 
the competition, the greater the irregular work provoked, given that companies would 
attempt to improve their competitivity margins by making savings on their most easily 
controlled costs, namely the socially weakest labour supply. In practice however, things 
are usually more complicated, since oligarchic control of substantial parts or all of the 
market by some companies moves open competition to the periphery, towards a limited 
market context, as is the case with decentralisation. 
This process should also be related to the international division of labour, since 
there are many differences within the EEC resulting from the fact that each of the 12 
member countries not only trades with the others, but has its own trading partners in other 
parts of the world. West Germany's automobile and chemicals industries, for example, 
allow that country to compete on world levels without having to reduce labour costs 
through irregular work. Portugal, on the other hand, has a textiles industry that can only 
compete on European or world levels by reducing its labour costs, both legal —since its 
salaries are much lower than in Germany— and of course irregular. 
Labour Market 
The second aspect we are concerned with here concerns the labour market, 
understood as the supply and demand of the labour needed by enterprises to produce 
goods and services. From the point of view of both supply and demand, this kind of 
relation obviously has far more influence on modes of employment than does the goods 
and services market. The labour supply may vary in accordance with qualifications, sex 
and age, and these factors may moreover be conditioned by important cultural or 
traditional aspects (the incorporation of women in to the labour market, for example). But 
variations also depend on "market power", understood as the labour force's ability to 
negotiate. Consideration must thus be given to industrial relations and their various actors 
(unions, employer associations, etc.) and institutions (collective negotiation, state 
intervention, etc.). Account should also be taken of supply factors like forms of 
employment contracts, the size of enterprises and the corresponding modes of labour 
organisation. 
The theoretical model we shall use to analyse the various influences of the labour 
market dynamic on irregular work is that of labour market segmentation, according to 
which the labour market has historically tended towards increasing segmentation into 
groups of jobs which have different features (with respect to salaries, promotion, 
security, etc.) and are occupied by workers with different characteristics (with respect to 
qualifications, age, sex, etc.). This segmentation (or simple duality according to some 
researchers) produces some stronger or more central segments, others which are weaker, 
and some marginal segments. 
Our present hypothesis has two parts: firstly, that segmentation has tended to 
become more accentuated over the most recent historical period as a result of decline in 
anti-segmentary processes (for example the role of the welfare state in education and 
social subsidies) and increase in segmentary dynamics, which once again may vary from 
one country to another; secondly, that as inferior segments undergo increased 
marginalisation, their labour force becomes extremely weak and flexible and thus either 
easily "organised" by enterprises in terms of irregular employment or subject to the 
creation of types of employment (multiple jobholders, etc.) which are more flexible than 
those of the labour market itself. 
We should nevertheless adopt the general working hypothesis that the labour 
market's influence on the opportunities for irregular work varies according to the country 
concerned, since'each case accords different roles to the labour force itself and to the 
market's actors and institutions. The extent of irregular work is very much subject to 
elements like the fact that unemployment is subsidised in northern European countries and 
hardly at all in the southern countries, and by factors including the degree to which 
women are incorporated into the workforce, union membership rates and the unions' 
ability to bring pressure to bear upon the labour market 
Relations between the Two Markets 
A final hypothesis should state that the goods and services market and the labour 
market exert a combined influence on irregular work. This may sometimes involve 
situations where state protection of certain industries against international competition is 
carried out through social actors reaching agreement on the utilisation of labour in certain 
types of activity or in certain regions. It may also involve tacit or explicit compromises — 
or indeed simply imposed strategies— which at once affect the labour market and benefit 
the market competitiveness of certain products or services. 
In the following analysis it will not always be easy to distinguish between the 
influences of these two markets on irregular work. The two sections below will 
nevertheless attempt to deal with each market separately, despite our awareness that the 
other market can never fully be excluded. 
Π. The Role of the Goods and Services Market in Irregular Work 
Traditional Aspects 
Market size would appear to have had two different effects on the use of irregular 
labour, although note should be made of certain recent changes in this respect. 
Sectors and enterprises with national and often multinational market projection 
have tended to employ very little irregular labour, mainly because their extended markets 
allow them to base their productivity on a Taylorist organisation of labour and their profit 
margins on large production runs with direct and effective market control (as is the case 
with technologically advanced sectors like automobiles, chemicals, electronics and other 
industries in the north and centre of Europe and in the north of Italy). These sectors and 
enterprises are also able to exert influence on the political context affecting the market 
through protectionist laws, export subsidies, etc. (as has more commonly been the case in 
some countries in Southern Europe). These factors not only bring to light the differences 
between countries, but also those between regions within countries. Moreover, the size of 
the enterprises concerned —the extent of their economic influence on the market and their 
political influence on the government— plays an essential role here. 
The other side of the story concerns sectors and enterprises whose markets are 
local, regional or, in certain limit cases, national. These sectors and enterprises tend to 
turn to irregular labour more frequently —in the form of irregular workers, undeclared 
overtime or multiple jobholders— because their inability to dominate the market 
economically or politically means that their profit margins tend to be guaranteed through 
reductions in director indirect labour costs. This mainly concerns the less technologically 
developed regions of Europe and sectors like personal services and traditional agriculture. 
The dominant enterprise form here is the small business, since it is more easily able to 
avoid certain constraints resulting from official regulations, the application of which is 
usually not subject to any social control. 
A synthesis of these two situations is to be found in regions where small 
enterprises are dominant, where there is only one industrial activity and where the basic 
orientation is towards the international market. This would be the case of the third Italy, 
of the North Portuguese textile industry and of lhe footwear and toy-making industry of 
the Valencia-Alicante region. In these examples, entry into the international market partly 
came about or has been maintained through irregular work, but this directly economic fact 
tends to hide a certain underlying social compromise in which enterprises, government 
and unions (or workers, in the absence of unions) allow irregular work to continue in 
return for various benefits such as competitivity margins for the enterprises, additional 
income for the families and the country's participation in international markets for the 
government. 
Recent Changes 
The economic recession and restructuring processes of recent decades have 
brought about some important changes affecting the market's influence on irregular work. 
The first of these was a considerable decentralisation process based on large 
enterprises contracting out to small and medium plants or enterprises. The activities thus 
decentralised were often formerly carried out in the large enterprises and include many 
production activities (elaboration of components of the production chain) and service 
activities (cleaning, marketing, accounting, etc.). (We shall later analyse this aspect from 
the point of view of the labour market.) It should not be forgotten that this process has 
enabled the creation of many new enterprises offering easily decentralised services. These 
small firms (in number of employees) often have highly advanced technology or high 
degrees of work organisation. They tend to make use of irregular labour in their initial 
stages and then, once established, adopt legal forms of employment and develop high 
levels of exchange with larger enterprises. In other cases these firms have low degrees of 
technology or organisation and can only survive if part of their labour is employed 
irregularly, through either family work or irregular contracting of outside workers. 
The second recent change concerns situations in which decentralisation —which 
promotes labour flexibility outside although under the control of the enterprise— is not 
possible and where flexibility must thus be sought within the enterprise itself, mainly 
through variations in working hours. This is where irregular work presently takes the 
forms of undeclared overtime or second jobs, and in some countries where the labour 
market is highly regulated these may indeed be the most common modes of irregular 
employmenL This use of irregular labour may be better accepted socially —by unions, 
public opinion and even the government— than is direct employment of clandestine 
workers. It allows enterprises to adjust to market fluctuations corresponding either to 
situations external to the country concerned —variations in the price of raw materials or 
movements in the currencies of buying or selling countries— or to internal variants such 
as fluctuations in the price of money or changes in fashion, etc. 
A third new factor is the enormous expansion which has taken place in the 
services market over recent years, with respect to both individuals and enterprises. This 
has come about through various factors. Firstly, with respect to enterprises, new needs 
have been created by processes including the above-mentioned decentralisation, the 
adoption of new technology (concerning individuals as well) and large urban 
agglomerations like transport, cleaning, personal services of all kinds and tourist services 
based on new conceptions of free time and holidays. This wide field, sometimes highly 
innovative with respect to organisation if not always technology, is also completely open 
to small businesses, which may often be more agile in adapting to changing demands than 
are large enterprises. The formation of extensive new markets which are difficult to 
monopolise —be they regional, national or international— and of production units able to 
compete in them, present more opportunities than ever before for the development of 
irregular forms of employmenL 
Irregular work in the service sector has grown considerably over the past few 
years and in all EEC countries. Large urban centres with important services markets 
present enormous opportunities for irregular work, since the exchange of services is less 
regulated than the exchange of products. The enterprises concerned —generally small if 
they are new— may have either high or low levels of technology and qualification. 
Irregular work is very frequent in both these cases, although with very different 
features. There is normally no hiding of the enterprise —as may be the case with 
industrial activities— since it is essential to have public presence in order to sell. In cases 
of high levels of technology and qualification —involving marketing, consulting, data 
processing, etc.— regular employment may coexist with irregular work and there is 
generally an enormous amount of overtime. But the more these firms become 
consolidated, the more they tend to declare their employees —with the possible exception 
of young people working in temporary second jobs— since the social or academic 
backgrounds of the workers concerned make it difficult for them to accept clandestine 
status. In other words, these workers have considerable, though individual, market 
power. 
The situation may be different in enterprises offering services to families or 
individuals, particularly when these services require only low qualifications (cleaning, 
catering, repair work, etc.). The lack of social and legal control over these market 
exchanges means that the tendencies towards irregular work can be considerable. 
III. Labour Market and Irregular Work 
Features of the Work Force 
Various national reports indicate that variations between countries have quite a lot 
to do with the type of labour available on the market. First reference must be made here to 
the housewives who make up considerable irregular labour sectors in countries like 
Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy and to some extent France, mainly in the more 
industrialised or urbanised regions of these countries. The situation of these women 
differs considerably from that of women in countries where part-time work is protected 
and there is greater social support for their full-time incorporation into the labour market. 
The differences will only disappear when there is equality in these factors which, 
although external to the labour market, have strong effects on its workings. Although the 
cases that have most been studied from this perspective reveal the irregular employment of 
women in industries such as textiles, toy-making, leather goods and packaging, etc., it is 
clear that the greatest numbers of women working on an irregular basis are to be found in 
the service sector, essentially in personal services (domestic services, cleaning, retailing, 
catering, etc.). 
It is important to gain a clear understanding of two factors conditioning the 
irregular employment of women. The first and most important is the role of women in 
society and in the family. This role is profoundly marked by reproductive tasks —men 
would be accorded productive tasks— and has not been broken by any positive action for 
example on the part of the welfare state (the very weak actions of which tend to 
"subsidise" the man for his non-working wife). This is why there has been a tendency to 
consider women's external work as something done in their "free time" away from 
domestic work, with the exclusive purpose of complementing the husband's earnings. It 
was thus thought of little importance whether or not the working women benefited from 
all her rights, or indeed from minimal rights such as a contract attesting to her 
employment. In other words, her presence in the working world tended to be negated, 
whether she worked or not. The second factor has sometimes been called the "tradition" 
of irregular work in some areas. The phenomenon at the base of this tradition is usually of 
a kind determined by industrialisation processes in which important roles have been 
played by factors like small enterprises, multiple jobholding involving industry-
agriculture or industry-services, or essentially paternalistic industrial relations. These 
factors traditionally involve use of a flexible source of labour —female labour— in order 
to adjust to the needs of changing situations. 
The unemployment rate, especially the existence of high numbers of unemployed 
workers who do not receive benefits, has given rise to a very flexible labour segment 
which is easily used for irregular although generally casual tasks. This phenomenon has 
only taken place in some EEC countries, since in other countries most unemployed people 
receive benefits which they are unwilling to risk for the sake of casual work. On the other 
hand, the threat of unemployment has provoked readiness to accept any job whatsoever, 
no matter how unstable it may be. This has mainly had repercussions on young people 
with low educational levels who in many countries have found it difficult to find steady 
employment with the features characteristic of jobs once available to previous generations. 
In some countries, emphasis has be placed on the low qualifications of labour as a 
factor conditioning the transformation of legal employees into irregular workers, 
especially where sectors or enterprises have been restructured and labour needs thus 
reduced. But the differences between countries have not only been with respect to labour 
force qualification levels —influenced by both the technological level of production and 
the level and quality of education—, but also by the retraining and continuous training 
opportunities existing before workers leaving one sector have had to attempt to adapt to 
the requirements of another. The low qualification levels of many irregular workers in 
countries with high rates of irregularity indicates that this type of worker is more inclined 
to be organised as informal labour than is the highly qualified worker. 
High levels of employment of minors — irregular work by definition— have been 
delected in Spain, Greece, Portugal and Great Britain. There appear to be two basic 
reasons for this. In the southern European countries there is often a gap of one or two 
years between the end of compulsory education and the minimum legal working age. 
Either because of family economic necessities or simply to stop their children from 
misusing their time, parents often consent to the casual employment of their children, 
usually in the service sector. In northern European countries, the reasons for juvenile 
employment could have more to do with the adolescents' at least relative desire for 
independence, with the educational institutions or other factors possibly conditioning the 
existence of this labour sector which is highly given to irregular employment. 
The final factor that must be taken into account is the level of old-age pensions. 
Part of irregular family work, agricultural work and at-home work for industrial 
enterprises is carried out by people whose retirement or old-age pensions do not allow 
them to maintain the quality of life they had when they were working legally. 
The above comments generally refer to labour sectors easily used for irregular 
work in the interests of demand factors. This is what we have occasionally termed 
"organised" irregular work. Not only does such labour have certain social features that 
make it highly flexible, but its use is often to be found in production units where social 
flexibility is also high, namely in small enterprises where there are no unions and usually 
no control over the application of collectively negotiated agreements. There is however 
another kind of work which we might qualify as "autonomous". This is usually carried 
out either in autonomous production units involving the owner or the owner's family, or 
as second jobs or overtime involving professionals or qualified workers. In the latter 
case, workers usually have a fairly secure first job and are qualified to the extent that they 
occupy strong positions within the labour market. Both "organised" and "autonomous" 
modes of irregular work vary from country to country and from region to region in 
accordance with factors like the general level of the enterprises' economic development, 
the qualification level of the work force, and the degree of social and state control over the 
use of hidden labour. 
Regulation of the Labour Market 
The relative level of effective —not merely theoretical— regulation of the labour 
market is perhaps one of the most important factors affecting the degree and nature of 
irregular work. Here we shall refer to three main aspects of such regulation, leaving aside 
the exclusively legal aspects dealt with in another part of this study. 
We should firstly point out that collective negotiation of work conditions, 
especially when the institutions concerned are efficient, is directly related to lower levels 
of irregular work. In other words, irregular work tends to occur in areas where there is 
little or no control over the application of negotiated agreements, as is the case in small 
enterprises or in situations where a certain informal social consensus may accept non-
application so as to avoid a major crisis. Collective negotiation may be replaced by 
government regulations, but this requires very strong state institutions —work 
inspections— able to ensure that the regulations are adhered to and thai some forms of 
irregular employment do not occur. Such institutions rarely exist. Collective negotiation is 
clearly able to control the existence of organised irregular work within enterprises, but not 
when such work takes place outside of enterprises —at-home work— or is to some extent 
autonomous. 
The degree and nature of unionisation also influence irregular work. The highest 
rates of irregularity tend to be found where there are neither unions nor any other form of 
worker representation, or in production structures —the small enterprise system, the less 
developed regions— where unionisation is usually difficult. Irregular work also exists in 
situations where there are high union membership rates and considerable union strength, 
but in such cases it tends to be in forms like overtime, etc., which are more easily 
controlled by the unions. 
Final mention should be made of modes of employment contract. Enterprises have 
tended to look for an irregular relation with their employees in situations where they 
cannot turn to more flexible forms of employment such asrt^N'^and part-time work. 
Countries where these forms have existed for some time thus have lesser levels of 
irregular work. The proof by negation is to be found in those countries where such forms 
have been introduced more recently and there has been evidence of a transformation of 
irregular work into unstable employment which, despite continuation of other "irregular" 
social conditions, is in fact legal. But the effects of this change have not always been so 
clear-cut. The jobs created forTev^^^or part-time employment are sometimes those 
which, because of segmentation, cannot be carried out by just any worker whatsoever, 
but only by people with specific qualifications or abilities. In other cases, especially f. 
where there are high unemployment rates as is the case in Spain, the creation of ¿ewbrrAS-
jobs does not absorb irregular workers but instead employs those who have not yet 
entered the labour market for the first time. 
Segmentation of the Labour Market 
I believe that the theories explaining the workings of the labour market as a non-
homogeneous, segmented entity also have some explanatory force with respect to not 
only irregular work as such, but also its close ties with socially precarious forms of 
employment and the differences existing between countries or between regions within one 
country. 
In southern EEC countries, anti-segmentary tendencies have traditionally been 
weaker than in the central and northern countries. The education systems have been less 
extensive or of poorer quality, there has been less equality of education opportunities and 
less access to retraining programmes. There has moreover been less social support for the 
weaker family members —wife and children— which might enable them to enter the 
labour market as freely as can be hoped. Social welfare benefits have been lower and 
sometimes inexistent, thus prohibiting unemployed workers, for example, from finding 
working conditions similar to those of their previous jobs. The reasons for this are at least 
partly to be found in the social compromises that have accompanied the development of 
the welfare state. But the southern countries have in any case had increasing numbers of 
workers who, in the absence of social protection, have had to accept any job whatsoever, 
no maner what the social conditions involved may be. 
Traditional production structures —dominance of agriculture, personal services 
and small enterprises in the south; industry, large enterprises and specialised services in 
the north— have led to the existence of much more extensive secondary or marginal 
segments in the south. At the same time, the difficulties experienced by unions in these 
segments has left the workers concerned with less collective protection against the 
employers' various tendencies towards flexibility, which often infringe legal or negotiated 
regulations. 
The economic recession of the 1970s also developed segmentary tendencies within 
the strategies of the unions themselves. These have led unions to be far more concerned 
about workers in the strong segments of the labour market —about their salaries, security 
and jobs— and less worried about weaker segments like workers in small enterprises, 
young people, women and the unemployed. At the same time, these weaker segments 
have had progressively less instruments for applying pressure as they became more 
distanced from the centre of the labour market. A division between southern and northern 
countries would be simplistic in this context, but a more valid distinction may perhaps be 
made between countries with strong unionisation well implanted in enterprises and those 
with weaker unions more distanced from the centre of the labour market. Basically 
because of political reasons, this second category would include countries like Spain, 
Greece and Portugal. 
Finally, some importance must be attached to differences in the organisation of 
work. Segmentation has had less influence in situations where Taylorist organisation has 
been predominant, whereas situations of direct control are associated with more powerful 
segmentary tendencies. Here we once again find differences between countries and within 
each country in accordance with factors like the size of enterprises, employer strategies 
and worker organisation. 
Faustino Miguélez Lobo 
Universität Autònoma de Barcelona 
Spain 
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Alois Wenig, Hagen 
The Impact of the Shadow Economy on the Economic and Social Cohesion 
and the Role of the State"* 
By its very definition the supply of black labour implies the 
violation of laws and regulations. Since every state must attempt 
to enforce its own legislation one would expect monitoring and 
controlling strategies to be the most natural reaction of public 
authorities to illicit labour. However, we observe that some states 
are quite reluctant to really fight against shadow activities. 
Obviously black labour is not always seen as really hazardous 
to public welfare. 
In fact, the shadow economy has two faces. On the one hand, black 
labour produces goods and services which would, in principle, 
have to be added to the National Product. This aspect of additional 
wealth creation must, on the other hand, be balanced against the 
welfare losses brought about by the contempt of law and public 
order. In weighing the positive against the negative effects 
of illicit work the reactions of government to black labour 
therefore range from ignoring or more or less legalising it 
to the attempt of strictly controlling all shadow activities. 
It is obvious that economic and social cohesion must be jeopar­
dised if the overall disadvantages of black labour in a society 
outweigh its benefits. On the other hand, as long as large strata 
of the population find it advantageous to participate in irregular 
activities either as suppliers of black labour or as buyers of 
illicit services then the shadow economy will to a certain degree 
also have an integrating rather than a disintegrating effect. 
One must bear in mind in this connection that voluntary market 
♦Research sponsered by the Commission of the European Community 
under contract no. 87925 (project: Le travail au noir en Europe) 
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interaction is always an act of social communication which makes 
either side better off. Market transactions thus promote economic 
cohesion unless the conditions of exchange are not unfairly im-
posed from outside by a third party and unless there are no 
adverse effects on the public well-being in general ("externali-
ties") . 
In order to study the impact of the shadow economy on the econo-
mic and social cohesion we must, therefore, analyse the benefits 
and losses of illicit work in more detail. The outcome of this 
"cost-benefit-analysis" depends, of course, on the definition of 
"black labour" or "irregular activity" we use. Since we are also 
to investigate into the role of the state vis-à-vus black labour 
we suggest to use a fairly narrow definition. In what follows 
we interpret irregular activities as transactions which do not 
comply with current state regulations and approved administra-
tive procedures. A more broader concept of shadow activities 
would also include other violations of institutional arrangements 
such as, for example, the evasion of agreements between labour 
unions and firms. However, this very general notion of irrregu-
lar activity is not easy to deal with. Taken literally every 
breach of an institutional arrangement between any two 
parties would then have to be considered as part of the shadow economy. 
This would clearly imply that the object we are analysing 
would be too bloated to be of interest for research as well as for 
policy recommendations. 
l.The Benefits From Black Labour 
It has been argued that the services supplied in the shadow 
economy are not really a welfare gain because if labour mar-
kets were sufficiently monitored by the state then shadow demand 
would automatically shift to the regular suppliers. However, 
this would and could only partly occur. Demand depends on the 
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price so that the volume of transactions must necessarily 
shrink if the buyers of shadow services were to pay the 
higher expenses in the regular market. The existence of 
black labour allows for the production of goods and ser-
vices in addition to the official GNP. But the increase of 
net wealth is not the only benefit from black labour. The 
shadow economy is a device to soften the burden of unemploy-
ment, to improve the flexibility of our social security 
system, to increase the economic welfare of the relatively 
poor, and to help create new small businesses with new jobs 
both illicit and official ones. 
The construction of our social security system discriminates 
against the unemployed in a double sense. Firstly, the regu-
lations of the labour markets including the wage structure do 
not allow all workers to be absorbed by the jobs offered to 
them officially. The arrangements in the markets for labour 
imposed by both the governments and the labour unions do not 
bring about wages that equilibrate demand and supply. Secondly, in 
many countries the unemployed are, in addition, also supposed to 
remain economically inactive as long as they receive unemployment 
compensation. By participating in the shadow economy they can 
prove themselves that they are still able to make valuable contri-
butions to other members of the society. This way they are also 
encouraged not to give up their struggle for re-entering the 
official labour market. Thus, black labour supplied by the 
unemployed does not only increase their income. In our societies 
work is of importance to the individual beyond the financial 
aspect. The mere fact to be employed symbolises success in life 
as such. The unemployed who are kept away from regular work life 
experience a social desaster regardless of whether the unemploy-
ment benefits allow for a reasonable high standard of living 
or not. In this respect the shadow sector can be seen to function 
as an additional safety valve. 
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One should, however, not over-emphasize this aspect of 
black labour. As the country reports show the unemployed 
of most economies in the EEC have less access to markets 
for black labour than the officially employed. They lack 
the net of social communication and interaction which pro-
vides the information where shadow services can be allo-
cated. Furthermore, the consequences of being caught are much 
more severe for the unemployed than for the officially em-
ployed. In many countries the unemployed lose their total 
income if they supply services irregularly while the offi-
cially employed only put an incremental income at risk. 
It is, for this reason, not surprising that the total amount 
of income earned by the unemployed in the shadow economy 
is only a fraction of what others are able to earn in this 
sector. In countries in which unemployment compensation is 
only a neglegible amount the shadow economy, however, is 
often the major source of income of those who have not been 
able to manage to allocate their labour in the official job 
market. 
The improvement of the distribution of income is another 
consequence of the existence of black labour. That data 
available for most of the member states of the EEC show 
that the suppliers of irregular services usually belong to 
the lower income classes. Obviously, the shadow economy 
opens the opportunity of narrowing the income gap between 
the less privileged and the middle and upper classes. 
Shifting the economic position of those in the lower tail 
of the income distribution upwards can be expected to reduce 
economic and social tension which is a contribution to a 
socially peaceful and cohesive society. 
Finally, it has often and rightly been stated that the shadow 
economy provides a good test site for the start of new busi-
nesses . 
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Many small firms begin with first cautious steps in the 
shadow sector where the new entrepreneur tries out his 
business idea and starts to acquire a reliable clientele. 
Since the cost of entering the official market can be 
considerable the risk of failure is high. The shadow economy 
opens the chance to reduce this risk and lowers the barrier 
to market entry. The dynamics of growth in an economy gains 
if one allows the shadow economy to be the nucleus of the 
creation of new firms and new jobs. 
2. The Welfare Losses From Black Labour 
Given these obvious welfare gains from the shadow economy there 
is no straightforward answer to the question how harmful to the 
society the existence of black labour really is and how much social 
friction it produces. To get a clearer picture one must look more 
closely at the various kinds of black labour. 
First, there are shadow activities which are intrinsically per-
missive but actually illicit just because they violate some 
market regulation. The arguments for such regulations are 
manifold. Some laws are meant to guarantee fair competition, 
others are introduced to avoid environmental pollution, and so 
on. Basically it is either the existence of externalities or 
the lack of market information which makes regulations necessary. 
Externalitites are adverse effects of market transactions on 
persons not directly involved in the exchange. An example 
is the production and sale of a handgun which could easily be 
used to kill a third person. The lack of information about the 
skills of, for example, a surgeon makes it necessary to check his 
professional abilities before he is allowed to practice. 
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Since there exists no market transaction without at least 
some externality or in which contracting parties lack 
important information almost every regulation can somehow 
be justified. The problem, however, is that regulations 
also function as barriers to market entry. As such they 
violate a fairness principle: equal access to the markets 
for everybody. It is, therefore, necessary to balance 
the negative externality effect against this require-
ment of equity. 
There are obvious cases in which the violation of regulations 
can cause serious dammage to the society due to severe externa-
lities or as a consequence of the lack of important informa-
tion for one of the parties involved in a market transaction. 
Here, the restriction of market access is justified and law 
enforcement is imperative. But in many examples this is not 
so clear. Should a plumber need a license and is it necessary 
to register his business at the Chamber of Crafts, as he has to, 
for example, in West Germany? Would it not be sufficient that 
he thinks to be able to do a decent job and that his client 
trusts him? In such instances the regulation may appear as 
just a protection of those who have managed to be in the 
market rather than as a safeguard of the general welfare 
in the society. It is not surprising that people who are not eli-
gible for getting appropriate licenses but who do have the 
skills necessary to carry out a particular service do not 
feel moral restraints to offer their services in the form of 
black labour. Intuitively they consider the regulation as 
intrinsically unfair because they see them mainly as a shelter 
of market insiders against competition from outsiders who are 
willing to work for less. 
But what is more, in most cases the supplier of black labour 
is often officially employed in a job in which his work is 
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closely related to his activity in the shadow market. Thus 
he does not see why he should not continue on evenings and 
weekends on his own what he is doing during official labour 
hours under the guidance of his boss. The moral scruples to 
evade market regulations under such circumstances must be 
limited. 
Similar views are taken by the buyers of black services. To 
them the lower price they pay is justified because the job 
is carried out under less legal protection, and, in particular, 
without enforceable warranty. Tricking the administration by 
evading regulations that do not offer protection against 
obvious public nuisance is, therefore, often seen as a minor 
offense. In most cases the general public shares this view 
because, in reality, the areas in which black labour evades 
market regulations seem to be not extremely sensitive with 
respect to public order. It is mainly the crafts industries 
and the construction business in which moonlighters offer 
their services without officially qualifying for their jobs 
and without adhering to the long list of rules introduced to 
keep bunglers out of the market. 
Circumventing market regulations does not necessarily go 
along with tax evasion. Since tax authorities are in some 
countries of the Community quite efficient at monitoring 
the tax-payers a moonlighter may well decide to declare 
his income to the inland-revenue department. This applies 
at least in those cases in which tax authorities are strictly 
obliged not to use their information for purposes other than 
assessing taxes. Furthermore, tax-evasion is not alien to the 
official businesses, too. A moonlighter who evades taxes may 
feel that he is behaving like his employer whom he supposes 
to evade at least part of his taxes. In fact, much of what 
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people perceive as black labour or a shadow activity in 
many countries is just tax-evasion by the self-employed. 
Not asking for a bill in an official deal often allows the 
buyer to get a rebate while the supplier avoids the tax. 
However, we must assume that the rate of tax-evasion is 
much higher in the shadow economy than in the regular 
business sector. In this respect the general welfare loss 
from black labour is obvious. 
The nature of benefit fraud is quite similar to tax-
evasion. There is no intrinsic difference in not paying 
taxes or in unlawfully receiving a transfer from the state. 
Nevertheless, benefit fraud associated with black labour is 
often seen as less acceptable than tax evasion. For the 
majority of the employed the job is usually not a risk because 
even if the rate of unemployment is high the large majority 
is still having a job. To the members of this majority benefit 
fraud is a misuse of their own willingness to help the needy. 
Benefit fraud on a large scale may thus reduce the general 
acceptability of the public transfer system which is then 
regarded with suspicion by a large fraction of the population. 
The payers into the system may then feel exploited by the 
recipiants of social aid, unemployment compensation, and 
similar benefits. In order to reduce the friction between 
these two groups the authorities can either impose more controls 
or lower the public benefits. A third way is to legalise black 
labour by allowing the recipients of public benefits to 
supply their services on the market without any restrictions. 
This strategy if accompanied by lower public benefits amounts 
to make the poor and the unemployed to take care of themselves. 
Another perhaps more acceptable way is to make the social securi-
ty system incentive compatible so that an increase in informal 
earnings does not imply loosing the public benefit. 
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3. The balance between welfare gains and welfare losses 
and the role of the state 
Balancing the welfare gains and welfare losses from black 
labour is a matter of the weights one is willing to attach 
to the positive and negative aspects of this phenomenon. 
Certainly, the existence of even a large shadow sector does 
not put the economic and social cohesion of a society at 
stake. On the other hand, it is also not acceptable for a 
state that its citizens can make their own decisions which 
laws and regulations they are willing to abide. A policy 
of relaxing the controls, and reducing the regulations and 
lowering high public benefits seems to be an acceptable 
middle course. This strategy would allow to reduce the in-
vestment of resources in public monitoring activities. At 
the same time the violations of laws and regulations would 
remain within tolerable limits. But whether such a policy 
is seen as acceptable or not is a matter of one's basic 
political position. 
With respect to their policy vis-à-vis black labour there 
are three types of economies in the EEC. First, we have 
countries which strictly attempt to control black labour 
markets. This applies, for example, to West Germany which 
follows a policy of closely monitoring labour markets and 
punishing the evaders of regulations and taxes. Second, 
there are countries, such as e.g. Italy or other southern 
member states of the EEC, in which the number of regulations 
and state interventions is at least as large as anywhere 
else. However, the authorities of these states ignore shadow 
activities unless they exceed broad-gauged limits. A third 
type of country is Great Britain which has consistently 
deregulated its economy so that black activities have been 
whitened as the regulations disappear. France takes a position 
in between; it follows a strategy of deregulating in some 
areas and of strict controls in others. 
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Each of the three options of controlling, ignoring or 
legalising the shadow economy has its own justification. 
Monitoring and controlling is inevitable if one stresses 
compliance with current law. Ignoring the underground eco-
nomy takes into account that its size and growth is not 
sufficiently large as to deserve too much government atten-
tion. Legalising the informal sector amounts to reducing 
obstacles to economic activity in general. 
Among the three strategies controlling and monitoring the 
markets, however, is presumably the least efficient policy. 
It requires resources for which there may be better alterna-
tive uses. Furthermore, not being controlled is a value in 
itself for the citizens. The existence of large shadow 
sectors and of strong incentives to carry out transactions 
in black rather than in regular markets shows that the economy 
is suffering from fundamental imperfections in its institutions, 
People who are driven into kinds of activities which require 
evasive techniques are obstructed by the institutional frame-
work. Both, evasive techniques as well as techniques to con-
trol evasion produce waste. 
The presence of an informal sector is an indication of 
vitality of those citizens who are actually engaging in 
shadow transactions. There are people who want to do some-
thing, whatever they can,, even if it means getting around 
the rules, in order to make a living. This is part of the 
dynamics of an economy whose control may have a high price 
not only in terms of resources spent on monitoring but also 
in terms of forgone goods and services. 
Of course, every state must attempt to control activities 
which are fundamentally illicit such as e.g. organised 
crime, drug dealing, and similar offences. A strategy of 
not "too much" controlling shadow activities can only refer 
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to transactions which are at their core fundamentally per-
missible but carried out in a way that is not in compliance 
with current government law. Thus the policy of ignoring 
black labour has its limits where non-compliance with the 
law starts spilling over from petty offences in the shadow 
sector to other areas of social life. 
Also, large scale black work organised by firms in a systema-
tic way is not tolerable. The policy of ignoring black work 
seems to be appropriate if the transaction is carried out 
on an individual level even if done on a more or less regu-
lar basis. In order not to over-control an economy and to 
strangle the economic incentives of a vital part of the 
population a certain level of shadow activities should be 
accepted as inevitable. The amount of fiscal fraud in the 
form of tax-evasion in connection with black labour or of 
social security fraud by the unemployed or the poor is 
sufficiently small to be ignored without putting law 
compliance in general or social cohesion at risk. 
The third way of legalising black labour seems to be apt 
wherever regulations are predominantly devices to impede 
market entry. There are numerous disincentives for econo-
mic activities in our economies: the practice of licensing 
businesses and crafts, the tendency of our bureaucracies 
to permanently invent new rules for running businesses, 
the increasing complexity of the legal system, the obli-
gation of the firms to provide more and more statistical 
and other information, the enormous amount of paperwork 
involved in just starting a business, and many more. One 
may find a good reason for every particular regulation. 
But as a whole they amount to discourage wealth generat-
ing activities and they are thus displaying funda-
mental imperfections of our institutional framework. Deregu-
lation is an optimal policy if it means to abandon those 
laws and government interventions whose sole or main pur-
pose is to regulate intrinsically permissable forms of 
businesses. 
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Another important advantage of this legalising strategy 
confined to basically permissible transactions is its social 
acceptability. If only those activities are forbidden whose 
harmfulness is obvious to everybody then law enforcement is 
a matter not only of the state. In these cases social con-
trol is then a good substitute for policing. 
Finally, in any case is it difficult to predict how indi-
viduals react to a system of regulations. So many examples 
are known in which legislation intended to protect a certain 
group of people in the society turns out to undermine the 
welfare of this very group. Minimum wages, for example, are 
a barrier for the workers to enter the labour markets, laws 
to protect against lay-offs make employers overly cautious 
before they hire, technical provisions against accidents with 
consumer goods increases the prices of these products, etc. 
The list of such cases is almost infinitely long. Control as 
an instrument of economic and social policy should for this 
reason always be used with caution. 
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Alois Wenig, Hagen 
BLACK LABOUR IN THE EEC AFTER THE ACCOMPLISHMENT 
OF THE INTERNAL MARKET IN 1992* 
The immediate effect of the accomplishment of the internal market 
in 1992 on the shadow economy of the European Community is likely 
to be small. The country reports of the expert group show that the 
bulk of black labour in the member states of the Community is 
concentrated in the service industries, including the building 
sector and the crafts. The southern member states of the EEC, 
in particular Italy, are an exception. There, black labour is to 
some extent also used in manufacturing. Only the products of 
the manufacturing industries and to some degree also the services 
in the construction sector, however, are supplied nation­wide 
or EEC­wide whereas most other black services are traded 
locally by local people for the following three reasons: 
(i) Due to the illegal status of the transaction it is risky 
to advertise moonlighting or other shadow services in 
public. Therefore, suppliers prefer to rely on "mouth­
to­mouth" propaganda which works best if both the buyer 
and the supplier live in the same social environment 
and, in particular, if they speak the same language. 
(ii) The person who buys a shadow service from someone of whom 
he does not have sufficient information runs the risk of 
getting cheated. The best guarantee for a decent quality 
of the shadow service is knowledge about the "good­will" 
of the supplier based on information by friends, relatives, 
colleagues, or neighbours. 
♦Research sponsered by the Commission of the European Community 
under contract no. 87925 (project: Le travail au noir en Europe) 
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(iii) Most shadow services must be rendered in person. Since 
large distances imply high transaction costs for the 
supplier there is a natural geographical limit to shadow 
activities. Furthermore, many moonlighters have a 
full-time or a part-time job which makes it necessary to 
return to the same place every day. 
From this we can conclude that black labour in the EEC does not 
travel large distances so that the disappearance of national 
borders in 1992 is likely not to affect the shadow economies of 
the member states directly. The two exceptions have already 
been mentioned. First, in some countries of the EEC we can 
observe illicit teams of construction workers organised by agents 
who hire black labour from within EEC countries and to a limited 
degree also from outside. Recruiting takes place mostly among 
illegal immigrants as well as among unemployed residents of EEC 
countries. The existence of national borders restricts the 
operation of these illicit construction teams geographically. 
The disappearance of border controls in 1992 may make this hidden 
labour force more mobile. The teams could then be easily shifted 
from construction site to construction site across the Community. 
The second exception is black labour in the manufacturing indu-
stries. The free flow of goods and services within the EEC will 
make it possible for manufactured products of the shadow economy 
in the south to spill over to the northern member states. Under-
ground factories in the south produce labour-intensive goods 
such as e.g. shoes, textiles, agricultural products, etc. These 
industries will then be able to increase their competitive pressure 
on their northern counterparts so that these sectors will shrink 
in the north. It is not likely, however, that the labour-
intensive manufacturers in low wage countries will more and more 
grow out of their underground operations as their firm size 
increases. 
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As for the impact of the internal market on black labour in 
Europe in the medium as well as in the long run much will depend 
on the development of both the markets for goods and services 
and the labour markets after the national border controls will 
disappear in 1992. Since there is already now no substantial 
restriction to the movement of labour within the European 
Community the key issues, however, seem to be the economic 
consequences of an unrestricted trade of goods and services. 
Although many trade barriers have been lifted in the EEC in the 
recent two decades the national markets are still to some extent 
sheltered against competition from other countries in the 
Community by national administrative regulations, national tax 
laws, and tedious and time-consuming customs procedures. As these 
remaining obstacles to market entry cease to exist competition 
across national borders must intensify considerably. The 
crucial question is how this will indirectly affect the national 
markets for labour both hidden and official. 
If no further EEC-wide action is taken by the administrative 
bodies of the European Community in 1992 the economics of those 
countries will after a while gain a competitive edge whose wages 
and environmental standards are relatively low and whose markets 
are not overly regulated by the governments or by other power-
ful institutions (such as, for example, labour unions). As a 
consequence employment and with it the bargaining position 
of workers will improve in countries in which costs are low 
due to both cheap labour and the absence of regulations. In 
the economies with high wages and a costly regulative system 
evasive techniques may develop. In order not to loose market 
shares firms in these countries have to reduce the wage burden 
and to escape the onerous and expensive pressure of regulations. 
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The likely increase in shadow activities in high-cost-countries 
may be accompanied by a reduction of the underground economy 
in the other member states as their official rate of unemploy-
ment declines. However, two kinds of equilibrating reactions 
must be expected to occur. Firstly, wage differentials will 
disappear gradually between the economies in the EEC due to 
the competitive pressure on labour in high-wage-countries 
and the improved market position of the workers in countries 
in which pay has been low traditionally. Secondly, the firms 
which operate under the strong grip of administrative controls 
will urge their governments to deregulate in order to remain 
competitive. Since no government will allow its nationals to 
loose substantial market shares it is not unlikely to relax its ad-
ministrative and regulative controls. The firms that come under 
competitive pressure will argue that what is considered as a 
safeguard to protect the working conditions and the environ-
mental standards allows, in effect, unfair competitive practices 
by firms that can produce under more "favourable" conditions. 
Governments will have to follow these arguments and reduce the 
degree of administrative intervention in the market place so 
that the standards of regulation will gradually adjust EEC-wide. 
Thus without intervention of a central agency both wage-levels 
and the system of regulations will converge albeit this process 
is likely to be slow. 
It has often been argued that the competition from low-wage-
countries implies "social dumping". However, one must bear 
in mind that the comparative cost advantage low-wage-countries 
possess vis-à-vis the richer member states of the European 
Community leads to an EEC-wide adjustment of living-standards 
in the medium term. Thus not allowing the poorer countries to 
use low wages as an asset to improve their competitive position 
amounts to exclude them from the opportunities a common market 
can offer to them. 
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Although we 'must expect environmental standards and labour 
protection legislation to adjust Community-wide it is not 
so clear yet at what level this equilibrium will be established 
It may then well be desirable that new and better protection 
standards should be introduced for the European Community as 
a whole. The administrative bodies of the EEC will then be 
urged to fill the "regulation gap". The system of regulations 
and controls will however be shaped in a complicated political 
process whose outcome is not easy to predict at this stage. It 
is a matter of the policies chosen by the members of the EEC 
whether Europe will eventually have a system of highly deregu-
lated markets or an economy which is strictly controlled and 
monitored by administrative agencies. Historical experience 
tells us that the European Community will compromise somewhere 
in between. 
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Conclusion: Whose Problem? 
R.E. Pahl (University of Kent at Canterbury, England) 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that informal and irregular work 
appear in a variety of forms in different contexts and severally and 
collectively these forms of work pose distinctive problems and different 
opportunities. Considering the full range of reports and documents that 
have been prepared for this research initiative, it is clear that any 
attempt to construct a map of the shadow economy in Europe is a singularly 
fruitless exercise. In a previous attempt to draw together what is known 
about the relationships between the formal and informal (or hidden, 
shadow, black etc.) economies in four European countries, O'Higgins 
concluded 
'the results emphasize the diversity of national 
experiences and, therefore, the weakness of 
generalized assumptions based on the experience of any 
country.'* 
Rather than chasing after a will-o-the-wisp separate economy, most of 
the experts involved in this present exercise recognised that too great a 
concern with quantitative measures gave a spurious exactitude which the 
detailed case studies showed to be extremely misleading. Economists 
have, perhaps, been most at fault in using unreliable indicators which, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, produced wildly discrepant orders of magnitude of 
the so-called hidden economy in the various EC countries. However, in 
fairness to our colleagues many of these misleading quantitative studies 
were done some year-s ago and the most devastating critique of some of the 
M. O'Higgins, The Relationship Between the Formal and Hidden 
Economies: An Exploratory Analysis for Four Countries, pp.127-1^3 in 
W. Gaertner and A. Wenig (eds.) The Economics of the Shadow Economy. 
Springer Verlag, Heidelberg 1985, p.110. 
most widely quoted studies was written by a fellow economist. J.J. Thomas 
has pointed out that, typically, economists do not gather their own data 
and, on the rare occasions when they do, inadequate research methodologies 
can produce spurious results.* 
The detailed case studies carried out by sociologists, 
anthropologists and psychologists, that are referred to in the Reports 
relating to France, Italy, Spain and the UK in particular, provide more 
accurate data but they, too, have their problems. Those doing these 
locality or occupation based studies rarely concern themselves with the 
wider national or Community-wide implications of their work so that it is 
difficult to use such studies for comparative or cumulative understanding. 
The various documents produced under this research programme do try 
to assess the quantitative evidence and to come to some order of 
magnitude of the different forms of work in different contexts and 
qualitative studies are also used where possible to illustrate and to 
illuminate wider trends. A broad general picture of the range of 
informal work in the member states of the Community has certainly emerged. 
However, this is not the most important element of the team's work: of 
much greater significance is the focus on process rather than patterns. 
Individual experts struggled to draw out the dynamic elements in their 
respective contexts, relating the forms of informal work they described to 
wider socio-political and economic processes in member states and the 
Community as a whole. Unlike most previous attempts at surveying and 
synthesizing work in this field, the present team used their meetings, 
conferences and synthesizing chapters to make conceptual links with 
contemporary analytical approaches to labour markets and to distinctive 
* J.J. Thomas, The Politics of the Black Economy, Work, Employment and 
Society, 1988, Vol.2 (2) pp.169-190. 
forms and styles of the provision of welfare. 
This approach pointed up more sharply the role of the State and of 
employers than perhaps had hitherto been customary. Styles and modes of 
regulation and deregulation were seen to be central, as were the 
socio-political assumptions about the role of state in the provision of 
welfare. The socio-political variations that emerged accounted for many 
of the dramatic differences in what was counted as le travail au noir 
between, say, West Germany and the UK. Likewise, a common approach to 
deregulation in Spain and the UK produced similarities that may not have 
been initially expected. Some member states are more committed to 
deregulation of various forms of employment protection legislation - on 
the assumption that this will allow employers more freedom in the market 
to maintain a competitive edge over employers in other member states with 
legislation that is more 'restrictive' or more 'supportive' (depending on 
whether one is leaning more towards the interests of capital or towards 
the interests of labour). 
Some politicians may have imagined that those member states with 
apparently high levels of le travail au noir were thereby gaining some 
unfair advantage in the Community as a whole. Such an advantage might be 
the production of goods at a lower cost through the use of sweated 
informal labour or by having national accounts which underestimated the 
level of economic activity to a significant extent and hence supported a 
lower contribution to EC funds than should have been the case if all 
irregularly produced income were recorded. However, our studies 
undermine such assumptions, since a programme of deregulation can very 
soon re-label the black economy as the essential yeast of the enterprise 
culture. Once this point is grasped it is easy to see how those member 
states with the lowest levels of irregular work in the official statistics 
might nevertheless gain all the putative advantages associated with what 
is popularly understood to be 'the irregular economy'. 
Clearly a concern with precise definitions is not a matter of 
academic pedantry but a crucial part of the research task. Nevertheless 
in this concluding section it may be more helpful to focus on the politics 
of irregular work, interpreting 'politics' in the broadest possible way. 
By concentrating on the question 'Whose Problem?' readers may be able to 
use the accumulated documentation of the Research Programme on the Black 
Economy in Europe more effectively. 
I. The Concerns of Governments 
Governments are concerned with the incidence and dimensions of 
informal work for a variety of reasons, some of which may conflict with 
each other. In general, governments wish to gather a range of specific 
and general taxes efficiently. If specific forms of taxation are being 
systematically evaded, then governments are obliged to take steps to 
reduce fraud and illegal tax avoiding activity. However, this seemingly 
straightforward objective may conflict with other objectives such as 
encouraging enterprise, rewarding those who contribute to party political 
funds and creating an atmosphere of 'freedom', where bureaucratic control 
is not perceived to be overly intrusive. Some balance has to be struck 
between responding too heavily to those law-abiding citizens who resent 
the advantages some categories may have for gaining extra income or paying 
less tax and inhibiting those who may be too enthusiastically enjoying the 
enterprise culture. A good example of this tension is provided by the 
Irish Government who provided an ex gratia payment to disgruntled PAYE 
citizens who claimed that self-employed workers were able to under declare 
their tax liability. 
Some tension between maintaining social cohesion and encouraging 
individuals and enterprises to engage in activity that will stimulate 
economic growth and enhance the nation's competitive advantage is 
inevitable. Different member states solve the problem in different ways 
and it is important to recognise that the situation can change very 
rapidly. Thus, for example, part-time workers have rather limited rights 
in the UK. However, demographic trends indicate a dramatic decline in 
the labour force by the mid-1990s so that the Government and employers are 
obliged to think of ways in which more married women can be retained in 
the workforce. This may involve a return to greater regulation of 
temporary and part-time work and the encouragement of multiple job holding 
by providing tax incentives. The level of irregular work can thus rise 
or fall dramatically depending on the way government policy changes in 
response to exogenous processes. 
II. Employers 
Employers are anxious to reduce economic uncertainty by having a 
workforce with sufficient flexibility to cope with fluctuations in supply 
and demand. Casual workers in agriculture or the building trade provide 
an essential support for many concerns which could not continue trading if 
they were obliged to provide regular employment for all their workers. 
They may use 'unemployed' workers, children, women working from home, 
prisoners, young workers on a State subsidized 'training' scheme and a 
variety of other categories who are marginal in some way. Some countries 
rely on immigrants or migrant workers and one country's problem is 
another's solution. Northern countries face seasonal fluctuations in 
demand for a variety of jobs in agriculture and services and southern 
countries have seasonal demands for workers in tourism hotels and 
catering, often caused by the summer migration southwards of more affluent 
northern holiday makers. The building and construction industry has a 
need for casual and temporary workers through the member states. 
Like governments, employers are caught in something of a double bind. 
On the one hand they resist 'unfair' competition elsewhere and on the 
other hand they piously defend the freedom of the marketplace to Juetify 
their own sharp practices. There is no getting round the fact that 
competitive edge in many industrial sectors, particularly in the services 
is largely achieved through reducing labour costs. The growth of 
sub-contracting is simply one among many devices whereby employers seek to 
control the cost of the labour imputs. In the increasingly competitive 
post 1992 world, ways of reducing labour costs will be an even more 
essential part of employers' strategies. Evidently this could lead to a 
growth of irregular work and the use of migrant labour (especially in 
those countries experiencing a labour shortage for demographic reasons). 
One possible scenario would be for the Commission itself to insist on 
common regulations to control the use of marginal categories or 
immigrants. However, any attempt at such regulation would be perceived 
to be an attempt to freeze the status quo and to inhibit the growth of 
entrepreneurial challenges to established markets and producers. 
Governments wishing to protect their own employers and to provide them 
with a competitive edge may collude with them by choosing to ignore 
'irregular' employment practices either by defining them as 'regular' or 
by providing inadequate surveillance of say, the illegal employment of 
children. 
Finally, employers may collude with employees in condoning various 
forms of occupational theft. Modest amounts of pilferage of the firm's 
product or equipment may serve as a cheap fringe benefit which helps to 
keep the workforce satisfied and better controlled. A certain amount of 
'wastage' by damage or theft can be built into the accounts in such a way 
that profits are barely affected. This has the effect of stabilizing the 
workforce and maintaining loyalties, since workers may feel that a fairly 
substantial increase in wages or salary would be necessary to compensate 
for the perks or pilferage they can obtain where they are. It has been 
claimed that 'between 75 and 92 per cent of us regularly add to our 
incomes in ways that are technically against the law.'* This is largely 
through perks and pilferage at work or occupational theft as it may be 
called. This is Inevitably a large component of a putative 'hidden 
economy' and very few firms would ever call in the police to help them 
solve it. Internal policing provides some control and the occasional 
ritual sacking probably does something to maintain 'reasonable' limits. 
III. Employees 
To some extent the interests of employees are the converse of those 
of the employers in that they may in general, prefer better and more 
stable conditions of work. Workers will tend to resist the undermining 
of the power of collective labour by various employers' practices - both 
legal and illegal. However, workers may also have interests which 
encourage them to collude with employers against the State. They are 
likely to resist paying 'unnecessary' taxes and may be ready to create 
conditions of artificial overtime in order to supplement their wages. 
Women may be ready to accept less secure or illegal conditions of 
employment, if this allows them to combine paid employment with other 
forms of work. They may prefer to collude with employers rather than 
have no employment at all. 
Workers may have traditional expectations of the 'perks of the job', 
involving various occupational fiddles and a tacit understanding may be 
reached between employees and employers so that each, as it were, condones 
practices in the other side in return for a peaceful coexistence pact. 
Gerald Mars, Cheats at Work, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1982, p.1 
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IV. Self-Employed Workers and Owners of Small Businesses 
These are likely to be the heart of the irregular economy in most EC 
countries. There is considerable resistance amongst the self-employed 
throughout Europe 'to do the Government's work for it' by taxing 
themselves effectively. Many self-employed workers are adept in finding 
ways of avoiding all or a proportion of value added tax, of under-
declaring levels of profit and income, of inflating expenses, of employing 
people irregularly and paying them in cash, of using family members in a 
creatively tax evading way, of increasing benefits in kind and of avoiding 
full responsibilities in the sphere of health and safety regulations. 
These are therefore widespread practices amongst self-employed workers and 
owners of small businesses. 
Most of such tax evasion or tax avoidance is not readily welcomed by 
Governments, although there is an understanding that a too fierce attack 
on entrepreneurs would be counter-productive. New businesses inevitably 
have cash-flow problems in the early years and recourse to the informal 
economy may be a necessary survival strategy in Italy, Spain and 
elsewhere. However, many self-employed workers employ no one else and 
are not incipient entrepreneurs. They have simply re-classified 
themselves for tax avoidance purposes. Many workers in the building 
industry and certain types of small-scale agricultural workers come into 
this category. 
The growth of self-employed workers in Europe has substantially 
expanded the scope for irregular work and tax evasion.* Many EC 
governments are keen to encourage an enterprise culture and part of the 
price of the success that has been achieved is that the entrepreneurial 
* See Tables 1-5 for detailed documentation of the patterns of growth 
of self-employment in the European Community. 
spirit is extended to developing ways of defrauding the State. A not 
unreasonable corollary to the notion that Government should keep out of 
business is that business (and business profits) should be kept out of 
government. 
V. Those out of Employment 
Those who are unable or unwilling to take on formal employment either 
because jobs are scarce or because those that are available are badly paid 
or in unsatisfactory working environments will have an incentive to work 
informally if such opportunities are available. In some member countries 
paid work outside employment is tacitly encouraged as a necessary survival 
strategy in default of adequate welfare provision. In other, northern, 
countries the penalties for earning money whilst drawing benefits are so 
severe and the system is policed so effectively that scope for any 
substantial benefit fraud is considerably reduced. This is one area 
where there was complete unanimity amongst all the experts - irregular 
work amongst unemployed people is a negligible part of overall totals of 
le travail au noir. 
Despite the quantitatively unimportant nature of this work it 
nevertheless receives a disproportionate degree of public attention. 
This says more about political values and the role of the mass media than 
it does about the unemployed people themselves. It should be noted that 
real or hidden unemployment is particularly high amongst young people who 
may indeed have a strong incentive to work illegally but who have 
relatively few opportunities, especially in the northern countries to do 
so. It is arguably of greater over-all value to society for young people 
to have the opportunity to explore for themselves certain shady areas of 
the labour market, since the work ethic may be as effectively instilled 
doing irregular work as doing formal, legal employment or engaging in 
government 'make-work' schemes. 
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VI Intra and Inter Household Work Strategies 
Work done by members of families for themselves and for other family 
members, whether in the same or different households, is growing in 
Europe. This may be some form of do-it-yourself or self-building of 
domestic dwellings or it may be based on the cultivation of a small plot 
of land. Many small business such as restaurants or small shops are 
based entirely on family labour and this is particularly common amongst 
immigrants. Wages are likely to be low or paid in kind, hours may be long 
and conditions of work bad, yet the incentive to work together to build a 
home or run a business may be very strong. Typically, men control the 
labour of women and children and attempts to police this activity may be 
resisted as unwarranted intrusions in traditional practices. Formal 
rules and regulations may be infringed but ideologies of appropriate 
family or gender behaviour may be strongly entrenched amongst minority 
groups. Hence any insensitive attempts to apply universalistic principles 
could lead to confrontation. Different principles of economic 
organization are in conflict and it is important that appropriate 
sociological and anthropoligical insight is available when dealing with 
these problems. 
A number of EC countries have groups of travellers (or gypsies as 
they are sometimes derogatively labelled) who are perceived to have 
cultural values at odds with the host society. Over time a principle of 
peaceful coexistence has emerged in many contexts on the assumption that 
societies are rich enough to accommodate some diversity. Of course the 
question 'how much diversity?' remains. The whole question of inter 
cultural penetration and diversity is broader than the particular terms of 
reference that were provided for this programme of research. All we can 
do is to draw attention to the social construction of norms of economic 
behaviour amongst minority groups and to point out that one form of 
11 
economie behaviour - even when backed by the State - does not necessarily 
drive out another. Such issues raise complex questione about different 
forms of work and the social relations and cultural contexts in which they 
are embedded. Economists rarely devote much attention to these matters 
in Europe, although they may in parts of the third world. We believe it 
is necessary to point out that very little understanding of these matters 
is common amongst those developing economic policies and programmes in the 
Community. The unit of economic behaviour is seen to be the individual 
or the firm, not the- household or the family. 
Work that does not fit the economists* categories is designated as 
'informal', 'self-provisioning' or whatever. Because it is not easily 
described it is overlooked or ignored. There are many indications that 
work in and for household members by household members will continue to 
increase towards 2000. 
In Conclusion 
Posing the question 'Whose Problem?' makes it clear that research on 
the black economy in Europe cannot produce final value-free conclusions. 
There are interests that are in conflict and will remain in conflict. 
There is no way that 'better' legislation or policing could control all 
forms of irregular or informal work. Economic life is too complex and 
differentially culturally conditioned for simple economic models and 
assumptions to encompass it all. 
Post-Fordist strategies of flexible manning and the growth of 
sub-contracting is likely to produce increasingly 'untidy' patterns of 
work in the next decade. Government statistics are likely to be less 
reliable indicators as the conventional categories become outdated. The 
re-classification of forms of work will pose problems for researchers and 
confusion for administrators and politicians. There is no single 
trajectory of convergence so that southern EC countries will become more 
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like the northern or vice versa. The 'Black Economy' is not, of course, 
a separate economy but is inextricably linked up with 'the economy' tout 
court. The formal economy is becoming more diversified so that 
variations between labour markets within countries are greater than 
variations between them. One of the most interesting conclusions to 
emerge from the current programme of work was the convergence of interests 
between sociologists and economists working on labour markets and those 
working on informal work and the black economy. 
Thus there is no possibility that a final account of 'the' black 
economy in Europe can be produced. Rather than taking snapshots or 
reviewing 'the state of the art' at irregular intervals, it would be much 
more effective to maintain a modest monitoring exercise that would 
consider the changing pattern of all forms of work on a longitudinal 
basis. Analysis of process could be refined and patterns that are 
predicted could be checked for their adequacy and accuracy. Even if the 
impact of the 1992 single market is less than some people expect, it is 
certain that questions will be raised about its putative consequences that 
will require answers, even if only to confirm that the situation has not 
substantially changed. Social and economic processes that are evolving 
and changing over time cannot always be observed through the official 
statistics collected by member states. Some more regular sociologically 
informed monitoring, on however modest a scale, could have substantial 
long-term benefits. This programme of research has pointed up areas 
where our knowledge is good and revealed those areas and contexts where 
information is sparse. Some countries like France, Spain and Italy have 
good resources of quantitative and qualitative research studies. Other 
countries such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland have relatively little 
research. Some attempt to remedy these imbalances could be made by 
encouraging indigenous research and coordinating and monitoring the 
results. 
TABLE 1 
Proportion of multiple jobholders whose secondary jobs 
are in sei f-employment 
Belgium 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands . 
United Kingdom 
1979 
1979 
1977 
1979 
1977 
1977 
1985 
Percentages 
Proportion of 
all multiple 
jobholders to 
total 
employment 
(1) 
2.1 
1.7 3.2 2.0 3.6 2.2 3.3 
Proportion of 
those with 
second jobs in 
self-
employments to 
all multiple 
jobholders 
(2) 
43.6 
70.5 
53.9 
43.4 
26.5 
22.7 
33.4 
Proportion of 
multiple 
jobholders 
with second 
jobs in self-
employment to 
total 
employment 
(1) χ (2)/100 
0.9 1.2 1.7 0.9 1.0 0.5 1.1 
a) Multiple jobholders are defined as those workers who have more than 
one job at the same time. Secondary jobs are distinguished from primary 
jobs by the length of hours worked, the amount of earnings or other 
factors. 
b) Great Britain. 
TABLE 2 
Distr ibut ion of non-agricultural self-employment by industry 
Percentages 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain . 
United Kingdom 
1984 
1983 
1984 
1984 
1984 
1984 
1980 
1983 
1983 
1981 
1984 
1984 
All non-
agricultural 
industries 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mining and 
quarrying 
0.1 
0.1 
_ -
0.2 
0.2 
1.0 
_ -
0.2 
Manufac-
turing 
11.2 
14.9 
12.4 
21.5 
25.5 
9.3 
17.9 
6.9 
7.7 
22.9 
16.2 
2.2 
Construc-
tion 
10.1 
14.8 
16.0 
7.3 
9.4 
20.7 
12.6 
9.9 
8.7 
11.7 
12.8 
21.1 
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade and 
restaurants 
and hotels 
50.2 
32.7 
41.5 
29.3 
40.0 
40.4 
48.9 
57.4 
42.0 
42.5 
50.4 
36.4 
Transport, 
storage and 
communica-
tion 
2.8 
9.2 
3.3 
4.2 
9.2 
6.1 
4.7 
3.0 
3.1 
3.5 
9.7 
5.4 
Financing 
insurance, 
real 
and 
ness 
estate 
busi-
services 
9.2 
9.2 
9.1 
2.2 
7.0 
8.8 
1.3 
5.9 
11.9 
2.9 
3.1 
10.3 
Community-
social and 
personal 
services 
16.4 
19.1 
17.8 
35.5 
8.6 
14.2 
14.0 
12.9 
26.6 
12.6 
7.6 
18.3 
Unweighted average 100.0 14.2 13.4 37.4 6.7 7.9 19.3 
a) Data include unpaid family workers. 
b) Data may include some unpaid family workers 
TABLE 3 
GROWTH OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY 
Annual average growth rate in percentages 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain . 
United Kingdom 
1973-82 
1973-83 
1973-84 
1973-84 
1981-84 
1979-84 
1972-80 
1975-83 
1979-81 
1976-84 
1973-83 
All non-
agricultural 
industries 
-1.2 
1.2 
-0.4 
0.3 
-0.3 
1.0 
2.9 0.5 2.4 
0.5 1.3 
Mining and 
quarrying 
-6.1 
5.2 
-
-
7.7 
-
-
-
-
-7.9 
0.4 
Manufac-
turing 
-7.6 
-1.6 
-1.8 
-0.7 
-0.3 
-1.1 
-3.7 
-3.0 
-5.8 
-2.2 
4.5 
Construc-
tion 
-0.6 
-1.2 
0.5 
-1.4 
-4.6 
4.7 
8.2 
-3.8 
29.1 
2.6 
-0.6 
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade and s 
restaurants 
and hotels 
-0.4 
0.1 
-1.2 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.8 
4.7 
-0.9 
-1.0 
0.9 0.6 
sport, 
ge and 
Linica-
ion 
7.8 
3.1 0.4 
0.5 3.7 3.0 
0.8 3.6 4.4 
0.1 3.0 
Financing, 
insurance, 
real estate 
and bus-
ness services 
18.3 
4.6 1.5 
2.6 3.3 
25.9 
-
5.9 
29.0 
3.0 4.3 
Community, 
social and 
personal 
services 
-0.8 
4.5 1.3 
1.5 5.0 
-0.4 
-
5.2 
10.8 
1.3 3.7 
a) Data include unpaid family workers. 
b) Data may include some unpaid family workers. 
Unweighted average 
TABLE 4 
PROPORTION OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT TO CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT WITHIN INDUSTRY 
Percentages 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain b United Kingdom 
1982 
1983 
1983 
1984 
1984 
1984 
1983 
1983 1983 
1982 
1980 
1984 
Al 1 non -
agricultural 
industries 
11.7 
8.4 
9.9 8.2 
27.3 
11.4 
20.6 
7.3 4.9 
11.1 
16.3 9.6 
Mining and 
quarrying 
0.9 
6.8 
3.2 
0.2 5.3 1.8 
-
0.6 
-
6.7 
-
Manufac­
turing 
5.2 
4.9 
5.0 
4.8 25.7 
4.1 11.0 
4.5 2.6 
7.2 10.9 
3.3 
Construe-
4- 4 Λ « tion 
17.2 
14.3 
18.6 
8.8 25.4 
19.7 
20.7 
7.7 
7.5 
9.8 18.5 
32.3 
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade and 
restaurants 
and hotels 
27.0 
17.6 
23.7 
17.7 
50.0 
20.8 
43.1 
19.2 17.2 
27.8 
33.9 
16.4 
Transport, 
storage and 
communica­
tion 
4.2 
9.0 
4.2 
5.5 24.1 
8.9 13.8 
3.2 3.2 
7.7 19.1 
8.4 
Financing, 
insurance, 
real estate 
and bus-
ness services 
14.5 
11.0 
9.3 
5.4 37.2 
11.5 
8.4 5.0 9.3 
10.8 
12.6 
10.8 
Community, social and 
personal 
services 
6.0 
3.9 
9.0 
Λ 1 9.1 
1 Λ Ί 10.1 
5.5 11.3 
3.4 
5.1 
5.6 
6.7 
5.9 
10.7 6.5 16.2 21.7 9.6 12.2 6.7 
a) Data include unpaid family workers. 
b) Data may include some unpaid family workers, 
TABLE 5 
DISTRIBUTION OF NON-AGRICULTURAL SELF-EMPLOYMENT BY OCCU 
Percentages 
ON 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
1977 
1975 
1982 
1984 
1981 
1983 
1982 
1984 
1984 
All non-
agricultural 
occupations 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Professional, 
technical, and 
related workers 
14.1 
19.6 
19.7 
14.1 
16.4 
24.5 
5.9 6.6 
18.2 
Adm 
and 
inistrative 
managerial 
workers 
8.8 
8.0 12.0 
1.1 
-
7.5 8.2 5.8 
33.6 
Clerical and 
related workers 
0.4 2.4 
0.3 
_ 
1.2 
0.6 
_ 
3.1 
Sales 
workers 
45.3 
30.1 
28.4 
33.3 
41.4 
34.9 
40.3 
32.7 
5.6 
Service 
workers 
6.8 
11.2 
13.3 
15.6 
23.0 
13.4 
6.5 
13.9 
4.5 
Production and 
related workers, 
transport 
equipment 
operators and 
labourers 
25.0 
30.7 
24.2 
35.6 
19.3 
18.5 
38.6 
41.0 
35.0 
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0. Introduction 
The following qualitative monographs have been elaborated in 
order to give at least a preliminary approximate impression 
of the variety of irregular forms of employment in Italy. 
Those not signed by a different author have been written by 
myself in collaboration with Daniela Dalle Fusine and Stefano 
Cofini. 
The three monographs on moonlighting refer mainly to 
the results of a vast research program on multiple employment 
undertaken in the early eighties under the general direction 
of Luciano Gallino of the University of Turin and under the 
auspices of the Italian Council for the Social Sciences. 
This research program has produced the following seven books 
published by II Mulino of Bologna (only short titles are 
given here): 
Gallino L. , ed., Occupati^ e b :i occupât i , (Turin) 
Barsotti '0. 8< Podestà L. , edi. , Segmentazione del mercato del 
lavoro e doppia occupazione, (Pisa) 
Ragönë G.7~ ëd7, "ÊÇÕnõnuã in trasformazione e doppio lavoro, 
(Caserta) 
Reyneri E., ed., Doppio lavoro e città meridionale, (Catania) 
Paci Μ., ed., Stato^ mircato7~occüpazrañe7~TAñcoñI) 
Chiarello F., Sistema economico, bisogni sociali ' e 
occupazione, (Bari Τ 
Gallino L. , ed., 11^  kvoro e il suo doppio, (Final synthesis 
report). 
The others a.re predominantly based on personal research 
and study or on short ad hoc short qualitative 
investigati ons. 
19) 
1. The Moonlighter in the Centre-North 
In the Centre-North the pattern of production is highly 
differentiated with areas of diffuse and intensive industria-
lization and urban economies based mainly on services. In 
both cases the figure of the moonlighter cuts across all 
sectors and activities, whereas the types and intensity of 
moonlighting vary. Moonlighters hold down their main job in 
both large and small-scale industry, in the state sector and 
in commerce and services. It has been estimated that 207. of 
all employees engage in moonlighting. 
On everage, the second job increases the annual number 
of working hours by at least one third, and is a stable and 
lasting occupation. With it a worker can boost his income by 
507. of his regular wage. A factor common to all moonlighter 
is that they benefit from a system of economic, welfare and 
trade-union guarantees; this may even be considered a 
structural feature of moonlighting. By this we mean that only 
those workers, are in demand who are already covered by the 
protective system of the welfare state; consequently moon-
lighters do not compete with the unemployed. 
In general, the demand for and supply,of moonlighting 
labour i s'of the skilled kind. On the demand side, firms turn 
to moonlighters because they satisfy the need for 
flexibility, low cost and realiabi1 i ty, which is especially 
the case with skilled workers. 
The branches of industry which make use of moonlighters 
are predominantly engineering, textiles, building and all 
those activities affected by the decentralization of 
production. Indeed, in manufacturing opportunities for moon-
lighting are mostly created by decentralization. The 
implication is that moonlighting in manufacturing is a 
relatively recent phenomenon and is chiefly concentrated in 
the North in the old industrialized zones. Here, moonlighting 
plays an essential role in making it possible for small 
enterprises linked to the process of decentralization to 
acquire a high degree of flexibility and professionali ty at a 
low cost. In this perspective, the workers most sought after 
are those with skills. 
In the tertiary sector, firms mostly use moonlighters to 
cover their requirement for low-skilled labour, given that 
they generally turn to the regular market to fill skilled 
jobs. This situation results from the growth in services and 
is p¿irticularl y intense in the cities, while being less 
apparent in more highly industrialized zones. 
The demand coming from families, on the other hand, is 
based principally on the need for services at a low cost and 
to meet needs that cannot be satisfied in any other way. In 
peripheral areas this type of demand sometimes arises because 
the required services are not adequately supplied by the 
state. So, on the one hand, there is a demand for highly 
qualified non-manual labour (doctors, teachers, legal and tax 
advisors, etc.) and on the other for skilled manual workers 
(electricians, plumbers, etc.). On the whole, the market for 
moonlighting is shared equally by families and firms. 
With regard to the supply side, the principal motive for 
moonlighting is economic and these workers exploit the 
professional capacity of their main job or skills acquired in 
previous occupations. The moonlighter is predominantly male, 
at the peak of his working life and has a family with 
children. Despite its being an irregular and non-protected 
activity, moonlighting provides stable opportunities since it 
offers services required by the market at a suitable quality-
price ratio. 
Moonlighting in the Centre-North can be divided 
schematically into four standard types. 
- non manual skilled labour by the head of a family (often 
his wife works as well) usually involving a professional 
servi ce; 
- the skilled manual labour of technicians and workers who 
exploit the skill of their first in their second job. In this 
case, too, the moonlighter is the head of a family and often 
has a working wife. They are not engaged in any 
entrepreneurial activity; 
- manual work with some degree'of skill supplied to families. 
This kind oi moonlighter is male and his wife is generally a 
housewife (workers undertaking small-scale repair jobs in the 
home not on an entrepreneurial basis); 
-unskilled labour supplied equally to small firms, families 
and shops by the heads of traditionally extended families, in 
which more than one member is working. 
Research undertaking shows that these four types of 
moonlighters have the same incidence in the large industrial 
cities of the North, while the peripheral economies make more 
use of the self-employed and manual services to families. 
2. The Moonlighter in the South 
Investigations carried out in different parts of Italy have 
highlighted the strong correlation between the economic 
structure and the type of moonlighting engaged in. Therefore, 
it is necessary to state at the outset that in the South 
there are areas of recent but vigorous industrialization, 
areas with little industrialization and a well developed 
public sector and, lastly, areas in which the difficult 
development of the industry exists side by side with a large 
share of employment in agriculture and the public sector. The 
situations in the industrialized areas are like those in the 
North. 
In the others, however, particular features may be noted, 
which we will use to roughly sketch the figure of the moon-
lighter in the South. He lives in an area with little 
industry where regular guaranteed jobs are mostly in the 
public sector. In the South also, the moonlighter has a 
regular job with all the guarantees and possesses 
occupational skills in great demand. For this reason, he is 
high up in the hierarchy^ of blue and white-collar employment. 
In those areas with no industrialization 70% of main 
jobs are in the public sector and are equally distributed 
between manual and non-manual activities. The clearly 
predominant occupational figure is that of the teacher. 
Theachers account for more than one quarter of all moon-
lighters. Other cathegories are engine-drivers and drivers, 
public employees, caretakers and janitors, doctors and 
nurses. 
Moonlighting jobs continue without interruption and are 
in the overwhelming majority of cases of a self-employed kind 
and supplied for many years. Moonlighters exploit the 
flexibility in working hours and possibility of managing 
independently the workload in their main jobs. In other 
words, moonlighting leads to a 'controlled absenteeism' which 
arouses no reaction on the part of superiors or colleagues. 
A condition which is just as important in making moon-
lighting possible is the supply of entrepreneurial experience 
and skills in demand by the market. The second job often 
generates micro-entrepreneurial initiatives (professional 
practices, craft workshops, private clinics, commercial 
undertakings, etc.). 
The abilities exploited in the second job have either 
been acquired in previous occupations or belong to the main 
job. This is true predominantly for the self-employed, while 
there are cases of wage workers who moonlight in activities 
unconnected with their main job. The closest fit between 
first and second occupations occurs with doctors, engineering 
workers, bricklayers and carpenters. Other occupations, 
including teaching, reveal considerable differences between 
the first and second job. It frequently happens that a 
teacher of technical subjects engages in secondary activities 
of a professional kind. 
Second jobs are undertaken above all in the tertiary 
sector, in commerce and in teaching and health services; 
nevertheless they are also present in building, traditional 
manufacturing and agriculture. 
The demand for moonlighters comes from families and 
firms. Working for more than one firm is less frequent than a 
privileged relationship with a single client. THe self-
employed are often 'entrepreneurs' with their own 
organization who supply their professional skills to firms 
(public accountants, tax consultants, etc.) or to families 
(doctors). Skilled manual workers generally do have their own 
organization and moonlight mainly for families (plumbers, 
electricians, aerial fitters, etc.). Furthermore, in almost 
all cases moonlighters are middle-aged and married with a 
family of 3-4 dependents. 
An important motive for engaging in moonlighting is the 
economic one, especially where the demand for the weaker 
groups of workers (young people and women) is particularly 
low, that is, where rates of growth are lowest. In such cases 
the economic pressure on the head of the family is very 
great. A not insignificant factor, however, for certain 
professional groups is the motive of personal satisfaction, 
which is much more the case here than in the North. 
The characteristics of the moonlighter summmarized above 
highlight the fact that the income from the second job does 
not so much serve to alleviate grave economic distress. 
Insteas it serves to integrate middle-high social and 
economic positions and produces a relative privilege over· 
other employed groups. 
Given that the rate of youth unemployment is high, even 
among those with diplomas or degrees, we cannot but emphasize 
that the need to supplement family incomes reduces in 
practice opportunities for the younger generation to join the 
labour market« However, the fact that moonlighters and the 
unemployed are not in competition with one another also 
applies in the South. 
A particular figure found in some areas of the South is 
that of the worker-peasant; tied to certain contexts still 
agricultural in nature he is characterized by the following: 
- a complete lack of connection between the abilities 
required in the first and second jobs; 
- an economic motive for moonlighting alongside self-
consumption in a subsistence economy; 
- a high level of integration in the locality, community and 
family structure. 
In some cases the relation between agriculture and 
industry gives rise to forms of underemployment and moon-
lighting dealt with in another report. 
The casual moonlighter 
From a structural point of view, there is no substantial 
difference between a casual and a permanent moonlighter. The 
economic basis and social motives are the same, and their 
activities take place in the same sectors and areas of the 
country. This observation, however, must be evaluated in 
terms of three conditions: 
- i s the casual nature of the work determined by the type of 
demand? 
-- is it a conscious choice on the part of the moonlighter? 
- does it arise from factors such as the seasonal nature of 
the work or drawing on the state redundancy fund? 
In cases where the lack of continuity is a choice of the 
firm, the moonlighter is constantly on offer and his use 
depends on the economic cycle, that is, on the requirements 
of production and services. Thus firms use moonlighters only 
when they really need them, as a flexible element in 
production and a temporary stopgap in periods of over-
production. Thus it can be asserted that moonlighting by 
these workers indicates an upturn in the economy and the 
imminent creation of new jobs. This kind of moonlighter is 
clearly a less skilled worker and they work on a casual basis 
because they are unable to find a permanent second job. 
Moonlighters who undertake services for families are as a 
rule excluded from this category, which comprises above all 
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housewives and pensioners. 
A more specific and interesting type of casual moon-
lighting is that depending on the moonlighter's conscious 
choice, that is, when he decides to offer his services on an 
occasional basis. Here there are four main significant cases: 
- a highly skilled worker offers his services at a very high 
price and only accepts very remunerative work; he is able to 
do so because of his strong, in some respect dominant, 
position on the labour market; 
- the worker who wishes to change jobs and goes through a 
kind of trial period in his new activity, whether as a wage-
worker or self-employed; 
- the worker who does not normally moonlight, but needs money 
for specific contingencies; 
- lastly, there is the case of the worker who engages in 
moonlighting in order to help his family or a relation. 
The first case is typical of the more highly skilled 
workers, who offer their services to both families and firms. 
A 'trial' period prior to changing jobs is especially 
frequent among the self-employed. They engage in a 
specialized activity outside normal working hours to see how 
the market responds; for example, a public accountant starts 
to keep the books for a small enterprise to see whether there 
is a possibility of opening his own office, etc. This kind of 
transition also involves some wage workers. However, these 
forms of temporary activity are not socially stable and here 
moonlighting loose its specific social and economic 
characteristics. What we are basically dealing with are 
situations of adjustment; there are always a number of 
workers in this condition, but they are always different 
persons. 
Temporary needs lead to moonlighting. In this case, 
those involved are not necessarily skilled; in fact, most of 
the work is of a marginal kind, 'anything that can be picked 
up'. Moreover, there is no matching of acquired skills with 
types of moonlighting jobs. Here too, there are a 
considerable number of housewives and blue-collar workers. 
Their clients are mainly families and the work is chef 1 y in 
services (maintenance, transport, housework, etc.). Help from 
family members is another important source of casual moon-
lighting and takes place in craft, trades, building (also in 
conjunction with self-help building) and commerce. The type 
of work is in the overwhelming majority of cases unskilled 
and is undertaken occasionally or, more frequently, 
seasonally: at Christmas in commerce, during the dry season 
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in building, and in July and August in tourism, etc. 
The last sources of casual moonlighting are the state 
redundancy fund and seasonal activities. The latter 
correspond to the above-mentioned help by family members, 
with the difference that the work is supplied to third-
parties; the times, methods and sectors involved are the 
same. The number of these kinds of moonlighters is very high, 
above all in tourism and seasonal activities. A 
characteristic common to all sectors and areas is the low 
skill content and precarious nature of the work. 
Lastly, a phenomenon of great quantitative and social 
importance is represented by those workers benefiting from 
the state redundancy fund who undertake casual jobs. In 
reality, where firms are involved in a löng-running crisis, 
moonlighting becomes a normal phenomenon based on the 
guarantees offered by the first job, while the whole of a 
workers's time is dedicated to his second job. The most 
numerous group are workers at all the various skill levels. 
The phenomenon affects across the board all sectors and every 
area of the country. In some zones with many firms in crisis, 
there exists in practice a second parallel labour market, 
which means a real reduction in the number of job 
opportunities. The use of this kind of labour is particularly 
intense in sectors subject to less control by society, that 
is, craft production and building and, of course, services to 
fami 1 i es. 
4. Irregular industrial labour linked to chains of sub-
contracting in the Centre-North. 
The locality for this segment of the labour market is the 
advanced industrial zone. By this are meant thos highly-
industrialized areas characterized by a strong concentration 
of activities providing a reduced amount of added value and 
tending to become less competitive. 
A typical case is that of zones centered on textiles and 
clothing. Owing their growth to the low cost of labour, now 
that this competitive factor no longer exists, they manage to 
maintain a modest income by the use of irregular labour to 
keep costs down. Besides textiles and clothing the use of 
subcontracting has developed in traditional engineering and, 
above all, in small-scale carpentry. 
1 0 
None the less, even if in less typical forms, irregular 
labour is present in all sectors in which it is possible to 
separate production processes or hire out certain tasks. 
Consequently, building maintenance and transport show a high 
incidence of irregular labour. In these cases, however, there 
is no concentration within given areas. 
Geographically speaking, irregular work is widespread in 
all the northern part of Italy, but concentrated in the older 
industrialized areas where economic and social integration is 
at a high level. From an economic perspective, it is simple 
to use and is part of the process by which leading firms 
progressively decentralise less profitable productive 
activities to outsiders. The end links to this chain of 
production are usually microfirms which have recourse to 
irregular labour in order to make ends meet. Normally, there-
fore, it is not the direct employer who benefits from the 
lower cost of irregular labour, but the large enterprise at 
the top end of the chain. 
Given that the activities providing greater added value 
are usually those which are closer to the end market, and 
often those of a commercial nature, the irregular work done 
in outside firms usually concerns the initial processes of 
production. In textiles and clothing the leader firm keeps 
for itself the activities of quality enhancement, styling and 
marketing; in engineering those involving assembly and 
incorporation of technologically advanced components. 
This allows us a better understanding of the concept of 
'mature industry'. This does not necessarily apply to a whole 
sector as much as to particular processes making up the 
productive cycle. The fashion industry is in itself neither 
at a 'mature' stage nor of a low added value kind and the 
same can be said for large parts of engineering. The result 
is that this type of irregular labour is in most cases of the 
low-skilled kind and concentrated in craft firms. 
The irregular nature of this work is not comprised 
essentially of clandestine labour (though this does exist) 
but arises, rather, through a partial non-application of 
several regulations concerning employment. For adult workers 
this means first of all the non-payment of overtime, extra 
unrecorded payments, and a number of working hours not stated 
in the contract. Besides all of this, there are also in the 
case of young workers fictitious contractual wages. As a 
consequence, the worker surrenders a portion of his wage to 
the employer who thus enjoys a further undeclared income, 
which often makes up a considerable part of his total 
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earnings. Workers accept this situation just so that they can 
work. In fact in the older industrial zones there has been a 
high rate of job loss in general and in the larger concerns 
in particular. As a result, there is widespread fear of 
losing one's job, which due to the low average level of 
qualification means leaving the job market for good. If this 
economic motive is added to the situation in geographical 
terms (the concerns in question are often concentrated in the 
vallies of the North and, at any rate, in zones with a high 
level of social integration) it is easy to understand why the 
system of subcontracting is protected by a conspiracy of 
silence. In this way the system preserves itself and its 
reproduction is guaranteed by parents who introduce their 
children into the mechanism so that they are guaranteed work. 
They show little desire for their children to study which 
would prevent them taking up a job at the earliest moment 
possible. It is a fact that an adult worker with family 
dependents finds it objectively difficult to enter the sphere 
of irregular work. 
Therefore, more than the earnings the main motive is 
obtaining employment. This is also true because in these 
industrial zones average family income is, as a rule, 
satisfactory; all the mebers of the family manage to work 
either on a regular or irregular basis. 
The aspiration of the more highly skilled among these 
partial l,y irregular workers is to get a foothold in the 
system of subcontracting, that is, to become independent. 
They are often successful in this i n as much as the strategy 
of each entrepreneur within theis system is to have as many-
firms as possible upstream onto which he can offload his 
costs, thereby reproducing the mechanism by which production 
is decentralised. Moreover, the employers themselves often 
offer their employees the opportunity to set up their own 
firm, giving them financial assistance, or more frequently, 
selling them old machinery at a cheap price. 
In effect, the outcome to which this situation tends is 
the subcontracting of labour and in many 'mature' industrial 
zones this is already a common practice. Neither is it a 
coincidence that several old industrial zones equal, and in 
some cases surpass, the innovative areas for the number of 
new firms set up. However, this is inevitably a sign of 
further decline rather than of growth. 
It is clearly difficult to extend the control over this 
segment of the labour market due to its characteristic 
conspirancy of silence. The effects of a stricter regulation 
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would be very negative for employment, since they would 
spread along the entire chain of decentralization as far as 
the leader firm. 
5. Irregular work linked to chains of subcontracting in the 
South. 
(by Rosaria Faucello, Progetto Meridione, Messina) 
Two mechanisms characterise subcontracting in the South of 
Italy; the first involves both products for export and 
products for . internal consumption, whilst the second 
mechanism treats the manufacture of machine tools. However, 
both mechanisms can be seen as expressions of the same logic 
that is, as divisions of the productive process itself. 
As far as the sub-contracting of finished products is 
concerned, the various contracts are "farmed out" to several 
different workshops, each of which individually and 
autonomously acquires the necessary machinery for production, 
as well as finding and funding the labour. A part of the 
labour-force in these workshops will receive a work contract 
which is strictly in accord with Italian law, and each of 
these workers will enjoy at least the minimum guarantees of 
the contract, together with the benefits of social security 
payments made on their behalf by the employer; this enables 
the employers to justify (for tax reasons) certain outgoing 
payments. A second group of workers are what is called 
locally "black market workers": that is, they have no 
contract, and in consequence no statutory rights; their 
employer does not inform the authorities that the worker is 
in fact working, and in consequence the employer does not pay 
any social security contributions, taxes etc in respect of 
these workers. 
The percentage of these "black-market workers" has gone down 
in South Italy in recent years, partly because new laws have 
reduced the tax burden on employers, and partly because of 
the introduction of "training contracts" which permit wages 
below the national category minimums to be paid for up to 2 
years, if there is a significant component of training of the 
worker. Nevertheless, there remains a number of workers who 
receive an economic treatment which is in line with the legal 
constraints, but who prefer not to be contracted according to 
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the law, so as not to lose seniority in the waiting-lists at 
the Labour Exchange, as they hope sooner or later to receive 
a work contract as a State employee. A further group prefers 
not to be contracted legally; this activity is for them 
secondary, as they have other work. 
The central issue is to establish whether or not these 
processes can be considered to constitute an expansion of on 
the part of the sub-contracting companies in the districts 
they are situated in. 
The problem associated with this type of subcontract are 
manifold and are related to the process of production. 
For example, in some cases, raw materials are supplied in a 
semifinished state by the sub-contracting company itself 
(which, for convenience, we shall call the "mother company" 
from hereon); this occurs so as to guarantee uniformity of 
production, the mother company receiving back the finished 
product. In yet other cases, the mother company furnishes the 
unworked raw material together with a production 
specification, and all the phases of production are carried 
out in entirety outside the mother company. 
Furthermore, as far as the relationship between the 
contracting and the contracted companies are concerned, the 
manufacturing company is rarely concerned in the distribution 
of the finished product, in so far as the mother company 
usually has its own wel 1-developed and defined commercial 
structure, and so looks after all aspects of the 
commercialisation of the end product. 
At this point, it. is necessary to underline that quality 
control is the principal problem in any production system 
which relies on sub-contracting. Since, clearly, the actual 
manufacturing is divided among different production units, it 
follows that accurate and reliable quality control is 
necessary so as to obviate the possibility of different 
qualities of the same article simply because made in 
differing workshops. Unfortunately, however, the same 
article (for example mechanical tools, or packages of 
textiles) may sometimes be affected by this division of 
production. This does not happen when the production cycle is 
carried out wholly in one single productive unit. At the same 
time even increasing levels of specialization in the 
productive process permit continually higher qualitative 
standards to be reached and the complete control of the cycle 
means that it is possible to intervene with convections in 
sufficiently good time. 
The production of single parts however has different 
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implications. This type of production usually occurs in 
establishments which specialize in single phases of the 
production and which succeed in obtaining high qualitative 
standards; though these remains a basic problem, that is the 
synchronization of the time.taken to produce the single 
pieces and of the final assembly of the parts into the 
finished product. 
As regards the individual productive units, the people most 
likely to take out these forms of subcontract very often 
consist of family nuclei, which are extended to include other 
entities extraneous to the family, often consisting of 
emigrants who have returned from working abroad in the same 
sector of production; sometimes they are approaching the 
world of production for the first time and for this reason do 
not succeed very easily in coming up to production standards. 
These productive units, or more exactly workshops, are often 
situated in the most important towns of a province, whether 
on account of the number of inhabitants or on account of the 
infrastructure (motorway exits, etc.) rather than in the 
provincial capital or even cities in the interior or in the 
mountains. Another of the characteristic of this form of 
production contract is that the individuals concerned are 
able to scrape together a sufficient or nearly sufficient 
income, in contrast to what happened in the past when "black 
market" work was in every way penalized in economic terms. 
For example signora Franca (who has worked for 20 years 
abroad in the same sector of production) has organized a 
specialized workshops in one of the final phases of 
production, receives the help of her older children and at 
weekends that of her husband who usually work as a mason, but 
who uses some of his free time off work helping with the 
maintenance or construction of the tools necessary for his 
wife's work. About six women are engaged in the work, four of 
them young and unmarried and two of them middle-aged. They 
may be required to work even on public holidays, their wages 
amounting to around 500/600 thousand lira per month; for work 
done outside working hours or on public holidays they are 
paid according to how much they produce. 
Signora Pina, who worked for 14 years abroad in a chemicals' 
factory, on returning to Italy, helped her husband (a former 
mason who had emigrated abroad) to organize the running of a 
workshop in the ground floor of their house. For about two 
years she helped her husband to instruct the girls in the 
various phases of production, finally taking over direct 
management of the workshop, leaving her husband to deal with. 
the commercial contacts with the exterior and the aquisition 
and maintenance of the machines. About ten women work in the 
workshop, almost all of them young and unmarried, their wages 
coming to around 550 thousand lira per month» They work eight 
hours a day for five days a week and sometimes work on 
Saturday mornings, but rarely do overtime. 
One point that signora Pina's business has in common with 
that of signora Franca is their income, which comes to around 
two million lira per month, excluding the expenses incurred 
by the business itself and excluding the contribution paid to 
cover insurance for the people regularly employed. 
Another point in common is that they both returned to Italy 
to enable their children to study and to permit them to find 
a less strenuous form of work than the work they were given 
as emigrants (being of the persuasion, perhaps not 
incorrectly, that the son of an emigrant tile-maker abroad 
can be nothing other than a tile maker himself), even though 
they may have been aware that it would have been easier at 
that time for their children to find work abroad than in 
Italy. 
There are other emigrants who have returned, this time from 
the cities of Nothern Italy, moving back to their village of 
origin or to another one nearby because they were tired of 
working in factories, or wished to spend their retirement in 
places more familiar to them, or because they were worried 
about their children's future in a large city which might 
well have offered work but also offered many temptations and 
dangers. This is the case of signor Giuseppe who after 
having lived for 20 years in Turin, working first in a 
factory and then working for himself as a carpenter, started 
up a new and completely different business, employing his 
wife, his two oldest daughters and a group of six girls 
including nieces and daughters of acquaintances. He bought 
part of the machinary indispensible for production and 
received some of it on loan or hived it from his contracting 
company. 
Almost all the girls working in the workshop are legally 
employed, receiving the minimum wage agreed by the trade 
unions, and work eight hours per day except on Saturdays. 
Their salary amounts to around 500/600 thousand lira per 
month. If they do overtime, they are paid according to their 
output. 
Even though these workshops are located ih different places, 
and are distant from each other, there have been exchange of 
information between them about possible local contractors, 
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about the various phases of the manufacturing process, even 
to the point of arranging exchanges or loans of machinery 
and spare parts (unable to be found quickly in a particular 
locality). Thus they are able to alter their production in 
rapid response to the changing.demands of the contract 
company or of the market. 
Hidden family labour within diffused industrialization 
The object of our attention is not the help provided by 
family members in craft or commercial activities which, 
although irregular in terms of 'regulations concerning 
relations of work, aim to increase the family firm's income. 
What we are interested in is the work carried out in the 
family for outside clients, which often takes on the features 
of any normal· job. 
This kind of work is the 'most irregular and 
speculative' end result of the decentralization of 
production, dealt with in the observations on industrial work 
linked to chains of subcontracting. It differs from the 
latter, however, both in the main sectors concerned and, 
partly, with regard to the geographical areas and social 
figures involved. 
In geographical terms, we do not necessarily have 
concentration within sectors and economic-social integration. 
Hidden family labour .is also present in metropolitan and 
urban contexts; it can easily come into being in any place 
where there is a sufficient level of industrialization and, 
consequently, there is a need for complementary or marginal 
services or processes of production. In addition to the 
typical form which appears in industrialized zones, there are 
analogous forms in areas that may be backward, but are 
characterized by a high concentration of commercial 
act i vi ti es. 
It is possible that this form of labour may appear in 
all sectors where highly intense labour is required for 
irregular fixed periods. Typical are the sector of small-
scale assembly (electronics, engineering, toys, cheap 
jewellery) and that of artistic craftwork and 'processes that 
can be carried out in basements or workshops', for which a 
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single-function machine is sufficient. 
Normally this kind of work does take place within a 
proper enterprise and from the welfare and tax viewpoint it 
is essentially clandestine. To be more exact, it is semi-
regular in only some sectors where industrial work is done in 
the home (in textiles and clothing) or in the case of craft 
family firms engaged in heavier manufacturing processes 
(engineering and plastics); these latter activities are more 
easy for the tax authorities to identify. 
It is usually the case that one member of the family 
carries out a standard average amount of work; this is always 
the wife for textiles and clothing, small-scale assembly, 
cheap jewellery and copying and secretarial jobs, and the 
husband for engineering, plastics and small-scale 
maintenance. When there is a peak of work, the whole family 
helps and it is in such moments that the irregularity of the 
work is at its greatest. These situations are very frequent 
in. as much as the client employer has no economies of scale 
and tends to set the remuneration as low as possible. 
Therefore the workers continually ask for more work in order 
to boost their income. 
The average earnings for the hours worked tend to 
decrease marginally. Thus we are dealing with pure 
subcontract work or the direct selling of piece-work. As i n 
all cases of piece-work, it is in the employers's interest to 
be able to meet peaks of demand without making further 
investment and to reduce unit costs by lowering piece-rates 
in real terms. This is achieved by constantly increasing, 
productivity or the number of hours worked. 
As this work is predominantly clandestine, ther is also 
a need further upstream for incomes beyond the control of the 
tax autorities. The implications is that the sectors involved 
are also marginal or very close to the consumer markets, 
where it is easier to sell without an invoice and build up 
the required reserve of undeclared earnings. 
A further factor differentiating this kind of work from 
the chains of subcontracting is motivation. Here it is purely 
economic and the work is concentrated among the poorest and 
least skilled pockets of the population. The greatest 
concentration is among recent immigrants, at present those 
coming from Africa or the Far East. 
For the other low-income segments of society, this 
irregular form of work is often integrated by legal 
employment of at least one member of the family. Among other 
things« this guarantees that there is access to all parts of 
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the welfare system. In this sense irregular family labour 
intersects with moonlighting. 
Career prospects are non-existent; there is almost no 
possibility of setting up a company; and the levels of social 
integration are minimal. Often this family activity, whether 
principal or secondary, is even kept a secret. There is an 
obvious social reason for this: people do not like to admit 
that they have such a marginal role. There is also, however, 
an economic reason: the fact that no skill is required means 
that workers are easily replaced, with the constant risk of 
being excluded from the system. In any case, this kind of 
work is completely precarious; the fact that clients/ 
employers blackmail their workers is inherent in this type of 
working relationship. This is so despite the sustained demand 
for these workers given the low cost of their labour. 
Those involved in this kind of activity live in constant 
hope of escaping such an existence and are continually 
searching for a regular and socially more acceptable job. 
However, where they do manage to find one, there is a 
tendency to maintain the hidden family work in order to 
supplement their income or pass the work onto other family 
members or friends. In this way the mechanism is 
automatically kept going and reproduces itself. 
The entire phenomenon of moonlighting is closely tied to 
the family structure, but in this specific case the role of 
the family is essential. Hidden family work forms a basis and 
tends to preserve the traditional type of family. the demand 
for this kind of work- is, therefore, concentrated in those 
families in which patriarchal relations are present or 
predomi nant. 
7. Casual informal work by young people in metropolitan areas 
Demand for this group of young workers is determined by the 
growth in commercial services and by the preservation and 
even increase of a large number of low-skilled jobs. This is 
unlike the situation in industry. also on a craft basis, 
where there i s a constantly rising need for a more highly 
qualified workforce. 
With regard to the supply side, the young casual worker 
has in common with other young people the fact that he is 
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dependent on his original family. The result is that work 
loses the significance as a path to independence and 
participation in adult life which it had for his parents. 
Neither has he any particular expectations of, plans for or 
money to invest in a specific activity. It serves merely as a 
means to earn money while awaiting something better. 
Moreover, remuneration is evaluated subjectively 
according to the needs that it satisfies (to run a car or 
moped; for clothing; going out with friends). It is almost 
never related to the social usefulness of the work 
undertaken, the effort put into it, or the risk involved. 
The main types of casual young workers in cities are: 
- students, often at university, who do a job for a modest 
income for a few hours a day or days per month; 
- eighteen-year-olds who, having finished school and waiting 
to find a 'proper' job or to do military service, take on any 
kind of work so as to have a bit of money; 
- very young persons who possess only a middle school 
certificate, often unsuccessful at school, and are often told 
to find a job by their families, but who have great 
difficulty introducing themselves onto the regular job 
market. 
The incidence of these young workers is practically 
impossible to establish. Consider the fact that,.in as far as 
educational qualifications are indicative, throughout the 
1980s the workforce between the ages of 14 and 29 has been 
just above 7 million. More than half of these have only a 
middle school certificate. The growing number of enrolments 
in high school, which confirms a spontaneous raising of the 
school-1eaving age (continually .postponed at official levels) 
is met. by high rates of failure, mostly concentrated in the 
first two-year period. 
The types of work undertaken are of many various kinds. 
But they have in common the low level of skill, the 
precarious nature, and the impossibility of learning a trade 
or starting a career. In commerce, for example, there is the 
door-to door selling of products for the home (plastic bags, 
plasters, deodorants) interviewing leading to a sale (the 
latter is often entrusted to a different person with more 
experience who arrives by date; this is especially the case 
for electrical household goods, linen, books) the simple 
handing 'out of advertising or promotional material. Often 
economic success depends on the nature of the young person, 
who invariably' starts off by saying: "I'm a student,..." 
Still within commerce, a traditional opening in informal 
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work for very young persons in the figure of the 'shop-boy' 
has narrowed for a series of reasons; 
- greater controls over the workforce have gradually almost 
entirely eliminated house delivery; 
- in some areas (bars, restaurants, hotels) which in certain 
localities still have a seasonal demand, the importance 
attached to the service to the customer, increasingly 
attentive and demanding, makes it more convenient to use 
partially trained personnel (for example, from the Centres 
and Schools for Occupational Training) or, at any rate, 
experienced workers; 
Furthermore, in the metropolitan areas several jobs 
involving hard work (dishwasher, kitchen helps, cleaners) are 
increasingly the preserve of coloured immigrants. 
In other contexts, too, in which a young person 
traditionally learnt a trade on the spot (hairdressers, 
beauticians, general shop-assistants) a overall improvement 
in the services offered has lead to a greater stability in 
the workforce and the use of those from the Professional 
Training Schools. Lastly, the entire branch of commerce has 
felt the effects of a notable expansion. The number of 
clients served by a single enterprise is often limited, to 
the extent that the labour of the owners is sufficient (often 
these are family enterprises). 
The sector which at present uses the casual labour of 
young workers most is that of services to persons and, 
occasionally, to firms. Within this very wide sector there 
are the pony express delivery boys, baby sitters, escorts, 
the young persons who queue up for certificates and tickets, 
those who make bookings, etc. They work for agencies, are 
paid by the hour or for each delivery, and decide when and 
how much they work. To use the words of one employer, they 
are 'self-employed' workers; the pony express delivery boys 
even own their means of transport. 
Last of all, -there are several casual jobs which are 
undertaken by young people that differ from those described 
so far. Such jobs have a quite definite professional content 
and often pave the way to permanent employment in a 
profession engaged in at first only on a casual basis. These 
are services of an intellectual or artistic nature, which are 
not second jobs merely because the young person is still 
studying. What we have here ares 
- university students who give private lessons; 
- students or graduates in graphic-artistic subjects who 
carry out portraits, photographs, designs for professional 
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night-clubs, 
variety 
studios; 
- musicians working on a casual basis in pubs, 
etc. 
It is undoubtedly difficult to bring the great 
of informal activities described under one category. Never-
theless, if we wish to look for characteristics common to all 
the activities listed, the first observation to make is that 
a considerable number of needs are met by this segment of 
labour, and the mass of money involved is mostly undeclared. 
Not only is it difficult for the tax authorities to check on 
this type of work, but other kinds of control are difficult, 
above all everything concerning the protection and health of 
young workers. On the other hand, the young workers 
themselves show almost no interest at all for anything which 
does not touch on remuneration alone, since they consider 
this kind of work as entirely temporary. 
The possibility of these work experiences leading to 
more stable jobs in terms of a contract and professional 
content depends in reality more on the movements of the 
labour market than the attitude of the worker. For the more 
alienated stratum of young people the casual provision of 
services is not a transitory stage on the way to more 
satisfying jobs, but the only possibility of being able to 
work. 
8. Young workers in innovative fields 
This section of young workers, which is not yet very large, 
reveals several important new features, resulting from a 
different. conception of work on the part of new generations. 
In practice this form of work takes on one of two legal 
forms: the co-operative or the micro-firm. 
The sector in which these activities predominate is that 
of services, to persons and to firms: 
- there are young people working in the field of informatics 
in small companies, which find it more convenient to use 
casual workers rather than hire new personnel; 
- another particularly suitable area is that of free-time 
activities; groups of animators, mime artists, musicians 
entertain children and old peole on special occasions 
(festivals, fairs, summer events in towns); 
- groups which organize games at birthday parties; 
- groups which devise audio-visual material for educational 
or promotional purposes; 
- groups which organize trips and cultural exchanges; 
- helpers in various areas of the social services (old 
people, the unemployed, persons in a phase of recovery). 
Services are not, however, the only sector in which 
these new forms of youth work find expression. Co-operatives 
of young people, in some cases recovering from problems of 
drugs or social maladjustment, work in agricultural running 
farms or as craft co-ops making artistic products. 
Another sector of activity is that involving the 
environment, ecology and alternative agriculture. Here we 
find young people engaged in maintaining or recuperating 
areas of the environment which are at risk or already 
damaged. A further sector is that connected with 
restructuring and renovating buildings. In many cases the 
client is a public body (town-hall, provincial assembly, 
schools, associations). These activities which are 
discontinuos and often carried out by young people who are 
still studying are, from a qualitative perspective, clearly 
distinct from, and in some cases the reverse of, casual work. 
There is a strong motivation underlying the undertaking 
of such work, which also fits in well with their personal 
projects for the future. Young people generally attribute to 
these kinds of jobs two importnat functions: they are jobs 
that they 'like' to do and in which they can give expression 
to their own abilities in an independent manner. The elements 
of repeti ti veness and compulsion, which are to be found in 
such work, appear irrelevant compared to the advantages from 
sei f-management and collaborating with a peer group. 
The young people involved in these types of activities 
are almost exclusively graduates or holders of diplomas. In a 
few rare cases, they ave gained considerable experience in a 
particular job, an experience which they have completed by 
themselves on a theoretical level. However, for this kind of 
work a notable level of knowledge is acquired outside of the 
official educational channels, which are seriously behind the 
time in certain fields (for instance, audiovisual aids). 
Therefore, this kind of work still maintains an element of 
amateur committment which is so important for young people 
and very rare in other sectors and contractual relations. 
Remuneration is important not only relative to young 
people's needs but also often, and above all, to the value 
and rarity of the service given. These young people are 
of 
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constantly learning and updating themselves, which is often 
indispensable in order to stay in the market. 
The frequent dependence on their original families is 
related to convenience, to fairly high spending habits on 
personal consumption which often absorbs a large part of 
their earnings, and to the general absence 
between generations, given that they 
individualistic lives. 
The interest shown in these services and 
they meet with is undoubtedly connected with 
aspect. of the labour market, and that concerning demand in 
particular: certain jobs are still rare. Nevertheless, it is 
improbable that a greater spread of these services will lead 
to changes in the relations of this kind of work and its 
organization. 
Not only are the aspects of freedom in these jobs 
congenial to young people, they also fit in particularly with 
the need for flexibility and competitiveness expressed on the 
demand side. Consequently, rather than as an introduction to 
traditional forms of entrepreneurial activity, almost a sort 
of unusual apprenticeship in uncommon professions, these 
forms of activity may be seen as having a fair degree of 
stabi 1 i ty. 
In fact, as regards adults in some of these sectors, 
those wishing to return onto the market (women, long-term 
unemployed, etc.) choose the path of the co-operative of 
mi cro-fi rm. 
9. Irregular homework in Naples 
( b y har ia L i g uor i) 
Irregular work, that is, with no guarantees in terms of 
contract and pay, unrecorded in official statistics and 
commonly known as 'black work', is very widespread in the 
Neapolitan area. Studies and research into the economy and 
labour market underline the growth and diversification of the 
phenomenon throughout the entire province in recent years. 
There exists a very varied range of atypical working 
situations that are highly irregular and precarious in 
nature, ranging from black work in small firms in traditional 
sectors, to casual work by university students, child labour 
and the second jobs of 'official' workers. At the centre lies 
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that work which is undertaken ih the home for outside 
operators. The workers involved are almost exclusively 
females. 
The phenomenon of homework is closely linked to the 
decentralization of entire stages of the production process 
in large firms which need to cut costs and reorganize 
production. This was especially the case in Italy during the 
1970s. But it had already been quite widspread in the past in 
Naples as well. In March 1975, the Commission set up to 
inquire into homework estimated the number of homeworkers in 
the province of Naples at around 50,000, concentrated above 
all in the traditional sectors of footwear, clothing and 
leather goods. In footwear, for example, one of the 
traditional sectors which makes the greatest use of homework, 
it has been estimated that there is one homeworker for every 
four workers in a factory. 
In the city of Naples and the region of Campania, the 
use of homework is a typical of organizing work by small and 
very small firms, which, as is well-known, are very backward 
in this area. Where the productive apparatus is weak and the 
small firm has a precarious and by no means dynamic 
structure, the use of labour tends to be very flexible, work 
relations are not governed by institutional arrangements and 
the level of exploitation is high, and the workers have very 
little or no bargaining power. 
It is in this context that forms of labour with very 
litte protection grow up and multiply. Such a situation is 
characterized by an abundant supply of low-cost labour and as 
a result of restructuring and economic crises, decentra-
lization of production takes place from large concerns down 
to small and from small concerns down to small workshops 
and/or individual workers. This occurs in the footwear 
industry, where production is decentralized from a very-
limited number of slightly larger en t er pri aies to small craft 
workshops and in turn from the latter to individual workers, 
in clothing (off-the-peg and leather garments) where in many 
cases the stitching is done in private homes, in leather 
goods, in particular gloves (now in crisis) and in handbags. 
Homework is concentrated in some quarters of the city-
centre and in the periphery to the North. With urban 
development and the relocation of several firms from t hei 
centre to the outskirts, especially as regards footwear and 
leather goods, it has spread to the entire metropolitan s.rea. 
even as far as the boroughs around Vesuvius and the towns of 
Nola and Famigliano, where the Alfa Sud factory is situated. 
The old city centre has been in the past and is still 
today the prime site for homework due both to the presence of 
enterprises and middle­men, mainly concentrated in the 
sectors of footwear and clothing, and an abundant supply of 
on­the­spot labour resulting from the presence of low­income 
groups, high housing density and high unemployment. The 
closeness of an enterprise to the worker's dwelling and, 
furthermore, the existence of a network of social, friendship 
and family bonds between employer, middle­man and worker 
permit the working relation to be established, to persist and 
be reproduced, though in conditions clearly disadvantageous 
to the labour force. The latter, not officially included in 
the figures for the active population, is made up almost 
entirely of housewives engaged in producing shirts, shoes, 
flowers and bonbonnières, and in hemming and stitching. There 
are exceptions in some sectors like, for example, the working 
of coral for which some men are employed. 
The age groups involved in homework vary greatly 
according to industry and district. In clothing and footwear, 
older traditional activities located in the city centre, 
there appear to be mostly middle­aged women, while in the 
most recently developed zones (for example, the urban belt 
and the Nolano district) the phenomenon involves above all 
young unmarried women who give this type of work up when they 
get married and have children. This picture is in line with 
the situation found in regular stable employment of female 
labour. Socialization at work takes place through the mother 
passing her work experience onto her daughter or between 
members of the same family group. The case in which work 
experience gained in the factory is brought into the home is 
not very frequent. 
Wages ε-ire based on piece­work and tend to be low except 
in some activities requiring greater skill, like the 
production of top­quality shoes. They are very low in the 
making of artificial flowers or necklaces where many hours of 
labour and unpaid help (from sisters, children, etc) are 
required to obtain a decent daily wage (in the best cases­
still less than 20,000 lire). Moreover, the worker has to 
obtain a machine where necessary ­ usually not very advanced 
technologically ­ and pay for the electricity used, while the 
employer supplies the raw materials. This method of 
organizing work incurs no cost to the employer in terms of 
national insurance payments, which represents his biggest 
savi ng » 
Unlike other situations where homework is better paid 
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and protected and'decentralization has led to more dynamic 
growth, in the poorly developed areas or those with 
pronounced social and economic imblances, as in the case of 
Naples, homework, like other forms of irregular labour, 
maintains strong features of backwardness. It takes place in 
conditions of maximum exploitation, even compared to other 
irregular jobs which are better paid and protected, and is 
not a first step towards self-employment and small-scale 
independent activities as occurs, for example, in the Centre-
North. It does not appear to express any rigidity on the part 
of the labour supply with respect to factory work rhythms, 
given the fact that it is not '"Bchosen'"B by the worker and is 
in many respects highly disadvantageous. But, above all, it 
reproduces and extends the very detrimental conditions, both 
in the work and social and cultural spheres, of what today, 
together with minors, represents the weakest category in the 
labour market: female workers. 
10. Precariously employed building workers in the South of 
Italy 
In the South of Italy, precariously employed clandestine 
workers in the building industry still make up today the 
largest group of irregular workers outside the agricultural 
sector and account for a sizeable share of total employment. 
In the 19S1 census the estimated number of precariously 
employed building workers was just under half a million. This 
figure represented more than half of all employees in 
building, much more than the number of workers in medium-
size/large manufacturing industry and more than the number of 
white-collar workers in the public sector. 
• Today, however, the estimate for precarious employment 
in the building sector is more conservative. The reason for 
this is that during the 1970s the structure of the industry 
changed. The predominance of large-scale speculative building 
using clandestine labour on a permanent basis has given way 
to that of self-help building and small-scale commissioned 
jobs, especially renovation, villas and the illicit 
construction of second holiday homes. This more recent form 
of activity has given rise to a number of small firms which 
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were previously inexistent or hidden from view. At the same 
time, it has in many cases led to an increase in the casual, 
uncertain and irregular nature of the work. The workers in 
question are many tens of thousands of young males, Third-
World immigrants and pensioners who undertake casual work on 
small sites or in self-help building. They account for a 
growing share of the jobs done by low-skilled precariously 
employed adults. 
Between the second half of the 1950s and the start of 
the 1970s speculative building played a doubly significant 
role. First it acted as an intermediary stage in the 
emigration process; second, it represented the main urban 
sector whic enable a great mass of male bread winners to 
survive with difficulty and without any hope of constructing 
a working career. this second aspect of building work has 
been gaining in importance as the opportunities for blue-
collar jobs in Italy and Northern Europe have declined. 
The precariously employed workers in building who have 
not emigrated make up at present the largest group in the 
lowest social stratum in urban Southern Italy. Where these 
workers are heads of large families and the main bread-
winners, they exist in conditions of poverty. They are males 
aged between 30 and 50, mostly originating from peasant or 
agricultural labourers' families which emigrated to the towns 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Their wives are full-time housewives 
and their children often leave school without a school-
leaving certificate in order to do juvenile jobs, the males 
in building and the females housework above all else. 
Precariously employed building workers are officially 
registered as working on a site for one-three months a year. 
This allows them to receive the special unemployment benefit 
for building workers during the remaining months of the year. 
The amount they receive is insufficient to live on but higher 
than normal unemployment benefit. For another two or three 
months they work on the same sites on a clandestine basis. 
For the rest of the year they rely on casual labouring or 
fixed-period jobs in renovation work, repairs and self-help 
building, or in the illict building of villas; or else they 
rely on casual work in peddling and services. 
The constant supply of large numbers of precarious 
workers has an effect on the quality of work methods, 
production and organization in the building sector. In 
general, it promotes the persistence of highly intensive work 
processes using low-skilled labour and the polarization 
between large finance/real estate companies and small 
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building firms or individual semi-independent workers. A 
specific and complex system of subcontracting has spread 
which is based on the limited use of permanent regular labour 
and diverse forms of irregular, casual and fixed-period 
labour, the latter with no regular contract or relationship 
to the person who originally commissioned the work.' 
The more casual and intermittent precarious work in 
self-help building or on small sites which only remain open 
for a few weeks also involves a number of young males with 
little education in search of regular employment and coming 
from below average-income families. In many cases they are 
the sons of building labourers who introduce them to this 
kind of work. They start at 10-12 years of age helping their 
fathers on small casual jobs and occasionally, also on 
officially registered sites (frequent accidents at work 
reveal a large number of minors engaged in residential 
building in the South). When they reach 14, they register at 
the employment exchange; they are generally unable to find 
proper jobs given the abundance of adult labour in a sector 
with a steep decline in demand for 'formal' labour. They 
continue to learn the trade through casual work and some of 
them (few in number) manage to become semi-skilled and 
achieve more reliable and regular employment. 
In this way the life cycle of these young men is 
accompanied by an unusual working career. From working 
juveniles or casual young workers they move on to employment 
that is at first irregular but lasting and then, in part, to 
a regular job for a small firm. For a limited number of 
fortunate ones there even exists the possibility of setting 
up as independent agents in specialized activities or 
finishing work (roofs, hydraulic and electrical systems, 
structural carpentry and so on). 
11. Where immigrants work and the kinds of jobs they do 
(by Enrico Pugliese, University of Naples) 
In Italy, there are many hundreds of thousands of foreign 
immigrants from Third-World countries. In all probability 
they number close to a million, but existing estimates are by 
the nature of things very approximate. 
Until last year (1987) the vast majority of Third-World 
immigrant workers were illegal. The law passed last year to 
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regulate the position of foreigners in Italy allows foreign, 
workers and non-workers to apply for a residence permit. The 
percentage of workers having the right to apply for a permit 
who actually did so has possibly been relatively low. There 
a.re two reasons for this: 
1. First of all, the working conditions of 'submerged' labour 
in several sectors (agriculture, processing of agricultural 
products, building, catering) are so poor and characterised 
by such a violation of contractual wage levels that employers 
are not willing to make known and official the existence of 
their wage workers. 
2. Secondly, a large part of Third-World immigrant workers 
are street pedlars and the law does not provide for their 
régularisation in this capacity. In other words they cannot 
notify the authorities of their activity. So many end by 
registering as unemployed. 
When entering into the specific details of the analysis, 
it is worthwhile to take account of the immigrants' 
nationality and above all the groups they belong to. Among 
male workers from the Third World the largest group is 
probably made up of self-employed workers, to all practical 
purposes pedlars. In fact, these pedlars are almost all 
males. They originate from countries of the Islamic religion,, 
in particular Arab countries (in the first place Morocco) and 
Senegal. This particular group is important for various 
reasons: 
a) it is quite impossible to survey their presence and 
contribution to the creation of income. Their work is 
clandestine by definition; 
b) they may be the group which is most evenly spread around 
the country (without taking into account whether the areas in 
which they have settled are rural or urban) and are fairly 
evenly divided between North and South); 
c) they are perhaps the most numerous single occupational 
group with the sole exception of maids. 
The next group in terms of size and importance is that 
of female domestics. For the sake of precision, it must be 
pointed out that a certain percentage of these workers, are 
males. But they are very small in number and limited to only 
a few ethnic groups. Maids are the category of immigrant 
workers who are by far most regularised. Not only were a high 
percentage of thern already officially registerd before the 
new law came into effect, but large numbers have benefited 
from the new regulations. It is peculiar to the Italian 
situation that these workers are not employed as day helps 
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paid by the hour but live in with their employers, who 
establish a very traditional type of relation with them. A 
factor indicating that this is the most regularized group is 
the large presence of women among registered workers and the 
above average presence of certain nationalities which 
typically provide maids. 
The third group in terms of size is that of agricultural 
workers, once again predominantly male. Though also found in 
the North, they are mostly located in the regions of the 
South and in Latium. They are rarely workers on fixed wages. 
They are frequently used in harvesting. The labour market of 
which they are a part is under the total control of 'labour 
contractors' or 'charge hands'. It is highly unlikely that 
immigrants working as agricultural labourers are officially 
registered. It cannot be excluded that some of them also work 
as pedlars at certain times of the year. The majority of 
these workers are African, for the most part North-African. 
In order to provide an estimate of the three different 
occupational groups of immigrants, we will hazard a guess at 
the following i^ nd ideati ve figures: 200,000 for the first 
group; 150,000 "for thë~iecond; 100,000 (or under) for the 
third. These groups are followed by others of less numerical 
importance. For instance, many immigrants work in building 
(but in the South they partially overlap with those working 
in agriculture). They tend also not to be officially 
registered. In the North, the presence of immigrants in 
building is growing in importance, but they are still less 
than the number of agricultural workers. 
A more noticeable, but not necessarily more numerous, 
group consists of those who work in restaurants. They come 
from many different countries, even though the Africans 
predominate. They have a higher rate of régularisation than 
aigri cui turai workers, but a clearly lower rate than the 
mai ds. 
Next we have a complex composite group made up of 
various races and nationalities employed in different 
activities and parts of the country. They are mostly employed 
in industry and repair shops. It is known that some of them 
work in the metallurgical and engineering industries (there 
is mention of Egyptians in Emilia-Romagna). Others (Ghanaians 
in Campania) work in small industrial or commercial 
enterprises, or in repai shops. Immigrant workers are often 
found in different parts of the country working as cleaners 
or porters. These are evidently wage workers, mostly male, 
who are generally unable to achieve a sufficient wage or 
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continuity of employment for their employers to think it 
worth regularizing them. Naturally, many of the workers in 
this group (above all those in the most precarious jobs) move 
from one activity to another. 
With regard to their contribution to national income,· it 
may be said that this is almost entirely submerged, given the 
low percentage of those who have been able to register as 
wage workers, with the exception of maids. The contribution 
to production from the self-employed is totally 
'clandestine'. 
12. Irregular work of young unemployed in Southern Italian 
cities. 
(by Daniela Catanoso, Progetto Meridione, Messina) 
The economic structure of the South and the traditional 
precariousness of the employment market has varied the level 
of the informal economy in the South. 
In particular as regards unemployment among the young, it can 
be observed that, dividing them up according to their level 
of education, the problem for those who manage to complete 
their university studies consists above all in finding a 
stable, professional post; those who obtain their high school 
diploma are generally faced with the prospect of low level, 
underpaid employment (due to the sort of informal activity 
towards which they may/have to turn); for those who have 
abandoned compulsary education nothing remains but to seek 
temporary, underpaid work, especially in the building sector, 
or to turn to the ever growing illegal areas of employment. 
Young people engaged in university studies often take 
temporary part-time jobs to supplement, the financial support 
they receive from their family. 
In this way their period at university is generally prolonged 
and they enter the employment market, even if not 
continously. Employers, given the temporary nature of such 
work (which must permit students to intensify their studies 
during exam periods) often tend to underpay them. 
Sometimes the sector in which they seek/find work is the one 
they hope to go into in the -future, when they have completed 
their degree. 
Thus a young person reading Economics and Business Studies 
may seek to work in an accountant's office as a book-keeper 
or, failing that, as a secretary; or someone working part-
time for an insurance agency may hope subsequently to be 
offered regular employment. Otherwise young people may take 
jobs of brief duration which do not require any intellectual 
effort, but which are quite lucrative. I am referring, for 
example, to work as a hostess or as a model. 
In general, the representatives themselves and/or managers of 
various clothes shops,including furriers', organize small 
fashion parades at the beginning of a new season in order to 
present samples of their stock to their customers. Fashion 
models may earn about 70,000 lira per day. 
It is not difficult for this category of young person to find 
temporary employment which permits them to combine the roles 
of worker and of student, but the real difficulties arise 
after they graduate, i.e. when they seek to enter the 
employment market on a permanent basis and to find work in 
keeping with their qualifications and with their own wishes. 
Young people with secondary education have greater difficulty 
in finding work, even short term informal employment, both 
due to the excessive supply on the market and due to the 
remuneration which they are consequently offered. 
Normally the pay for a specialized assistant in a pre-school 
kindergarden comes to around 100,000 lire per month for a 
six-hour working day; innumerable young "builder surveyors" 
and book-keepers work in private practices for long hours, 
even performing tasks for which they are over-qualified 
without being taken on regularly and without sufficient 
remunerati on. 
Even those who seek to find some "new" form of employment 
such as working as a publicity graphics designer, making use 
of their creative capacities, over and beyond their 
scholastic experience, find that they are faced with the same 
attitudes of "exploitation" on the part of their employers. 
They generally manage to get in contact with the publicity 
agents through an advertisement in a newspaper. The agency 
has a direct relationship with the firms, shops and private 
customers who want a trade mark on advertising slot designed; 
the young graphics designers are contacted every so often and 
present the agency with a series of sketches which will be 
examined by the commissioning client. Once this choice has 
been made, the designer receives a reward which amounts to 
approximately a quarter of the sum paid by the client to the 
agency. 
The section of young people who leave school early is the one 
which is penalized most heavily during their initial contact 
with the official labour market. The majority of these young 
people undergo an experience of precariou, temporany 
employment, in different forms, for longer or shorter periods 
of time. Indeed it may be said that their contact with work 
comes mostly through these temporany and informed 
experiences. Sometimes, as they progress along their paths of 
employment, the manage to obtain regular work in the same 
sector, and at other times they are obliged to accept a non-
guaranteed job as their definitive employment. 
The broadest area of informal employment among males is 
provided by the building sector. At as early as the age of 10 
or 11, children leave school and start to carry out temporary 
jobs in this sector as hochmen or carpenters, even if their 
conditions of work are unsafe and very poorly paid. 
Often the workforce actually available on the marketplace for 
construction, work tends to prefer to accept "unofficial" 
employment, both in the sense of illegal work (minors who 
leave school early) and in the sense of unregulated work, in 
such a way as to permit them to remain enrolled at the state 
employment agency. Indeed it can happen that a young person 
considers his situation during his first period of employment 
to be transitory, hoping thereafter to find a "guaranteed and 
stable job" (known as a "post"), and preferring meanwhile to 
remain an irregular worker. With the passing of time, 
however, the progression of these young people's careers 
tends to fall into a pattern of temporany employment, and 
aüternance of various activities (from errand-boy to street-
peddlar) becomes extremely common. 
The most "fortunate" ones commence their early work 
experience with their own father, who often works in 
bui Iding. 
Thus, at first, they alternately go to school, and go to work 
during periods of greatest 'demand for manpower, later 
abandoning their studies and starting to work continuosly in 
in their father's business. It must be borne in mind however 
that this business is a family concern: it consists of the 
father plus the male children. Their situation is legalized 
on reaching the age of 14, but their pay packet is held back 
by their father who lets them have only a small sum for daily 
expenses. 
The situation of theoretically regular contracts, which in 
practice are reduced to irregular employment, is often the 
case in informal activities. Small concerns resort fairly 
frequently to evasion of wage minimums and social security 
contributions, taking advantage of young people's need to 
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work. Having worked for eleven years in a mechanical work-
shop, a young southerner resigned after realising the 
exploitation he had been subject to. Not only was he 
receiving reduced wages, but in cases of illness he was not 
paid at all. After a prolonged absence (of about three 
months) on health grounds, he discovered by going to the 
firm's accountant that during all his years at work he should 
have been receiving higher wages because, unknown to himself, 
his position had been regularized: the "boss" had been 
holding back part of his pay every month. 
For young women too, conditions of work and employment are 
far from satisfactory, generally consisting of work as 
maids by the hour, or in laundries, or as shop assistants, 
etc. 
The small business which provide irregular work tend to take 
maximum advantage of the girls' willingness to work away from 
their homes, underpaying them even if the number of working 
hours is no different from that of regular workers. For 
example, a company which manufactures women's clothing pays a 
15 year old girl who signs on at the state employment agency 
only 200,000 lire per month for eight hours' work per day, 
after about two years. 
The employment situation of these young women is regularized 
only after 2-3 years of irregular and poorly paid work in the 
same sector. 
PART TWO: GENERAL AND QUANTITATIVE REPORT 
1. The volume and nature of 'travail noir' in Italy. 
Italy is thought to be the industrialized country with the 
most extensive underground economy. For this reason it has 
been widely studied and is justifiably considered to be a 
particularly interesting case (1). 
As in other cases, the Italian underground economy, 
broadly intended, includes various phenomena. If we exclude 
in principle self-provision and other phenomena which are 
extremely difficult to quantify in monetary terms (like 
barter and exchanges of work skills), we-are left with three 
main areas which assume a different significance in our work: 
criminal activity; tax evasion by regular workers; and 
irregular work (travai^ noir) in the strict sense (i.e. 
various forms of~employment which are undeclared, evade 
taxation and social security regulations and produce a 
quantifiable income on a not entirely occasional basis). 
The three areas partially overlap, are by definition 
difficult to estimate and delimit and have in common the fact 
that they defraud the tax system (at the very least), whilst 
they are not entirely visible on the surface - they do not 
appear in statistics or in national accounts. 
Criminal activity, besides contravening laws governing 
work, taxes and contributions, also violates the penal code. 
CENSIS put out a report in 1985, relating to the beginning 'of 
the 1980s, in which the number of workers and the total 
business involved in eleven criminal spheres was estimated 
(see Table 1). According to this estimate, the yearly volume 
of business amounts roughly to 100-150 thousand billion lire. 
Some critics object that this estimate is too high (14-207. of 
1984 GDP, according to a recent ISTAT re-evaluation. However 
the two figures are not comparable). As far as we are 
concerned, given that it is difficult to appraise the 
estimate, we will adopt a cautious approach and take into 
(1) In the appended bibliography more than two hundredrecent 
publications relevant to the Italian case have been quoted. 
Among them there are at least six or seven important attempts 
to estimate the extent of the Italian underground economy. AS 
they do not focus particularly on irregular forms of 
employment and, in general, can be considered outdated by the 
semi-official ISTAT calculations of the real GNP, they are 
not discussed or quoted in the text of this report. 
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consideration only the minimum CENSIS value. According to 
CENSIS, there could be between a half a million and a million 
people involved in criminal activity in Italy, that is, from 
2.5 to 57. of the working population. 
Pure tax evasion is that which occurs where work is 
regular. It involves above all the evasion of direct taxes by 
self-employed workers -particularly traders and shopkeepers, 
artisans, professional people and others employed in the 
service sector - but also the evasion of company taxes and 
VAT. In the commercial sector alone, a recent Confcommercio 
(Confederazione Generale Italiana del Commercio = General 
Federation of Italian Traders and Shopkeepers) estimate 
indicates that the total turnover of clandestine commercial 
firms lies above 40 thousand billion lire. The total 
(conservative) figure for income which has avoided taxation 
is estimated as being greater than 150 thousand billion lire 
per year in the mid-eighties. The 1982 re-evaluation of Gross 
National Product at market prices elaborated by ISTAT 
attempted to give a conservative estimate of at least a part 
of the income produced in hidden forms. The resultant figure 
of more than 70 thousand billion was more than 157. above the 
previous estimates. The difference between the old estimates 
and the new ones elaborated by ISTAT for the following years 
continues to increase up to 17.77. in 1985. In 1984, the year 
to which the CENSIS estimates of criminal activity refer, the 
difference is 17.27. and the re-evaluation amounts to around 
120 thousand billion lire at current prices. The ISTAT re-
evaluation may be considered to be the part of hidden income 
which avoids tax, or better, still, an approximate indicator 
of some minimum thresholds, given that the ISTAT calculation 
of Gross National Product also takes into account non-taxable 
incomes (for example self-provi sioning for own consumption in 
agriculture), a percentage of taxable income which has 
avoided taxation and other variable items which cannot be 
classified under taxes and contributions. 
The evasion of taxes and contributions may well involve 
up to three million regular workers, a large number of 
enterprises, and the income produced by various categories of 
'travail noir' and irregular work. Taking the ISTAT estimates 
for 1984, which we re-elaborated using the criteria displayed 
in Table 2, nearly seven million irregular workers producing 
a substantial hidden income are involved (almost one and a 
half million non-agricultural irregular workers, almost two 
million casual workers, more than half a million non-resident 
foreigners and almost three million workers with a second 
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non-agricultural job). 
Approximate figures can be given for all the types of 
'travail noir' cited as a percentage of the total amount of 
business involved in tax evasion. This total comes to 
approximately 40 thousand billion lire, despite being based 
on generous criteria (see Table 2). 
We may therefore conclude that although 'irregular' work 
involves a large number of workers, it represents less than 
207. of the total income produced by criminal and hidden 
activities, estimated at around 250 thousand billion lire in 
1984. This figure cannot be compared with the GNP because it 
does not just refer to producted income but also to transfers 
from clearing transactions and so on and because it is 
difficult to say how much of this figure should be added to 
GNP, how much is already included and how much cannot be 
taken into consideration. 
2. Quantitative estimates of different types of irregular 
employment.~ 
As we saw from our opening remarks about the sphere of 
'irregular' work in Italy, it is clear that this type of work-
is particularly differentiated and heterogeneous. 
In order to estimate the different kinds of irregular 
employment we will mainly refer to the recent ISTAT estimates 
elaborated in order to re-evaluate the Italian Gross National 
Product, also taking into account a part of the Italian 
underground economy, for at least three good reasons. The 
ISTAT estimates are semi-official, very accurate (taking into 
consideration every possible institutional source) and relate 
to the whole country and may be broken down by economic 
sector and a certain number of branches. On the other hand, 
they cannot be broken down by regions, sex and age groups. In 
addition, it should be underlined at the outset that the new 
ISTAT series have been constructed for the purpose of re-
evaluating the national accounts system, using only 
institutional data. Consequently, they inevitably leave out 
some categories that may be of interest in a,complete survey 
on irregular employment or present problems which shall be 
corrected or reformulated for our different purposes. 
ISTAT data identify five types of irregular employment 
which are of immediate interest to us plus a sixth which we 
shall not take into consideration here. It relates to second 
or multiple job-holding in agriculture by non-agricultural 
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workers. While ISTAT officials are right to emphasize that 
these agricultural activities produce a shadow income, mainly 
in the context of self­provisioning, that has to be added to 
Gross National Product, for our purposes we have decided to 
exclude them from travail noir in the strict sense as they 
are. bound to be predomrnãntTy~oriented to self­provisioning. 
But with regard to this phenomenon, it is worthwhile to 
mention that since the number of such workers persists at 
about four million while agricultural workers are declining 
fast, this fact may be taken as an indication that self­
provisioning of food is not declining and possibly increasing 
(considering the possibility that in this area also the 
introduction of light technology is bound to increase labour 
and land productivity). 
The five types of irregular employment which are of 
immediate interest to us are the following: 
A ­ Multiple job­holding outside agriculture. This refers 
only to undeclared anEPIrregüTär woFkTñg­acti vi ties. For this 
reason, the data are very different from the official 
estimate of multiple job­holding (only regular cases are 
included; that is, where there is an accumulation of part­
time jobs or an extremely limited amount of officially 
declared work on top of full­time employment) elaborated by 
ISTAT for the EUROSTAT series (just to give an idea of the 
difference, for 1986 the ISTAT estimate is over three million 
units while the ISTAT/EUROSTAT figure is under 130,000). 
Β ­ UQderempl_oyed workers in agriculture. Here we have both 
wage­ workers and the~sëlf ­ëmpl oyëd~"wör king for less than 180 
days per year. This is not per se a form of travail au noir 
but an indicator of a f ul Ty~regi stered official"­ form of 
employment which produces highly insufficient income and 
consequently could signify that there exists the need to 
supplement it with other incomes derived from irregular 
empioyment. 
C ­ J^ CüS1­1!3.!! employment outside agriculture. This is the 
crucial category of non­occasional travail au­noir undertaken 
by officially resident workers. It is usually identified 
through a comparison of the population census data with the 
trade and industry census data or with other data. 
D ­ Occasional undeclared workers. Here we have a set of data 
deriving from the officiar survey of the labour force in 
which, starting in 1977, those declaring themselves as non­
employed (adult students, housewives, pensioners) are 
regularly asked whether they have worked occasionally during 
the last week. 
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E - N°n~refide;Qi: foreign workers. A category which is self-
explanatory and which ISTAT estimates mainly reports on the 
local presence in every Italian district compiled by the 
Police and the Ministry for Home Affairs. 
In addition to these types for which, thanks to the recent 
work of ISTAT, we are able to produce reasonable estimates, 
we will just mention the possible presence of other kinds of 
irregular employment which have not been taken into 
consideration by ISTAT for various reasons (mainly because 
either they are irrelevant in terms of re-evaluating Gross 
National Product or they cannot be estimated on the basis of 
the official sources from which ISTAT derived the new 
estimate). Consequently, we cannot produce viable 
quantitative estimates of these types either. They may be 
roughly divided into the following five types: 
F - Occasional multiple job-holding. 
G -"Occasional "work by the unemployed. The sample labour 
force "survey does not question the unemployed about 
occasional work. 
H - yndeclared 2££ssional work by housewives, pensioners and 
students. 
T~-_Trrëgular/il legal work by People under the minimum legal 
age (less than 14 years old). Both local surveys and legal 
cases show that this form of irregular employment is 
widespread. In the South, it is still connected with a 
relatively high rate of school-leaving before attaining the 
minimum diploma (still about 157. of the young generation) 
while, in the North, it is more diffused as a form of family 
help in after school hours. 
K - Irregular work in criminal sectors (see CENSIS estimates 
i n Table 1). 
With the new ISTAT series (for 1980-1986 Table 3 and 
followings) in mind, we present the following considerations. 
A. MULTIPLE £0B-H0LpING 
Without doubt the largest percentage is that of workers who 
for various reasons a.re available for additional jobs. As we 
have anticipated, second jobs in agriculture - generally-
speaking workers in non-agricultural sectors who also 
cultivate small plots of land, either their own or rented for 
sei f-provisioning or for modest additional incomes - should 
be distinguished from non-agricultural multiple job-holding. 
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For the most part second jobs are self-employed, continuous 
and strictly related to the first job as a complementary 
activity. The ISTAT estimates for second non-agricultural 
jobs are ih part based on the number of employees registered 
as paying VAT. This means that they inevitably underestimate 
the number of multiple irregular jobs done by self-employed 
workers and above all by multiple job-holders who also evade 
VAT. The figures involved here could be quite large. 
But, at the same time, the ISTAT figures are bound to 
include a number of people - estimates of this number are not 
possible - who are registered as paying VAT on extremely 
occasional work. However, these people are not strictly 
speaking multiple job-holders. It is possible that on a 
national scale the two 'errors' tend to compensate one 
another. But the figures for second jobs in the Centre-North 
of Italy which are derived in this way could prove to be 
inflated, due to the amount of casual work, whilst in the 
South of Italy the extent of multiple job-holding which 
evades VAT is such that it could well be underestimated. 
Six recent local surveys on irregular multiple job-
holding conducted in different terms but directed and co-
ordinated at a national level by Luciano Gallino tend to 
confirm that the ISTAT estimates are approximately correct. 
According to the ISTAT estimates, non-agricultural 
multiple job-holding in Italy has tended to increase 
regularly in the 1980s by approximately 100,000 additional 
jobs per year- Second jobs are particularly concentrated in 
marketable services. More than 807. of second jobs are in this 
sector of which approximately one half in trade and repairs, 
more than a quarter in transport (where they account for only 
slightly less than the same number of all other working 
activities) and the remaining less than a quarter in 
teaching, research and economic services to firms. 
The traditional profile of the multiple job-holder is 
that of a male employee in a relatively large and 
standardized firm who is the breadwinner for a family with 
above—average needs due to size or special problems 
(dependent adults or handicapped members). This picture is 
being progressively altered by the fact. that the 
fragmentation of work and the disappearance of some home 
repair services increase opportunities for multiple jobs. As 
these jobs are without tenure, provide an insufficient income 
and last for widely varying periods, they are much more 
suitable for the multiple job-holder than other kind of 
workers. The advantages to both the multiple job-holder and 
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his clients or employers reach a peak when there is a high 
degree of overlap between the occupational skill involved in 
the first job and that in the second or further activities: 
for instance, a skilled car worker in industry who repairs 
his neighbours' cars or who works a few hours per week in a 
small car-repair shop, or a bank clerk offering after-work 
advice on bank operations, and so on. Such possibilities may 
arise over a large range of both intellectual and manual 
occupational skills. It is worth mentioning that the overlap 
between the first job and other activities may even involve 
in certain extreme cases (not so rare in Italy) the position 
of power held in the first job. Examples are a school-
teacher who helps his weak pupils at home for a cash payment; 
the bank functionary responsible for the loan department who 
prepares the applications for some customers privately; an 
income tax officer who fills out the tax declarations for 
some tax payers in his district. In these cases the 
borderline between informal multiple job-holding and 
corruption is not clear. 
In addition, the diffusion of do-it-yourself and its 
related equipment has enormously increased these kinds of 
opportunities: even without any specific occupational skill 
or qualification, anybody who becomes experienced in 
undertaking certain repair or manufacturing activities for 
his family can also do so for paying customers. 
While occasionar mul tiple activities are in any case 
likely to be informal, whether long-term continuous ones 
become informal depends greatly on the fiscal system. The 
Italian fiscal system promotes a very high degree of 
informality for three reasons: .(a) tax is levied at a highly 
progressive rate on official personal income of employees 
(fully above board); consequently the level of taxation for 
additional income is high; (b) it is not particularly 
efficient in tracing income from sei f-empioyment or 
'irregular' employment; (c) tax deductions for family needs 
are low so that a single worker and the breadwinner of a 
large family earning, the same gross income end up with a 
similar net income. As a result, in Italy all three 
categories of multiple job-holders (traditional, new long-
term continuous, occasional) are likely to keep their further 
activities underground to more or less the same extent. This 
also explains why the official data for Italian multiple job-
holders usually greatly underestimate the phenomenon. 
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A second substantial type of 'travail noir' is constituted by 
continuous 'irregular' workers (approximately 1,500,000 
according to ISTAT estimates for the eighties). It is 
predominantly comprised of a category of vulnerable workers 
in that they have little education or few qualifications, are 
young or old or women and resident in areas with high rates 
of surplus population. They are obliged to accept 'irregular' 
conditions of work either during certain periods of their 
lives or permanently. 
Nearly one third of non-agriculture irregular workers (a 
number - approximately half a million - which is very slowly 
declining but which remains substantial) are concentrated in 
the building industry. From other sources we also know that 
907. of them are concentrated in the southern regions. These 
are male workers who throughout the year are regularly 
employed on official building sites for relatively short 
periods, an average of 10-14 weeks, at times unemployed (and 
doing other small restructuring or repair jobs) and during 
other periods employed off-the-books on the very same 
building sites (see the qualitative monograph η.10)κ 
Another kind of irregular worker is persistently 
employed in trade, cafés, restaurants and repair activities. 
In this case, unlike in building where irregular workers are 
predominantly wage- workers, the large majority are irregular 
self-employed workers and family helpers. In addition, it is 
possible that also this kind of worker is more concentrated 
in southern regions; and it is also likely that in this case 
there is a much wider spectrum of types with regard to age 
groups, sex, levels of income and professional 
qualifications. They range from the totally unskilled young 
male who works as a delivery boy for bars and shops to the 
adult male working as an irregular self-employed street 
vendor or as an irregular plumber and to the married female 
who irregularly runs a greengrocer's in place of her husband. 
But the economic areas where irregular workers appear to 
be increasing very fast, in the 1980s are those relating to 
marketable services to firms and health, education and 
entertainment services. Here irregular workers rose from less 
than 150,000 in 1980 to nearly 300,000 in 1987. 
On the other hand, irregular workers are sharply-
decreasing in manufacturing industry and, in particular ,in 
traditional manufacturing where they have been traditionally 
concentrated (from nearly 230,000 in the early 1980s to 
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approximately 170,000 in 1987). It is worth mentioning that 
irregular self-employed workers (including family helpers and 
industrial homeworkers in decentralized and subcontracting 
industries) in traditional manufacturing appear to be 
declining at a much slower rate than irregular wage workers 
(see table 3 and following tables). 
Agricultural workers who are officially underemployed 
(those working less than 180 days per year) can be added to 
this category. At the beginning of the 1980s more than a 
million workers were underemployed in this sense. Also, 
underemployed agricultural workers appear to have been 
consistently declining in the 1980s (from over 1,100,000 in 
1980 to approximately 900,000 in 1987). But they are 
declining less than other employment categories and, as a 
consequence, account for an' increasing percentage of 
agricultural employment (from exactly one third to slightly 
less than 407.), particularly underemployed self-employed 
workers who declined by only a few thousand in the said 
period. 
It is worth mentioning that within this category - but 
mainly in relation to underemployed Wage-workers - the 
percentage of females, and particularly of very young ones, 
is increasing while the number of unskilled and underemployed 
adult male agricultural labourers is decreasing very fast 
(also due to the ageing and disappearing of a generation). 
This trend raises a question which we are unable to answer 
from the quantitative point of view. Adult underemployed 
breadwinners are the ones more under pressure due to the need 
for additional income to support their families and, 
consequently, more likely to supplement agricultural 
underemployment with other irregular activities (apart from 
also receiving state subsidies and cash support from 
outmigrated relatives). Given this fact, it is likely that 
the existence of a persistent number of underemployed workers 
in agriculture is becoming increasingly less significant as 
an indicator of the propensity to take up irregular working 
activities. Also, underemployed workers in agriculture are 
almost entirely concentrated in the South and this reinforces 
what we have stated previously. Increasingly, widespread 
competition between various components of the labour supply 
to obtain even low-income irregular work means that weak 
elements of the labour supply (like young women) become 
easily discouraged and give up. 
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C. OCCASIONAL WORKERS 
The third category of 'irregular' workers is constituted by 
young people, pensioners, students and housewives who are 
engaged more or less occasionally in 'travail noir'. The 
ISTAT estimate for this element may be considered to be 
conservative since it is seasonally adjusted (each three-
monthly period is calculated as a quarter of the annual 
figure). 
In reality, the seasonal adjustment made for this 
category on an annual basis is debatable for our purpose, 
(but ISTAT officials had to apply it in order to evaluate 
correctly the real figures for GNP). Since we are here 
dealing with casual work, it is very probable that a large 
majority of the workers who are included in the statistics in 
one season are no lqnger working in the following season. 
They will have been substituted by other workers. It seems to 
me that to obtain a realistic figure for the number of people 
involved in 'irregular' work throughout the year, the ISTAT 
figure should be multiplied by 2.5. The multiplier would be 
four if the replacement were assumed to be total. Using this 
new estimate we obtain a figure of two million, declining at 
a discontinuous rate in the 1980s. This trend is mainly due 
to casual agricultural workers who were more than 407. of the 
total at the beginning of the 1980s and fell to less than 1/3 
in 1987 (from nearly 900,000 to approximately half a 
mi 11 ion). 
On the other hand, occasional workers are becoming 
increasingly concentrated in the marketable services sector, 
and particularly in marketable services to firms, in private 
education, health and entertainment services (where they 
increased from 330,000 in 1980 to approximately 400,000 in 
1987). High figures for occasional workers are registered by 
ISTAT estimates also in trade and repairs (more than 300,000 
but still a slight decline), in traditional manufacturing 
(135,000 declining to less than 100,000 in the last few 
years), in the building industry (more than 180,000 in the 
early eighties, with only a slight decline and composed 
exclusively of young or old males) and finally in non-
marketable services (mainly services to households like 
domestic work paid by the hours here the decline is very-
substantial, from nearly 80,000 to less than 50,000). 
As we have anticipated, these data reflect the source 
from which they are constructed, which is the sample 
quarterly survey on the national work force and more 
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precisely the question on occasional work put to housewives, 
students and pensioners. Since most of the respondents to 
this question are women, this is the only type of 'travail 
noir' where females are predominant. However, this set of 
data does not take into consideration occasional work done by 
those under 14 years old and by the unemployed. Neither is 
it possible to consider the occasional activities undertaken 
by the respondents to this question but not reported.for at 
least two different reasons: either because the fragment of 
work is too occasional or/and too small to be reported or 
because the respondents want to keep quiet about it. 
D- WORK DONE BY NON-RESIDENT FOREIGNERS 
Finally, there is the category of non-resident foreigners. 
The figures which interest us here regard people from Third 
World countries who do 'irregular' work. Estimates of the 
numbers involved are very variable and range from 300,000 to 
a mi 11 ion. 
Generally speaking, we are dealing with young people of 
both sexes with relatively high levels of education who 
emigrate without their families for periods of between two 
and five years (for a more accurate picture see qualitative 
monography n.10). Included here are seasonal/mi grant workers 
from North-African countries. 
The new ISTAT series estimates that this category of 
irregular employment has increased dramatically in the 1980s 
from less than 300,000 to more than 600,000 workers. 
According to ISTAT, in recent years non-resident foreigners 
have been particularly concentrated in the following sectors: 
non-marketable services (nearly 507., predominantly maids, not 
only females); trade, repairs and transport (more than one-
third, particularly concentrated in irregular street trade, 
as we know from other information); building and agriculture 
(slightly less than 107. each). Very few non-resident 
foreigners are employed in manufacturing and they are all 
concentrated in heavy industries; in particular we know that 
they are employed in steel and iron works in the Emilia 
Romagna region. 
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3. The structure of the demand/opportunities for irregular 
employment. 
Given that for the most part we are dealing with self-
employed ar semi-independent activities (subcontracting), 
demand for 'irregular' work, or in other words opportunities 
for 'irregular' work, is of a diversified and heterogeneous 
nature. 
In general the following areas of demand/opportunity can 
be identified: 
a) modern services and areas particularly subject to 
transformation and innovation where 'irregular' work is used 
experimentally or reflects a phase in which the consolidation 
of work mobility is not complete (software, subcontracting in 
the reorganisation of office work, marketing and advertising 
surveys, and so on). 
b) agriculture, local traditional industry, building, 
services in the home and services to the public where the 
seasonal nature of the work and/or high labour costs in 
relatively labour-intensive processes under normal working 
conditions encourage 'irregular' solutions; 
c) to a much lesser extent, manufacturing industry oriented 
towards the export market where strong competition and the 
relatively high cost of regular work in Italy (due more to 
taxes, contributions and trade union regulations than to wage 
levels as such) encourage the considerable use of informal 
I abour. 
A common cliché regarding travail noi_r in Italy is the 
idea that its widespread use in ëxport^orlented manufacturing 
concerns may explain their international competi ti vi ty. 
According to recent Istat estimates, irregular jobs are not 
highly concentrated in manufacturing industry. Strictly 
irregular workers in manufacturing were 13.77. of the total in 
1980 decreasing to 11.4 in 1986. They accounted for 5.77 of 
manufacturing employment in 1980 and for only 5.27. in 1986. 
Casual workers in manufacturing were 9.27. of the total in 
1980 and declined to 9% in 1986. They declined as a 
percentage of manufacturing employment from 3 to 2.8. Foreign 
workers were 3.27. of the total in i980 and declined to 27. in 
1986. They form an irrelevant percentage in manufacturing 
employ-merit (0.2 in 1986). Total irregular employment as a 
percentage of manufacturing employment declined from 8.8 in 
1980 to 8.2 in 1986. The percentage of non-agricultural 
second job-holding in manufacturing is not particularly 
relevant either and is on the decline (10.8 in 1980 and 8.3 
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in 1986). 
Irregular jobs are concentrated, on the other hand, in 
agriculture and building (but declining) and in marketable 
services and personal services (increasing fast). However, it 
is likely that high rates of tax evasion by the self-employed 
and by small firms (occupying a much larger portion of the 
Italian manufacturing sector than in other industrialized 
countries) and even by corporate activities help to explain 
the competi ti vi ty of Italian manufacturing and support the 
argument of unfair international competition. 
The connection between self-employment and small-scale 
employment on one side and the informal economy on the other 
shall be clarified preliminarily from two points of view. 
First, there is no automatic correlation between self-
employment or employment in small scale firms and the 
informal economy. Second, the problem of irregular/informal 
employment should be dealt with separately starting from the 
problem of tax evasion by the self-employed. As we have 
anticipated, in the Italian case tax evasion accounts for a 
very large share of unrecorded income; but at the same time 
it includes tax evasion by officially registered workers and 
corporations in various sectors. As far as concerns the first 
point to be clarified, it should be stressed that in the 
industrialized countries there is evidence: a) that only a 
part of irregular employment is related to small-scale 
activities and self-employment (the magnitude of this part 
varies according to country, sector and period); b) that the 
reverse is also true: only a part of self-employment and 
small-scale employment may show various degrees of 
irregularity; c) that, consequently, there are important 
trends in which, on the one hand, the spread of self-
employment and small-scale activities is not accompanied by a 
parallel increase in informal employment (the building 
industry in Italy in the last 15 years; the consolidation of 
manufacturing in north-eastern and central Italy between 1975 
and the early 1980s) and, on the other, the spread of 
irregular forms of employment may not be accompanied by a 
parallel increase in sei f-empioyment and small scale 
activities (the de facto development of a vigorous outwork 
subcontracting system" where the real employers are large 
firms and the informal workers are totally underground, but 
also the diffusion of areas of precarious employment such as 
casual employees in large private standardized service 
enterprises, like fast-food establishments). 
The main areas for which it may be important to discuss 
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the relation between sei f-empioyment or small-scale 
employment and informal work are the following: 1. family and 
flexible employment in small-scale systems of firms; 2. 
socio-economic innovation and informal self-employment; 3. 
casual self-employment activities of the unemployed and 
inactive population; and 4. second informal self-employed 
job-holding by regular workers. 
1. Family and irregular flexible employment has been 
variously linked to the development of a system of small 
firms in the case of north-eastern and central (NEC) Italy. 
In some sectors, the development has been accompanied by an 
increase in subcontracting but in others it has only 
reflected the high competi ti vi ty resulting from a different 
organization of the labour process compared to large, rigid 
economic units. Here we see an interesting historical process 
at work: a first stage where flexibility is both connected 
with small-scale employment and with the use of undeclared 
family and irregular labour; a second stage of consolidation 
where small-scale employment and the incidence of self-
employment resist the pressures of economic concentration 
mainly through 1 ocal/regional networks (both state-supported 
or completely private consortia) while the use of undeclared 
and informal employment decreases substantially; a third 
stage (the present) where new tendencies towards submersion 
are registered as a response to increased international 
competition and the further necessity to cut costs. 
2. Socio-economic innovation is variously connected with both 
self-empioyment and informal working conditions, mainly in 
the service industries. This connection applies when there is 
either a new area of activity (depending - like software 
consultants or small-scale video producers - or not - as in 
the case of new food or leisure fashions - on technological 
innovation) or a new organization of the labour process in an 
already existing area of activity (the possibility of 
subcontracting, for example, jobs previously done in large 
integrated firms). These innovations are in a first phase 
inevitably small-scale, use very little capital, show great 
organizational imagination, rely on social networks and, at 
the same time, are rather inadequately regulated or 
controlled (if subjected to tight control, they are forced to 
evade it in order to achieve take-off). Then, in a following 
phase, there is a tendency for the scale of activities to 
increase and for the degree of informality to decrease; but 
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these two trends are not always parallel and symmetrical. 
Some areas may tend to concentrate activities and remain tied 
to high levels of informai/irregular employment (some 'pony 
express' enterprises for fast mail delivery in Italian 
cities). Others may remain relatively small-size but 
eventually regularize their working activities (some of the 
software consultant cooperatives, for example). 
3. An age of mass unemployment with a decreasing number of 
regular tenured jobs has opened up a vast area of casual 
sei f-empioyment, which does not fill the employment gap 
adequately and meets only partially the unsatisfied need for 
work of large social groups that are particularly weak on the 
labour market due to age (young or old), sex (women) or 
social origin (recent migrants or'ethnic minorities). 
Baby-sitters, home-typists, irregular occasional street 
vendors and many other old and new, sometimes strange, 
occupations are typical examples of this kind of situation. 
4. The previous area eventually comes up against irresistible 
competition from the very large area of multiple job-holders 
who are in a much stronger position to engage in irregular 
part-time sei f-empioyment, as they are protected by the 
income and the social security contributions of their first 
job. 
The Italian ISTAT estimates are impressive in this 
respect: self-employed second jobs (almost always irregular) 
were estimated at less than a million and a half in 1980 
(with large concentrations in commerce, hotels and coffee 
shops, repair services and subcontracted services to firms 
and the building trade) and they increased to over two 
million in 1987 (nearly doubling in repair services and in 
subcontracting services to firms, and doubling in marketable 
health services and in marketable research, education and 
cultural services where, in the meantime, they accounted for 
a sizeable proportion of total employment in this sector). 
To summarize, we may say that in the Italian case it is 
particularly evident that the present stage of industrial 
development (the crisis in systems based on the large firm, 
de-industrialization, the decline in manufacturing jobs in 
the primary segment, new trends in tertiarization beyond the 
welfare state) is promoting a parallel increase in self-
employment and small-scale activities on the one hand and of 
informal activities on the other. The two trends are not 
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mechanically related. 
Two main areas with an important connection between 
self-employment/smal1-scale economies and informal activities 
displaying different developments are: 
a - the take-off of innovative processes and the diffusion 
and fast growth of new organizational combinations (local 
systems of small, but export-oriented, firms) where the 
initial stage is characterized by different combinations of 
small-scale and informal activities, which then decrease at 
different rates in successive stages; 
b - the fragmentation of labour processes with a rapid 
increase in fragmented activities (either occasional or 
seasonal or temporary) which do not constitute proper jobs 
and are filled either by the 'non-employed' (weak on the 
labour market) or by second job-holders. 
Innovations can be considered from two different points 
of view: new ways of organizing the labour process; new 
activities or economic areas related or not to high 
technology. An example of the first kind is the diffusion of 
particular forms of subcontracting or of new contracts to 
perform tasks which were previously integrated within the 
productive system of a single firm (vertical 
disintegration). Examples of the second kind are software 
consultancy enterprises based on different expertise (-for 
example accountants, legal experts, planning operations, 
engineering), or independent audiovisual production (related 
in a different way to high technology in respect to the 
previous example); the macrobiotic food trade and restaurants 
or other activities connected with new needs and fashions. 
Innovative activities may involve informal work to a 
high degree for two different reasons: first because they are 
labour-intensive, experimental, and poorly capitalized; 
and/or second because they have not yet come within the 
purview of the regulatory system so that they prove 
economically convenient for evading and/or saving on tax or 
other payments. It is important to consider both these 
conditions because they imply a different pattern of take-
off. In both cases, innovative activities may remain informal 
for a limited period and then become formalized. But if they 
are informal only for the first reason, it is mainly their 
consolidation that pushes them into the formal area,. On the 
other hand, innovative activities which are informal chiefly 
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for the second reason tend to remain such for as long as the 
regulatory system remains unable to subject them to effective 
regulation. 
Software consultancy firms in Italy constitute an 
example of the first path. At first they involved mainly 
groups of friends, young and with educational training in 
computers and/or some experience in different professional 
areas (accountancy, law, architecture, commerce, etc.). The 
groups that survived the take- off period were forced to 
formalize their activities in order to be able to continue to 
operate and expand their market. 
A more controversial Italian example is that of the so-
called 'pony express' city delivery systems. They were set up 
as a reaction to the inefficient state postal system. In a 
way they have been, and some remain, highly exploitative in 
that they employ teenage students and the unemployed on their 
own mopeds or motorcycles on a temporary or occasional basis. 
The consolidation of these enterprises has meant that the 
administrative, organizational (they are now fully registered 
firms and use the same technical equipment as mini-cabs 
firms: powerful walkie-talkie systems) and managerial 
structures have become fully formalized; but it remains 
likely that temporary and part-time employment agreements 
with young delivery boys are still 'irregular' to the 
advantage of both parties (the delivery boys do not pay taxes 
on their income and are fully legitimized to look for a more 
permanent job). 
The main problem is that the regulatory system is shaped 
to respond in a general way to a set of standardized 
industrial pressures (prevention of various forms of unfair 
competition from the point of view of economic units and 
professional organizations; job tenure, minimum wage, social 
insurance and protection against harmful working conditions 
from the point of view of employees; prevention of large-
scale tax evasion and social and ecological disasters from 
the point of view of the state). The more the organization of 
work becomes heterogeneous and fragmented, the more the 
regulatory system finds it difficult to cope. It is 
impossible to apply general rules to the temporary employment 
of delivery boys and, at. the same time, it is very difficult 
to adapt the regulatory system to an increasing number of 
specific cases and exceptions, 
4. Factors determining the extent of 'irregular' work. 
In general three main often inter-related reasons for the 
presence and extent of 'irregular' work at a national level 
in Italy can be detected. 
The first derives from the specific forms of 
transformation which take place within traditional labour-
intensive industries. In agriculture this tendency is further 
accentuated by the persistence of work with a. seasonal 
character, in particular related to some types of 
Mediterranean crops grown on small plots of land. In this 
sphere working activity tends to yield a very low and 
relatively decreasing income with respect to the cost of 
survival of a standard formal working unit. Building, 
agriculture and some traditional services in particular fall 
into a logic which encourages both the frequency of 
fragmented working activity (part-time 'irregular' work, 
seasonal work, etc.) which is often 'irregular' for a below 
subsistence level income, making it necessary to find other 
forms of income, and the related deterioration in working 
conditions (income, hours of work, job stability etc.) 
compared to standard official work which is subject to tax 
and legal regulations. 
The second circumstance which encourages 'irregular 
work is the relatively high cost of labour due in particular 
to taxes and contributions and above all to the immense 
rigidity of standard/insti tuti onal conditions of employment. 
This factor makes 'irregular' work convenient and 
competitive, especially in the most competitive sectors of 
the economy. In this light, the convenience of a second job 
both from the point of view of supply and demand is evident. 
We are here referring to working conditions which may be 
subject to high risk, lacking in welfare provisions, offering 
continuity and so on. This situation is acceptable because of 
the protection and guarantees provided by the first job. 
The third factor is given by general economic 
transformations which increase the types of jobs which are 
fragmentary and/or provisional, above all in the sector of 
private marketable services. We have in mind the 
reorganisation of some services to firms, like advertising 
and market surveys, and the restructuring of some office jobs 
using home subcontracting, and also the technologically most 
advanced sectors with high rates of obsolescence, ranging 
from software consultants to image creators. 
All these factors share a formidable common denominator 
which combines the advantages of 'irregular' work and travail 
noir: taxes and contributions. This last-mentioned Is 
ixTremely oppressive for formal activities, especially for 
standard wage and salary work, and it is particularly 
ineffective and lax with respect to self-employment and 
hidden work. 
It is worthwhile to mention the fact that, as a general 
economic and political trend, the Italian model based on a 
rigid, complicated fiscal structure which has never been 
properly enforced has worked not only in favour of a de facto 
protection of self-employment and small-scale activities, but 
also opposed 'normal' capitalistic concentration at least to 
some extent. Small ventures both in manufacturing and in 
services have always found it more convenient to grow 
horizontally rather than to increase in size. In other words, 
a small successful entrepreneur in Italy finds it more 
convenient to start another small venture rather than enlarge 
the first and expand to a size where it becomes more 
difficult to evade taxes or ignore trade-union or safety 
regulations. This is reflected even more in the different 
criteria for taxing artisan concerns and standard economic 
enterprises. The considerable advantages of being an 
'artisan' in Italy have meant that a large number of artisan 
concerns have persisted and that many such units do not have 
the minimum requirements needed to qualify as such in other 
countries, at least de facto if not on paper. For the same 
reason, trade has remained much less concentrated than in 
other countries and small shopkeepers have survived to a much 
greater extent in comparison to other industrialized 
countries. 
To use a fashionable expression, we could say that the 
Italian institutional system has favoured ante litteram the 
trend towards extensive 'vertical disintegFãtiõn" and that 
the Italian economy has developed in a very polarized fashion 
with an extremely concentrated formal manufacturing system, 
at least until the 1970s, in financial and operational terms, 
along-side other highly dispersed and fragmented economic 
undertakings. 
The specific local features of the various possible 
kinds of informal working activities in general depend on 
the following patterns: the degree of survival or adaption of 
traditional ways of organising work; the territorial 
articulation - inner cities, peripheries, medium-small 
cities, the countryside; and the degree of social and 
geographical stability versus mobility. 
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In addition to these general characteristics, the 
problem can be considered from the point of view of the 
different socio-economic histories of large regions. This 
approach works quite well in the Italian case (the three 
Italies) but tends to explore the issue in directions which 
make international comparison difficult. For example, the 
experience of the Third Italy (the North-east and Centre: 
NEC) has often been misused in international comparative 
analysis. . · 
The local impact in the case of the three Italies 
appears as follows. In the North-west (big industry and 
advanced sectors) the types of informal activities which are 
particularly widespread are innovative ones, both high tech 
and organizational (these are bound to be immediately linked 
to the vertical disintegration of large industrial 
manufacturing systems) and informal services, both to firms 
and economic units (with a high concentration of new services 
for large manufacturing and informational activities) and 
personal to customers (mainly in the medium-sized and small 
cities and in the stable residential areas of large 
metropolitan areas - less so in the highly unstable inner 
cities). 
In the Centre and North-east, the spread of informal 
activities has been connected with the trend towards diffused 
industrialization based on small and medium-size 
manufacturing industry. In short, this involved a substantial 
increase in irregular working activities (non-registered 
family work, various irregular part-time, overtime and 
homework activities) mainly in manufacturing but 
complementary to a certain degree with agriculture and with 
services during the initial stage in the boom of diffused 
industrialisation (1965-1975); an accentuated trend towards 
formalization during the following period due to the 
consolidation of the system, its redirecting away from the 
local market and towards exports and the consequent 
necessity for economic enterprises to be fully above board in 
order to be protected and serviced by central state bodies 
and local authorities (1975-1983); and a third more 
controversial phase in which the crisis in some 'traditional 
world markets (shoes, garments, etc.) has stimulated a new 
wave of submersion to save on production costs (mainly but 
not only the cost of labour). 
In the South, two general types of situation can be 
distinguished. In areas where agriculture prevails the 
irregularity of work is largely conditioned by labour 
processes in agriculture which leave a large proportion of 
the workers (about 3/4) idle for long periods of time. As a 
result, these workers are available for other irregular work 
in non-agricultural sectors, above all in building but also 
in commerce, basic services and traditional sectors. 
Moreover, this- produces a large increase in the demand for 
work in the brief harvest season. 
By contrast, in the large and'medium-size cities in the 
South 'irregular' work has always been concentrated in 
building and is tending to spread in the services sector but 
with a less innovative and experimental character compared to 
the forms found in cities in the Centre-North. It largely 
consists of street pedlars, boys who work in bars and shops, 
waiters and waitresses, seasonal workers in the tourist 
industry, multiple job-holding in services in the home and to 
people, etc. 
In general, I would stress that the most interesting 
cases for comparison at a European level are first the highly 
unstable and heterogeneous inner cities, which show a 
negative vocation for certain kinds of informal activities 
due to instability and social heterogeneity, but also a wide 
range of opportunities from other points of view: proximity 
to services, trade and research centres, seats of 
multinational companies and high-income residential areas 
with an increasing need for personalized services in the home 
(delivery of goods, baby-sitting, cleaning and cooking, 
occasional secretarial help, etc.); and second various types 
of stable 'peripheries' (small and medium-size towns, 
metropolitan peripheries, urbanized countryside) where the 
degree of local complementarity between formal and irregular 
activities is high and on the increase. From this 
perspective, it is important to stress that in northern and 
central Italy peasant-workers or worker-peasants have been a 
crucial element in every sector of manufacturing employment 
in the relatively recent past and in many cases are still 
important today. They appear as the immediate historical 
precursor to - and a.re not so different from - the highly 
'self-provisioning' households in contemporary Britain 
described by Pahl (Division of Labour, Oxford: 1984). A 
stable local community, home (and land) ownership and 
sufficient employment opportunities in modern full-time jobs, 
at least for adult males, are in both cases the essential 
elements which reinforce both traditional and modern forms of 
self-provisioning and informal activities (often also 
multiple job-holding, manufacturing work in the home, various 
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forms of subcontracting). 
In addition to what has already been said in terms of 
factors which facilitate the presence of 'travail noir', it 
is useful to mention the processes which are present in the 
Italian services cycle. The persistence of inefficient public 
services and the relative poverty of many consumer areas 
aggravate the general tendencies which in Italy encourage 
forms of 'irregular' work in services. Here we are referring 
to innovations in the work process which- are expressed more 
in 'irregular' re-organisation than in an increase in the 
productivity of regular labour. Also, many services carried 
out in the home, repairs for example, tend to become too 
dear and sporadic if they are organised formally, and so they 
are everywhere transformed into areas of self-provisioning 
and/or 'irregular' work: second jobs or jobs for non-
declared cash payments. It is also worth underlining the 
fact that the number of working units engaged in paid 
household work, both full-time corresident maids and workers 
by the hour, is persistently higher than in other northern 
European countries. In this case too, the degree of 
'irregularity' is high and difficult to control both when the 
wor*k is done by Italian maids and more so when they are wives 
of regular employees and consequently uninterested in social 
and health insurance and in favour of avoiding relatively-
high rates of marginal taxation and when it is done by non-
resident foreigners. 
As regards public services, there is a lack of public 
nurseries and the high cost of private nurseries has led to 
the development of several alternative solutions based on 
'irregular' work. This involves a range of activities from 
daytime baby-sitters to full-time maids, increasing numbers 
of which are from Third World countries. Private nurseries 
have emerged making use of 'irregular' workers. 
Another example is the express postal service for 
1 etters and small packages in the metropolitan areas using 
young men with their own mopeds (pony express); it fills in 
for the public postal service which is inefficient and 
unreli abi e. 
A different kind of example is related to the relative 
absence of canteens in the workplace both in the private and 
public sectors. This has encouraged the proliferation of 
private substitutes (self-service establishments, small 
restaurants, snack-bars and so on) which have reasonably low 
prices in agreement with firms through the luncheon voucher 
system. They presumably use a significant number of 
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'irregular' workers. 
This situation is so widespread in Italy that it is to 
be found even in the area of scientific research where 
frequently lack of investment and tight bureaucratic controls 
have combined to bring about immaginative informal solutions. 
Socio-cultural impact of 'travai^ noir'. 
This is a vast and complex problem and I will concentrate 
only on a few aspects: the family, gender and age focusing 
mainly on the last. Specific attention will be paid to the 
socio-cultural impact on the present young generation of 
their relatively high and long-lasting involvement in 
irregular working activities. 
From the point of view of the family, Pahl is right when 
he stresses that it makes a great social difference whether 
irregular low-income activities are undertaken for a 
supplementary income (multiple job-holding; activities done 
by previously non-employed members of an household with one 
or more full-time regular workers) or for breadwinning. In 
the first case, the spread of irregular activities can 
upgrade in economic terms some middle or even middle-low 
income families and multiply their opportunities. In the 
second case, they may be the first step towards social 
marginalization and poverty. An important example of the 
latter case in Italy concerns the irregularly employed 
unskilled building workers in the South. Their families have 
become trapped in a state of poverty and marginalization. 
Children are forced to leave school even before obtaining 
the lowest diploma required by law in order to work as minors 
(males in building, females as maids paid by the hour), 
Consequently-, the same conditions are reproduced in the 
following generation (semi-illiterate totally· unskilled 
workers obliged to accept poor, irregular and b lack-market 
working conditions). 
The gender question is very controversial. There is no 
evidence that a majority or a large increasing proportion of 
irregular poorly paid activities are done by adult females. 
In the industrialized countries, gender discrimination is in 
many cases simple to operate and 'legal' within the official 
employment structure (part-time workers are largely females 
and low-paid jobs are reserved for women while high-income 
jobs remain the prerogative of men). It is likely that the 
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two most important aspects of irregular employment in terms 
of gender concern young females (but here it is important to 
consider jointly the questions of age and sex) and maids. 
An incorrect assumption about Italian travail noir 
concerns the idea that it is mainly female work. ISTAT 
estimates are not broken down by sex, age and regions, but 
this assumption is easily disproved by other data and 
research results. Females make up a sizeable majority of 
occasional workers according to the data resulting from the 
quarterly labour force survey based on a set of questions to 
the non-employed, the largest sub-group of which are by far 
housewives. A large portion of underemployed workers in 
agriculture in the South are females; but they are less 
likely to supplement their insufficient income through 
complementary casual work outside agriculture than adult 
males, who traditionally combine official underemployment in 
agriculture with unofficial temporary work in building and 
street trade. Females are a minority of irregular workers 
outside agriculture and a tiny minority of informal multiple 
job-holders (this category is correctly computed in Italy on 
top of full-time jobs to avoid the inclusion of official 
multiple job-holders, like maids employed by the hour in a 
number of different families). But even official data for 
multiple job holders produced by ISTAT for EUROSTAT give a 
male to female ratio of 85/15 for 1986. 
The unemployed also appear to be largely excluded from 
irregular jobs with the exception of a limited number of 
occasional temporary activities. 
The second area (mainly relating to paid domestic 
services to households) in the Italian case is giving rise to 
an important socio-cultural transformation: the supply of 
indigenous workers ready to accept the very poor conditions 
of employment and the low status attached to working as a 
maid in private households is decreasing everywhere. These 
jobs are filled to an increasing extent by Third World 
immigrants; however, a relatively high proportion (50-607.) 
are legal and consequently the work they do is not travail 
noir'. This has important social consequences: the increasing 
multiethnic nature of Italian society and at the same time 
the taking-root and spread of racial discrimination,, also 
through certain migrant ethnic minorities being concentrated 
in irregular poorly paid 'dirty' jobs. 
There is evidence, at least for Italy, of a relatively 
high concentration of irregular work (with the exclusion of 
multiple job-holding) among young people. Instability and 
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irregular working conditions for young workers are nothing 
new. The new aspect, which may have an important negative 
social impact, is that the evidence suggests that these 
conditions may persist over a long period (and for some 
continue throughout their working lives) and become 
increasingly incompatible with life projects. The latter 
point is important and not given sufficient consideration. To 
be a poorly paid temporary part-time worker employed in a 
restaurant or in a coffee bar is a different matter for a 
university student (compatible with his life project and a 
free choice to earn some money during a limited period) and 
for a young unskilled unemployed person who is ideally 
looking for a decent job for life and will never find it 
(incompatible with his life project). In the Italian case, 
this emerges very clearly from interviews with young 
irregular workers (for instance, 'pony express' delivery 
boys) in the North (compatible) and with young workers in a 
similar condition (coffee bar delivery boys) in the South 
(incompatible). The former only pass through travail noir; 
the latter remain either for a very long period Tõver tin 
years!) or for life. Moreover, in the second case they will 
reproduce and possibly enlarge (with youth unemployment in 
the South of over 407. and with peaks of over 707. for females 
in certain districts) an already vast area of poverty and 
social marginalization. In the case of young people, the 
additional impact of the gender question should be 
considered. Young Italian males and females show a converse 
relation between average length of involvement in irregular 
or occasional activities and levels of education. Most males 
involved have a low level of education and occupational 
training. Young women with high school diplomas, on the 
other hand, form the majority of those involved in irregular-
activities and for longer periods. This does not mean that 
poorly educated females easily find a regular job but that, 
on the contrary, a large proportion of them 'officially' 
become full-time housewives, even before marriage, and end up 
doing even more occasional irregular and low-paid kinds of 
work, which are difficult to identify. 
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6. Conclusions and poli_tj_cal_ i^ rnpl^ cati^ OQS. 
The attitude of the Italian government regarding the problem 
of 'irregular' work has in general been ambiguous and 
superficial. It has been ambiguous in the sense that it 
cannot fail to condemn the forms of exploitation and evasion 
of legal obligations which are integral to the persistence 
and spread of 'irregular' work, while at the same time it 
accepts the idea that the spread of 'irregular' work, above 
all in small and medium-sized export manufacturing industry 
in the Third Italy and in the modern tertiary sector in the 
Centre-North, is one of the main reasons for the solidity and 
vitality of the Italian economy. In addition, the large 
extent of 'irregular' work in the South is an expression of 
the ability to 'get by' and provides a good alibi for 
avoiding the serious problems of mass unemployment, chronic 
underdevelopment and the deep-rooted difference between North 
and South. 
One of the principal indicators of government 
embarassment and its failure to deal with the problem is the 
fact that' the problem is given very little consideration in 
projects for reforming the tax and the social welfare 
systems. Undoubtedly the iniquity and the rigidity of the two 
systems form an important breeding-ground for the diffusion 
of 'irregular" work in Italy. Another indicator is that the 
few measures taken concern only insignificant questions not 
organically related to the question and are temporary 
palliatives. We particularly have in mind the recent law 
regulating work and residence permits for a number of illegal 
i mmi grants. 
The starting-point in the Italian situation is the 
chronic chaos which reins in the job market and the iniquity 
of the tax system. The effects of the delayed decline in 
traditional processes (out-of-date methods in agriculture, 
labour-intensive practices in the building industry, local 
traditional industry, basic personal services and home 
services) the effects of commercial and technological 
innovation and the development of the tertiary sector are 
accompanied by job instability and the spread of fragmented 
work activities which are insufficient to live on. 
The situation has become especially dramatic in recent 
years with the emergence of the problem of mass unemployment 
which particularly affects young people in the South. In 
Italy the overlap between unemployment and 'irregular' work 
is very limited. It occurs in the main where unemployed 
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youths take on casual work, a proportion of the travail noir 
carried on in the building sector during pëFIods "of 
unemployment, and casual work in agriculture or building done 
by unemployed farm labourers. 
One of the most evident fundamental questions in the 
Italian situation is difficult to define by means of 
traditional analysis and to tackle politically. It concerns 
the existence of more than two million standard jobs occupied 
by multiple job-holders, apart from their main occupation, or 
by foreign immigrants. · This is not absolutely incompatible 
with the parallel existence of a high or increasing number of 
unemployed. Second and third jobs are almost always 
fragmented work activities which are not convertible. Since 
they are segments of work, they cannot be done by the 
unemployed. They can only be taken up if they are 
complementary to protected jobs. This does not apply only in 
the evident case of someone cultivating a garden, rented or 
owned, for their own consumption, or to provide a 
supplementary income, but also with regard to most second or 
third non-agricultural jobs. 
Jobs are not taken away from young people by the 
mechanic who repairs cars for his neighbours and people he 
knows for two or three hours a day, by the typist who works 
privately at home ten hours a week, by the nurse who gives 
injections in the home after hospital hours, by the bank 
clerk who does electrical repairs or by the railway worker 
who installs curtain tracks. The same argument applies more 
or less to most of the jobs carried out by immigrants from 
the Third World. Aside from questions of taste and 
aspirations, the local unemployed cannot be full-time 
waiters, street hawkers, garage night-watchmen, farm 
labourers or fishermen under the conditions offered to and 
accepted by immigrants. 
There are old and new fragments of the job market which 
cannot be converted or integrated into the standardized 
structure of formal regular work. This is the crucial point 
to be faced, particularly with regard to emergent 
fragmentation as exhibited in new 'irregular' jobs, in 
fragmented work activities and in the consequences of 
increasing instability in working careers. This side of the 
question must be compared with the character, profile and 
prevailing expectations of those forming the labour supply. 
In particular, jobs for young people with intermediate 
education would seem to be the most penalised by current 
transformations in general. In the South the labour market 
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gap also affects an increasingly group of highly educated 
young women and a persistent number of unskilled and poorly 
educated young men. 
As a first approximation, it seems to me that the 
following political proposal can be put forward. Its goal is 
to progressively'absorb the negative effects produced by the 
diffusion of 'irregular' work without suppressing the 
potential for work flexibility and experimentation which 
'irregular' work embodies and without compromising the 
guarantees which have arisen historically in order to protect 
employment and regular economic activity. 
A. More radical tax reforms than in the past, with the aim of 
diminishing the oppressive burden borne by formal activity 
a\nd at the same time increasing the tax yield from hidden 
and/or self-employed activities. 
B. Comprehensive and efficient reorganisation of state 
agencies concerned with the labour market, if possible taking 
into account the existence and extent of fragmented work 
activity which cannot be converted into stable careers but 
which could be organised, better protected and guaranteed 
through special bodies. 
C. The guarantee of a degree of institutional flexibility and 
certain forms of exemption from legal obligations which are 
too suffocating for some activities based on experimentation 
and innovation, especially where associations, consortia and 
co-operatives are involved. Here it is less likely that there 
will be a degeneration towards the forms of excessive 
exploitation prevalent where there is travail noir. 
In our opinion the most interesting - and least 
understood - area for further investigation, so as to acquire 
in part instruments for understanding the main lines of 
change in the job market in the near future, is that 
concerning the job strategies adopted by youths who are 
currently unemployed. This would also be useful in connection 
with the job strategies used in innovative sectors, 
especially those in the heterogeneous complex of marketable 
services destined to be sold and in certain modern sectors of 
manufacturing industry. 
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TABLE 1. Estimate of the dimensions of illegal activity in Italy. 
Items Value of 
illegal activity 
in billions 
Number of 
workers 
1 Production and sale of drugs 
2 Production and clandestine 
sale of arms 
3 Production and clandestine 
traffic of works of art 
4 Earnings from prostitution 
5 Clandestine gambling 
6 Blackmail and distortion 
7 Theft, robbery and receiving 
stolen goods 
small-time theft 
S Contraband 
9 Illegal trade in currency 
10 Illegal payment for services 
11 Various other illegal activities 
(forgery, fraud, exploitation of 
incapacitated persons, etc.) 
25,000-35,000 
4,000-5,000 
1, 300-2,000 
15, 
S, 
>υυ 
>00-7,000 
)00-20,000 
2 0 , 
1 , 
( 2 , 
0 0 0 
00 0-
ϋ 00-
_^ 
.3 
, 000 
, 000 
000-10,000 
300-12,500 
12,500-17,500 
20,000-30,000 
50,000 
5,000-10,000 
50,000 
10,000 
75,000-150,000 
400,000 
250,000-300,000 
25,000-50,000) 
50,000-100,000 
100,000-150,000 
Source: CENSIS, Illegal Activities Dossier, 1985, Year XXI, No 4, p.29. 
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TABLE 2. ISTAT estimates for 1984 of J£ LS ΙH Ia. C ÍÍEÜlíiSCii ÜGË Ξϋϋ ËSËiüËËËË of"gross hidden income produced by each category. 
Under-employed 
agricultural workers 
Non-agri cui turai 
'irregular' workers 
Undeclared hourly 
workers (ISTAT 
annual adjustment) 
Our estimate of casual 
work including turnover 
of majority (multiplied 
by 2.5 out of a max. 4) 
Non-resident foreigners 
Non-agric.al second job 
Agricultural second.jab 
In thousands 
1006 
1484 
774 
1935 
515 
2873 
3992 
TOTAL: 
HIDDEN INCOME 
ESTIMATED AS CATEGORY 
PRODUCT IN BILLIONS 
15,000 ( 1) 
6,000 (2) 
5,000 (3) 
14,350 (4) 
40,350 
SOURCE: G. Lamberti Pedullà, C. Rascarei la, C. Abbate, "New estimates of the 
employed population in the national accounts. Methodological concepts 
and results'. Run off by ISTAT, February 1987. 
NOTES : (1) For all categories we have taken our estimates in millions of 
income produced in 1984 to make it roughly comparable to other data. 
In this case the multiplier is 10 million. 
(2) The multiplier is just above 2 million. 
(3) The multiplier is just short of 10 million. 
(45 The multiplier is 5 million. 
Table 3: Regular and irregular forms of employment in different 
economic sectors and branches. 1980/1986 numbres in thousands. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198Ï 1986 
AGRICULTURE 
Total workers (non 
including multiple) 3.430 3.186 2.958 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 229 209 195 
Underemployed workers 775 724 703 
Casual workers 149 116 111 
Non res.foreigners 39 41 45 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 1.109 1.041 950 
Underemployed 389 374 356 
Casual workers 741 680 597 
3.022 2.798 2.654 2.601 
188 
676 
112 
46 
957 
356 
688 
Multiple job holders 4.008 4.002 4.000 3.995 
171 
633 
123 
51 
924 
373 
521 
3.992 
172 
615 
139 
55 
869 
371 
433 
3.989 
164 
598 
125 
58 
832 
370 
454 
,986 
MANIFACTURING AND 
ENERGY INDUSTRIES 
Total workers (non 
including multiple) 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemploye 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
6.376 6. 149 5.987 5.748 5.495 5.487 5.43S 
5 Λ?2'? 
245 
108 
9 
591 
118d 
83 
<­^e=­'n 
5.018 
236 
104 
10 
599 
115 ' 
68 
255 
4, ,849 
253 
93 
10 
602 
116 
63 
256 
4.638 
242 
88 
10 
585 
111 
72 
259 
4.451 
183 
ΡΓ? 
11 
567 
108 
82 
259 
4,452 
183 
92 
12 
565 
105 
78 
258 
4.410 
171 
80 
12 
581 
109 
73 
257 
HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
Total workers (non 
including multiple) 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemploye 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
1.764 
1 
1.71! 1. 683 1.618 1.558 1.529 
545 
61 
Τ' τ 
­τ 
104 
17d 
7 
50 
1.492 
59' 
■7­7 
S 
109 
17 
ó 
51 
1.452 
69 
17 
9 
114 
17 
6 
S^ 1 
1. 393 
70 
16 
9 
107 
15 
.­"1 
c­­
1. 323 
57 
39 
10 
105 
15 
9 
41 
1.316 
47 
30 
11 
110 
16 
ó 
54 
1.313 
44 
25 
11 
112 
1 '7 
7 
54 
1 
1 
LIGHT MODERN INDUSTRIES 
Total workers (nan 
including multiple) 
Empìoyees 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemploye 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
793 
635 
45 
13 
0. 3 
82 
6d 
12 
66 
1 
1 
. 690 
.538 
41 
13 
0.2 
85 
11 
0.9 
66 
1 
1 
.639 
. 480 
48 
10 
0.3 
88 
11 
0.8 
66 
1 
1, 
cr cr ­7 
. vJvJ / 
. 400 
50 
10 
0. 3 
84 
11 
1 
66 
1, 
1, 
. 490 
. 332 
45 
21 
0. 3 
81 
11 
1 
65 
1 
1 
.482 
.337 
38 
15 
0.2 
80 
11 
1 
65 
1. 
1, 
, 450 
.312 
T T ' 
12 
0.3 
82 
11 
1 
65 
66 
(continuation of table 3, second page) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198Ï 
TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 
total workers (non 
including multiple) 2. 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 1. 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemploye 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
624 
1986 
2.624 2.467 2.371 2.296 2.269 2.258 
855 
138 
71 
0.8 
405 
90d 
63 
135 
1.854 
138 
72 
0.8 
405 
90 
63 
137 
1.729 
135 
66 
0.8 
340 
87 
48 
138 
1.658 
121 
59 
0.8 
394 
85 
51 
139 
1.609 
109 
56 
0.8 
380 
82 
58 
139 
1.609 
97 
48 
0.8 
375 
79 
60 
138 
1.595 
95 
44 
•0.8 
387 
82 
55 
138 
BUILDING INDUSTRY 
Total workers (non 
including multiple) 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Nan res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemploye 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
1.851 1.875 
816 
365 
160 
26 
343 
114d 
26 
98 
819 
372 
153 
29 
357 
118 
27 
98 
1.854 
806 
370 
125 
32 
379 
117 
24 
97 
1.862 1.801 1 .750 1.757 
791 
356 
138 
33 
394 
120 
29 
97 
730 
357 
164 
38 
369 
112 
31 
95 
719 
348 
141 
41 
370 
104 
28 
98 
719 
344 
142 
42 
376 
105 
o c 
100 
MARKETABLE SERVICES 
Total workers (non 
including multiple) 7.317 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 3.547 
Irregular workers 244 
Casual workers 362 
Non res.foreigners 88 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 2.309 
Irregular selfemploye 403d 
Casual workers 363 
Multiple job holders 1.781 
TRADE AND REPAIRS 
Total workers (non 
including multiple) 3.970 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 1.393 
Irregular workers 143 
Casual workers 109 
Nan res.foreigners 60 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 1.727 
Irregular selfemployed 283 
Casual workers 254 
Multiple job holders 1.138 
7.479 
3.616 
348 
94 
2.449 
411 
319 
1.880 
4. 03b 
1. 
7,712 
3,756 
331 
113 
2.583 
423 
274 
2. 07 1 
4. 148 
427 
140 
95 
66 
815 
280 
216 
151 
1.494 
141 
88 
75 
1. 880 
280 
189 
1. 196 
7 . 9 3 0 8 . 4 5 0 8 . 7 3 8 8 . 9 2 7 
3.787 3.936 
212 226 
353 459 
126 157 
4.165 4.269 
256 267 
416 398 
182 205 
2.683 2.822 2.875 2.937 
439 468 490 495 
329 382 353 356 
2 . 2 4 0 2 . 3 1 7 2 . 4 7 9 2 . 5 4 8 
4 . 2 9 5 4 . 5 1 2 4 . 5 9 1 4 . 6 3 5 
495 
136 
102 
87 
1.535 
143 
132 
116 
606 
155 
105 
140 
1 . 640 
154 
99 
163 
1.970 2.017 2.034 2.028 
286 300 303 294 
219 270 248 237 
1.182 1.200 729 1.284 
(13) 
67 
638 
54 
18 
26 
143 
21d 
9 
291 
639 
54 
22 
26 
148 
21 
7 
350 
617 
41 
13 
35 
150 
21 
9 
455 
497 
23 
12 
37 
152 
20 
6 
584 
586 
22 
25 
39 
155 
20 
8 
623 
568 
16 
23 
40 
154 
20 
8 
689 
585 
22 
26 
40 
153 
19 
11 
685 
(continuation of table 3, third page) 
1980 ,1981 1982 , 1983 1984 1985 1986 
TRANSPORTS 
Total workers (non 
including multiple) 908 917 885 748 855 829 856 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemploye 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
SERVICES TO INDUSTRIES 
PRIVATE HEALTH, EDUCATION 
AND ENTERTAINMENT 
Total workers (non 
including multiple) 1.837 1.906 2.046 2.130 2.421 2.642 2.766 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Nan res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemploye 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
NON MARKETABLE 
SERVICES 
Total workers (non 
including multiple) 3.620 3.708 3.787 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 3.429 3.481 3.525 
Irregular workers 1 1 1 
Casual workers 77 79 73 
Non res.foreigners 111 148 188 
Sei f empioyed: 
Regular selfemployed - - - - - - -
Irregular selfemployed - - - - - - -
Casual workers - - - - - - -
Multiple job holders 201 200 187 200 202 201 197 
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data, see table 2. 
919 
44 
234 
*p 
438 
99d 
100 
346 
939 
44 
^^q 
Γ? 
485 
110 
96 
374 
1.016 
48 
9^o 
-C 
553 
1 *~>ί"\ 
1 ¿-X-76 
414 
1.043 
51 
238 
*^ l 
559 
134 
103 
469 
1. 158 
59 
300 
o 
649 
149 
104 
488 
1. 320 
82 
286 
^i 
686 
168 
97 
536 
1. 359 
89 
271 
O 
754 
182 
109 
573 
840 
542 
1 
68 
228 
3.921 
3.607 
1 
55 
257 
4.001 
3.669 
49 
281 
4. 037 
3.701 
47 
286 
68 
TABLE 4: Regular and irregular forms of employment in different 
economic sectors and branches. 1980/1986 percentages on employment in 
the sector or branch. 
1980 1981 198; 1983 1984 1985 1986 
AGRICULTURE 
Employees: 
Regeilar wage workers 
Underemployed workers 
Caseial workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regeil ar selfemployed 
Underemployed 
Caseial workers 
Multiple job holders 
6.7 
22.6 
4.3 
1. 1 
32.3 
11.3 
21.6 
111.8 
6.6 
'7'p ~7 
3.6 
1.3 
32.7 
11.7 
21.4 
125.6 
6.6 
23.8 
3.8 
1.5 
32. 1 
12 
20.2 
135.3 
6.2 
22.4 
3.7 
1.5 
31.7 
11.8 
22.8 
132.2 
6. 1 
22.6 
4.4 
1.8 
33 
13.3 
18.6 
142.6 
6.5 
23.2 
5.2 
2. 1 
32.7 
14 
16.3 
150.3 
6.3 
^ T 
4.8 
"TO 
14.2 
17.5 
153.3 
MANIFACTURING AND 
ENERGY INDUSTRIES 
Empioyees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Caseial workers 
Nan res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Caseial workers 
Multiple jab holders 
81.9 
3.9 
1.7 
0. 1 
9.3 
1.9 
1.3 
4 
81.6 
3.8 
1.7 
0.2 
9, 7 
1.9 
1. 1 
4. 1 
81 
4.2 
1.6 
0. 2 
10. 1 
1.9 
1. 1 
4.3 
80.7 
4.2 
1.5 
0.2 
10.2 
1.9 
1.3 
4.5 
81 
y y 
1.7 
0. 2 
10. 3-
'_Ί 
1.5 
4.7 
81, 1 
y y 
1.7 
0.2 
10.3 
1.9 
1.4 
4.7 
81. 1 
_ ^ 
1.5 
0.2 
10.7 
•~ 
1.4 
4.7 
HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
87. 
1. 
0. 
1 
37 
1. 
0. 
6. 
i 
0. 
86. 
4. 
1 
0. 
6. 
1 
0. 
3 
3 
1 
5 
8 
4 
1 
86. 1 
4.3 
1 
0. 6 
6.6 
0. 9 
0.5 
3 3 
84.9 
3.6 
2.5 
0. 6 
6.8 
0.9 
0.6 
2.6 
85.8 
3. 1 
1.9 
0.7 
7. 1 
1 
0. 4 
3.5 
85.9 
O Q 
1.6 
0. 7 
7.3 
1. 1 
0.5 
3.6 
LIGHT MODERN INDUSTRIES 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Nan res.fareigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
91.2 
f~y cr 
0.7 
0. 02 
4.6 
0. 3 
0.7 
3.7 
91 
2,4 
0. 8 
0. 02 
5 
0. 7 
0. 1 
3. 9 
90.3 
2.9 
0.6 
0.02 
5.4 
0.7 
0. 1 
4 
89.9 
3. 2 
0, 6 
0. 02 
5.4 
0.7 
0. 1 
4.2 
89.4 
y 
1.4 
0, 02 
5.4 
0.7 
0. 1 
4.4 
90.2 
2.6 
1 
0. 02 
5.4 
0.7 
0. 1 
4.4 
90.5 
2.2 
0.8 
0. 02 
5.6 
0.7 
0. 1 
4.5 
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(contineies table 4: second page) 
1980 1981 198: 198: 1984 1985 1986 
TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 
Employees: 
Regeil ar wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Caseial workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regeilar selfemployed 
Irregeilar selfemployed 
Caseial workers 
Meiltiple job holders 
7 0 . 7 
5 . 3 
2 . 7 
0 . 0 3 
1 5 . 4 
3 . 5 
2 . 4 
7 0 . 7 
5 . 3 
2 . 7 
0 . 0 3 
1 5 . 4 
3 . 5 
2 . 4 
7 0 . 1 
5 . 5 
2 . 7 
0 . 0 3 
1 6 . 2 
τ c 
-_■ m U 
2 
i.6 
69.9 70.1 70.9 70.6 
5.1 4.7 4.3 4.2 
2.5 2.5 2.1 1.9 
0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
16.6 16.6 16.5 17.2 
3.6 3.6 3.5 3.6 
2.2 2.5 2.6 2.4 
5.9 6.1 6.1 6.1 
BUILDING INDUSTRY 
Regeilar wage workers 
Irregeilar workers 
Caseial workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
4 4 . 1 
1 9 . 8 
8 . 6 
1 . 4 
1 8 . 6 
6 . 1 
1 . 4 
5 . 3 
4 3 . 7 
1 9 . 9 
8 . 2 
1 . 5 
19 
6 . 3 
1 . 4 
5 . 2 
4 3 . 5 
1 9 . 9 
6 . 8 
1 . 7 
2 0 . 5 
6 . 3 
1 . 3 
cr τ 
4 2 . 5 
19. 1 
7 . 4 
1 . 8 
6 . 4 
1 . 6 
5 . 2 
4 0 . 5 
1 9 . 8 
. 9 . 1 
2 . 1 
2 0 . 5 
6 . 2 
1 . 7 
5 . 3 
4 1 . 1 
1 9 . 9 
8 . 1 
2 . 4 
2 1 . 1 
6 
1 . 6 
5 . 6 
4 0 . 9 
1 9 . 6 
8 . 1 
2 . 4 
2 1 . 4 
6 
1 . 6 
5 . 7 
MARKETABLE SERVICES 
Empioyees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Caseial workers 
Multiple jab holders 
4 8 . 5 
y "^  
5 
1 . 2 
3 1 . 6 
5 . 5 
ET -_J 
2 4 . 3 
4 S . 4 
Τ Ό 
4 . 7 
1 . 3 
3 2 . 7 
5 . 5 
4 . 3 
2 5 . 1 
4 8 . 7 
"Τ 
4 . 3 
1 . 5 
T T CT 
■_■■ o . v j 
er er 
3 . 6 
2 6 . 9 
4 7 . 8 
2 . 7 
4 . 5 
1 . 6 
3 3 . 8 
er er 
4 . 1 
2 8 . 3 
4 6 . 6 
2 . 7 
5 . 4 
1 . 9 
3 3 . 4 
er t=r 
U m U 
4 . 5 
2 7 . 4 
4 7 . 7 
2 . 9 
4 . 8 
2 . 1 
3 2 . 9 
5 . 6 
4 
2 8 . 4 
4 7 . 8 
~? 
4 . 5 
·—* -?■ 
3 2 . 9 
5 . 6 
4 
2 8 . 6 
TRADE AND REPAIRS 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Caseial workers 
Nan res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Casual workers 
Meiltiple job holders 
3 5 . 1 
3 . 6 
2 . 7 
1 . 5 
4 3 . 5 
7 . 1 
6 . 4 
2 8 , 7 
3 5 . 3 
3 . 5 
2 . 4 
1 . 6 
4 4 . 9 
6 . 9 
5 . 4 
2 8 . 5 
3 6 
3 . 4 
2 . 1 
1 . 8 
4 5 . 3 
6 . 8 
4 . 6 
2 8 . 8 
3 4 . 8 
•2' ■ ji. 
2 . 4 
2 
4 5 . 9 
6 . 7 
5. 1 
2 7 . 5 
34 
~T *~? 
2 . 9 
2 . 6 
4 4 . 7 
6 . 6 
6 
2 6 . 6 
3 5 
3 . 4 
*~> τ 
3 . 1 
4 4 , 3 
6 . 6 
5 . 4 
1 5 . 9 
3 5 . 5 
y y 
2 . 1 
Τ c=] 
44 
6 . 4 
5. 1 
T 7 O 
¿- f m I-/ 
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(contineiation of table 4, third page) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
TRANSPORTS 
Employees: 
Regeilar wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Caseial workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regeilar selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Caseial workers 
Meiltiple job holders 
70.2 
6 
r-y 
2.8 
15.8 
2.3 
0.9 
32. 1 
69.7 
5.9 
2.4 
2.9 
16. 1 
2.3 
0.7 
38. 1 
69.7 
4.6 
1.5 
4 
16.9 
2.3 
1 
51.5 
66. 5 
3.1 
1.7 
5 
20.3 
2.6 
0.8 
78 
68.6 68.5 68.4 
2.5 2 2.6 
2.9 2.8 3 
4.6 4.8 4.6 
18.1 18.6 17.9 
2.3 2.4 2.3 
1 1 1.2 
72.9 83 80 
SERVICES TO INDUSTRIES, 
PRIVATE HEALTH, EDUCATION 
AND ENTERTAINMENT 
Employees: 
Regeilar wage workers 
Irregeilar workers 
Caseial workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regeilar selfemployed 
Irregeilar selfemployed 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
50 
2.4 
12.7 
0. 1 
23.9 
5.4 
5.5 
18.8 
49.3 
Ο Τ 
12 
0. 1 
25.5 
5.8 
5. 1 
19.6 
49.7 
2.4 
11.2 
0. 1 
27 
6 
3.7 
20. 2 
48.9 
2.4 
11.2 
0. 1 
26.3 
6.3 
4.9 
22 
47.8 
2.4 
12.4 
0. 1 
26.8 
6. 1 
4.3 
20. 2 
50 
3. 1 
10.8 
0. 1 
26 
6.4 
3.7 
20.3 
49. 1 
Τ *p 
9.8 
0. 1 
27.3 
6.6 
3.9 
20.7 
NON MARKETABLE 
SERVICES 
Empioyees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Casual workers-
Multiple job holders 
94.7 
0. 03 
2. 1 
3. 1 
93.9 
0. 03 
2. 1 
4 
93. 1 
0.03 
1.9 
5 
92. 3 
0. 03 
1.8 
6 
4.9 
92 91.7 91.7 
0.03 0.1 0.1 
1.41 1.2 1.2 
6.6 7 7.1 
4.9 
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data, see table 2 
71 
TABLE 5: Regular and irregeilar forms of employment in different 
economic sectors and branches. 1980/1986 percentages an the total 
category of employment. 
1980 1981 198; 198: 1984 1985 1986 
AGRICULTURE 
Regeilar wage workers 
Underemployed workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Underemployed 
Caseial workers 
Multiple job holders 
1 . 3 
2 9 . 2 
7 . 2 
1 4 . 3 
6 . 4 
1 4 . 7 
3 5 . 8 
100 
1 . 2 
2 7 . 9 
6 . 1 
1 2 . 8 
6 
1 4 . 4 
3 5 . 9 
100 
1 . 1 
2 7 . 3 
6 . 6 
1 1 . 6 
5 . 4 
1 3 . 9 
3 5 . 3 
100 
1 . 1 
2 6 . 9 
6 
1 0 . 3 
5 . 5 
1 4 . 2 
3 6 . 6 
100 
1 
2 5 . 4 
6 . 4 
10 
5 . 3 
15 
2 6 . 9 
100 
1 
2 4 . 9 
8 
9 . 6 
4 . 9 
15 
2 5 
100 
0 . 9 
2 4 . 3 
7 . 3 
9 . 6 
4 . 7 
1 5 . 0 
2 6 . 6 
100 
MANIFACTURING AND 
ENERGY INDUSTRIES 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
3 0 
9 . 3 
3 ·-> 
3 . 4 
4 . 4 
4 
1 0 . 8 
2 8 . 8 
9 . 1 
5 . 5 
3 
3 . 4 
4 . 4 
3 . 6 
1 0 . 5 
2 7 . 8 
9 . 9 
5 . 5 
2 . 6 
3 . 5 
4 . 5 
3 . 7 
9 . 8 
2 6 . 7 
9 . 6 
4 . 7 
2 . 3 
3 . 4 
4 . 4 
3 . 9 
9 . 3 
2 5 . 6 
7 . 4 
4 . 8 
r - j j - j 
7,, 3 
4 . 4 
4 . 2 
9 
'"JET O 
J l . ι—1 ■ j l . 
7 . 4 
5 . 3 
O 
"Τ D 
4 . 2 
4 . 5 
8 . 5 
2 4 . 7 
6 . 9 
4 . 7 
2 . 0 
3_ 3 
4 . 4 
4 . 3 
8 . 3 
HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Casual workers-
Multiple job holders 
8 . 9 
Ο Τ 
1 . 1 
2 . 8 
0 . 6 
0 . 6 
0. 4 
2 . 1 
8 . 6 
Ο Τ 
1 . 2 
2 . 6 
0 . 6 
0 . 7 
0, 3 
2 . 1 
tí. 3 
-? 7 
1 
r-y ^ p 
0 . 7 
0. 7 
0 . 4 
2 
8 
2 . 8 
0 . 8 
T> 
0 . 6 
0 . 6 
0 . 5 
1 . 9 
7 . 6 
O Τ 
~ 
Ί· 
0 . 6 
0. 6 
0 . 5 
1 . 4 
7 . 5 
1 , 9 
1 . 7 
1 . 8 
0 . 6 
0 . 6 
0 . 4 
1 . 8 
7 . 4 
1 = 8 
1 . 5 
1 . 8 
0 . 6 
0 . 7 
0 . 4 
1 . 7 
LIGHT MODERN INDUSTRIES 
Empioyees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.f oreigners 
Self employed: 
Regeilar selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
9 . 4 
1 . 7 
0 . 6 
0 . 1 
0 . 5 
0 . 2 
0 . 5 
2 . 8 
8 . 
i . 
0 = 
0 . 
0 = 
0 . 
0 . 
■-1 
8 
ò 
-τ f -i. 
c r 
4 
1 
7 
S . 
1 . 
0 ■ 
( ) 
0 . 
0. 
0. 
ili ■ 
cr 
Q 
1 
■-J 
4 
1 
5 
8 . 
(-1 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
*-> 
1 
cr ■-J 
1 
ar 
4 
1 
4 
7 . 
1 . 
1 . 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
0 . 
Ό 
/ 
j—1 
1 
1 
cr 
4 
1 
3 
7 . 6 
1 . 5 
0 . 9 
0 . 1 
0 . 5 
0 . 4 
0 . 1 c-4 
C-4 
7 . 4 
1 . 3 
0 . 7 
0 . 1 
0 . 5 
0 . 4 
0 . 1 
2 . 1 
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(continues table 5: second page) 
1980 1981 198: 198: 1984 198Ï 1986 
TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 
Employees: 
Regeilar wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Caseial workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regeilar selfemployed 
Irregeilar selfemployed 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
1 0 . 7 
5 . 2 
3 . 5 
0 . 3 
2 . 3 
3 . 4 
3 . 1 
5 . 8 
1 0 . 7 
5 . 3 
3 . 8 
0 . 3 
2 . 3 
3 . 5 
y y 
5 . 7 
9 . 9 
5 . 3 
3 . 9 
0 . 2 
2 . 3 
3 . 4 
2 . 9 
5 . 3 
9 . 5 
4 . 8 
3 f 
0 . 2 
Ο "Τ 
3 . 4 
2 . 8 
5 
9 . 3 
4 . 4 
2 . 9 
0 . 2 
Γ? *? 
yw y 
y, 
4 . 9 
9 . 1 
3 . 9 
2 . 8 
0 . 1 
2 . 1 
3 . 2 
3 . 5 
4 . 6 
9 . 0 
3 . 9 
2 . 6 
0 . 1 
Γ? 7 
3 . 3 
3 . 2 
4 . 5 
BUILDING INDUSTRY 
Employees: 
Regeilar wage workers 
Irregeilar workers 
Caseial workers 
Nan res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregeilar selfemployed 
Caseial workers 
Multiple job holders 
i: 
4 . 7 
3 . 8 
7 . 7 
9 . 6 
*~y 
■^­
4 . 3 
1 . 3 
4 . 2 
4 . 7 
1 4 . 4 
8 . 1 
9 
2 . 1 
4 . 6 
1 .4 
4 
4 . 6 
1 4 . 4 
7 . 4 
8 . 3 
*"? O 
X. ■ X­
4 . 6 
1 .4 
3 . 7 
4 . 6 
1 4 . 2 
7 . 4 
7 . 5 
r­y ­^· 
X. ■ ·_' 
4 . 8 
1 .6 
3 . 5 
4 . 2 
1 4 . 4 
8 . 5 
7 . 4 
2 . 1 
4 . 5 
1 .6 
τι y. 
4 . 1 
14 . 1 
8 . 2 
7 . 2 
2 . 1 
4 . 2 
1 .6 
3 . 2 
4 . 1 
1 4 . 0 
8 . 3 
7 . 0 
2 . 1 
4 . 3 
1 .7 
3 3 
MARKETABLE SERVICES 
Employees: 
Regular wage workers 20.4 
Irregular workers 9.2 
Casual workers 17.5 
Non res.f oreigners 32.1 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 13.3 
Irregular sel f empioyed15,2 
Casual workers 17.6 
Multiple job holders 76.4 
2 0 . 8 
9 . 3 
18 .4 
2 9 . 3 
14. 1 
1 5 . 9 
1 6 . 9 
7 7 . 3 
2 1 . 5 
9 . 1 
1 9 . 5 
2 9 
1 4 . 8 
1 6 . 5 
1 6 . 2 
7 9 . 3 
2 1 . 8 
8 . 5 
1 8 . 8 
2 8 . 4 
1 5 . 4 
1 7 . 5 
1 7 . 5 
8 0 . 1 
2 2 . 6 
9 . 1 
2 3 . 7 
3 0 . 5 
1 6 . 2 
1 8 . 8 
1 9 . 8 
8 0 . 7 
2 3 . 6 
1 0 . 3 
2 4 . 1 
3 1 . 9 
1 6 . 3 
1 9 . 8 
2 0 . 4 
8 1 . 7 
2 4 . 0 
1 0 . 9 
1 7 7 Τ 
3 3 . 9 
1 6 . 5 
2 0 . i 
2 0 . 9 
8 2 . 1 
TRADE AND REPAIRS 
Empioyees: 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular sel f employed 10,7 
Casual workers 12.3 
Multiple job holders 48.8 
5.4 
9.9 
8 , 2 
5 . 4 
2 0 . 4 
1 0 . 4 
1 0 . 8 
1 1 . 4 
4 7 . 3 
8 . 6 
5 . 5 
cz­ '­1 
1 9 . 4 
1 0 . 8 
1 0 . 9 
1 1 . 2 
4 5 . 8 
8 , 6 
5 . 4 
5 . 4 
1 9 . 6 
1 1 . 3 
1 1 . 4 
1 1 . 7 
4 2 . 3 
8 . 8 
ΠΓ ­ 7 
U . .1 
6 . 8 
0 7 <=r 
1 1 , 6 
12 
14 
4 1 . 8 
9 . 1 
6 . 3 
6 . 1 
2 4 . 6 
1 1 . 5 
Ι Ο O 
1 4 . 4 
2 4 
9 . 2 
6 . 3 
5 . 8 
2 7 . 0 
1 1 . 4 
12, 0 
1 3 . 9 
4 1 . 4 
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3 . 5 
1 . 6 
0 . 8 
9 . 1 
0 . 9 
0 . 8 
0 . 5 
7 . 4 
2 . 9 
0 . 9 
0 . 7 
8 . 4 
0 . 9 
0 . 8 
0 . 3 
2 0 . 9 
3 . 4 
0 . 9 
1 . 3 
7 . 6 
0 . 9 
0 . 8 
0 . 4 
2 1 . 7 
3 . 2 
0 . 7 
1 . 3 
7 
0 . 9 
0 . 8 
0 . 5 
2 2 . 7 
y ~^ 
0 . 9 
1 . 5 
6 . 6 
0 . 9 
0 . 8 
0 . 6 
Γ?Γ? 1 
(continues table 5: third page) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
TRANSPORTS 
Employees: 
Regeilar wage workers 3.7 3.7 
Irregeilar workers 2 2.1 
Casual workers 0.9 1.2 
Non res.foreigners 9.4 8.2 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 0.8 0.9 
Irregular selfemployed 0.8 0.8 
Casual workers 0.4 0.4 
Multiple job holders 12.5 14.4 
SERVICES TO INDUSTRIES, 
PRIVATE HEALTH, EDUCATION 
AND ENTERTAINMENT 
Employees:. 
Regular wage workers 
Irregular workers 
Casual workers 
Non res.foreigners 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed 
Irregular selfemployed 
Casual workers 
Multiple job holders 
NON MARKETABLE 
SERVICES 
Empioyees: 
Regular wage workers 19.7 
Irregular workers 0.1 
Caseial workers 3.8 
Non res.foreigners 40.9 
Self employed: 
Regular selfemployed ­ ­ ­
Irregular selfemployed ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
Casual workers ­­ ­ ­ ­ ­
Multiple job holders 8.6 8.2 7.2 7.2 7 6,6 
Source: Our elaboration of ISTAT data, see table 2. 
5 . 3 
1 . 7 
1 1 . 3 
0 . 8 
2 . 5 
3 . 8 
4 . 9 
1 4 . 8 
5 . 4 
1 . 7 
12. 1 
0 . 6 
2 . 8 
4 . 2 
5. 1 
1 5 . 4 
5 . 8 
1 . 9 
131.5 
0 . 5 
Τ D 
4 . 6 
4 . 5 
1 5 . 8 
6 
2 
1 2 . 7 
0 . 5 
Τ O 
5 . 3 
5 . 5 
1 6 . 8 
6 . 7 
2 . 4 
1 5 . 5 
0 . 4 
3 . 7 
6 
5 . 4 
17 
7 . 5 
y y 
1 6 . 5 
0 . 4 
3 , 9 
6 . 8 
5 . 6 
1 7 . 6 
7 . 6 
3 . 6 
1 5 . 9 
0 . 3 
4 . 2 
7 . 4 
6 . 3 
1 8 . 5 
2 0 
0. 04 
4 . 2 
4 6 
2 0 
0 
4 
48 
2 0 . 4 
0 . 1 
3 . 6 
5 1 , 5 
2 0 . 7 
0 . 1 
2 , 9 
4 9 , 9 
2 0 . 8 
0 . 1 
¿L m ' 7 
4 9 . 3 
2 0 . 3 
0 . 1 
2 . 8 
4 7 . 5 
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PART ONE: QUALITATIVE MONOGRAPHIES 
1. The qualitative conditions of employment of foreign 
workers, by E. Mingione 
As we shall see in the second part of this report, 
irregular employment of foreign workers in Greece is quite 
seibstantial and can be divided into two main types: seasonal 
and all year-round. Our qeialitative investigation will 
concern three cases: two seasonal ones (yoeing North-Eeiropean 
workers employed in toeirist services deiring the summer and 
Polish families working in agriceiltetre also deiring the 
seimmer) and an example of year-roetnd irregeilar employment 
(Filipino domestic helpers, mainly qeioting from the 
transcription of some interventions at a symposieim on the 
conditions of employment of migrant workers. This symposieim 
was held in Athens in April 1988 and organized by KASAPI 
ELLAS, a recently set-eip organization of Filipino migrant 
workers, together with Greek solidarity organizations, 
chiefly the Women's Committee of the Hellenic Leageie) . 
E^CiillEicCEE?:?G ^fflÜEOfl w.EÜ_ÍÜÍ!r:E in. toLirist services. 
A sizeable number of yoeing foreigners, mainly women, are 
irregeilarly employed in tourist services (bars and cafés, 
restaeirants, shops, small hotels and pensions, travel 
agencies, night clubs) deiring the summer season. They come 
predominantly from Holland, Denmark, West Germany, 
Scandinavia and Great Britain. They are mostly recruited in 
two ways, both related to the existence of Greek communities 
of migrant workers in these countries. Some, perhaps the 
majority, are contacted by Greek boyfriends and perseiaded to 
spend the summer in Greece on a part-holiday part-work 
basis. Others are recruited by specialized or semi-
specialized agencies (Greek-owned small travel agencies 
-specializing also in cheap tourism for young people and in 
discoemted train and air travel). 
They work mainly on the islands and to a lesser extent 
on the mainland coast and in Athens. They are mostly 
employed in jobs involving contact with foreigners where 
their language and culteiral skills are prized. Usually their 
conditions of employment are meich worse than expected for at 
least two reasons. As they are extremely vulnerable -
stranded in a foreign coemtry with no money, eiseially 
unwilling to reteirn home immediately and without a work 
permit - preliminary agreements are not respected by 
employers. They end eip working much longer hoeirs, having 
very little free time for holidays, doing tasks they were 
not seipposed to (for example, a girl bartender woeild be 
asked to clean the place after closeire) . The second reason 
for disappointment concerns only female foreign workers, who 
are the large majority. They are subjected to and resent the 
strong male chaeivinist attiteide of both their Greek male 
colleagues and their male employers. 
Polish toeirist workers in agriculture. 
Deiring the peak season in agri ceil teire and mainly in 
Northern Greece, a qeiite seibstantial neimber of Poles are 
irregularly employed in harvesting, collecting freiit and 
olives and many other agricultural tasks. Poles obtain the 
tourist expatriation visa more easily than other Eastern 
Eeiropeans. They drive down to Greece in crowded cars packed 
feill of camping equipment. They receive permission to camp 
from farmers in exchange for a few days work and then work 
throeighoeit the entire agricultural season for food and 
relatively low cash payments. 
They move around the countryside following the 
intensive demand for labour in successive areas determined 
by the harvesting of different crops (apricots, peaches, 
plums, potatoes, apples, figs, grapes, and so on). Before 
reteirning home, they eiseially sell their camping eqeiipment 
and other goods,· which are relatively cheaper in Poland, in 
order to raise money so that they can save hard currency 
(they eiseially change drachmas into US dollars). Some of them 
do not go back to Poland and become political refugees. They 
remain in Greece as refeigees until they obtain a visa to 
North America or Aeistralia. 
Filipino migrant workers in Greece, 
As mentioned above, the following are passages from 
interventions at a symposieim recently held in Athens. I am 
grateful to Georgia Petraki for having sent me copies of the 
transcriptions. 
For reasons of comparison, it shoeild be kept in mind 
that the minimeim salary of a full-time Greek domestic helper 
is over 60,000 drachmas per month. The near totality of 
Filipino maids in Greece do not have a work permit; as a 
consequence they are highly veil ner able. They are recreiited 
by specialized agencies to which they pay a substantial 
amoeint of money ($US 1-3,000) in order to obtain what is 
described as a very decent high-income job. They are usually 
well edeicated and can speak fairly good English. 
FIRST SPEAKER: 
Now one may ask: how many Filipino migrants are working in 
Greece? It is difficult to state the exact figure, as qeiite 
a netmber of oeir people are illegal, that is, withoeit any 
documents or permits. A reasonable estimate woeild peit the 
number to 10,000. 957. are women. Age ranges from as yoeing as 
15 years old to 55 years old. The oldest among eis at 64 
years old jeist returned to the Philippines. After working in 
Greece for 14 years, the only money that was given her was 
her salary for the last month she was working. Nothing else. 
No benefits. 
My colleageies will share with yoei testimonies aboeit the 
conditions we live and the daily streiggles oeir lives 
involve. The accoemts which are not in the least 
'sensational', tell mainly of the ordinary things of 
everyday life, the uncertainties aboeit the fetteire. 
SECOND SPEAKER: 
The case of Pedro and Seisan. 
Pedro and Susan are a yoeing couple, who were directly hired 
from the Philippines. The family incleided a sick man, who 
was paralyzed and bedridden, his wife and their grown-up 
daughter. They were nurses during the night and houseworkers 
in the day time. Some characteristics of the employer family 
incletde such things like: for every mistake in doing the 
hoeisework, there is a corresponding deduction of the salary. 
When they are late in coming back from their day-off, the 
minutes late are lead to an equivalent salary deduction. 
After some months, they coeild no longer stand the siteiation. 
One day, they decided to leave. The employers had 
confiscated the passports, believing that withoeit any 
documents they would be under their complete control. 
Moreover, the employers did not work their stay permit nor 
their work permit, even though the two Filipinos were 
directly hired from the Philippines. 
Thus their life of illegality and clandestini ty started. A 
life feill of inseceirity and emcertainty. Anytime, they coeild 
be picked up by the immigration police. Meanwhile, what the 
employers did was to report them to the immigration police, 
acceising the coeiple of stealing money, jewelry and other 
valetables. For this reason, it became near impossible for 
them to get themselves legal, even if they could have a new 
employer. 
At this point, I woetld like to stress the role of 
recreiitment agencies, who have amassed so metch wealth from 
this dirty beisiness of recreating Filipinos. These agencies 
would give beaettifeil promises to prospectives applicants. 
The money each prospective applicant woetld give to an agency 
is between 2,000 and 3,000 f-US. Many migrants arriving every 
week are women, most of them with toeirist visas. 
How can a migrant worker save money? With the salary of 20-
25,000 drachmas a month, and she has to pay back the amoemt 
given to the recruitment agency, and every month she has to 
send .some amoetnt to her family in the Philippines. 
THIRD SPEAKER: 
One of the experiences upon arrival in Greece is to be 
confronted by the Airport immigration police. At the 
passport control, the Filipino women are immediately asked 
to step aside from the line of arriving passengers. The 
interrogation could last for a day, emless the employer 
would come and getarantee for her. The situation is 
compounded by the lack of language facilities. The 
intimidating behavioeir of the police really terrifies the 
Fi 1 i pi nos. 
Upon arrival at the house from the airport, the Filipino 
domestic worker is immediately given the things to be done, 
no consideration at all whether the person is suffering from 
jet-lag after a long journey. 
And so the Filipino woman starts her life as a domestic 
servant. Sometimes the family does not speak English. The 
language problem makes it often impossible for the worker to 
understand the way things should be done according to the 
wishes of the employer. 
Domestic worker becomes completely under control of the 
employer, who often consists of the whole family of hetsband 
and wife with their children. 
This process of thoetght and valete-assimi lati on is done in a 
setbtle manner. As a domestic worker, she metst stay in the 
hoetse, 24 hoetrs a day, work and sleep in the same house. In 
effect, without realizing it, she has became a domestic 
property of the employer. 
Employers have the habit of making assurances to us that in 
case of illness, they woetld be the ones to take care of all 
the expenses. In reality, it does not always happen. Like 
the case of Maria Borje, who underwent setrgery. Her hospital 
bills were not paid by the employer. Two weeks ago, she 
died. She was only 23 years old. Throetgh voletntary 
contribetti ons, the body was broetght back to the Philippines. 
FOURTH SPEAKER 
We meist say that there are employers who show concern for 
their domestic helpers. Unfortunately these employers are a 
minority, more of an exception. My testimony will be aboeit 
the working conditions under employers who exploit to the 
full, our being foreign workers, and who treat us as one of 
their domestic properties, incapable of thinking. 
Let me start with the case of MIA. 
She is 38 years old, separated from her husband, and has 
three children to support. She came to Greece 4 years ago. 
She had no idea what the work woetld be, bett was willing to 
try any work. Althoeigh she had finished a college degree at 
one of the Philippine etni versi ties, she could not get any 
work: fitted to her profession. The only job available was 
that of a domestic helper. Her first employer was an Arab 
businessman, who promised to work out her documents so she 
would be legal here in Greece. He was always boasting about 
his connections with people in high places. Getting her the 
permit to work and permit to stay would have been very easy. 
However, he did not. He realized that by not making her 
legal before Greek law, she would be completely dependent on 
him. From being arrogant, the employer became abusive. He 
would shout at her for anything she did that was not 
according to his likes. One time, she tried to reason with 
him, as a result she was slapped in the face. Aside from the 
insults and verbal assaults, she was subjected to many-
indignities. For example, she was allowed to eat only left-
overs from the master's table. She could never eat on time. 
She was intimidated from going out and socialize with her 
fellow Filipinos. One time, she had the coeirage to leave for 
a short period. When the employer foeind oeit, she was no 
longer allowed to leave the house. She was kept locked 
inside the hoeise. One day she managed to escape by passing 
throetgh the window. 
MARIA'S CASE. 
She is only 21 years old. Her employer got her from an 
agency involved in the beisi ness of recruitment for Greek 
families. She was told that her employer occetpies a very 
high position in a government ministry, that he is a man of 
honoetr. However, she was only given a salary of Dr 25,000 a 
month. Althoeigh the contract says that the domestic worker 
is entitled to one rest day, this was not followed. On 
Setndays, she metst bring the children to the cheirch, which 
according to the contract, metst be an orthodox cheirch. 
Practically, she coeild only go oeit for a few hoetrs. The 
situation became so unbearable that she asked her friends 
for advice. They conseil ted a lawyer. When the employer knew 
aboett it, he was very mad. One day, the employer brought her 
to the airport and sent her home to the Philippines on the 
first available plane. 
Maria's case is very common. The agent from the recreiitment 
company promised her a very good salary. Even if she had to 
give ÍUS 2,000, the money could be recovered. So, what Maria 
and her family did was to borrow money. However, when the 
e;mployer decided to send her home to the Philippines, Maria 
and her family had nothing and nobody to give them 
protect!on. 
MARTHA'S CASE 
She is 35 years old, directly hired from the Phi 1 ippines. 
Her contract says that her work would be to baby-sit two 
children. When she started her work, she was told that when 
the children are asleep, she would have to do all the things 
in the hoetse, like cleaning, washing and preparing food. She 
would start her day at 6.00 in the morning to prepare coffe 
-for the master, clean the room and prepare the bed; when the 
children are in bed by 9.00 p.m., she would still continue 
the work of ironing clothes; at 11.30 p.m. she has to put on 
the washing-machine. Finally she could retire past midnight. 
There is one peculiarity in Martha's case. Her employer 
was sexetally attracted to her. As she did not have her own 
room, she would have to sleep in the living-room. Sometimes, 
the employer would come into the living-room half naked. One 
evening, he attempted to molest her sexually touching her, 
Nateirally she resisted. The next day, she escaped from the 
hoetse. Her employers had confiscated her passport, believing 
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that as long as her passport was in their possession, she 
would not have the courage to leave. Moreover, they 
petrposely did not work oett her permit to work and stay 
permit. After her escape was discovered, the emplpyers 
broetght the passport to the immigration police accetsing her 
of stealing money and valetables. She coetld not get another 
employer becaetse she has been blacklisted. 
JENNY'S CASE 
She is 20 years old. When she arrived, she was only 18 years 
old. Her contract was good for two years only. Because she 
did everything in the hoetse - she was a hard worker -
according to the employer, her employer did not want to lose 
her. For all the hoeisehold work, she was given a salary of 
Dr 28,000. The problem is that with the present salary of 
28,000, she woeild never be able to pay back the amoetnt given 
to the agent. She had foetnd an employer willing to give her 
507. more than what she was actually receiving. The employer 
liked her very much. Sometimes her employer would even ask 
her to clean the hoetse of their parents. In spite of the 
extra work and long hours of work, she never got any extra 
compensation. Nevertheless, she was told that if she really 
wanted to change employment, she woetld have to go home 
first. The only way for her to stay legally in Greece is to 
renew her contract of employment. The other option woetld be 
to go home. 
2, The case of Crete, by P.M. Delladecima 
The growth areas of Northern Crete consti tette a major 
illustrative case of a type of development which is 
currently taking place in Greece and in tetrn of a type of 
employment streicture which such development relates to. 
The island of Crete consists of 4 administrative 
regions - Chania, Rethimno, Heraklio, and Lassithi - each 
one including the respective main regional centres of 
Chania, Rethimno, Heraklio and Ag. Ni kol aos. It could be 
argeied that in terms of economic and administrative 
influence the cities of Heraklion and Chania are the 
dominant ones. Overall, despite the parti cui ari ti es of each 
region the economy of the island is strongly based on 
agriculture and tourism. 
Development tends to concentrate aroetnd the main 
regional centres and it is expanding linearly along the 
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Northern coastal road-route which connects each centre with 
the others. This form of development is characterized by a 
mixed pattern of eises and activities concerning tourism 
(small-scale accomodation in the form of room-renting and 
big-scale hotel accomodation combined with entertainment 
eises setch as shops, restaurants, etc.), agricetltetre (in 
certain cases highly productive), housing and services in 
general. It should be pointed out that the prodetced pattern 
relies heavily on the fragmented small-scale ownership 
strucettre (preserved also by the existing legal framework). 
Small-scale land ownership facilitates adjetstments to 
changes of eises (i.e. agricul tetral to tourist eises) , changes 
determined by new rent relations primarily promoted by the 
road network (the main coastal road completed in the 1970 
increased accessibility and "opened up" favoetrable areas to 
tourist uses). 
Thus, the entire northern coastal area is gradually 
incorporated to this pattern of development, leading also to 
a unified and extensive commodity, hoetsing and laboeir market 
embodying considerable aspects of internationalization. The 
whole sitetat i on proves to be particularly favourable to 
income and employment opportunities for wide population 
strata. 
Within the limits of this presentation it is difficult 
to produce any form of qetanti tati ve information concerning 
the employment structure and the labour market in general. 
We can, however, briefly describe some of the phenomena 
which are identifiable in the area. 
a) Underemployment involving various sectors of the 
economy. 
b) Population and labour mobility, primarily due to 
seasonal "demand for "labour iñ agriculture and the tourist 
sector of the coastal areas: For example, labour demand in 
agriculture during crop collection relies heavily on 
imported labour from northern Greece and on cheap labour by 
young tourists and migrants from foreign countries (Poland, 
N. Africa, etc.). Similarly, the tourist sector during the 
peak period absorbs labour from other areas in Greece. 
c) Mul ti activity, the most important and widely spread 
phenomenõn~rn~Crête7 I t T s very common, for instance, for a 
public employee, to maintain agricultural land and benefit 
from the sa.le of products such as olive oil, oranges, etc., 
or even to engage in tourist. activities as forms of 
complementary income. Mul ti activi ty is also met in the 
agricetl turai sector. Members of an agricultural family may 
work in the building sector or be involved in tourist 
activities setch as room-renting or even in handicraft petty 
commodity prodeiction for the local toeirist market. 
Finally, it is necessary to point oeit the disjointed 
and fragmented character of state policy in the area (i.e. 
economic incentives for tourist and indetstrial development 
which operate independently from land eise policy) which 
proves to be etnable to exert any form of control, based on 
simplicistic assetmptions of clear distinctions between 
economic and physical development and ignoring the totality 
of the problems involved. 
3. Yoetth laboetr, by P.M. Delladecima 
It is estimated that in Greece approximately 170,000 
children from 12 to 18 years old (and even yoemger) are 
engaged in various activities. Only 53,000 oeit of them work 
under licence conceeded by the Ministry of Labour. 
There is virtually no legal framework to protect 
children or youth labour. Existing law only determines 
working conditions for "officially employed" yoetth and no 
consideration is given at all to those engaged in handicraft 
family activities or those who work in various petty forms 
of sei f-empioyment. A recent law prposal, intending to 
introduce considerable innovations into the matter, has not 
yet been approved. 
Theis, thousands of children - not having even completed 
primary education - work under conditions of over-
exploitation by their families or even within organized 
networks (which distribute them around the etrban centres) as 
"street pedlars", selling flowers at restaurants or 
entertainment clubs, cleaning cars, windows, etc. 
4. Fetr Processing in Kastaria - (Northern Greece) 
by Cost i s Hadji mi chai i s and Dina Vaiou 
Kastaria is a mountainous nomos (province) in North West 
Macedonia, by the Greek-Albanian border, with poor 
connection to the rest of the country (pop. 1981: 53169, 
density: 30,9 people per sq.km). The principal town, 
Kastaria, with about 25000 people in 1981, is a traditional 
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International f eir-processing center. Until 1975 its 
excleisiveness for this activity was secured by law. Theis the 
town óf Kastoria has attracted population from smaller towns 
and nearby provinces. 
Of the 21510 people in formal employment in 1981, 14000 
work in the 3500 fetr-processing workshops. This does not 
mean that all 14000 are classified as feir-workers. Many are 
listed as peasants - a phenomenon identified by the 
Agricetl tetre Bank whose estimate is that 63% of the peasants' 
income is generated from this activity. Fetr-processing forms 
about 107. of Greek exports and generates *120m in foreign 
cetrrency. Kastoria and neighboetring Siatista now accoetnt for 
977. of fetr-processing in Greece and control aboeit 107. of the 
international fur trade. A featetre characteristic to 
Kastoria is the high level of per capita savings, which 
exceeds the national average by 417. (130,000 drs compared to 
the national average of 92,000 drs in 1981). 
Fetr-processing in Kastoria is based on a long local 
tradition (dating back to the 18th centetry) of pettting 
together very small pieces of feir (2-3 cm by 1-2 cm) to make 
a long coat. Since the 1960s pieces of feir are imported 
while almost 807. of local production is exported again. 
After 1975, the excl eisi veness of fur-processing has been 
extended to the entire prefecture and to the neighboetring 
city of Siatista. Both the state and local aetthorities are 
pressured by local corporatist interests not to further 
extend the privilege to other competing regions. 
After the geographical extension of processing 
privileges, a new pattern of employment started to develop. 
Kastoria town continued to be the center of the activity, 
comprising all formal workshops and firms' offices. An 
equally important part of the work (estimated between 40 and 
507. of total production) is now diffused to a number of 
villages and towns in the prefecture, to non-registered 
home-based workers, usually women. The fur-workers etnion, 
with only 700 members, has been able to negotiate the terms 
of employment in the workshops but has not been able to 
prevent extra piece-work used by firms to produce first-rate 
goods. 
It is not uncommon for male fur-workers to rescrt to 
piece-work at home. But in the majority of cases they act as 
middlemen who negotiate such commissions for their wives and 
daughters, usually a much lower rates than in the workshops. 
Working for the fur industry at home does not lighten 
'women's duties' as mothers and. housewives. They do not have 
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the freedom of going oeit to work and they work in conditions 
that are detrimental.to their health. Stress, overwork and 
health hazards from constant exposetre to feir deist are the 
etnderside of the betrgeoning feir indetstry in Kastoria. The 
patriarchal valetes of the household stretctetre make of women 
a captive and flexible laboeir force to which the fur 
indetstry can always resort (via men) for the laboetr-
intensive part of the prodeiction process. At the same time, 
women are trapped in the regional specialization of 
Kastoria, where the fetr indeistry~Is~ãn ëxcTüsi vë~source of 
employment oettside agricetl tetre. 
As in other cases of homework in Greece, the home-based 
part of fetr-processing is not recorded or detected, theis 
avoiding taxation. It involves no social seceirity benefits 
or costs on the part of the firm that does not have to abide 
with laboetr legislation either. Fur-processing is thets 
incletded in the household economy as a source of income to 
be combined with agricultural activities (mainly apple and 
bean prodeiction) that often continue to be listed as the 
'head of hoeisehol d ' s ' occetpation. 
The whole situation is highly profitable for fur 
traders, since the labour-intensive skilled processing is 
carried oett with minimetm labour costs. In addition, fur 
traders make extra profits from extensive transfer-pricing 
and illegal transactions with foreign companies. The issete 
has been taken to court three times with 85 fur traders 
accused by the Ministry of Trade. But their corporate power 
has been strong enough to influence political parties and 
MPs to stop prosecution. 
5. Women's Informal Work in Services by M. Stratigaki 
Gender-based discrimination in Greece is metch more evident 
in the informal than in the formal labour market. The 
eiseially unfavoetrable working conditions in the informal 
sector, such as lack of social security, irregular working 
times, i riappropri ate environment, inadeqeiate payment, etc., 
are the result of the absence of any state or trade-union 
intervention in the labour process. These conditions form 
the basis of the so-called 'free' bargaining between workers 
and employers and favour personal relations in the labour 
contract. Participating less than men in the formal 
workforce and burdened by the patriarchal relations 
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prevailing in Greek society, women consti tette a 'willing 
reserve-army' ready to accept minimum standards of working 
conditions and payment. 
Women's working patterns in services differ enormoetsly 
from those of men. MEN'S informal work in the service 
sector is eiseially secondary to their formal employment, 
especially in the public sector or in organizations of 
public interest (banks included). Low salaries, inadequate 
for the proper seipport of children and hoetseholds, push men 
with families to look for a 'second' afternoon job. 
Relatively favourable working times (eiseially from 7.30 to 
15.00) as well as abstention from domestic work (exclusively 
etndertaken by their wives), allow them to extend their 
working-day etntil late evening. 'Second' jobs are eiseially 
related to their formal occetpation and the skills acqetired 
in it, i.e. bookkeeping, teaching, engineering, selling. 
WOMEN'S informal work is eiseially their primary and only 
employment which very often supports the whole family. 
Flexibility in working time provided by informal employment 
suits women's responsibilities at home. Women with children 
'prefer' to work at home, if this is permitted by the nateire 
of the service rendered in order to combine both domestic 
and waged labour in the same place. 
Women's informal employment in services appears mostly 
in sectors connected with 'female' tasks, i.e. caring for, 
edeicating, assi ting men. Three groups of women's informal 
labour in services can be distingetished. 
a. Personal services offered by individual women 
workers to persons or families, such as nursing, baby 
sitting, cleaning, teaching, housekeeping, hairdressing, 
beauty care, typing data entry, prostitution. Such services 
ë\.re provided on a piecemeal or hourly basis usually at. the 
employer's home. Recently, foreign women, coming mainly from 
the Philippines, have been employed in nursing and 
housekeeping. Informal labour relations may extend in this 
case to the employer's control over the legitimacy of the 
worker's residence in the country. 
b. Services provided to family businesses. 
The functioning of "medi urn-si zed and small" units, which 
characterize the Greek economic structure, are largely based 
on the unpaid labour provided by women and children as 
members of the family. Especially in retailing and tourism, 
the majority of shops, restaurants and rooms-to-rent are 
mostly run withoeit any waged labour. Women's labour 
relations confused with family relations remain informal in 
13 
most cases. Hetsband-employers control women's laboetr and 
determine working conditions. A small amount of this etnwaged 
laboetr is statistically visible, appearing einder the 
classification 'Assisting and non-paid family members'. 
c. Services provided to small and medieim-sized fi_rm£· 
The ëmpröyëFs~öf these units, "especial ly~In tourism, when 
not etsing the services of their family members, or in 
addition to them, etsually employ informally Greek and 
foreign women. Women foreign workers coming mainly from 
Eetrope provide services to toeirists, i.e. guidance and 
information, entertainment in hotels, bars and discos, room-
cleaning. Althoeigh informal work is officially forbidden, 
surveillance and control by the State Social Seceirity 
Authorities is almost non-existent in the toetrist sector. 
Generally, one could say that in Greece, conditions 
remlated to both its economic and social structetre have 
created a female workforce 'willing to be employed 
informally in the service sector. These conditions not only 
favoeir flexible accumulation of capital beit also aggravate 
existing gender-based discrimination, both in working and 
family life. 
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PART TWO: GENERAL AND QUANTITATIVE REPORT 
The preparation of this report has been made possible thanks 
to the collaboration of Professor Costis Hadjimichalis and 
Professor Dina Vaioet who gathered the relevant material, 
organized meetings and discussions with officials and experts 
and assisted me during the'visit to Greece in July 1988. An 
extremely valuable contribution was also made by Doctor 
Pavios Delladecima who translated the most relevant docetments 
from Greek into English. 
1. Introduction 
In order to understand the case of Greece, it is important 
to start by mentioning some elements in the economic and 
industrial history of the country which have had a very 
important impact on its present social stretcture and socio-
regetl ative patterns. What is peceiliar to Greek industrial 
and financial history and to its present economic structetre 
is not so metch the high degree of polarization between big 
international capital on one side and a persistent large 
number of small and very small concerns on the other side. 
This is also foetnd, for instance, in some Italian regions 
and in Spain. The specificity of Greece is dete to the fact 
that the concentrated and internationalized pole of the 
economic structetre has developed in historical terms almost 
exclusively aroetnd shipping (the commercial fleet), ship-
building and a few other industries (in the main chemicals, 
steel, electricity, cement and food processing). These 
activities have been characterized by unusual patterns of 
Taylorist and Fordist systems compared to those put into 
practice by producers of durables where large numbers of 
fully urbanized and propertyless workers are increasingly 
concentrated in large factories. The dominant sectors in 
Greece have not only been more capital-intensive or operated 
outside of a proper factory organization (like shipping) 
belt, in addition, they have employed a working class with 
some landed property either in rural areas or in cities, the 
reseilt of semi-sqeiatting or 'afthereta' as it is called in 
Greek (Hastaoglou, Had jimichal is, Kalogiloet and Papamichos, 
1987). This factor has also decreased reproduction tensions 
to the benefit of a more complete development of a proper 
Welfare State. 
This pecetliar indeistrial stretcteire became increasingly 
accentuated in the post-war period up to the crisis of 1973. 
In this phase the so-called Greek indeistrial miracle was 
lead by metltinational capital and internationalized domestic 
capital, belt mainly in the branches mentioned above. Deiring 
the crisis of the seventies, the climate became decreasingly 
favoetrable to these kinds of metl tinational and 
internationalized sectors, bett neither was it any more 
favourable to the deirable goods indetstry which had been 
petshing in other countries for the establishment of a 
Fordist-welfarist regetlative system; it woetld perhaps have 
been too late to set one eip in a period when the trend 
towards flexible soleitions was already einder way in other 
indeistrial i zed countries. During this period, medietm-smal 1 
traditional manetf act etri ng oriented to the local market and 
to exports, mainly to the Middle East, was in a phase af 
expansion. Conseqetently, when in the eighties Greece joined 
the EEC, it did not possess an appropriate regetlative 
stretctetre, which in other coetntries had more or less been 
promoted by Fordist Welfarist coalitions; nor did the 
social base and indeistrial structure exist which had been 
responsible elsewhere for the betilding of setch regulative 
systems. 
At the same time small-scale ownership of land, not 
only in the coetntryside, has mantained a very high level of 
importance. Fetrthermore, compared to other countries in 
southern European, there is an even more noticeable aspect: 
the absence of agri ceti turai latifundia, eliminated by a 
radical and relatively early land reform (Hadjimichali s, 
1986). 
The combination of these elements means that Greece 
never fully underwent a Fordi st-Wel f arist regetlative stage. 
The same is trete of Portugal but for a different reason, the 
overwhelming importance of its colonies. It would be 
interesting to compare the differences and si mi 1 i ari ties of 
these two cases in this respect. The absence of a Fordist-
Welfarist regetlative stage of some importance is relevant to 
oeir steidy for a netmber of reasons. Irregular forms of 
employment are not only particeli ari y widespread and 
difficult to spot and quantify, but they are also completely 
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embedded in the normal everyday life of every Greek citizen, 
as we shall see later on. The fiscal system remains mainly 
based on indirect taxation, which accoetnts for nearly three 
qeiarters of the State's tax revenetes. On the other hand, 
direct taxation of incomes is parti cetlarly ineffective and 
the rate of tax evasion is very high and concerns the great 
majority of incomes, with the sole excletsion of earnings 
from official wages and salaries. 
The state welfare system is weak, poorly developed and 
incomplete. This contribettes in turn to the spread of 
irregular forms of employment in many branches of services 
and to the persistence of traditional family or hoeisehold 
working arrangements. Here are some examples: einpaid family 
work in all three sectors of the economy, bett mainly in 
agri ceti ture, still involved in 1985 more than one third of 
the women officially in employment; and as we shall see, 
this may conceal setbstantial travail au noir in toeirist 
services and in indeistrial homework. Not being specifically 
regulated by law, part-time employment is considered illegal 
in many economic areas and conseqeiently becomes part of the 
undergroeind economy. Lastly, the same happens to almost all 
industrial homeworkers, with the exception of a few who 
manage to register as self-employed workers. 
2. Existing estimates of the Greek underground economy, 
Although irregular employment and informal activities are an 
important and widespread phenomenon in Greece, or perhaps 
for this very reason, the problem has not attracted great 
attention until recently. The casets belli has been the 
failure of the Papandreu government's austerity program in 
the mid eighties. In order to control the foreign trade 
deficit and the expansion of internal demand and to attract 
investment, the government imposed a severe freeze on wages 
and salaries agreed etpon with EEC and international economic 
authorities. Despite a reduction of 12.57. in the disposable 
income of wage earners during the two years of the austerity 
program, consumption increased by 1.87., imports by 12,27, 
and furthermore i πvesternent fell by 57 (Bank of Greece, 
1987; reported in Hadjimichali s and Vaiou, 1988). 
The failure became predominantly interpreted as a sign 
that a large part of the Greek economy was not under control 
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and lay oeitside the formal system for salaries and wages. 
This fact broetght the qetestion of the etnderground economy, 
called 'paraeconomi a' in Greek, to the general attention of 
the petblic, officials, academics and political parties. 
Since 1985-86 many articles have been petblished in the daily 
and weekly press bett eint il now there has been only one 
scientific attempt to estimate in detail the 'paraeconomi a' 
(Pavlopoulos, 1987). 
The setmmarized reseti ts of Pavlopoetlos's work are shown in 
table 1. Income from the eindergroemd economy in 1984 is 
estimated at 28.67. of GNP. This reseti t is not far from a 
setbseqeient evaluation by another author, Dermenakis (1988), 
former Depetty-Head of the Bank of Greece, etsing a different 
method in which the figeires are not disaggregated for the 
different sectors (see table 2). However the Dermenakis 
estimate incletdes a figetre of 107. which he argetes appears in 
the GNP beit cannot be attributed to any formal activity. 
This valete cannot be accoetnted for with Pavlopoetlos ' s 
method, since for him the entire underground economy is a 
separate item added on top of the official GNP. Against the 
Pavlopoulos approach it could be argued on the basis of 
other experiences that a part of the etnderground economy, 
including some of the taxes evaded, is accounted for in the 
GNP; this is eiseially the income which emerges in terms of 
VAT, and also other values, but not in terms of direct 
income tax. The method used by Pavlopoetlos has been 
criticized for various reasons. Above all it is argeted that 
it leads one to greatly underestimate irregeilar incomes 
deriving from tourism, building and agricetl tetre, and 
possibly to overestimate the etnderground prodeiction of 
personal and professional services. 
However the main problem for us is that neither of 
these two methods of calculation leads to any estimate of 
the types of irregeilar forms of employment and the extent 
of their presence. In order to provide a very rough 
tentative picture of the quantities involved, I have tried 
in table 3 to summarise available emofficial data and 
estimates. It metst be pointed oett that this exercise has 
not been carried out on a properly scientific and docetmented 
basis; consequently it should be considered excleisively as a 
very roetgh starting hypothesis that has still to be tested 
by scientific research in the field. In addition, I woetld 
suggest that in order to calculate the percentage of the 
roughly estimated product of various kinds of irregular 
employment within the Greek underground economy (that is, 
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including tax evasion by regular workers and by corporations 
and the prodetct of the criminal economy) we should take as a 
yardstick Pavloetpolos's estimate of the latter and add to it 
the 107. of the etnderground economy which Dermenakis assetmes 
is incletded in the official GNP. This final figetre came 
close to 1,300 billion drachmas in 1984, bett is no longer 
reliable as a percentage of GNP and needs to be adjeisted for 
Pavlopoetlos ' s einderest i mates for the var i oets sectors, 
parti ceil ari y toeirism and agri ceil tetre. If the figeires from 
this calcetlations are roetghly correct, the income produced 
by irregeilar forms of employment woeild range from a low of 
23.57. to a high of 35.47. of the entire eindergroemd economy. 
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TABLE 1: Pavlopoulos's estimates of the Greek etnderground economy 
for the year 1984 per economic branch, in billion drachmas at 
cetrrent valete. 
sector and branch 
Primary 
Secondary 
mining 
manetf a c t e i r i n g 
e l e c t r i c i t y and 
beli l d i n g 
T'erti ary 
transport 
trade 
banking and insurance 
hoeising 
petblic administration 
health and edetcation 
varioeis services 
(A) product (B) 
water 
formal 
593.4 
960.0 
70. 1 
601.8 
76.3 
211.8 
1764.5 
261.2 
427.0 
85.7 
177.6 
361.3 
197.8 
253.7 
real 
593.6 
1200.5 
70. 1 
691.8 
76.3 
362.3 
2485.5 
338. 9 
550. 0 
88.7 
339. 0 
361.3 
257.3 
418.3 
Β/Α χ 
100. 0 
125. 1 
100. 0 
115.0 
100. 0 
171. 1 
140. 3 
129.7 
128.8 
103.5 
190.9 
100. 0 
130. 1 
164.9 
100 
Criminal activities 130 
TOTAL 317.9 4277.6 128.6 
EVALUATION OF THE PRODUCT OF THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY: 959. 
(Pavlopoulos, 1987, p.158) 
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TABLE 2: Dermenakis's estimates for the year 1984. 
(soetrce: National Accounts: Introdetction to the Budget, 
Statistical Betl leti n of the Bank of Greece) 
1. Undeclared income from ownership and entrepreneeirship 933 
2. Profits not distribetted by personal firms -32 
3. = 1 - 2 901 
4. Undeclared agri ceil teiral income 42 
5. = 3 + 4 943 
6. Income declared to local aeithorities not incletding 
income from waged services -346 
7. = 5 + 6 etndeclared income 597 
8. 107. of GNP nat appearing anywhere 336 
9. Under and over-estimation of external trade 80 
Total eindergroemd economy 7+8+9 1013 
above as a 7. of the GNP 30.2 
(Dermenakis, 1988, p. 27) 
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TABLE 3: 
Typology of irregeilar forms of employment with estimates of the 
number of workers, the average yearly per capita (p.c.) income and the 
total income prodeiced in billion drachmas for the year 1984. 
1. Irregeilar industrial homeworkers: 
number: 2/300,000; p.c. income: 400,000 80 120 
2. Year-roetnd illegal foreign workers: 
number : 100,000; p.c. i ncome: 400,000 40 40 
3. Multiple irregular activities by wage and 
salary workers in their free time: 
number: 3/500,000; p.c. income: 300,000 90 150 
4. Irregeilar multiple activity based on a combination 
of toetrism, agricetl tetre, trade and petty craft 
production for toetrists. Number of families: 2/300,000 
Income calculated from irregeilar payments in drachmas 
1/2,000 per day by 30 million tourists 
(approximately half the estimated tourist presence 
in the mid eighties) 30 60 
5. Seasonal irregeilar wage employment in tourism 
and agriculture. 
Illegal migrants 50,000 to 100,000. 
Income: 100,000 5 10 
Greeks: 100,000. Income: 100,000 10 10 
6. Irregular employment in building of beiilding 
workers on unemployment benefit. 
number: 50,000 Income: 200,000 10 10 
7. Undeclared multiple activity in agricetl ture, 
manuf actetri ng (excluding industrial homework) 
and services, but not in tourism. 
number: 100,000 Income: 200,000 20 20 
8. Youth and ethnic minorities (mainly gypsies) 
engaged in non-authorized or undeclared 
street trade. 
Number: 100,000 Income: 200,000 20 20 
9. Unpaid family work and other irregular female 
employment leading to undeclared income not 
aceoem ted for in 1, 4, 5 and 7. 
Number: 100,000 Income: 200,000 
Total : 
"/. of the total underground economy estimated at 
bi 11 i on drachmas 1.300: : 
Total number of workers involved (in case 4 only 
one worker is counted per family) in thousands 1,: 
2 0 
0 5 
3 . 5 
0 0 1 
2 0 
4 6 0 
3 5 . 4 
, 750 
3. The demand side of irregeilar employment. 
A feirther comment on table three will serve as an 
introduction to this section. Many Greek colleagues would 
immediately argete that some of the types of irregular 
employment are underestimated both as regards the number of 
workers and the amount of per capita undeclared income. 
Taking each case' indi videtal ly, this may be trete bett, in 
general, a certain degree of etnderestimation is necessary in 
order to counterbalance the relatively high rate of overlap 
between different types. 
As we shall see more clearly in this section and in the 
following ones, the Greek situation is structurally very 
complicated. This is becaeise it is based on a very high rate 
of self-employment, on traditional small-scale activities 
and on complex mixes of very intensive seasonal work with 
long periods of etnderemp 1 oyment, non-employment or 
etnemployment during the winter. For this same reason, it is 
difficetlt to disentangle demand from setpply, organized 
cC£Y.f?ÌI QEÜLC from family or worker strategies and 
opportetnities from exploitation. As we have anticipated, 
'...in 1984, Greece had only 457. of its active population 
etnder wage-relations, while 28.27. were classified as self-
employed.' (Hadjimichalis and Vaiou, 1988, p.99). To the 
high number of self-employed we shoetld add an equally 
persistent high number of "assisting and non-paid family-
members', a condition which involves more than 400,000 
females or exactly one third of the female population in 
employment, and finally a grea\t netmber of small and very 
small employers. As a conseqeience, it even becomes difficetlt 
to analyse the sitetat i on at the level of economic sectors 
and branches, as we shall try to show below. In fact 
different kinds of irregular employment are made up of 
complicated mixes of var i oets activities, as shown by some of 
the types indicated in table 3. 
Before dealing with the demand side in some economic 
branches, it is worthwhile to qetote a passage from a recent 
paper by Lila Leontidou describing the origins of the 
informal sector in Greece. 
'It has been usually taken for granted that the informal 
sector is neglected by the State, especially with respect to 
financing, or even that it escapes State control and 
develops to a large extent within illegality or even 
corruption. By contrast, the beginnings of the Greek 
(15) 
informal sector can be traced in the years of the refeigee 
arrival in 1922 under the recognition and, moreover, the 
active seipport by the State, the Refeigee Settlement 
Commission and the National Bank. 
The first recognition of the informal sector was the 
erection of small shacks for petty traders by the municipal 
aetthorities in Athens in 1923. These seibstitetted the flimsy 
commerce stands and wooden shops erected in central streets 
of Athens by the refetgees as soon as they arrived. Law 
3142/2.8.1924 was then drafted on "granting of economic 
seipport, on getarantee of the Greek State, to refeigee small 
entrepreneetrs, organized into groetps, as well as to etrban 
cooperatives of small indeistri al i sts and artisans" by the 
National Bank of Greece. Small cooperative production emits 
and groetps of artisans as well as independent entrepreneetrs 
were financed. The Bank "made vocational loans to small 
traders and artisans, whether or not grouped in 
associations". Such measetres favoetred the development of a 
cooperative movement, small productive units, and 
independent artisans. By 1930, 307. of the people employed 
in indetstry, 677. of those in commerce and 697. of those in 
services were absorbed in a petty informal economy of 
enterprises employing less than 5 workers. ' (Leontitoet, 
1988, p.48) (internal references suppressed) 
TOURISM. 
At least. from the fall of the military regime in 1973, 
tourist activities have expanded enormoetsly on the Greek 
islands and on the coasts of the mainland and developed an 
increasingly complicated irregular character. First of all 
there is the non-authorised renting out of rooms to tourists 
by local people. In the Greek tourist industry the largest 
number of beds are provided by private persons in local 
houses located on the coasts of both the islands and the 
mainland. This activity is not totally underground since in 
order to be put on the list of the local tourist office, 
families usually declare the renting-out of one/two rooms. 
But in actual fact they rent out many more and funti on as 
small unauthorized pensions. Often, the family itself 
sleeps in the open air or in a. tent or in other provisional 
arrangements on agricetl turai land. The local agriculture of 
the islands and coastal regions has also been greatly 
transformed by the effects of mass tourism. Traditional 
crops picked by intensive laboetr during the seimmer season, 
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like tomatoes for indeistrial processing, have been 
progressively abandoned in favoeir of either crops reqetiring 
less labour-intensive methods and matetring later, like olive 
oil, or, even better, the growing of freiit and vegetables 
(possibly expensive and etnetseial kinds for Greece, like 
kiwis, advocados and bananas) and the rearing of animals to 
feed the tourists, without passing throetgh either the market 
or the fiscal system. In this sense, we coetld say that the 
advent of seich a style of mass toetrism is promoting an 
increasing setbmerged expansion of agri ceil tetre, paralleled 
only by the increase in self and commissioned beiilding 
activities in order to host a growing number of tourists in 
private houses. 
Deiring the summer months, most members of families 
living on the coastal regions and the islands, including 
children whose presence is massive and visible, work very-
hard in the service of- the tourists. The large majority of 
these working activities are unaccounted for and irregular. 
The landlady who cleans the room, prepares breakfast and 
possibly also some meals is in official statistics either a 
fij.ll-time hoetsewife or an unpaid family helper in 
agri cui tetre. The head of the household who takes the 
toetrists out in his boat and unofficially offers it for-
bire, who has extended his hoetse with the help of relatives 
and male children, is a farmer whose agriculture prodeiction 
is "officially' falling, as he sells most of the fruit and 
vegetables he grows directly to the tourists. Such examples 
can be multiplied by as many tourist needs as can be 
directly satisfied by local irregular arrangements to the 
reciprocal satisfaction of both the customer and the 
provi der. 
If we go beyond the microfami 1 y ventures in the small-
scale official or semi-official area of shops, restaurants, 
nightclubs, bars, pensions and small local hotels we find 
other forms of irregular employment. As part-time work is 
not specifically regulated and, as a consequence, highly-
inconvenient because officially it should be paid the 
minimum wage and the full social insurance rate, and as the 
local labour supply is largely insufficient for the peak 
tourist season demand, the solution lies in the extensive 
use of migrant labour, both Greek and foreign. In this case 
foreign means most of the time young people from northern 
Europe. The latter are hired directly through migrated 
friends and relatives or indirectly throetgh specialized 
agencies in the main northern European cities. Their board 
and lodging and travel costs are paid for and they receive a 
little cash (well beyond any salary level); in addition they 
get enoeigh free time to enjoy the setmmer in a nice place 
(bett often other aspects are disappointing: the 
overwhelming majority of yoetng females get very little free 
time and their working conditions can be particetlarly hard). 
This kind of arrangement is likely to be even more 
exploitative and less satisfactory for the worker in the 
case of non-seasonal migrants coming from Third World 
countries or of political refetgees from Eastern Eetropean 
coetntries, Turkey or the Middle East. It is interesting to 
note that in medieim-smal 1 local toetrist emits you find the 
exact reverse ratio of Greek to foreign workers that are 
foetnd in the large hotels owned by foreign metl tinational 
companies. In the small-medium venteires the owners and the 
top-level permanent officially employed workers, like chefs 
and head waiters in restaetrants, are Greek while a large 
proportion of the lower levels are foreigners. This is also 
explainded by the fact that semi-skilled Greek labour (able 
to cope with foreign cetstomers and with at least some 
rudimentary knowledge of foreign languages) woetld cost the 
owners and managers metch more than, for instance, a Dettch or 
Swedish or Danish college student. 
In this area, it is also likely that a substantial part 
of the seasonally employed Greek laboetr force, with the 
excletsion of specialized jobs in high demand, is irregeilar: 
students and the yoetng unemployed mostly with high-school 
degrees from the large urban conurbations of Athens and 
Thessaloniki. In contrast, there is little evidence that the 
large tourist ventures employ irregeilar labour directly. 
They may subcontract services to medium-small firms in order 
to enjoy the advantages of low-labour costs while avoiding 
the risk of serious harm that could resell t from reports or 
inspections by the authorities. 
AGRICULTURE. 
The official statistics on employment in agriculture give 
only one really important piece of information, that is, the 
fact that a sizeable class of permanent agricultural wage-
workers has not existed in Greece for a very long time. 
Since the agri ceil turai reform, the large estates have 
disappeared and there has been no trend towards large-scale 
concentration of ownership in land. This does not mean that 
Greek agricetl tetre does not need a large number of 
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agricetlteiral day-laboeirers detring the peak season; bett this 
has been salved both in the past and recently in ways which 
do not prodeice a permanent stratum of landless agricetl teiral 
workers. We shall see below the irregeilar natetre of present 
forms of employment. 
In the 1981 census slightly more than 307. of the Greek 
popeilation in employment was registered as working in 
agricetl tetre and fishing, and now the figetre is approximately 
a qeiarter. In 1985, more than a qetarter of employed women 
were non-paid family helpers in agricetl tetre. As we have 
anticipated in the previous section and will repeat later on 
when speaking of manetfacturing and services, the large 
majority of the Greek agricultural popeilation, small farmers 
and their families, is involved in networks of unofficial 
multiple activities, which complement an increasingly 
insufficient income from agriculture. The more fortunate 
are in the toetrist beisiness, while the poorest families in 
the regions of the interior provide a flow of seasonally 
migrating agri ceil teiral workers who help to solve the problem 
of the high demand in the seimmer months, together with 
gypsies, other ethnic minorities and, increasingly, illegal 
temporary workers from Poland and Yugoslavia. In the middle 
there are varioets combinations of indeistrial homeworkers, 
industrial/peasant commuters, temporary workers in building 
and varioets degrees of involvement in the local service 
industry and in relatively long-distance seasonal migration 
to the toetrist areas or to Athens and Thessaloniki. 
As we shall see when speaking of the supply side, an 
interesting case is the involvement of a large number of 
F'olish, but also Yugoslavian, migrant workers. It is also 
worth mentioning the fact that a persistent neimber of farms 
are owned by urban workers either directly or throetgh a 
member of the family, and they may be worked etsing a 
considerable number of undeclared irregeilar labourers. 
MANUFACTURING. 
It is worth beginning this section by quoting part of a 
recent paper by Papamichos and Tsoulouvis entitled 
'Indeistrial estates and employment structetre in Greece', 
which discusses the origins and persistence of some forms of 
irregular employment in Greek manufacturing. 
'In 1958, in Greece as a whole, there were registered 
109,793 manetf acturing establishments in the "core" part of 
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manetf acturing sector, and 46,295 home manetf acteir ing units 
(with 450,375 and 67,824 persons employed in them 
respectively). In other words, hoetsehold prodeiction units 
were almost half the establishments of the core sector while 
the persons employed in the former were 1/7 of the latter. A 
significant percentage of these emits were prodeicing goods 
not for sei f-consetmption bett for the market. Therefore, they 
did not consti tette part of a domestic mode of prodeiction beit 
were integrated into the capitalist mode of prodeiction. 
However, they did not consti tette small and dispersed 
production units of large firms, but rather were themselves 
small firms. Nor were they prodeicing on a seib-contract basis 
for larger firms .... 
In Athens region and, to a smaller extent, in the 
prefectetre of Thessaloniki, ratios of prodeiction emits and 
employment in household maneifacturing as to the units and 
employment in the core manetf acturing sector were much 
smaller (1/18 and 1/80 for Athens, and 1/5 and 1/15 for 
Thessaloniki, respectively). Bett in other geographical 
departments like Thessaly, Epi rets, Ionian islands and 
Thrace, household production units were well over 1/2 of the 
core sector establishments. As to the PIE, surprisingly-
enough, prefectures in southern Greece displayed the highest 
rate of household manufacturing units. Yet this part of the 
country was integrated to international capitalism earlier 
than northern Greece. 
Unfortunately the ESYE did not continue using this 
distinction between household maneif acturing units and the 
core manetf actur i ng sector in more recent censuses: it has 
just put household units producing for the market together 
with those of the core sector and left unregistered units 
producing for self-consumption. Any attempt to estimate the 
number of household units of both these categories is risky. 
What is more, one cannot be sure if those units considered 
by the ESYE operating for self-consumption are in reality 
operating this way or constitute part of an 'informal 
sector': family members may bring the product of their 
overtime work to consetmption not by following the rules of 
the market but in an indirect way .... 
However, it is important to note that the statistics 
given sar li er suggest that as recently as almost at the 
beginning of the sixties, there existed a considerable 
number of household maneif acturing units. Subsequent State 
policies, like those of the SOMMEX (National Organization 
■for Small and Medietm Size Manetf actetr ing Companies and 
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Handcraft), of NELE (Prefectural Committees for People's 
Further Education), and those supporting the cooperative 
movement in the country, have forwarded the idea of this 
mode of production. They have been encouraging people to 
exploit all their opportunities as self-employed prodetcers. 
One can trace back the existence of setch an ideology and 
State policy as early as in the twenties, in relationship 
not only to manetfactetring bett also to agriculteire and other 
sectors of the economy. Therefore, hoetsehold maneif actetr ing, 
whatever its extent may be today, does not const i tette an 
original development directly related to present-day trends 
appearing at the international level, as for instance the 
shift from the just-in-case to the jeist-i η-time model of 
production, setb-contracting and flexible work. Even its 
expansion, to the extent that one proves that this took 
place in recent years, is not new, given its large size in 
the recent past Greek maneif actetr ing has hardly 
passed throetgh a fully developed 'fordist' model of just-in­
case prodeiction in big firms. Also, the large percentage of 
small firms today has not resulted from a dissolution of 
larger firms into small units, preferring (or compelled) to 
operate on a subcontracting basis, since small industry has 
been the mode of existence of Greek manufacturing for a long 
t i me. 
Further, a decisive question in the case of home 
maneifacteiring is whether women working at home are organized 
to produce carpets, fashion dresses, or whatever else, by 
industrialists or merchants. If the latter is the case, as 
was happening in the past, it seems more plausible to think 
of this situation not as an outcome of the recent crisis, 
the restructuring of capital and changing labour processes, 
since after all capital involved in such a process is too 
small, but rather as directly deriving from what already 
existed as a significant mode of integration of household 
production into the capitalist market. 
Of course, home manetf acturing of today does not 
originate in a linear evolution of Greek society. Neither is 
it a remnant of the past, of a traditional society organized 
on the ' basis of petty commodity prodeiction. Processes of 
capitalist integration, the pre-existing social and economic 
structures, Stati sm, the weakness of the civil society, the 
impossibility of emergence of a hegemonic industrial class, 
and the repeated abortive attempts of the State to create 
such a class, all these factors, that cannot be examined 
here in detail, have played their role in this process. 
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Nonetheless, if we had to choose between continetity and 
streicteiral change as factors accounting for home 
manetf acturing activities of today, we woetld argete that what 
happens now is by and large accounted for by the former." 
(Papamichos S< Tsoulouvis, 1988, pp. 40-42). 
Indeistrial homeworking and subcontracting systems based 
on some kind of irregeilar employment at the bottom of the 
chain are very diffeised in Greek manuf actetring. They 
piratically involve every indeistrial branch, with the 
exception perhaps of the most capital-intensive and 
internationalized ones, including the commercial fleet, 
which is a special case to which we shall refer at the end 
of this section. Irregular industrial homeworking and forms 
of subcontracting are highly concentrated in the clothing, 
leather and footwear industries, but also in furs, toys and 
tourist handicraft, as well as in a wide range of other 
industries. Even the State takes advantage of illegal 
piece-work in maneif actetring. In State training schools, 
women learning how to make carpets produce them for export 
directly under the control of the State. They are paid, a 
very low rate per thousand knots so that when well-trai ned 
their maximum daily earnings reach 1,000 drachmas, well 
below the minimum legal wage. There are other examples of 
the State taking direct advantage of the exceedingly poorly 
paid and flexible labour supplied by chains of 
subcontracting and industrial homeworkers. For instance, the 
Ministry of Defence directly seibcontracts to homeworkers the 
manetf acturing of tents and other light military eqeiipment. 
Furthermore, it is well-known that the Ministries of Defence 
of Belgium and Holland indirectly subcontract the 
maneifactetre of most of their military uniforms to irregular 
homeworkers in Greece. 
In the toy indetstry even the leading firm, El Greco, 
has grown and developed through the extensive use of 
subcontracting work to industrial homeworkers. An early 
network of very well co-ordinated and specialized 
homeworkers on the island of Zakynthos was abandoned as soon 
as the workers became organised and asked for higher rates 
of pay. El Greco moved its subcontracting practices to the 
western Péloponnèse, and the specialized network on 
Zakynthos soon became involved in other industrial circuits, 
producing yet again toys but also tourist crafts. 
The case of the fur industry' in northern Greece has 
also been under investigation (see the qualitative monograph 
on fur-processing in Kastoria and Hadjimichalis and Vaiou, 
1987 and 1988).' Here, industrial homework is highly 
specialized (mostly the pettting together of small and very 
small pieces of fetrs) and provides heige savings on costs 
throetgh the use of permanently hired skilled workers. This 
combination is also in part to the advantage of the workers, 
who can combine work with agri ceil teiral and domestic tasks 
and save on taxes and social contribeitions (as we shall see, 
in the Greek sitetation women find it difficetlt for varioeis 
reasons to accept a permanent factory job even when it 
involves skilled and relatively well paid work). 
Apart from the cases quoted above and a few others, 
subcontracting and indeistrial homeworking is highly 
concentrated in Greater Athens, particularly in the 
outskirts where there are large areas totally specialized in 
a branch of homeworking (for instance, the district of 
Peristeri in West Athens), and to a minor extent in the 
metropolitan area of Thessaloniki. It is worth mentioning 
the case of toetrist craft maneif acteir ing, which is almost 
totally concentrated in the indeistrial homeworking networks 
of Greater Athens. Its products are also sent for sale on 
the Islands, while local craft manufacturing is becoming 
increasingly rare for a combination of at least two reasons. 
The islanders find it more advantageous to specialize in 
direct. services to tourists and the powerful hold of the 
large trading network and market in Athens makes peripheral 
production less and less viable. 
In addition, some big foreign firms or contractors make 
extensive eise of the Greek homeworking system. Two examples: 
the raincoats for street-cleaners in France are now all 
produced by Greek homeworkers through chains of 
subcontracting in the area of Ioannina since the ban 
introduced by French law on the etse of the plastic they are 
made from; the metl ti national Newmann subcontracts to small 
firms in Larissa which in tetrn subcontract to more than 
2,500 homeworkers. 
As mentioned above, the commercial fleet is a special 
case worth noting mainly for its important role in the Greek 
economy and for the indirect effect of promoting irregular 
employment on the part of its fully regular employment 
structure. During the last twenty years, the fleet has 
increasingly hired foreign workers for menial jobs, mainly 
Filipinos and Pakistanis, with the legal consent of the 
authorities who have made an exception in this important 
case. These foreign workers are paid much less than the 
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emi on rates based on the legal wage paid to Greek workers 
doing the same jobs; this fact has allowed the Greek fleet 
to remain highly competitive internationally. The Greek 
fleet is probably the only large concentrated industry in 
the West which employs perfectly legal foreign workers at 
salaries well below the minimetm consented for national 
workers. The Tribunal of Piraeets has recently passed a 
sentence against this practice: ship-owners are aetthorized 
to hire foreign workers bett not to pay them wages below the 
levels consented by Greek regetlations and agreements. This 
was probably not so meich a move in favoetr of -foreign workers 
belt rather a reseti t of the increasing pressure deie to 
etnemployment to force Greek employers to hire Greek workers; 
there is also an awareness that this abseird employment 
practice by the most important and internationalized section 
of Greek capital cannot arrive at the deadline of 1992 
withoeit being modified. Beit the immediate result has been 
that an increasing netmber of foreign workers, formerly 
employed by the fleet and laid off in Greek ports, remain in 
Greece to work illegally in other branches of the economy 
for at least several months, if not longer. 
BUILDING 
Employment in building activities as recorded by the 
censuses increased dramatically in the post-war decades, 
from a low of 75,000 in 1951 to nearly 300,000 in 1981. 
This increase in the number of workers was paral led by a 
vast chaotic process of urbanization which concentrated 407. 
of the Greek population in the Greater Athens metropolitan 
area and another 107. in the metropolitan region of the 
second largest city, Thessaloniki. This process has been 
defined as 'anarchic' and characterized by building which is 
illegal (most of the edifices are relatively small, built 
pjrivately on tiny plots owned by one or a small number of 
families and often the resetlt of much self-help, also in 
etrban areas) but incorporated into town-planning later on. 
Even the more recent 'Master Plans' are frequently violated 
and far from insensitive to special interests of varioeis 
kinds in opposition to any logic of planning. 
Also, building firms are parti cui ari y small and 
fragmented and, consequently, are able to operate very 
f J ex i bly with respect to regetlations and the law (the 
estimate in table 1 shows the building sector as one of the 
most active in the underground economy). But, unlike in 
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maneif actetring, building workers have been traditionally 
highly unionized and have betilt eip a very powerfeil etnion. 
As a consequence of this strength, beiilding workers enjoy a 
level of unemployment benefit well above the normal low 
rate. As summarized in table three, one of the forms of 
irregetlar employment is that of building workers who 
continue to work whilst receiving unemployment benefit, to 
the advantage of both employers and employees belt to the 
detriment of the State and the social secetrity system. No 
precise estimate or study is available on the matter, and 
only a very rough guess is possible. 
The other type of irregeilar employment in beiilding is 
even less documented and more difficult to estimate. It 
relates to building labour contracted on the black market 
for short-term jobs within the still rather extensive area 
of sei f-bui Iding, now mainly located on the islands, in 
summer and winter vacation resorts and in the agricultural 
regions of the interior, but also in the outer peripheries 
of the two large metropolitan areas. Here it is not even 
possible to guess at the quantities and local kinds of 
irregular employment, apart from mentioning that it is 
likely to exist and flourish in the form of relatively small 
jobs and in areas where the control of the powerfeil building 
workers union is weak. 
SERVICES 
In the case of Greece, it is not the dismantling or 
reshaping of the Welfare State or its increasing inability 
to meet. new needs which has led to the appearance of 
irregular employment but rather the historical weakness and 
incomplete formation of the existing welfare system. 
Traditional and new private alternative soleitions to modern 
welfare are furthering the vast diffusion of forms of 
irregetlar employment in health, education, chi Ideare, 
transport, household services and many other areas. 
For example, it is suggested that the great majority of 
private educational institettes, a substantial number of 
which a.re language schools, irregularly employ moonlighting 
state school-teachers or yoeing unemployed university 
graduates seeking a first job or retired teachers. Private 
clinics increasingly hire irregular Filipino nurses and pay 
them a much lower wage than the minimum laid down for their 
Greek colleagues. There is a growing demand in private 
households for Filipino maids, since they are usually paid 
less than 30,000 drachmas a month against a minimeim wage of 
60,000 for their regetlarly employed Greek counterparts. The 
lack of state provision in the field of childcare and homes 
for the elderly and the handicapped has promoted the spread 
of private establishments, which very often hire irregeilar 
workers in order to keep costs low enoeigh to attract 
customers. This is also facilitated by the already-mentioned 
fact that the lack of specific legislation for part-time 
work drives practically every form of part-time employment 
eindergroemd. Obvioetsly, the diffused system of babysitting 
is in the large majority of cases travail aet noir. 
Déte to the fact that we coetTd~nöt"träce~äny specific 
research or inqeiiry into this very heterogeneoeis area, it is 
impossible to estimate numbers of workers, types of. work and 
incomes·beyond the documented cases already mentioned. 
Street trade and small shops are also a sizeable soetrce of 
irregular employment. One journalist has estimated that of 
the more than 100,000 yoeing street-traders in the 
metropolitan area of Athens less than a qetarter are licensed 
and authorized. 
Finally we could mention, although again completely in 
the dark deie to the lack of any docetmentation, that Greek 
experts seiggest that the forms of irregular employment in 
services connected with technological or organizational 
innovation in office work are increasing fast. For example, 
the subcontracting of typing at home, irregetlar consetlting 
services in accounting, computer system and so on. Another 
new kind of irregular employment mentioned is the diffusion 
of door-to-door selling, mainly practised and not declared 
by middle-class housewives. 
4. The supply side of irregular employments 
So as not to repeat what was already said in the previous 
section, we will deal here only with four important 
questions: women; young people and the unemployed; the 
labour supply for multiple activities and moonlighting; 
illegal work by non- resident foreigners. 
WOMEN IN IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT 
A substantial part of irregularly employed workers in Greece 
are made eip of women. Correspondingly, the rate for official 
employment of Greek women is particeli arly low. According to 
official 1985 statistics, active females are calcetlated at 
34.27. of the adetlt popeilation (over 14 years of age) and the 
rate of female employment at 30.27.; but the figure is 
reduced to. only 19.97. if we include only the women in paid 
employment and excleide non-paid family helpers. That is to 
say, only one woman in five over the age of 14 is officially 
in paid employment. The low rate of participation in paid 
employment and the high rate of irregetlar employment have 
parallel histories. 
Among other factors, three appear to be the most 
important in explaining the parallel low presence of women 
in official paid employment and their high level of 
participation in irregetlar forms of work: the extraordinary 
diffeision of small-scale ownership and family betsinesses; 
the recurrent outcry from both trade unions and government 
officials against female employment every time male 
unemployment rises above a certain level; and the 
undeveloped state and poor level of public welfare programs. 
To these factors can be added a fourth, which completes the 
picture: the widespread inadequacy of the breadwinner's 
income in a country which has never known the family wage 
system, at least, to the extent characteristic of northern 
Europe (including France and North Italy) and North America 
in the sixties and early seventies. In other words, the 
high level of female involvement in irregeilar employment is, 
from the seipply angle, both the result of persisting social 
and ideological traditions and a sort of substitute for the 
increasing official part-time employment of women in other 
countries. 
Industrial piece-work in the home is the form which 
attracts most attention, but is probably not the numerically 
most important given the rapidly rising rate of irregular 
employment in tourist-related activities and in services. 
According to the Federation of Greek Women, there are 
between two and three hetndred thoetsand industrial 
homeworkers, of whom at least 150,000 are in the Greater 
Athens area alone. They are mostly married women with 
children who appear in official data as unpaid agricultural 
helpers or as housewives. A large group is composed of the 
wives of building workers who supplement their insufficient 
incomes with both unemployment benefit and indeistrial 
homework by every member of the family. Children are 
eiseially involved in the work and this.is demonstrated by the 
high number of children hurt by toxic vapours, raw materials 
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or machinery. Heisbands may also take part in seich homework, 
particeilarly when they are working in seasonal sectors like 
toeirism, agriculture or beiilding. The average income is 
estimated at between thirty and forty thousand drachmas a 
month per experienced family unit, belt it can vary greatly, 
also depending on seasonal peaks in demand. 
Deie to the high and growing level of yoeing female 
etnempl oyment, this groetp is also increasingly involved in 
indeistrial homework at least for a period of time and if 
they live in an area where networks of indeistrial homework 
already exist. Another category of homeworkers on the 
increase consists of preretired industrial workers on a 
limited pension. As their income is insetf f icient, they 
contineie to do at home what they eised to do in the factory. 
Female homework is also increasing in services in connection 
with the reorganization of office work and the advent of new 
technologies, bett there is absolutely no docetmentation on 
this aspect. 
YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE UNEMPLOYED 
According to official statistics, in 1985 there were 
slightly more than 300,000 unemployed, which is less than 87. 
of the laboetr force. It is generally understood that the 
real number and rate is higher because those out of work who 
do not receive benefit (the long-term unemployed and first-
job seekers) are underestimated. Among the officially 
einemployed slightly more are women than men and the yoetng 
and very yoetng age groetps are on the increase. 
We have already mentioned the case of unemployed 
building workers who contineie to work in the eindergroemd 
economy. In the largely unregulated, fragmented and 
dispersed Greek system of employment it is likely that other-
categories of the unemployed, both those who are on the very-
low unemployment benefit and even more so those who are not, 
work in temporary 'irregular jobs when they can find them. 
There is no documentation, bett we can easily assume that 
deiring the seimmer anyone who is prepared to accept a low 
wage and irregular conditions can find a job. The situation' 
is much worse during the other seasons when temporary 
irregetlar employment drops drastically. The only document 
found relating to this specific question is the newspaper-
article already mentioned above. 
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MOONLIGHTING AND MULTIPLE ACTIVITY 
Apart from some information on particeilar cases and 
conjectetres that they might constitette the largest share of 
irregular employment in Greece, there is practically no 
scientific documentation on these forms of irregular 
employment. It is argeted that irregular moonlighting 
involves approximately one half of all salaried employees, 
particeilarly civil servants, teachers and bank clerks. The 
typical profile of this moonlighter portrays him as a 
middle-aged married male whose wife does not work. In seich 
cases, the inadequate income to support a family will peish 
the heisband to look for a second activity; as this is not 
permitted by law, because it is part-time and cetmetlated 
with a full-time job, it is likely to be some form of 
traya.il au ncúr. Feirther factors contribetting to this kind 
of solution are the relatively low salaries and the fact 
that most public or bank employees finish work in the early 
afternoon. 
Pavios Dermenakis suggests that: 'In the area of 
salaried employees, according to one moderate estimate 507 
have a supplementary income from the undergroetnd economy, 
principally deriving from either moonlighting or from 
undeclared agricetl turai income. Some examples are: teachers 
giving private lessons for cash payments; bank employees 
working as accounting consultants for seriali and medium-sized 
enterprises. Furthermore, illegal income obtained by civil 
servants through corrupt practices must also be taken into 
account. ' (Dermenakis, 1988, pp.22-23; freely translated 
from the Greek). 
The fact that the Greek authorities have been thinking 
for some time of passing a law to try and bring illegal 
moonlighting under control (it would probably meet with 
little success to go by the examples of other pieces of 
legislation mentioned in the next section) is an indication 
of the huge dimensions assumed by the phenomenon. In July 
1988, the Minister of Labour declared at a press conference 
that he had redrafted a bill prepared by his predecessor-
providing sanctions against irregular moonlighters (both 
employees and pensioners) and legalizing early partial 
retirement based on a combination of part-time work, feill 
social insurance coverage and a reduced pension. All this 
in order to favour the creation of new jobs and fight 
against unemployment. But latest rumours sctggest that the 
Government is now oriented towards a- more liberal and 
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flexible position as regards meiltiple employment, which is 
to be made legal at least to some extent. The aim is to make 
it possible to enforce restrictions and prohibition in areas 
which are considered to have a strong bearing on 
etnempl oyment levels. 
We have now said nearly everything possible at this 
stage relative to the various typologies of multiactivi ty 
mixes, either mainly based on toetrism or agricetl ture or 
other indeistries. It is worth mentioning that some of these 
mixes, mainly the ones based on toetrism, are becoming 
increasingly remunerati ve for the local popeilation (see the 
qeialitative monograph on Crete) while others permit no more 
than bare .survival. It is also worth mentioning the fact 
that preseimably the worst-off are not local people involved 
in one or another set of meiltiple activities bett the even 
more marginalised and irregetlar workers who have to travel 
outside their residential area in search of temporary 
irregeilar work involving one of these mixes. They are 
usually gypsies, Muslim minorities, Turk refugees or 
agricultural workers from the poor internal regions. 
ILLEGAL WORK BY NON-RESIDENT FOREIGNERS 
A typology of foreign irregetlar workers in Greece is 
included in the qualitative part of this report. Here we 
shall look only at some general problems and explanations 
and the available data and estimates. We shall begin by 
di stingeti shi ng two categories of irregular foreign workers: 
seasonal and non-seasonal . 
The first category is very difficult. to estimate 
numerically because it includes several groups of workers 
coming mainly from northern and eastern Europe who enter-
Greece as tourists. In the qeialitative mini -monograph, we 
have dealt in detail with the case of Poles who work. in 
agriculture during the summer mainly in the regions of 
northern Greece. It is suggested that there are also 
considerable numbers of Yetgoslavs who do the same. The case 
of the irregular seasonal workers from northern Europe has 
already been treated when discussing the situation in 
toetrism from the demand side. The estimate which puts the 
number of these foreigners at approximately 100,000 is a 
totally undocumented guess. However, it is likely that the 
actual figure for those foreigners who do more than just 
occasional work during the summer lies between 50,000 and 
150,000. 
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Non-seasonal irregular foreign workers are largely 
migrants in transit, including most of the political 
refugees from eastern Europe and the Middle East. They come 
to Greece and scrap a living by doing irregular work until 
they manage to get a visa for Canada or the United States, 
or a work permit for West Germany in the case of Turks. The 
fact that final destination countries have recently 
introduced increasingly restrictive policies is likely to 
increase the length of stay in Greece and the possibility 
that it will become permanent. There are however some 
exceptions to temporary immigration. These are mainly 
migrants from Arab countries, especially Palestinians to 
whom the Greek regime is more open than others, Egyptians, 
Eritrean and Somalian refugees, Filipino and Pakistani 
sailors laid off in Greek ports after years of authorized 
work in the Greek commercial fleet, and a growing number of 
Filipino maids directly recruited in the Philippines by 
specialized Greek agencies. 
Foreigners with work permits, not including those 
officially employed by the commercial fleet, numbered 28,572 
in 1983. Since then the figure has dropped slightly due to 
the increasingly restrictive policy of the Ministry of 
Labour. Of these more than 407. (estimated to be over 13,000) 
are Greeks from other countries (mainly from Cyprus and 
Turkey) who are automatically entitled to a. work permit. 
Furthermore, included within the group of officially-
authorized foreign workers are a large number of citizens 
from the developed world working for multinational or 
international companies in Greece. This leaves room for a 
few hundred authorized Afro-Asian workers out of the many-
thousands (the current estimate is over 100,000 and includes 
only irregular workers) permanently present in Greece 
today. Irregular foreign workers find a job easily in some 
sectors, mainly services, agriculture and households, 
because they are paid much less than what Greeks earn for 
the same kind of work. This is less true in manufacturing 
and, consequently, here foreigners either work on an 
official basis, like a relatively large group of skilled 
Egyptian workers employed in medium-large specialized 
engineering firms, or they do temporary or dirty- jobs 
etnacceptabl e to Greek workers. A recent circular from the 
Ministry of Labour restricts the jobs which foreigners 
withoeit a work permit are allowed to perform to just a few 
agricultural tasks: animal rearing, with the exclusion of 
sheep, and plant nurseries. 
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5, Factors determining i^L^ÇJular employment and its national 
versus local stretcteire. 
As we have mentioned, Greece faces the problem of a labour 
market with an uncontrollable structure. This situation 
depends in part on historical factors, that is, mainly the 
persistent -importance of small family betsinesses, and in 
part on new developments. The latter are prevalently shaped 
by the way in which the latest increase in mass tourism has 
affected the economy of the islands belt also by the pace of 
tertiarization and the diffetsion of flexible set-ups in 
maneif acturing (including the specific managerial strategies 
of individetal firms or petty traders favoetring the fetrther 
expansion of industrial homework in order to keep down the 
cost of labour, already particeli ari y low due to the special 
conditions existing in Greece). 
Family businesses and industrial homework are very 
difficetlt to control and regulate both as regards the eise 
of labour and real levels of pay. There is probably a 
connection between the persistent working activity of unpaid 
family helpers and the fact that emtil recently there has 
been no need to regeil ate officially part-time work. The 
same may be true in the case of industrial homeworkers. The 
latter provide a good example of an areas where existing 
legislation is not enforced. In 1957 a bill was approved 
for the clothing industry compelling employers to pay social 
insurance contribettions for homeworkers, and explicitly 
incletding those who owned their own machines. Trade-union 
officials reckon that the law has never been implemented. 
According to a. new bill, approved in 1986 under pressetre 
from the trade unions and women's organizations, all 
homeworkers metst be considered wage-workers. This law too 
has not yet been enforced due to the opposition of employers 
and of the Social Insurance Organization for the Self-
employed (estimated to be loosing 35-40 billion drachmas per 
year in payments) and to the difficulty in contacting and 
organizing the workers. 
Another example of a law which is toeigh on paper but 
cannot be enforced is the legislation against irregular 
employment of foreigners. Law 1346 of 1983, which provides 
severe sanctions against the employers of unauthorised 
foreign workers, has not in the slightest discouraged the 
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spread of this practice. The same applies to the above-said 
provision of the Ministry of Laboeir limiting the employment 
of foreigners without official work permits to some sectors 
of agri ceil teire, which indirectly admits the faileire to 
enforce the law. 
Apparently, the Greek authorities are increasingly 
aware of and worried aboeit the fact that their patterns of 
non-regulated work relations and the existing laboeir market 
represent a problem within the Community and will even more 
so after 1992. However, they have not yet foetnd a viable and 
enforceable solettion within an employment structeire mainly 
dictated by highly dispersed and fragmented economic 
operators. Moreover, the other obvioets headache for the 
Greek Government faced with seich a diffused pattern of 
irregular employment is the increase in unemployment. As we 
have anticipated, the decision of the Piraeeis Court to 
forbid the payment of lower salaries to foreign sailors has 
to be interpreted mainly as a provision in favour of 
creating jobs for Greek workers. The problem is that 
enforcement cannot be extended much further beyond the few 
concentrated official sectors of some size to the labyrinth 
of medium-size, small and family businesses and to those 
families which employ Filipino maids becaetse they can pay 
them one third of the rate due to an equivalent Greek 
worker. 
Among the recent factors which have promoted an 
increase in irregular employment it is safe to include also 
the impact of the two-year austerity program launched by the 
government. The freeze on wages and salaries has not been 
inviting enough to attract investment in a situation which 
is already flexible, but in which this flexibility applies 
mainly to the underground economy. However, it has probably 
setfficed to increase the pressure to look for complementary-
irregular incomes and employment. It has convinced some 
official workers to opt for moonlighting, others to work 
harder in the underground system to make good what they have 
lost in the formal economy-, others, where possible., to 
join their wives in homework to boost income from this 
source, and so on, 
We have already mentioned at various times the main 
geographical differences characterizing the map of irregular-
employment in Greece: the two big metropolitan areas of 
Athens and Thessaloniki; the islands, or at least their 
coaistal strips, and the other areas affected by increasing 
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toetrism; the regions of the interior where the predominant 
activities are in agricetlture and those where there is a 
maneif actetring tradition. It is important to etnderline the 
fact that local traditions have probabaly only remained 
relevant in the last two types of region. Both eirbanization 
and the receht impact of mass toetrism have almost entirely 
eradicated local forms of work in favoetr of the new forms of 
irregetlar employmment, always along the above-described 
lines of homework and family businesses but following the 
reqetirements of a radical restructetring. The example of the 
virtetally complete end to local craft manetf acturing on the 
islands and its concentration in the oettskirts of the 
Greater Athens area is very i nstretcti ve. 
Within the metropolitan areas, it is possible to 
setggest the existence of at least a marked difference 
between the central part of the city and the outer 
peripheries specifically in terms of irregetlar forms of 
employment. In the central areas there is a high 
concentration of moonlighting, irregetlar employment in 
commerce and street trade and in other services, incletding 
the new irregular forms of work produced by technological 
and organizational innovation. In the peripheral areas 
there is more industrial homework and irregeilar employment 
in building. 
The tourist. areas have been extensively dealt with 
above and a qualitative monograph is dedicated to the case 
of Crete. As far as concerns the regions with a predominant 
manufacturing mix and those with a mainly agricultural one, 
we cam refer only to recent studies on the northern regions, 
among which the above-mentioned investigations by 
Hadjimichali s and Vaiou (1987 and 1988). Everywhere, the 
mixes appear to be very complex and fetndamental 1 y based on a 
range of combinations of local opportunities. 
'For example, Kastaria has in 1981 a national record in 
employment in the secondary·- sector with 537 of its total 
active population, while at the same time more than half of 
its highly-specialized workforce in fur-processing work also 
in agricetl ture. The same is true in Xanthi , a nomos with a 
great increase in industrial employment: 40-607, of those 
classified as industrial workers (depending on branch) work 
also at least 120 days per year in agriculture, so that they 
can earn additional agricultural subsidies from the Greek 
state and the EEC (dir, 159/72). This combination has some 
advantages for both capital and labour. The former uses 
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low-paid seasonal laboeir with no pay obbligations for the 
rest of the time, while the latter makes a living on more 
than one job deiring the year and on seibsidies. ' 
... Out-working for clothing in villages around Serres 
town is strongly related with a local tradition for 
"flocati" carpet prodeiction, which was organized in small 
family workshops. This tradition "trained" local women, who 
are now sewing in their homes etniforms for the army of 
Holland and Belgium. In Chrissoupol i s, near Kavala and in 
Xanthi, ex-tobacco women workers with "trained hands" are 
assembling at home Christmas and carnival decorations for 
the national market and for export to EEC. The setpplier of 
material and collector of their piece-work is etsing a 
Japanese patent. And finally, in Kozani acceimetlated capital 
from land compensations payed by the power company permitted 
at least 50 company engineers to beiy small, modern mills and 
grind flour in their backyard. They work on rather stable 
sub-contracts from a large local mill which is now operating 
only as a warehoeise. ... ' 
... In northern Greece the share of wage-employment in 
total employment is aroetnd 297. (national: 487. in 1981) and 
multiple employment very widespread ... This share becomes 
even rower~whën~wë~include not only the so-called "active 
population" but all persons whose work is or could be 
incorporated in the prodeictive process. This is common with 
the rest of the'coetntry but acquires increased importance in 
northern Greece where significant structural chnges have 
taken places over the last two decades. Research condetcted 
by the Agri ceti turai Bank (1981-84) shows that 637. of farmers 
in East Macedonia and Thraki earn income from additional 
soeirces (wage employment on limited time contracts, 
pensions, rents, subsidies, etc.). 40-607. of those who work 
in industry also work in agriculture and around 107. work 
part-time in tourism. ..." 
... The variety of prodeictive traditions in different 
parts of northern Greece has contributed to the formation of 
highly differentiated labour markets, in terms of 
geographical boundaries available skills, training of the 
workforce and ways of organizing. Some skills are still 
useful in present production processes, for example in fetr-
processining in Kastoria or in plough manetf acturing in Nea 
Moudania, near Thessaloniki. In other cases still the 
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inexistence of indeistrial tradition has attracted new firms 
employing etnskilled labour.' 
(Hadjimichalis and Vaiou, 1988, p.105, 106, 108, 109) 
Apart from the variety of local combinations, it may be 
interesting to inquire in the future into what happens in 
regions with very poor mixes of local opportunities. The 
main qetestion is whether in recent times, instead of 
permanent or long-term oettmi grati on, there has been an 
increase in regular commuting to varioeis agricultural and 
toetrist regions where the demand for irregetlar laboetr is 
high, with the workers returning to their native regions 
during the dead season. It is very common among Greek 
gypsies, but may increasingly involve other inhabitants of 
the poorer regions as a consequence of the heightened 
seasonal i zati on of the Greek economy in combination with the 
persistent absence of enforceable regulations governing the 
labour market. 
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RESUME 
Cette étude, qui AZ propose d'analyser te travail au noir en Trance, 
est divisez en deux parties. Vans la première [aspects qualitatifs), sept cas 
concrztA ont été sélectionnés en {¡onction du critère dela représentativité des 
situations expoAézA. Sont tour à tour nuis en évidence le travail au noir des 
ouvriers, des étudiants, de¿ chô meurs, des travailleurs à domicile, des personnet 
plurl-actlves et des Immigrés. En considérant globalement ce¿ divers cas-typzA, 
apparaît en {¡ILigrane une véritable carte de France du travail au noir., car le-i 
exemptes retenus ont été ckolAls de {¡açon tette que toutes IZA réglons sont 
représentées. 
Vans ta deuxième partie [a¿>pects quantitatifs), on cherche à mesurer 
l'ampleur du travail au noir et à en examiner la nature et les déterminants. 
Vans cette perspective, une sorte de radioscopie du travail au noir est proposée, 
car l'accent est m¿ó Aur Aes aspects structu.rzÃA. Quels sont les participants ? 
Pourquoi décident-Ils dz se porter o{¡{¡reurA ou demandeurs de travail clandestin ? 
Quets sont les Impacts reApectl{¡A des {¡acteurs réglementaires, des aspects 
AOCMLUX, des déterminants cultúrela ?... 
L'étude se termine par une appréciation générale sur le phénomène, 
appréciation établie à partir dzA textzA destlyiés à le réprimer et deA politiques 
macroéconomiques adaptées aux nouvelles {¡ormes de {¡lexlblllté sur le marché 
du travail. 
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La littérature actuellement disponible sur le travail au noir en 
France se compose d'analyses macroéconomiques, d'études ponctuelles, de 
rapports officiels, d'articles de journaux, de textes de lois, et de docu­
ments qui émanent d'organisations les plus diverses. A problématiques 
différentes, résultats différents et souvent contradictoires : aussi le 
besoin de clarifier, d'ordonner, de dresser des typologies si ce n'est de 
systématiser se fait particulièrement ressentir. C'est à cet objectif que 
le présent rapporc est consacré. 
Etant destiné à être inséré dans une étude plus vaste dont la pers­
pective est purement communautaire, les traits spécifiques du travail au 
noir français seront privilégiés, quite à occulter volontairement certains 
aspects plus connus, plus classiques et peut être même plus conformes à 
l'intuition et aux connaissances a priori. 
En adoptant ces principes, la démarche suivie consistera à développer 
tour à tour deux étapes complémentaires. Au cours de la première, des illus­
trations concrètes et représentatives du vécu du travail au noir seront 
privilégiées. Il s'agira de repérer sur le terrain des acteurs de l'éco­
nomie souterraine et de brosser leur portrait à travers l'analyse de leurs 
motivations, l'étude des activités auxquelles ils s'adonnent et l'examen 
de leur environnement professionnel, social et culturel. L'enjeu de la 
deuxième étape sera plus analytique dans la mesure où il· s'agira d'évaluer 
l'ampleur du travail au noir et de dégager les facteurs qui contribuent à 
1'expliquer. 
Pour respecter cette ligne directrice qui a l'avantage de mettre 
la connaissance avant l'action et les propositions, deux parties seront 
successivement traitées. Au cours de la première, l'accent sera mis sur 
les aspects qualitatifs du phénomène■;"les aspects quantitatifs faisant, 
pour leur part, l'objet de la deuxième. 

Ρ A S Τ Ι H 
ASPECTS QUALITATIFS 

S'il y a plusieurs façons d'aborder le phénomène du travail au noir, 
il en est une qui revêt un intérêt particulier, celle qui consiste modestement 
à regarder vivre les travailleurs au noir pour se demander qu'elles sont 
leurs motivations, leurs préoccupations, leurs attentes et plus généralement 
les raisons qui les ont poussé à se porter demandeurs d'emplois occultes. 
Une approche de cette nature ne peut pas, par définition, déboucher 
sur des considérations générales, mais elle est susceptible de brosser le 
portrait de travailleurs spécifiques qui, tous réunis, permettent d'approcher 
la physionomie du travail au noir d'un pays. Si l'on parvient à décrire 
les comportements de personnes jeunes et de personnes plus âgées, de 
personnes employées et de chômeurs, de personnes qui résident en zone urbaine 
et de personnes qui résident en zone rurale, d'actifs et de retraités, de 
travailleurs qualifiés et d'individus sans qualification, de travailleurs 
nationaux et de travailleurs immigrés, on obtiendra une mosaïque de situations 
locales dont le caractère composite constituera une première approche d'une 
réalité par essence multiforme. 
C'est cette optique que nous retenons ici en examinant tour à tour 
les principales conclusions d'enquêtes ou d'études qui ont été effectuées 
sur le terrain. 
Il convient de préciser en préambule que tous les cas-types passés 
en revue ont été choisi pour leur représentativité, laquelle est fonction 
de deux critères : l'activité réalisée d'une part, la localisation de cette 
activité d'autre part. 
Pour visualiser davantage ce dernier aspect, figurent sur la carte 
de France ci-après les lieux des études que nous avons sélectionnées. 

Exemple n°1 : Le bâtiment dans la région parisienne (*) 
On avance souvent l'idée selon laquelle le secteur du bâtiment et 
des travaux publics fait partie des activités où la place du travail clan­
destin est importante. Aussi est­ce tout naturellement que le premier cas­
type évoqué concerne ce secteur. Les auteurs de l'étude dont il ι est fait 
mention se sont préoccupés du travail au noir réalisé pour le compte de 
particuliers. 4 corps de métier du bâtiment sont concernés : la peinture, 
la plomberie, l'électricité et la menuiserie. L'échantillon des travailleurs 
au noir interrogés ne se compose que d'hommes, ce qui ne constitue pas­
forcément un biais dans l'analyse car la part des femmes dans ce secteur 
est insignifiante d'après les enquêtes sur les structures des emplois. 
Ces hommes sont jeunes (de 24 à 43 ans) et leur âge moyen est de 32 ans. Il 
convient de noter que les travailleurs interrogés à deux exceptions près, 
résident depuis plus de 4 ans dans leur quartier. Cette observation est 
importante car pour travailler au domicile d'un particulier il est en 
général indispensable de pouvoir présenter des "références" d'où la nécessité 
d'être "connu" et "bien intégré". Les travailleurs au noir sont titulaires 
à 70% d'un diplôme de qualification professionnelle (CAP, BT' ou BTS). Les 
30% qui ne disposent pas de qualification font au noir des travaux de 
peinture (activités dont les connaissances techniques requises sont plus 
faibles). 
Sur le plan de leur statut professionnel, 50% des personnes inter­
rogées sont employés, 20% ouvriers, 10% cadres moyens et 20% chômeurs. Notons 
que 40% des employés (soit 20% de l'ensemble) occupent un emploi vacataire. 
La moyenne des salaires officiels mensuels déclarés (chômeurs exclus) 
correspond environ à deux fois le salaire minimum. Il convient d'observer 
que les emplois occupés dans leur activité principale laissent aux tra­
vailleurs un temps libre important (20% travaillent à horaire variable et 
20% ont un emploi laissant du temps libre dans la journée). Cette consta­
tation revêt une grande importance car il faut du temps disponible pour 
(*) Source : J.J. LE BABS, G. CAMUS, A. COSSET et ï. NOTTOLA : Essai 
d'analyse des causes socio­économiques du développement du travail au 
noir dans les métiers du bâtiment, SEDES, étude pour le CORDES, Paris, 
juillet 1980. 
travailler au noir de façon non occasionnelle. 
Sur le plan des motivations, elles sont essentiellement financières 
(80% des cas), mais dans la population étudiée elles ne sont "vitales" que 
dans 20% des cas. Acquérir à terme une résidence secondaire ou un bien 
de consommation finale durable constitue la finalité de la majorité des 
personnes interrogées. Pour eux, la "fin justifie les moyens", alors que 
pour les autres travailleurs au noir c'est la "faim" qui les justifie. 
Les revenus tirés du travail au noir sont très variables selon les 
individus puisqu'ils s'échelonnent entre 2500 francs et 36000 francs par 
an ; le revenu moyen de l'échantillon étant de 17400 francs, soit 1450 francs 
par mois ou à peu près un demi salaire minimum de l'année d'étude. 
Le temps consacré au travail au noir soit 12 heures par semaine, 
n'a pas beaucoup de signification. Un premier groupe travaille au noir entre 
1 et 3 heures par semaine, un second groupe entre 6 heures et 15 heures 
par semaine. 
L'étude dont nous commentons les principales conclusions a également 
pour intérêt de mentionner des résultats qui concernent les donneurs 
d'ouvrage. Les situations personnelles apparaissent ici beaucoup moins typées 
car les âges s'étalent entre 27 et 82 ans, les revenus entre 3000 et 11000 
francs par mois et les catégories socio-professionnelles de cadres supérieurs 
et retraités à techniciens et ouvriers. Leur seul point commun réside dans 
le fait que 90% d'entre eux ont eu pour la première fois recours à des 
travailleurs au noir par nécessité financière. Cette motivation principale 
est souvent doublée d'une motivation secondaire : urgence des travaux 
40%, pas assez de temps ou de courage pour les faire soi-même 20%, bricolage 
non terminé par incompétence du donneur d'ouvrage 10% ou volonté d'aider 
une personne en difficulté 10%. 
Notons enfin que la relation entre offreur et demandeur de travail 
au noir se noue pour moitié par connaissance directe (famille, amis, collè-
gues de travail), et pour moitié par le biais d'intermédiaires dont on a 
confiance a priori, (amis de la.famille, amis d'amis, relations de voisin-
nage, etc.). Cela montre à l'évidence que des relations conviviales sont 
présentes dans l'établissement du contrat de travail au noir (relation 
de confiance mutuelle appuyée par la connaissance en commun d'un tiers). 
Dans l'étude dont il est fait ici allusion, l'adéquation entre offre 
et demande de travail au noir ne pose pas de problème. Très peu de fournis-
seurs d'ouvrage (30%) disent avoir eu des difficultés à trouver un travail-
leur au noir, et sur ce nombre encore faut-il exclure tous ceux qui répondent 
avoir eu des difficultés non pas pour trouver un travailleur au noir, mais 
pour trouver un travailleur au noir acceptant de faire un travail soit 
dangereux, soit trop voyant (peinture d'une façade extérieure par exemple). 
En résumé, ce premier cas-type est celui d'un travailleur au noir 
qui parallèlement à son activité principale exerce clandestinement et de 
façon plus ou moins régulière une autre activité. Cette activité au noir est 
motivée par le souci de compléter le revenu familial, revenu suffisant pour 
vivre mais perçu comme insuffisant eu égard à des désirs d'achats de biens 
spécifiques. Ce travailleur au noir type dispose chaque semaine d'une plage 
horaire libre pour exercer en marge de toute règle d'ordre social ou fiscal 
sa seconde activité. Dans le cadre de son activité au noir, ce travailleur 
se comporte comme son propre patron ; le matériel qu'il utilise étant 
par ailleurs souvent "emprunté" à son employeur principal. Cette forme de 
travailleur est extrêmement répandue en France, notamment dans les catégories 
socio-professionnelles, ouvriers, employés et cadres moyens. 
Exemple n°2 : La maroquinerie dans le Tarn (*) 
L'intérêt de ce deuxième cas-type est de montrer le fonctionnement 
d'une véritable "filière économique" du travail au noir. Le département du 
Tarn est spécialisé dans la maroquinerie (confection d'articles en cuir) et 
dans la mégisserie (tannage des peaux avant leur utilisation par les maro-
quiniers) . Dans le Tarn, on dénombre plus de 450 maroquineries et mégisseries 
qui emploient généralement moins de 10 salariés, à l'exception d'une entre-
prise qui a un effectif salarié supérieur à 200 personnes. Dans la seule 
ville de Gra'ulhet, 65% des actifs ont une activité appartenant au secteur 
(*) Source : Gabriel TARAR : le marché du travail marginal et clandestin 
en France, au Royaume-Uni et en Italie, Etude nu79/42, Commis-
sion des Communautés Européennes, Bruxelles, février 1980, 
p. 73 à 82. 
cuir et peaux. Il s'agit donc d'un processus de production très décentralisé, 
composé d'une pléiade de petites entreprises de nature davantage artisanale 
qu'industrielle qui ont en outre fréquemment recours au travail à domicile. 
On estime à Graulhet à plus de 300 personnes, le nombre de travailleurs 
à domicile, ce qui correspond dans certaines entreprises à plus de 30% de 
l'effectif salarié. Cette pratique est également très répandue dans les 
petites communes rurales où des agriculteurs qui font de l'élevage à temps 
partiel trouvent ainsi une activité complémentaire pour occuper les périodes 
creuses de leur activité principale. Ces travailleurs à domicile sont rému-
nérés à la tâche et ils sont le plus souvent propriétaires de leur matériel. 
La mégisserie tarnaise (qui réalise environ 70% du chiffre d'affaire 
français) écoule 10% de sa production aux maroquiniers tarnais. Il est 
facile pour ces derniers de justifier aux services fiscaux une production 
d'articles en cuir relativement faible malgré un approvisionnement conséquent 
auprès des mégissiers. En effet, TAHAR nous précise (*) que "le service 
des impôts a édicté en 1950 des normes visant à éliminer les fraudes. Dans 
chaque activité, à une unité de matière première doit correspondre un mini-
mum de production. Cette norme encourage· le détournement du surplus de pro-
duction, pour éviter sa révision à la hausse". Le pourcentage de matière 
première perdue varie selon la fabrication envisagée (sacs, portefeuilles, 
ceintures, articles de voyage, etc.), et peut atteindre 30%. Cette production 
non déclarée est l'oeuvre de travailleurs au noir à domicile, mais aussi 
dès ateliers légaux le jour qui se transforment la nuit en ateliers clandes-
tins. 
La production illégale est ensuite vendue sans facture à des petites 
boutiques, à des marchands forains, à des courtiers et à des camelots. Ainsi, 
de l'amont (abattage clandestin) à l'aval (distribution d'articles en cuir), 
en passant par les étapes intermédiaires du processus de. production (tannage 
et confection) une véritable filière noire est mise en place, échappant en 
totalité aux statistiques officielles. 
Une preuve indirecte de ce trafic est trouvée lorsqu'une maroquinerie 
est mise en règlement judiciaire ou en liquidation de biens. L'évaluation 
(*) G. TARAR : op. cit.; p.80, footnote 1. 
des stocks ressort à une valeur nettement supérieure à celle qui est prévi­
sible à la lecture attentive des comptes de l'entreprise . 
Ce deuxième cas­type montre non pas le comportement d'un travailleur 
au noir, mais celui d'un réseau très bien organisé d'activités soustraites 
aux règles fiscales et sociales. Il va de soi qu'une activité productive 
comme celle des cuirs et peaux où globalement les grandes firmes sont rares 
et les petits ateliers nombreux et assez concentrés, favorise ce type de 
filière (*). 
En analysant la structure par taille d'établissement et par région 
d'autres branches industrielles, on peut déduire ­ sous l'hypothèse que ces 
paramètres servent d'indicateurs ­ les activités où des filières de cette 
nature sont susceptibles d'exister. Il n'est pas surprenant de relever sur 
cette liste les principales activités textiles et d'habillement, la fabrica­
tion de meubles et quelques activités de transformation agro­alimentaires. 
Exemple n°3 : Les chômeurs dans la région lilloise (**) 
On accuse souvent les chômeurs de participer avec beaucoup d'inten­
sité aux activités souterraines, 1'argumentation reposant sur le temps libre 
laissé par l'inactivité. Les chômeurs dans cette logique seraient doublement 
voleurs : d'une part, ils concurrenceraient de façon illégale les personnes 
actives en leur prenant des chantiers et d'autre part, ils bénéficieraient 
de la solidarité collective en percevant des allocations de chômage. L'éco­
nomie informelle jouerait ainsi un rôle amortisseur de la crise car les 
ressources des personnes sans emplois seraient artificiellement gonflées. 
L'enquête menée dans la région lilloise auprès d'un échantillon de 
94 personnes du sexe masculin, inscrites à l'Agence Nationale pour l'Emploi 
depuis plus de 3 mois et âgées de 25 à 50 ans démystifie cette idée reçue. 
(*) Il y avait en France en 1985 dans le secteur du cuir, Z5 firmes em­
ployant de 100 à 199 personnes, 12 firmes employant de 200 à 499 personnes 
et 4 firmes employant plus de 500 personnes. Le nombre total d'entreprises 
de ce secteur étant de plusieurs milliers, on mesure le poids des petits 
ateliers et donc la place des filières de ce type. 
Source : Annuaire de Statistique. Industrielle 1986, Ministère de l'Indus­
trie, des Ρ et Τ et du Tourisme, Direction générale de l'Industrie, Paris 
p. ZZ9. 
(**) Source : R. FOUDI, F. STANKIEWICZ et N. VANEECLOO : "Les chômeurs et 
l'économie informelle", in : Travail noir, productions domestiques et 
entraide, Cahiers de l Observation du Changement Social, Volume 17, CNRS, 
Paris, 1982. 
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On peut commencer par classer les chômeurs en fonction du critère : 
ils se livraient ou non au travail au noir avant d'entrer à l'Agence Nationale 
pour l'Emploi. 
- Sur les 33% de chômeurs appartenant à la catégorie 1, 35% s'y livrent 
davantage qu'auparavant, 26% s'y adonnent de façon équivalente et 39% y 
participent avec moins d'intensité. 
- Sur les 67% de chômeurs appartenant à la catégorie 2, 71% continuent à ne 
pas travailler au noir et 29% ont commencé à y participer. 
Les ressources obtenues grâce aux activités au noir sont généralement modestes 
Pour l'ensemble des chômeurs qui ont une activité au noir, les ressources 
sont essentielles (plus de la moitié du salaire minimum), dans 7,5% des cas, 
elles sont significatives (entre le quart et la moitié du salaire minimum) 
dans 30% des cas, elles sont faibles ou insignifiantes dans 62,5% des cas. 
L'étude que nous présentons ne se limite pas aux aspects quantitatifs 
du travail au noir des chômeurs, elle permet aussi de mieux connaître les 
caractéristiques économiques et sociales des personnes interrogées. 
S'agissant des personnes pour qui les revenus du travail au noir sont 
conséquents, trois cas de figure ont pu être isolés. 
- "Les travailleurs au noir de la misère" pour qui la pauvreté commande 
impérativement le recours aux activités clandestines ; 
- "Les entrepreneurs du travail au noir" qui illustrent réellement 
l'image d'Epinal du "professionnel du noir", qui disposent d'un réseau 
de fournisseurs d'ouvrage bien organisé et qui travaillent dans le bâtiment ; 
ces entrepreneurs ne représentent que 3% des chômeurs interrogés ; 
- "Les chômeurs en reconversion" qui sont associés de façon occulte 
à une petite entreprise et dont l'activité, au terme d'une période probatoire 
effectuée dans la clandestinité, devrait prochainement devenir officielle. 
S'agissant des personnes dont les revenus du travail au noir sont 
dérisoires, plusieurs facteurs socio-économiques explicatifs ont pu être 
isolés. Parmi ceux-ci, on relève d'une part la contraction des demandes 
de travail liée à la baisse du pouvoir d'achat des donneurs d'ouvrage et à la 
concurrence du bricolage domestique et d'autre part une série d'éléments 
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propres aux travailleurs au noir - chômeurs eux-mêmes (dégradation de la 
santé, impossibilité d'emprunter les équipements nécessaires aux employeurs, 
risque de dénonciation, etc.). 
Les auteurs de l'étude présentée se sont ensuite interrogés sur un 
autre aspect de l'activité des chômeurs, celui de la production domestique. 
Au lieu de travailler pour autrui (travail au noir), travaillent-ils pour 
eux-mêmes (activité domestique) ? La réponse est ici encore dépourvue d'am-
biguïté . 
En ce qui concerne l'entretien, la réparation et l'aménagement des 
logements, la population peut être divisée en trois groupes d'effectifs à 
peu près identiques. Un tiers des personnes limite ses activités principalement 
en raison de la chute des ressources. Un deuxième tiers maintient ou accroît 
ses activités. Ce groupe est très hétérogène car il comprend des personnes 
qui bricolent car elles ont plus de temps disponible, des personnes qui 
bricolent car leurs revenus ont chuté (elles faisaient auparavant appel à 
des professionnels), des personnes enfin qui font des travaux d'aménagement 
en contrepartie de la gratuité de leur logement. Le dernier tiers est peu 
concerné par les travaux domestiques dans le cadre du logement, il se compose 
de personnes qui habitent au foyer de parents ou d'amis et de personnes dont 
la faiblesse des revenus a occasionné un déménagement. 
Pour les autres activités domestiques, celles qui sont traditionnelles 
comme les jardins familiaux, les conserves, la couture ou le tricot, les 
comportements des personnes interrogées sont peu modifiés par rapport à 
ceux qui prévalaient dans la situation antérieure au chômage. Les seuls 
cas de réduction d'activité sont liés à la perte de jardins familiaux lorsque 
la pauvreté nécessite la vente d'une maison et donc la perte du jardin (*). 
En conclusion", l'examen de l'échantillon de chômeurs lillois montre que 
le recours au secteur informel (ici, travail au noir et production domestique) 
. est loin de fournir des ressources susceptibles de compenser la perte de 
(*) It convient d'observer que dans la région Nord-Pas de Calais, les jardins 
ouvriers sont choses communes. C'est le résultat d'une politique mise en 
oeuvre à la fin du XIXo pour permettre aux familles défavorisées d'assurer 
une partie de leur subsistance. 
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revenu salarial. Le fait d'être exclu du marché du travail officiel n'implique 
pas que l'on est forcément acteur du marché du travail au noir. Les cas de 
chômeurs contraints d'épuiser leur stock, d'épargne, de liquider une partie 
de leur patrimoine et d'accroître leur endettement sont des preuves évidentes 
qu'ils ne retrouvent pas dans les activités souterraines un revenu voisin 
de celui qu'ils avaient avant la perte de leur emploi. 
Exemple n°4 : Les étudiants des Bouches du Rhône (*) 
Nous avons eu l'occasion de préciser que les activités effectuées 
au noir étaient très liées aux activités réalisées dans le cadre de l'activité 
principale. Ce constat va être réitéré et illustré dans cet exemple consacré 
au travail au noir des étudiants. L'échantillon se compose d'un ensemble de 
242 étudiants qui ont été sélectionnés selon deux critères : ils sont de 
nationalité française et ils résident dans.-le département des Bouches du 
Rhône. 88 habitent à Marseille, 78 à Aix-en-Provence et 76 dans les autres 
communes du département. 
79,2% des étudiants interrogés ont déclaré avoir déjà travaillé 
au noir, davantage pour les filles (89,8%) que pour les garçons (72,2%). Les 
questions ont été posées sur la nature des activités réalisées au noir, sur 
le contexte dans lequel les expériences se sont déroulées et sur les motiva-
tions qui ont poussé des étudiants à s'engager dans l'économie souterraine. 
La lecture des résultats relatifs aux activités réalisées fait 
clairement apparaître le biais introduit dans l'échantillon, biais lié à la 
jeunesse et à la qualification des étudiants interrogés. 
Babysitting et leçons particulières sont en effet les pratiques les pluî 
répandues, notamment chez les filles. On observe que les secteurs comme le 
commerce, le tourisme et l'agriculture sont très souvent mentionnés (respec-
tivement 29,9%, 9,5% et 15%). Cette constatation reflète principalement 
les travaux saisonniers non déclarés des jeunes au moment des vacances 
(cafés, restaurants, vendanges . . . ) . 
(*) Source : Ph. BARTRELEMI, JP GIRAN et JY LESUEUR : "l'Economie souterraine 
dans la région Provence-Alpes-Câte d'Azur", in G.R.I.F.E., Emploi et 
Marché régional du Travail, Etude pour le Conseil Régional PACA, Aix-en-
Provence, avril 1987, pages 5Z à 72. 
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On aurait pu s'attendre à ce que le BTP comme la mécanique auto, 
sanctuaires traditionnels de l'économie souterraine soient davantage fréquen-
tés, (respectivement 7,3% et 6% et uniquement chez les garçons), mais il 
convient de ne pas oublier que les étudiants ne sont pas particulièrement 
enclins à pratiquer des travaux manuels ou requérant une expérience profes-
sionnelle. 
Les activités au noir des étudiants apparaissent comme des activités 
à durée limitée et à fréquence intermitíante. Il ne s'agit en effet d'emploi 
régulier que dans 32% des cas. Les rémunérations obtenues sont jugées très 
rentables par 15% de l'échantillon et rentables par 70%. Les conditions de 
travail sont quant à elles très bonnes pour 27,2% des étudiants et bonnes 
pour 46,3%. De façon générale, les jeunes ne semblent pas déçus de leurs 
expériences. On peut en induire deux types de conclusion. En premier lieu, 
le fait que les activités dominantes concernent le babysitting et les 
leçons particulières invite à penser que le cadre dans lequel se déroule 
le travail au noir n'est pas a priori hostile. En second lieu, les petits 
boulots exécutés par les étudiants ne sont pas comparables avec ceux qui 
sont réalisés par des chômeurs de longue durée ou par des personnes à la 
recherche d'un premier emploi-qui ne disposent d'aucune qualification par-
ticulière. C'est moins pour eux un problème d' insertion sociale qu'une 
nécessité d'augmenter leurs ressources en complément des bourses qu'ils 
perçoivent ou de l'argent de poche qui leur est alloué par leur famille. 
Les questions relatives aux motivations montrent que 83,7% des 
étudiants travaillent au noir pour gagner de l'argent. Dans les motivations 
résiduelles, rendre service sst la seule motivation qui obtient un pour-
centage de réponses non négligeable. La vocation financière est donc large-
ment dominante, même si le souci d'altruisme mérite d'être mentionné comme 
raison secondaire. 
Le questionnaire qui a été proposé aux étudiants comporte une série 
de questions destinées à analyser le travail au noir de leurs parents. Près 
de la moitié des parents des étudiants aurait déjà travaillé au noir (42,7%), 
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dans des proportions comparables qu'il s'agisse du père (27,3%) ou de la 
mère (30,1%). Ce résultat est très inférieur à celui observé pour les 
étudiants, et on peut l'interpréter de deux façons différentes : soit la 
propension au travail au noir diminue avec l'âge, soit elle s'est accrue 
de la génération des parents à celle des enfants. Si la première interpré-
tation est correcte, on retrouve sur notre échantillon un résultat qui a 
pu être observé dans d'autres approches ; si c'est la deuxième qui est 
correcte, un développement de l'économie souterraine pourrait en résulter 
à terme sous l'hypothèse du maintien de la tendance. 
Le travail au noir des parents a pu être analysé selon la CSP du 
chef de famille. Confirmant une fois encore les conclusions de nombreuses 
études, il en ressort que deux CSP alimentent en priorité l'offre de tra-
vail au noir : les artisans et commerçants d'une part (66,7%) et les employés 
et ouvriers d'autre part (73,7%). Pour les premiers, la propension élevée 
provient sans doute de la nature intrinsèque de leurs activités, pour les 
seconds, elle naît plus vraisemblablement du niveau insuffisant de leur 
revenu principal. 
L'aspect demande de travail au noir des familles n'a pas été négligé. 
Si l'entretien du logement constitue pour la quasi totalité de l'échan-
tillon! 1 'objet privilégié de la demande (52,3% en moyenne), deux activités 
semblent spécifiques à des CSP bien délimitées. 
- La réparation automobile qui représente près de 25% des réponses 
est totalement exclus de la demande de travail au noir des artisans et 
commerçants. Cela signifie sans doute que l'adage "on n'est jamais mieux 
servi que par soi-même" s'applique en cette occasion. Pour le dire en 
d'autres termes, il s'agit d'une auto-consommation de la production souter-
raine de cette catégorie. 
- La demand^ de personnel domestique est quant à elle l'apanage des 
cadres supérieurs, professions libérales et chefs d'entreprises de plus de 
10 salariés. Si elle relève également de la demande des artisans et commer-
çants ainsi que de celle des inactifs, il convient de noter qu'elle disparaît 
presque totalement pour la catégorie des employés et ouvriers. On ne peut 
à la fois être offreur et demandeur du même service. 
Ces structures spécifiques conduisent à penser que des problèmes 
d'inadéquations structurelles similaires à ceux qui caractérisent le marché 
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du travail légal peuvent apparaître dans le cadre du marché du travail au 
noir. 
Enfin, quand la demande de travail au noir s'exprime au titre de 1 
l'unité de production plutôt qu'à celui de l'unité de consommation, les 
artisans et commerçants semblent plus facilement s'affranchir des contraintes 
fiscales et sociales (30% et 10%) que les chefs d'entreprises de plus de 
10 salariés (3%). 
Remarquons, pour terminer, que les CSP justifient leur demande de 
travail au noir par la recherche d'une économie de coût. Cette variable 
est fortement pondérée pour les employés et les ouvriers dont les ressour-
ces financières sont par nature limitées, tandis qu'elle est minorée par 
les cadres supérieurs, les professions libérales et les chefs d'entreprises 
de plus de 10 salariés qui lui adjoignent dans ce qui pourrait apparaître 
comme un souci de justification (charité oblige), la volonté d'aider des 
personnes en difficulté. 
Exemple n°5 : Les relations d'entraide Lorraine (*) 
La crise économique pousse des couches entières de la population 
à compléter ou à remplacer leur revenu par des ressources tirées de travaux 
informels. Si dans les zones urbaines, le support de ces revenus complémen-
taires prend souvent la forme d'un travail noir "marchand", dans les zones 
rurales, l'absence d'anonymat et la nature très conviviale des relations 
sociales est favorable à un travail au noir davantage "non marchand". 
La France comportant environ 36.400 communes dont 33.600 comptent 
moins de 2000 habitants, on mesure l'importance quantitative des personnes 
concernées par les relations non marchandes, même s'il convient de pondérer 
cet argument en observant que 30% de la population française seulement 
réside dans une commune de moins de 2000 habitants. 
(*) Source : Claire LEGRAIN : "L'économie informelle à Grand-Failly", Cahiers 
de l'Observation du changement social, Volume VII, CNRS, Paris, 1982. 
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L'étude dont nous extrayons ces quelques commentaires concerne le 
village de Grand-Failly, situé à proximité du bassin de Longwy. Avant la 
crise de la sidérurgie lorraine, 32 des 42 ouvriers du village travaillaient 
dans l'une des trois usines du bassin sidérurgique-de Longwy Villerupt. Après 
la fermeture de l'usine de la Chiers, et la vente à Usinor de l'usine de 
Rehon, il ne reste que 24 ouvriers à Grand-Failly dont 14 seulement conti-
nuent à travailler à Longwy. 
L'enquête menée dans le village montre que le recours à l'économie 
informelle a permis à la population de rester au village et de préserver 
autant que faire se peut les conditions de vie. 
Certains ouvriers ont accru leur production domestique au point 
que plusieurs vont jusqu'à la commercialiser. Pour ce faire, ils se sont 
associés de façon informelle avec les petits exploitants agricoles du 
village. Ces alliances entre agriculteurs à part entière et ouvriers-paysans 
sont fondées sur des liens de parenté importants dans le village mais aussi 
sur des critères purement économiques. Les prêts de matériel agricole des 
exploitants aux ouvriers leur permettent d'exploiter en propre quelques 
hectares de terres sur lesquels ils pratiquent l'auto-consommation. En 
contre-partie, ils fournissent aux exploitants des "coups de main" lors des 
gros travaux agricoles. Cette entraide permet aux agriculteurs de maintenir 
leur compétitivité face aux grandes exploitations très mécanisées et aux 
ouvriers de remplacer leurs anciennes heures supplémentaires par des heures 
d'économie informelle. 
Parallèlement à ces premiers réseaux, l'habitat s'est considérablement 
amélioré dans le village étudié depuis la crise sidérurgique. Toutes les 
modalités d'arrangements possibles ont été employées (emploi d'artisans 
pour le gros oeuvre puis échange de services, prêt de matériel en contre-
partie de coups de main, bricolage organisé contre rémunération en nature, 
etc.). 
Sans développer ici les autres formes de relations informelles ou les 
activités domestiques, l'idée qui se dégage de l'étude qualitative des acti-. 
vités de ce village est celle d'une parfaite harmonie sous réserve que 
chacun participe aux efforts de la communauté et accepte les valeurs morales 
sur lesquelles le système est établi. 
Il est patent que tout est réalisé au noir. L'Etat ne perçoit pas 
d'impôt sur le revenu, sur la dépense ou sur les mutations car toutes les 
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transactions sont réalisées en nature. La sécurité sociale ne perçoit pas 
de cotisations car les emplois ne sont pas déclarés. 
L'économie souterraine est ici purement structurelle, profondément 
enracinée dans la vie sociale. Mis à part quelques individus qui volontaire-
ment ne participent pas à "l'entreprise" collective et quelques personnes 
exclues car taxées de "paresseuses", tous les villageois se retrouvent dans 
ce modèle. 
En terminant son étude, Claire LEGRAIN écrit une phrase qui me paraît 
adaptée à toutes les communautés villageoises qui ont vécu des contextes 
comparables. "La crise économique, loin d'avoir détruit la cohérence du 
village l'a renforcée, grâce à l'économie informelle". 
Nous ne pensons pas qu'il existe une contradiction entre la pauvreté 
des chômeurs lillois et la richesse relative des ouvriers licenciés du 
bassin lorrain, même si le contraste est considérable entre les deux 
situations. Si l'environnement est favorable, l'économie informelle peut 
se développer mais s'il ne l'est pas, les systèmes organisés d'entraide ne 
se créent pas spontanément. La crise économique et la montée du chômage 
permettent d'activer des réseaux en sommeil, surtout en zone rurale ; elles 
ne permettent pas d'en susciter ex-nihilo, surtout en zone urbaine. 
Le modèle qui vient d'être sommairement décrit ne caractérise pas 
les grandes villes alors qu'il pourrait être transposé sans modification 
majeure aux vallées alpines, au plateau ardéchois ou à la campagne bretonne. 
Exemple n°6 : La confection à Paris (*) 
Le quartier du Sentier à Paris est connu comme étant l'un des hauts 
lieux de l'activité clandestine dans le domaine de la confection. Les tra-
vailleurs concernés sont le plus souvent des immigrés clandestins dont cer-
tains ont été régularisés lors de la procédure entreprise en 1981. Les tra-
vailleurs sont embauchés dans la rue, ils sont rémunérés en espèces à la 
(*) Source^ : Mirjana MOROKVASIC : "Le recovers aux immigrés dans la confec-
tion à Paris", in La lutte contre les trafics de main d'oeuvre en 
1985-1986 : objectif prioritaire, le travail clandestin, Rapport au 
Ministre des Affaires Sociales et de l'Emploi, La Documentation Française 
Paris, 1987, pages 199 à 241. 
de) 
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journée, à la demi-journée et parfois même à l'heure. Le taux de salaire 
horaire varie entre 10 francs et 20 francs... Un pakistanais rencontré 
place du Caire raconte : "chez nous, sur le "tchoke", c'est-à-dire sur 
la place du marché, tous les corps de métier sont représentés : vitriers, 
maçons, serruriers. Quand quelqu'un a besoin d'un ouvrier, il va au 
"tchoke". On marchande un peu et on conclut l'affaire" (*). Ce mode d'éla-
boration de contrats de travail que l'on ne peut appeler autrement qu'un 
marché aux esclaves se reproduit chaque jour à Paris, notamment dans les 
2° et 10° arrondissements. 
Le secteur de l'habillement se caractérise par deux traits : un 
grand nombre d'entreprises et d'établissements de très petite taille et 
un recours de plus en plus marqué à la sous-traitance. L'INSEE en 1984 a 
répertorié dans la ville de Paris 12.404 établissements dont 44,5% ne 
déclarent aucun salarié. Par ailleurs, selon une enquête auprès de 350 
confectionneurs en France, les 3/4 des entreprises ont recours systémati-
quement à la sous-traitance. L'enquête distingue la sous-traitance indus-
trielle plus répandue en province et la sous-traitance artisanale phénomène 
typiquement parisien. 
Des cartes de Paris ont pu être dressées, montrant par arrondisse-
ment le nombre d'établissements du secteur de la confection d'une part et 
le nombre d'établissements du secteur de la confection cotisanc aux ASSEDIC 
d'autre part. 
CARTE DES ARRONDISSEMENTS DE LA 
VILLE DE PARIS 
(*) Jean BENOIT : "Place du Caire : le "Tchoke" des Pakistanais", Le Monde, 
22 février 1983. 
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NOMBRE D'ETABLISSEMENTS DU SECTEUR 
DE LA CONFECTION A PARIS 
< 200 O O o o o o o o o 900 à 1900 
V¿ 200 à 400 > 1900 
400 à 900 
Source : M. MOROKVASIC, op. cit., page 222 
20 
NOMBRE D'ETABLISSEMENTS DU SECTEUR DE_LA CONFECTION 
A PARIS, COTISANTS AUX ASSEDIO 
< 100 
K--H 100-300 
RÃ»1 300-600 
> 600 
Source : M. MOROKVASIC, op. cit. page 222 
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Comme le dissèque le rapport RAGOT, le système de la "French Confec-
tion" est à peu près le suivant (*). Un grossiste décide d'un modèle à 
confectionner, il le fait couper puis le distribue dans différents ateliers 
de travail à façon. Dans ces ateliers (caves, greniers, garages, logements 
vétustés, arrière-boutiques, etc.) des entrepreneurs souvent étrangers et 
eux-mêmes parfois clandestins, travaillent à la commande en embauchant au 
noir. Les pièces une fois montées sont ensuite livrées à des facturiers 
qui sont régulièrement installés mais qui ne possèdent pas d'ateliers. Le 
facturier blanchit le travail en le facturant au grossiste qui doit pouvoir 
justifier l'origine du travail élaboré à façon. 
Sur le plan quantitatif, le nombre de personnes qui travaillent dans 
la confection à Paris sans être déclarées n'est pas connu. Selon certaines 
informations, après la procédure de régularisation des immigrés clandestins, 
il resterait entre 30 000 et 40 000 salariés non déclarés (**). 
Grâce aux dossiers collectés par la Direction Départementale du 
Travail et de l'Emploi de Paris, il est possible de dresser le portrait-
robot du travailleur clandestin dans la confection parisienne régularisé 
en 1981. 
Ce travailleur est à 82,5% du sexe masculin ce qui est une "anomalie" 
par rapport aux résultats du recensement de 1982 où les femmes sont largement 
majoritaires dans le secteur de la confection. (80% au niveau national et 
58% à Paris). Ce déséquilibre dans la distribution par sexe, peut être 
expliqué par la sur-représentation des hommes dans la population étrangère 
immigrée régularisée (83,4%). 
Sur les 34 nationalités recensées, les personnes les plus nombreuses 
sont les turcs (32%), et les yougoslaves (22%). Compte tenu du fait que 
ces nationalités représentent respectivement 9,8% et 2,5% de la population 
étrangère régularisée, on peut conclure à la présence d'une spécialisation 
par nationalité des activités clandestines. 
En matière de durée de la clandestinité, et si l'on suppose exactes 
(*) Maurice RAGOT : Le travail clandestin, Conseil Economique et Social, 
avis adopté le 12 janvier 1983, page 38. 
(**) Les sources de ces estimations... dont les méthodes de calcul ne sont 
pas précisées... sont données dans l'article de M. MOROKVASIC. Il s'agit 
de Confection 2000, n°5Z, 1985, pour l'estimation basse et de Sciences 
et Vie économie , n°ll, 1985, pour l'estimation haute. 
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les dates d'entrée en France déclarées par les personnes régularisées, la 
moyenne se situe autour de deux ans. Cette moyenne cache une disparité im-
portante pour les yougoslaves (plus de 5 ans) montrant pour ces travailleurs 
un "stage" de clandestinité bien plus long. Ce cas particulier est suscep-
tible d'être expliqué par deux considérations : d'une part les yougoslaves 
bénéficient d'une relative "invisibilité" et d'autre part, les filières 
d'entrée sur le territoire sont anciennes, car les immigrés yougoslaves se 
sont établis dans-la confection dès la fin des années 60. 
Les données relatives à l'arrondissement de résidence des personnes 
régularisées sont intéressantes car elles montrent une concentration dans 
le nord-est de Paris. 
Les turcs résident plutôt dans les 2°, 10° et 11° arrondissements, 
les pakistanais dans le 10° et le 11°, les yougoslaves sont répartis dans 
les 5 arrondissements du nord-est, les mauriciens vivent dans le 18° et 
le 20°. 
Quant au lieu de travail, la concentration est plus forte encore, 
car plus de la moitié des régularisés de la confection travaillent dans les 
10° et 11° arrondissements. Il faut noter que la part des établissements 
ne déclarant aucun salarié est plus importante dans les 10° et 11° arron-
dissements (50% environ) que dans les 2° et 3° (30% environ). Le recours 
à la sous-traitance et au travail au noir semble donc plus important dans 
les 10° et 11° arrondissements de Paris. 
Ces éléments, ainsi que d'autres résultats sur les emplois exercés, permettent 
de dire en conclusion que le travailleur régularisé type dans la confection 
est un homme, le plus souvent turc ou yougoslave, d'une trentaine d'années, 
habitant dans .le nord-est de Paris, et travaillant non loin de son domicile. 
Cette personne-type travaille chez un compatriote et sa clandes-
tinité est récente. Il est mécanicien sur machine à coudre (l'emploi le plus 
couramment exercé) et son "employeur" est une société commerciale sans 
salarié dont l'activité principale est la confection en tout genre. 
Exemple n°7 : Les ouvriers en Seine Maritime (*) 
Les cas-types présentés dans cette nouvelle illustration ont été 
déterminés grâce à une enquête sur le terrain qui a duré plusieurs mois. 
(*) Source : Jean-François LAE : Travailler au noir, Rapport au Commissariat 
Général au Plan, janvier 1987. 
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Une cinquantaine de personnes ont pu être suivies quotidiennement 
et l'étude se propose d'apprécier de "l'intérieur" leur vie matérielle. Si 
le statut des personnes qui ont fait l'objet de l'analyse est assez diver-
sifié (des artisans, des salariés et des chômeurs), leur point commun est 
d'exercer leurs activités au noir dans une fonction d'ouvrier principalement 
dans le bâtiment, la réparation automobile, le montage de stands et la fa-
brication de maquettes. Ces travailleurs au noir sont tous des personnes 
qualifiées, leurs qualifications ayant été acquises par plusieurs années 
de travail officiel et de travail clandestin. 
En croisant deux critères - l'activité officielle et le degré 
d'intensité de participation aux activités souterraines - , quatre situations 
types ont été isolées, situations qui ont l'avantage de structurer l'ensemble 
très hétérogènes des acteurs de l'économie non officielle. 
Le premier cas de figure est celui de l'artisan qui est au bord de 
la faillite. Très endetté et quasiment contraint de déposer patente, les 
activités non officielles sont pour lui une condition nécessaire au maintien 
de son activité officielle. Le travail au noir apparaît comme une assurance 
contre la faillite de sa petite entreprise artisanale. Il est généralement 
synchrone de la baisse de l'activité, de la réduction des bénéfices et de 
la perte de débouchés. L'artisan qui travaille au noir en retire un revenu 
moyen égal à 38% du SMIC (salaire minimum). Compte tenu de son salaire 
(5970 F.) et de celui de son conjoint (2030 F.), les revenus au noir 
correspondent à 18% des ressources salariales du ménage. Il s'agit donc 
d'un revenu d'appoint mais dont l'enjeu est important car sans lui, liartisan 
serait contraint de liquider son affaire. 
Le deuxième cas de figure est celui d'un salarié rémunéré dans son 
activité officielle au voisinage du SMIC. S'il travaille au noir, c'est 
pour obtenir un complément de salaire destiné à l'acquisition de biens 
durables. Le travail au noir est une activité secondaire exécutée de façon 
indépendante, sans la tutelle d'un patron. 
Les tâches réalisées au noir sont librement choisies et le travail 
est perçu comme un plaisir et non comme une contrainte. Sur la base d'un 
salaire mensuel moyen du ménage égal à 5216 Francs, le salaire au noir corres-
24 
pond à 1920 francs par mois ou' 42% du SMIC. Ce salaire supplémentaire dont 
le montant est très significatif n'assure pas la survie du salarié, il lui 
permet d'approcher un mode de vie., supérieur à celui qu'il aurait eu en 
l'absence d'activités au noir. 
La troisième situation est celle d'une personne qui a perdu son 
emploi et pour qui le travail au noir est une condition essentielle de la 
survie. Compte tenu des caractéristiques très segmentées du marché du tra­
vail, ses opportunités d'embauchés se réduisent à un choix limité entre 
un emploi intérimaire et un petit boulot. La solution du travail au noir 
permet d'assurer au ménage des ressources voisines du salaire minimum, les 
activités réalisées permettant en outre d'acquérir des compétences suscep­
tibles d'être ultérieurement valorisées lors d'une ..embauche plus stable. 
Cette forme de travail au noir rapporte en moyenne à ceux qui s'y 
adonnent la moitié du SMIC. Ces activités clandestines jouent le rôle de 
stages de formation effectués sur le tas au lieu de l'être de façon organisée, 
La quatrième situation est celle des travailleurs au noir "profes­
sionnels" que LAE dénomme avec humour les all­blacks. Ces individus ne 
vivent que du travail au noir et leur expérience de clandestinité est . de 
très longue durée (plusieurs années). II.s'agit souvent d'anciens artisans 
qui ont été contraints de liquider leur entreprise et qui travaillent au 
noir avec une intensité très élevée pour rembourser leurs dettes passées 
tout en continuant à s'assurer un revenu décent. Le revenu gagné au noir 
està la mesure du salaire d'un emploi principal : 5640 francs, soit 126% 
du SMIC. Deux remarques paraissent utiles pour mieux cerner le comportement 
d'un all­black. D'une part, ses ressources officielles hors prestations 
sociales sont quasiment nulles et d'autre part sa volonté de retrouver son 
ancien statut d'artisan est manifeste mais la décision est sans cesse 
repoussée par crainte d'une deuxième expérience malheureuse ou par accou­
tumance à la marginalité. ι 
En résumé, et sans développer les caractéristiques de tous les 
réseaux qui permettent aux travailleurs au noir de s'insérer dans la vie 
sociale et de rencontrer des contreparties aux prestations qu'ils offrent, 
on peut dire qu'il y a un véritable spectre dans le degré de participation 
aux activités souterraines. Du côté des infra­rouges se trouvent des sala­
riés qui viennent régulièrement compléter leurs revenus et du côté des 
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ultra-violets des personnes qui vivent dans l'illégalité la plus complète. 
Parvenu au terme de cet examen de cas concrets, l'impression générale 
qui se dégage et bien celle de la multiplicité des formes du travail au noir. 
Au plan géographique, on a recensé du travail au noir dans des dépar-
tements aussi différents que le Nord, la Moselle, la Seine-Maritime, Paris, 
le Tarn ou les Bouches du Rhône. 
Au plan des statuts professionnels, on a étudié des salariés, des 
non salariés, des chômeurs et des étudiants. 
Au plan des formes, on a mis en évidence des cas où le travail au 
noir est réalisé de façon individuelle, des cas où il est organisé par des 
employeurs, des cas où il nait de la spontanéité des personnes concernées, 
des cas où il relève de réseaux d'immigration clandestine. 
Face à de telles disparités permises par une démarche descriptive, 
le besoin de classer, d'expliquer et d'analyser se fait naturellement ressen-
tir. 
Aussi, nos prochains développements sont-ils consacrés à une approche 
plus quantitative où seront plus spécifiquement abordés la nature et les 
déterminants du travail au noir. 

P A R T I E II 
ASPECTS QÜA3TITATIFS 
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I - LE VOLUME ET LA NATURE DU TRAVAIL AU NOIR 
Passer de la dimension qualitative à une dimension quantitative 
s'avère particulièrement utile car les décideurs doivent impérativement 
connaître le nombre de personnes concernées, l'importance des sommes en-
gagées, le niveau de production réalisé et les secteurs les plus touchés 
pour définir la politique économique adaptée à la gestion macroéconomique 
du travail au noir. Il ne suffit pas de se fonder sur des préjugés ou sur 
des connaissances a priori pour mettre en place une batterie de mesures, 
il faut au contraire percevoir la complexité de l'ensemble avant de sub-
ventionner, de taxer ou de légiférer. Pour ce faire, nous traiterons dans 
un premier temps les estimations du travail au noir (1a), nous préciserons 
ensuite qui sont les participants, quelles sont les activités concernées 
et comment les travailleurs au noir potentiels trouvent ou ne trouvent pas 
des tâches à effectuer (1b). 
1a/ Estimations du volume du travail au noir 
Il importe de préciser à titre préliminaire que les estimations 
macroéconomiques du travail au noir sont très rares en raison de l'extrême 
difficulté qu'il y a à isoler une partie (le travail au noir) d'un tout 
(l'économie souterraine). 
Pour estimer l'économie souterraine, une dizaine de méthodes ont 
été mises au point, certaines ayant des soubassements monétaires, d'autres 
des fondements comptabilité nationale, d'autres encore s'appuient sur le 
marché du travail, sur la fiscalité ou sur des indicateurs composites. 
Même s'il est possible de critiquer ces approches, elles ont le 
mérite de proposer des évaluations montrant que la part de l'économie 
souterraine dans le PIB est loin d'être marginale (*). 
En France, nous disposons de deux estimations. La première concerne 
l'année 1978 et a été réalisée avec la méthode composite. La seconde con— 
(*) Philippe BARTRELEMY : "The Macroeconomia Estimates of the Ridden Economy 
a critical Analysis", Review of Income and Wealth, June 1988. 
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cerne l'année 1979 et a été effectuée avec la méthode mi­monétaire, mi­
fiscale de TANZI. 
Les résultats de la première approche montrent une économie souter­
raine égale à 8,7% du PNB. Les variables retenues, compte tenu du fait que 
l'approche requiert un examen simultané de plusieurs pays sont les suivantes : 
le poids de l'Etat dans l'économie, la moralité fiscale, le taux de chômage 
et un indicateur du niveau développement (*). 
La seconde approche estime l'économie souterraine dans une fourchette 
comprise entre 6,3% et 6,7% du PIB. La relation testée était du type : 
Q 
Log ­=τ = a0 + ai Log W + a2 Log T + a3 Log Y 
C où γ­ est le rapport des billets aux dépôts à vue, W et Y des variables 
représentant la part des salaires dans le revenu disponible des ménages et 
un indice du PIB réel par tête, T la variable fiscale de l'estimation (part 
de l'impôt sur le revenu et de la TVA dans le revenu des ménages avant 
impôts) (**). 
En ce qui concerne plus spécifiquement l'objet de ce rapport, deux 
estimations globales du travail au noir ont été proposées en France. La 
première étude repose sur une adaptation de l'approche composite mise au 
point par FREY et WECK. Au lieu de sélectionner comme indicateurs, des 
variables susceptibles d'expliquer l'économie souterraine, des variables 
spécialement reliées au travail au noir ont été choisies. Il s'agit plus 
spécifiquement de variables dotées de deux qualités jugées essentielles : 
elles reflètent les structures économiques des pays analysés et elles sont 
directement en relation avec les facteurs généralement retenus pour expliquer 
l'entrée dans les activités clandestines. 
Cinq variables ont paru correspondre à cette double exigence : la 
durée du travail, le taux de participation, le taux d'absentéisme, le taux 
de salariat et le taux de chômage. 
(*) Bruno S. FREY and Hannelore WECK : "The Hidden Economy as an "Unobserved" 
variable", Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung, Zürich, January 
1984 
(**) Philippe BARTHELEMY : "L'ajustement déguisé sur les marchés du travail : 
l'économie souterraine", in Jean­Pierre GIRAN et Roland GRANIER : Poli­
tique de l'emploi, Economica, Paris, 1983, pages 173 à 199. 
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Après traitement et compte tenu d'un ensemble d'hypothèses, notamment 
sur les bornes de l'estimation, le travail au noir en France pour l'année 
1980 concernerait 8% de la population active ou 1.851.000 personnes. Ce 
résultat ne signifie pas que le nombre de travailleurs au noir correspond 
au chiffre indiqué, il doit être perçu comme un équivalent emplois à plein 
temps (*). 
La deuxième estimation globale du travail au noir a été mise au point 
par les comptables nationaux avec le souci d'opérer dans leurs comptes un 
redressement pour ce type d'activité. 
Aucune source statistique ne fournissant d'informations précises sur 
le travail au noir, deux hypothèses ont été formulées, l'une concerne sa 
localisation sectorielle, l'autre son importance relative par rapport à 
l'emploi légal. 
Le travail au noir est supposé concentré dans 10 activités sélec­
tionnées par référence au poids élevé des petites entreprises dans la 
structure par taille des firmes qui les exercent. 
Τ 02 Industries de la viande et du lait 
Τ 03 Autres industries agricoles et alimentaires 
Τ 18 Industries textiles et de l'habillement 
Τ 19 Industries du cuir et de la chaussure 
Τ 20 Industries du bois et de l'ameublement, industries diverses 
Τ 24 Bâtiment, génie civil et agricole 
Τ 29 Réparation et commerce de l'automobile 
Τ 31 Transports 
Τ 33 Services marchands rendus principalement aux entreprises 
Τ 34 Services marchands rendus principalement aux particuliers 
Les effectifs employés au noir sont calculés par référence aux 
effectifs employés par les établissements de moins de 5 salariés. L'INSEE 
suppose que les effectifs au noir représentent 80% des effectifs salariés 
(*) Philippe BARTHELEMY : L'emploi légal caché dans les pays de l'OCDE : 
analyse méthodologique et essais de quantification, contrat de recherche 
pour l'OCDE, G.R.I.F.E., Aix­en­Provence, décembre 1984, pages 38 à S3. 
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officiellement déclarés, (soit environ 220.000 personnes en 1982). La 
durée du travail appliquée à ces travailleurs au noir est la durée annuelle 
maximale dans chacune des branches concernées. 
Au total, le volume d'heures travaillées au noir pour l'année 1981 
est estimé à 476.000.000. Précisons que cette évaluation n'a pas pour 
objet de décrire le travail au noir, l'ambition des comptables nationaux 
étant limitée à rapprocher les évaluations de la production et celles du 
volume d'heures travaillées (*). 
Parallèlement à ces estimations du travail au noir, d'autres pans 
de l'économie souterraine ont été analysés et quantifiés. La fraude fiscale 
globale, tous impôts confondus, a été estimée pour les années 1979 à 1982. 
Elle correspond avec des petits écarts selon les années à environ 2,4% du 
PIB (**). Des données plus précises existent sur l'impôt sur le revenu et 
sur la TVA. En cas de vérification exhaustive de toutes les déclarations 
d'impôts sur le revenu, 22% des contribuables seraient redressés et le taux 
moyen de rehaussement des bases d'imposition des contribuables redressés 
s'élèverait à 17,4%. Il y a par ailleurs d'énormes disparités en fonction 
du type de revenu dominant d'une part et du montant des bases d'imposition 
d'autre part (***). 
(*) Bernard ERNST : "Le facteur de production travail dans la base 1980 des 
comptes nationaux : emploi, durée, activité", Archives et Documents, 
n°220, octobre 1987, pages 59 et 60. 
(**) Cf Thierry GODEFR0Y et Bernard LAFFARGUE : Les coûts du crime en France : 
données 1980, 1981 et 1982, CESDIP, Paris, 1984. 
Thierry GODEFROY et Bernard LAFFARGUE : "Eléments sur l'impact économique 
du phénomène criminel", Gazette du Palais, 23-24 mars 1984. 
(***) 18,2% des personnes dont le revenu principal déclaré est constitué de 
traitement, de salaire, de pension ou de rente viagère seraient redressées 
en cas de vérification exhaustive. Ce pourcentage passe à 32,5% pour les 
revenus de capitaux mobiliers, à 50,6% pour les revenus fonciers et 
s'élève jusqu'à 85,2% pour les bénéfices des professions non commerciales 
soumis au régime de la déclaration contrôlée. 
Plus les revenus, déclarés sont élevés, plus le pourcentage de contribuable 
qui seraient redressés en cas de vérification exhaustive s'élève, mais il 
n'y a pas de liaison entre le taux de rehaussement qui serait opéré et 
le niveau des matières imposables déclarées. 
Source : Conseil des Impôts : 4° Rapport au Président de la République 
relatif à l'impôt sur le revenu, Journaux Officiels, Paris, 1979. 
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La fraude à la TVA est plus difficile à calculer car elle est 
collectée en partie par la direction générale des impôts et en partie par la 
direction générale des douanes. L'idée qui se dégage est celle d'une rela­
tion très nette entre fraude à la TVA et chiffre d'affaire des entreprises. 
Plus les firmes sont petites, plus la part de fraude est grande. 
L'explication de cette liaison inverse réside dans le fait qu'il est plus 
facile de frauder la TVA lorsqu'on s'adresse directement aux consommateurs 
finals que lorsqu'on vend à titre intermédiaire à des entreprises qui ont 
le droit de déduire la TVA de leurs achats. Il s'avère que souvent les 
entreprises les plus petites sont celles qui se trouvent en aval du processus 
de production (*) . La fraude à la TVA est également estimée par 1 'INSE­Ε au 
moyen d'une méthode dite de l'écart de TVA. On calcule les recettes de TVA 
effectivement reçues par l'Etat et on les compare aux recettes qui auraient 
dû théoriquement être perçues compte tenu de l'activité économique mesurée 
par les comptables nationaux. La différence entre TVA théorique et TVA 
effective forme l'écart de TVA qu'il suffit de corriger pour obtenir une 
estimation de la fraude (**). Les estimations obtenues varient légèrement 
d'une année à l'autre mais elles gravitent autour­de 0,8% du PIB. 
Certaines autres composantes de l'économie souterraine (proxénétisme, 
corruption, jeux clandestins, faux­monnayage, trafic de stupéfiants, vols, 
contrefaçon, etc.) sont régulièrement quantifiées mais aucune de ces prati­
ques n'est estimée à une importance supérieure à 0,2% du PIB, même si leur 
sommation peut ne pas être négligeable et dépasser 1% du PIB (***). 
(*) Conseil des Impôts : 6° Rapport au Président de la République relatif 
à la TVA, Journaux Officiels, Paris, 1982. 
(**) La correction repose sur les franchises et décotes légales et sur les 
décalages qui proviennent naturellement des règles de versement et de 
déduction de TVA. 
(***) Leg données sur le trafic de stupéfiants ne concernent que les saisies 
opérées par les services officiels. Pour l'année 1987, 13 tonnes, tous 
produits confondus ont été saisies, ce qui correspond, compte tenu des 
prix en vigueur sur le marché pour les différents produits à 786 millions 
de Francs. Ces données officielles ne reflètent pas certaines estimations 
avancées dans la presse... 
cf : XXX : "La douane et la lutte contre la drogue : bilan 1987", Les 
Notes Bleues, n°37Z, 29 fêvrier­6 mars 1988. 
(19) 
32 
En résumé, le travail au noir et la fraude fiscale sont et de très 
loin les éléments quantitativement les plus importants de l'économie souter­
raine. Il convient de rappeler ici que, par nature, le travail au noir génère 
de la fraude fiscale, mais la réciproque n'est pas vraie. Chaque fois qu'une 
activité au noir est réalisée, ipso facto des cotisations sociales ne sont 
pas payées, une taxe sur les salaires n'est pas perçue par l'Etat, des 
revenus de personnes physiques ne sont pas déclarés et une valeur ajoutée 
est créée sans que la taxe correspondante soit versée. En revanche, il est 
parfaitement possible de ne pas déclarer une partie de ses revenus officiels 
sans pour autant être fournisseur d'ouvrage à un travailleur au noir. 
Ces dernières propositions nous semblent pourtant devoir être amendées 
car deux études, l'une réalisée en Belgique et l'autre en France montrent 
clairement que les catégories socio­professionnelles à haut revenu parti­
cipent davantage à l'économie souterraine par la voie de la fraude fiscale 
et que les catégories socio­professionnelles à revenu plus faible y parti­
cipent essentiellement en tant que travailleurs au noir (*). Si les premiers 
sont donneurs d'ouvrage et les seconds exécutants, les sommes dégagées par 
la fraude servent à rémunérer les travailleurs au noir. Dans cette logique, 
un véritable circuit parallèle se met en place, mais un circuit qui n'a de 
sens qu'en symbiose avec le circuit officiel. Les sommes sont prélevées 
au départ sur des revenus officiels et peuvent très bien y retourner par 
le biais de dépenses officielles des travailleurs au noir. 
Cette remarque sur les acteurs de l'économie non officielle est déjà 
une invitation à poursuivre cette analyse dans la direction de la nature 
du travail au noir. 
(*) Pierre PESTIEAU : "Belgium's Irregular Economy", in Wulf GAERTNER and 
Alois WENIG eds : The Economics of the Shadow Economy, Springer Verlag, 
Berlin, 1985. 
Philippe BARTHELEMY : "La participation des français à l'économie 
­ souterraine", in Daniel VITRY et Bernadette MARECHAL eds : Emploi­Chômage­
Modelisation et analyses quantitatives, Collection de l'I.Μ.E, Dijon, 
1984. 
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1b/ Estimations de la nature du travail au noir 
Au-delà des estimations globales qui ont pour principal intérêt de 
donner des informations sur les masses soustraites aux administrations, sur 
les effectifs participant aux activités au noir et sur les chiffres d'affaire 
de l'économie souterraine, il convient de présenter quelques traits carac-
téristiques du travail au noir. Est-il réalisé à titre individuel ou sous 
une forme organisée ? Est-il l'oeuvre de travailleurs nationaux ou d'immi-
grés entrés clandestinement ? Est-il localisé au domicile de particuliers 
ou dans le cadre d'une entreprise agricole, artisanale ou industrielle ? 
Concerne-t-il tous les secteurs d'activité ou est-il principalement concen-
tré dans des secteurs spécifiques ? 
Répondre à ces questions revient à analyser la nature du travail au 
noir, et à dégager les aspects structurels de l'emploi souterrain. 
Structure par âge 
S'il n'y a pas de relation bien marquée entre âge et demandeurs de 
travail au noir, il semble que les personnes jeunes (moins de 40 ans) sont 
les plus représentées dans la population des offreurs de travail au noir. 
En liaison avec la théorie du cycle vital qui montre que les jeunes sont 
plutôt emprunteurs et les personnes plus âgées plutôt prêteuses, la recher-
che de revenu supplémentaire est le déterminant majeur de la participation 
des jeunes à l'économie souterraine. 
Une enquête a été consacrée au travail au noir des jeunes qui accom-
plissent leur service national (*). L'échantillon se compose de 2465 person-
nes, le champs de l'enquête es t national et les jeunes interrogés ont été 
sélectionnés par le ministère de la défense. Ils appartiennent à six régi-
ments choisis en fonction de la représentativité nationale de leur recru-' 
tement. Dans l'ensemble, la pratique du travail au noir est largement répan-
due chez les jeunes car 57% d'entre eux y ont eu recours. L'intensité de 
(*) Hubert MADINIER et Michel MOUILLART : "La perception du travail au noir 
par les jeunes", Consommation, n°4, 1984 
34 
participation est cependant variable car l'expérience est occasionnelle 
pour 11,3% des jeunes alors que la pratique est quasi-professionnelle pour 
15,6%. 
Si les secteurs d'activité concernés (bâtiment, mécanique auto, 
commerce, restauration, industrie et agriculture) apparaissent avec des 
fréquences voisines, le cadre de l'expérience est essentiellement le domicile 
privé de connaissances(56,2%) alors que l'entreprise ne recueille que 19,7% 
des réponses. 
Le questionnaire ayant été bâti pour permettre une exploitation 
croisée des critères de partition de l'ensemble, plusieurs conclusions qua-
litatives peuvent être dégagées. Les occasions de recourir au travail au 
noir sont d'autant plus nombreuses que le jeune travaille dans son domaine 
de compétence et/ou dans son milieu familial. On rejoint ici l'association 
qui parait confirmée entre profession régulière et activité au noir. 
La relation entre chômage des jeunes et travail au noir n'est pas 
tout à fait univoque, mais on peut l'éclairer par deux considérations. D'une 
part, la pécarisation et l'exclusion du marché du travail sont des facteurs 
favorables à l'exercice des activités au noir et d'autre part le cadre de 
l'entreprise est meilleur que celui du domicile d'un particulier lorsque 
la motivation principale du travail au noir est de gagner de l'argent. 
Le travail au noir exercé de façon régulière est souvent le fait 
de jeunes restés peu de temps au chômage (présomption de substitution entre 
chômage et travail au noir) mais il ne semble pas caractériser les jeunes 
n'ayant jamais été employés (pas de présomption de substitution entre 
demandes de premier emploi et travail au noir). Compte tenu de l'âge des 
personnes interrogées, la relation entre chômage de longue durée et travail 
au noir ne peut pas être étudiée. 
Notons enfin que les rémunérations sont jugées bonnes dans l'agricul-
ture et la mécanique auto, moyennes dans l'industrie et insuffisantes dans 
les services. 
En conclusion, l'âge-des offreurs de travail au noir est compris 
pour l'essentiel entre 18 et 40 ans, avec des fréquences de participation 
pondérées par la situation de famille des personnes concernées. Il est rare 
qu'un célibataire de 35 ans travaille au noir alors qu'une personne mariée 
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avec enfants, de 35 ans, travaillera au noir avec une fréquence plus élevée. 
La tranche d'âge comprise entre 40 et 60 ans est peu représentée dans 
la population des travailleurs au noir et un regain d'intérêt pour les 
revenus complémentaires non déclarés apparaît pour les personnes âgées de 
plus de 60 ans. Dans ce cas, l'activité réalisée flirte souvent avec le 
bénévolat car la motivation principale n'est plus de gagner de l'argent mais 
devient rendre service ou s'occuper. 
Structure par CSP 
En étudiant la participation des catégories socio-professionnelles 
à l'économie souterraine, un clivage important apparaît entre celles qui ne 
déclarent pas une partie de leurs revenus officiels et celles qui ne décla-
rent pas leurs revenus au noir. Les premières pratiquent la fraude fiscale, 
les secondes le travail au noir et par voie de conséquence obligée la fraude 
fiscale. 
En adaptant la méthode composite de FREY et WECK, l'intensité de par-
ticipation de 8 CSP a pu être estimée ainsi que le degré d'homogénéité de 
participation propre à chaque catégorie socio-professionnelle (*). Les 
variables choisies pour opérer le classement sont au nombre de 6 : trois 
indicateurs appréhendent l'aspect fraude fiscale (la part des revenus sala-
riaux et assimilés dans le revenu des ménages, le pourcentage de contri-
buables redressés par CSP et l'évolution du revenu moyen imposé par CSP) et 
trois indicateurs concernent plus spécifiquement le travail au noir (la pro-
portion des ménages accédant à la propriété de leur logement selon la CSP 
du chef de famille, le taux de chômage par CSP et une variable proxy du 
temps disponible pour exercer un deuxième emploi ; la proportion de salariés 
travaillant plus de 50 nuits par an). Il va de soi que selon les indicateurs 
la relation est positive ou négative avec l'exercice d'une activité souter-
raine . 
Pour apprécier le degré d'homogénéité intra-catégories, trois mesures 
de l'inégalité des revenus ont été confrontées (le coefficient de GINI, 
l'indicateur de THEIL et la déviation logarithmique moyenne) 
(*) Philippe BARTHELEMY : "La participation des français à l'économie souter-
raine", in Daniel VITRY et Bernadette MARECHAL eds : Emploi-Chômage-
Modélisation et analyses quantitatives, I.M.E., Dijon, 1984, pages 261 à. 
282. 
Le tableau ci-dessous résume les principaux résultats de l'analyse, 
PARTICIPATION A L'ECONOMIE SOUTERRAINE 
Très 
hétérogènes 
Très forte Forte Moyenne Modérée 
Professions 
indépendantes et 
Agriculteurs 
exploitants 
Inactifs 
Peu 
homogènes 
Cadres 
supérieurs 
Salariés 
agricoles 
Assez 
semblables Employés Cadres moyens Ouvriers 
Pour notre propos qui ne concerne ici que le travail au noir, et 
en utilisant comme éléments d'appréciation les commentaires de l'article 
original, il convient d'isoler trois groupes de CSP à comportements bien 
typés. 
Les professions indépendantes, les agriculteurs-exploitants et les 
cadres supérieurs intervienent surtout comme demandeurs de travail au noir. 
Ils embauchent au noir des membres d'autres CSP dans le cadre de leurs entre-
prises artisanales ou de services (les professions libérales), pour des 
travaux agricoles (agriculteurs-exploitants) ou pour des travaux à l'inté-
rieur de leur logement (cadres supérieurs). Comme ces catégories sont par 
ailleurs les plus enclines à dissimuler une partie de leurs revenus, on 
peut imaginer que les sommes soustraites au fisc sont partiellement et peut 
être inconsciemment employées à la rémunération de travailleurs au noir. 
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Les catégories employés, cadres moyens, ouvriers et salariés agricoles 
font du travail au noir en tant qu'offreurs. Disposant de compétences tech-
niques spécifiques (ouvriers), étant favorisés par l'environnement de 
leur emploi officiel (salariés agricoles) et disposant de revenus inférieurs 
à la moyenne nationale, ces catégories trouvent dans le travail au noir 
un complément de ressources. Les cadres moyens et les employés paraissent 
avoir une motivation davantage liée à leur désir d'obtenir un statut social 
comparable à celui des cadres supérieurs. Pour ce faire, leur travail au 
noir est plus régulier d'une part (participation supérieure dans le tableau 
synoptique) et plus lié à des travaux pour leur propre compte (construc-
tion de maisons individuelles) que pour le compte de donneurs d'ouvrage 
extérieurs. En d'autres termes, les sommes acquises au noir sont épargnées 
pendant plusieurs années puis dépensées pour l'acquisition d'un logement 
au lieu d'être dépensées au fur età mesure de leur perception. 
Le groupe des inactifs est très hétérogène vu qu'il comprend aussi 
bien des retraités que des étudiants non rattachés au foyer fiscal de leurs 
parents. Dans l'étude examinée, les tests de sensibilité des résultats ne 
sont pas bons pour ce groupe, aussi aucune conclusion même provisoire ou 
informelle ne peut être proposée pour les inactifs. 
Structure par activité 
S'il existe un clivage assez net entre travail au noir "organisé" 
et travail au noir "individuel", c'est sans doute en raison de la structure 
du système productif propre à telle ou telle activité. Lorsque le tissu 
industriel est composé d'une pléiade de petites firmes employant un nombre 
réduit de salariés, le travail au noir revêt souvent une forme organisée. 
Les employeurs embauchent dans ce cas de trois façons différentes : 
du personnel déclaré, du personnel déclaré partiellement et du personnel 
entièrement au noir. Les salariés employés au noir sont soit des immigrés 
clandestins (cas du textile), soit des travailleurs à domicile oeuvrant 
souvent en sous-traitance (cas du textile, de l'horlogerie ou de la maroqui-
nerie) . Les salariés déclarés pour un travail à mi-temps qui travaillent 
réellement à plein-temps sont fréquemment des personnes qui passent de véri-
tables contrats avec leurs employeurs ; ceux-ci réduisent leurs charges et 
peuvent prouver en cas de contrôle qu'il y a bien une embauche authentique, 
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ceux-là bénéficient de la protection sociale minimale permise par leur 
statut de salarié et n'étant pas ou peu imposables obtiennent les prestations 
sociales maximales auxquelles leurs faibles revenus officiels donnent droit. 
Les petites entreprises qui recourent à ces pratiques sont parfois 
elles-mêmes en situation irrégulière. Dans ce cas, il arrive qu'elles fassent 
de fausses déclarations d'embauché, les salariés se croient couverts socia-
lement alors qu'ils ne le sont pas. 
Les activités concernées par cette forme de travail au noir organisée 
par les employeurs sont assez diversifiées mais on a pu isoler des secteurs 
sensibles (l'agriculture, la confection, l'hôtellerie, la restauration et 
le bâtiment). 
Il convient d'observer que ces activités ont en commun d'être affec-
tées par des pointes saisonnières importantes. A titre d'illustration, nous 
avons pu disposer des résultats de deux opérations effectuées par l'URSSAF 
(Union Régionale de la Sécurité Sociale et des Allocations Familiales) du 
département du Var. Ces opérations sont destinées à contrôler et éventuel-
lement à redresser les firmes irrégulières ou les firmes régulières employant 
irrégulièrement des salariés (*). 
La première opération menée en 1986 concerne les hôtels, cafés, 
restaurants, bars et les boutiques saisonnières dans1les secteurs de Hyères, 
Bando1-Saint-Cyr sur Mer, Six-Fours-Sanary et Saint-Tropez-Ramatuelle. Une 
affaire sur cinq est irrégulière sur le plan administratif. Sur cet ensem-
ble, dans 13% des cas, il s'agit de travailleurs indépendants immatriculés 
qui occupent du personnel non déclaré ; dans 65% des cas, les affaires ne 
sont pas immatriculées et elles emploient du personnel ; dans 22% des cas, 
il s'agit d'affaires non immatriculées qui n'emploient pas de personnel. 
La seconde opération menée en 1987 concerne le bâtiment dans les 
secteurs de Toulon, Hyères, Sanary et le Lavandou. Les visites ont été 
effectuées sur des chantiers de maisons individuelles. 7% des entreprises 
(*) U.R.S.S.A.F. du Var : documents à usage interne. Pour cette raison, 
seules des grandes tendances seront ici évoquées. 
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ne sont pas immatriculées et 11% des affaires sont des travailleurs indé-
pendants immatriculés en tant que tel mais qui · emploient du personnel 
non déclaré. Sur ce dernier ensemble, 85% des affaires ont une activité de 
sous-traitance. 
Parallèlement à ces cas de travail au noir organisé, il faut recenser 
les secteurs où la forme de travail au noir dominante est le travail indi-
viduel. Une liste exhaustive d'activités s'avère impossible à dresser car 
l'imagination des travailleurs au noir est considérable et les activités 
concernées en perpétuelle "restructuration". On peut citer à titre de 
pure illustration le personnel domestique, la réparation automobile et 
d'appareils électro-ménagers, la tenue de comptabilité, les cours particu-
liers, le babysitting, les travaux de secrétariat, de traduction, les 
conseils juridiques et fiscaux, le montage de programmes informatiques, etc. 
Il faut observer que les compétences professionnelles acquises dans 
les activités principales sont très souvent employées dans les activités 
au noir, ce sont les comptables qui font des comptabilités au noir, les 
enseignants qui donnent des leçons particulières, les ouvriers du bâtiment 
qui oeuvrent au noir dans le bâtiment, etc. 
Lorsqu'une personne n'a pas de compétence particulière dans un 
secteur d'activité où la demande est forte, elle est contrainte de travailler 
au noir soit dans un domaine où aucune qualification n'est requise (certains 
travaux agricoles par exemple), soit dans une spécialité acquise sur le 
tas. 
Globalement deux conclusions peuvent être déduites de cette adéqua-
tion entre qualification et travail au noir. Il est très rare de relever 
un donneur d'ouvrage non satisfait de la prestation du travailleur au noir 
qu'il a embauché, même si l'impossibilité matérielle de faire un recours 
pour malfaçon est évidente). Par ailleurs, certains corps de métiers sont 
placés dans une position plus "favorable" que d'autres pour travailler au 
noir. Tel est en particulier le cas de ceux qui disposent d'une qualifi-
cation adaptée à la demande de travail clandestin. 
Après avoir évoqué les secteurs sensibles, il convient de relever 
quelques activités où a priori le travail au noir est absent. Tous les 
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travaux nécessitant un label ou un agrément officiel ainsi que tous les 
travaux dangereux entrent dans cette catégorie. Pour souder des conduites 
de gaz, laver des vitres dans une tour de plusieurs étages ou émonder des 
arbres dont les branches menacent une voie ferrée, on peut affirmer sans 
risque de se tromper que tout le travail est officiel et déclaré. 
Structure par statut professionnel 
Il convient ici de démystifier l'idée selon laquelle les chômeurs 
travailleraient massivement au noir. On dispose, en effet, d'études assez 
contradictoires. A Lille, les chômeurs de longue durée ne trouveraient pas 
dans le travail au noir, un complément de revenu significatif, alors qu'en 
Lorraine, les sidérurgistes licenciés parviendraient à organiser des 
réseaux informels de solidarité (*). Dans le département des Bouches du 
Rhône, des syndicats professionnels (non cités), considèrent que 80% des 
travailleurs au noir sont des chômeurs (**), alors que dans la ville de 
Marseille, les premiers résultats d'une étude sur les jeunes chômeurs mon-
trent que ces derniers ont davantage un problème d'insertion fut-ce après 
des stages ou des petits boulots que des activités au noir leur rapportant 
des revenus réguliers (***). 
La relation entre chômage et -travail au noir n'est pas simple car 
des effets favorables et des effets pervers se conjugent, ce qui conduit 
à écarter toute ébauche de position générale et définitive. 
Sur un plan conjoncturel, un chômage massif entraîne une baisse des 
revenus officiels qui peut conduire à deux attitudes différentes des don-
neurs d'ouvrage en fonction de l'intensité de leur demande : soit ils 
accentuent leur demande pour continuer à bénéficier de prestations mais à 
(*) cf : exemple n°3 et n°5 (première partie) 
(**) Yves CHAVAGNE : "Les clandestins du travail noir", La Croix, 18 juin 
1976. 
(***) César CENTI : "Cheminement des jeunes chômeurs et ruptures du marché 
du travail â Marseille", C.E.R.S., Université d'AIX-MARSEILLE II, 1987 
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un moindre coût (effet positif), soit ils substituent le bricolage pour 
leur propre compte à l'embauche de travailleurs au noir (effet négatif). Sous 
l'hypothèse que les chômeurs qui bénéficient d'une disponibilité plus grande 
que les personnes employées sont offreuses de travail au noir, il s'en suit 
une activité clandestine des chômeurs florissante dans le premier cas de 
figure et insignifiante dans le second. Les chômeurs étant par ailleurs 
moins bien placés que les personnes employées pour emprunter des outils 
à leur entreprise et pour accéder aux lieux où se négocient les contrats de 
travail au noir, la version la plus probable est celle d'un rationnement 
de l'activité au noir des chômeurs par rapport à une norme d'activité 
potentielle. 
Sur un plan structurel, la thèse de la réactivation de réseaux de 
travail au noir endormis paraît plus soutenable que celle de la constitution 
de réseaux nouveaux. Dans une zone rurale, où tout le monde se connaît et 
où les relations de voisinage sont très développées, le chômage de plusieurs 
résidents est en quelque sorte pris en charge par la collectivité. Le tra-
vail au noir peut s'y propager car les liens entre prestataires de services 
et fournisseurs d'ouvrage préexistent à l'apparition du chômage. Dans une 
zone urbaine, au contraire, où les relations sont impersonnelles et où l'on 
ignore souvent tout de ses voisins de palier, le chômage est synonyme d'ex-
clusion et de perte de relations. Même si la volonté de travailler au noir 
est présente, les chances de trouver les moyens d'exercer de façon signifi-
cative une activité souterraine apparaissent réduites. 
A la lueur de ces arguments, il n'est pas étonnant d'observer dans 
la littérature des conclusions contradictoires. C'est l'environnement du 
chômeur et pas le fait d'être sans emploi qui explique la plus ou moins 
grande participation des chômeurs aux activités au noir. 
Structure par nationalité 
Des problèmes de recensement se posent avec acuité si l'on veut 
mesurer le rôle de l'immigration clandestine dans les activités au noir, car 
par obligation on a affaire à une population contrainte d'exercer une acti-
vité souterraine. En France, la politique menée durant, l'été 1981 est pleine 
42 
d'enseignements car elle a consisté à régulariser la situation des étrangers 
entrés clandestinement sur le territoire avant le 1er janvier 1981. On dis-
pose ainsi d'une maquette de la réalité dont le degré de fiabilité est 
total pour les personnes qui ont engagé une procédure de régularisation 
même si l'on ignore, d'une part, le stock d'immigrés clandestins qui ne se 
sont pas présentés et d'autre part le flux net d'immigration clandestine 
postérieure à janvier 1981. 
Selon les statistiques de l'Office National d'Immigration, 109.012 
cartes de travail ont été délivrées au 1er août 1983, chiffre auquel s'ajoute 
14.567 cartes de travail délivrées à des algériens (c'est le ministère 
de l'Intérieur et de la Décentralisation qui s'occupe des algériens et pas 
l'Office National d'Immigration). Par nationalité, ont été régularisés 
106.638 non membres de la communauté, 21.405 tunisiens, 20.677 marocains, 
18.399 ressortissants d'Etats d'Afrique Noire, 14.567 algériens, 10721 turcs, 
2.811 mauriciens, 2.736 yougoslaves, 2.654 pakistanais et 12.668.ressortis-
sants d'autres nationalités. A cet effectif, il convient d'ajouter 16.941 
ressortissants d'un pays de la communauté, 15.711 portugais et 1.230 espa-
gnols (*) . 
Pour notre propos, il paraît utile de relever qu'au moment de leur 
régularisation, 95% des travailleurs immigrés clandestins avaient un emploi 
et cet emploi était localisé dans une petite ou même une très petite entre-
prise (41,8% oeuvraient dans une firme employant moins de cinq salariés 
et 24,5% dans une entreprise dont l'effectif salarié était compris entre 
5 et 9 personnes). 
Les travailleurs clandestins étaient ouvriers à hauteur de 70,4% 
principalement ouvriers de type artisanal ou agricole. Ceux qui avaient 
un autre métier étaient employés comme personnel de service (17,3%) surtout 
les femmes ou comme employés de commerce (7,9%). 
En matière de secteurs d'activité, les travailleurs immigrés clandes-
tins oeuvraient dans des secteurs bien déterminés ; le bâtiment et travaux 
(*) Source : "Immigration clandestine (la régularisation des travailleurs 
sans papiers 1981-1982)", Bulletin Mensuel des Statistiques du Travail", 
Numéro Spécial, Supplément du n°106, 1983, page 17. 
43 
publics (30%), les hôtels, cafés et restaurants (11,5%), l'agriculture et 
le forestage (10,7%), les services domestiques (10,3%), les commerces (9,5%), 
le textile et l'habillement (7,8%) et les entreprises de nettoyage (4,6%) (*) 
Ces secteurs, caractérisés par une structure par taille des établis-
sements où prédominent les petites entreprises, sont également ceux où 
travaillent le plus les travailleurs au noir nationaux comme le montrent les 
analyses sectorielles exposées précédemment. Il y a donc des secteurs sen-
sibles et des secteurs moins vulnérables, les premiers employant indistinc-
tement des immigrés ou des nationaux mais pas forcément pour des tâches 
identiques. Le travail au noir organisé semble prédominant pour les immigrés, 
le travail au noir des nationaux étant pour sa part beaucoup moins typé 
comme en témoignent les divers cas-types présentés dans la première partie. 
Un indicateur indirect de la forme très organisée du travail clandes-
tin des immigrés nous semble résider dans la spécialisation par nationalité 
des activités au noir. Mis à part le bâtiment et les travaux publics où 
toutes les nationalités sont représentées à l'exception des asiatiques, lès 
espagnols et les portugais' travaillent davantage dans les services domesti-
ques, les yougoslaves dans le textile, les marocains dans l'agriculture, 
les tunisiens dans le commerce et la restauration, les turcs dans l'agricul-
ture et le textile, etc. De véritables filières se mettent en place, allant 
de l'entrée illégale sur le territoire à la fourniture d'un emploi, en 
passant par l'hébergement. Une preuve de l'existence de telles filières 
semble manifeste lorsque l'on examine les moyens dont on eu recours les 
travailleurs immigrés clandestins pour franchir la frontière. Si le prétexte 
du séjour touristique est largement dominant (68,4% des personnes régulari-
sées), les marocains et les tunisiens adoptent la technique du permis de 
travail saisonnier, les ressortissants des pays d'Afrique Noire privilégient 
l'usage de faux papiers, les turcs l'entrée clandestine. 
S'agissant enfin de la répartition géographique des travailleurs 
immigrés clandestins, avant la régularisation de leur situation, elle était 
concentrée dans quatre régions : la région parisienne (60%), la région 
(*) Claude Valentin MARIE : "L'immigration clandestine en France", Travail 
et emploi, n°17, juillet-septembre 198Z, page Z3. 
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Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (13,2%), la Corse (6,1%) et la région Rhône-
Alpes (4,7%). 
S'il est difficile d'établir un bilan de l'immigration clandestine 
tant les cas sont différents les uns des autres, il faut dire que leur con-
tribution à l'économie française répondait parfaitement au besoin de flexi-
bilité exprimé par certains employeurs peu scrupuleux, qui souhaitaient 
contourner les rigidités de gestion de la main d'oeuvre étrangère installée 
légalement en France. La précarité du statut social des immigrés clandestins 
génère une stratification de la main d'oeuvre étrangère entre ceux qui 
jouissent des acquis sociaux auxquels tous les travailleurs ont droit et 
ceux qui sont exploités sous couvert de flexibilité. 
L'un des objectifs de la procédure de régularisation de 1981 était 
de gommer cette stratification. La politique adoptée depuis cette opération 
de grande envergure (*), repose quant à elle sur quatre piliers : le contrôle 
des frontières, le contrôle de la situation des étrangers sur le territoire 
français, la lutte contre l'emploi clandestin des étrangers et la coopération 
internationale (**). 
Au terme de cet examen du volume et de la nature du travail au noir 
en France, l'impression qui se dégage est celle de la complexité des si-
tuations : les méthodes d'estimations ne sont pas exemptes de biais, les 
formes d'activités clandestines sont très diversifiées et les comportements 
des agents dépendent étroitement des contextes locaux dans lesquels ils 
s'insèrent. Eu égard à cette hétérogénéité générale, il n'est pas étonnant 
de retrouver au niveau des déterminants du travail au noir une palette de 
causes également très étendue. Tel est l'objet de nos prochains développe-
ments . 
(*) Le document, (cf annexe) distribué dans les boites aux lettres en 
1982 est rédigé en arabe, portugais, bambara, ouolof, turc et serbo-
croate . 
(**) Cf : Jean-Michel DINAND : "La politique française en matière d'immi-
gration clandestine : 1981-1986", Revue Française des Affaires Sociales, 
janvier-mars 1986. ' 
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II - LES DETERMINANTS DU TRAVAIL AU NOIR 
Sans forcément pouvoir dresser une hiérarchie entre les déterminants 
nationaux, régionaux, locaux ou individuels du travail au noir, il nous 
semble essentiel de relever un faisceau de causes susceptibles d'expliquer 
le phénomène. C'est l'interaction de causes multiples qui importe même si 
dans telle ou telle région, à telle ou telle période et pour tel ou tel 
groupe d'individus une intention peut se transformer en réalisation sous 
l'effet d'une motivation spécifique. N'est-ce pas cette interrelation entre 
inclinaison personnelle et opportunité qui a justifié notre approche quali-
tative où plusieurs cas-types ont été tour à tour développés ? N'est-ce pas 
le sentiment d'être traité de façon injuste par la puissance publique qui 
pousse une personne à travailler au noir ou à embaucher au noir ? N'est-ce 
pas la misère qui conduit un travailleur à accepter d'être rémunéré à la 
pièce dans un atelier clandestin ? 
Pour tenter de clarifier les choses sans pour autant proposer une 
taxinomie, nous allons successivement mesurer l'influence de facteurs natio-
naux, régionaux et individuels. 
2a/ Au niveau national 
Bien que les aspects réglementaires, sociaux et culturels soient 
étroitement imbriqués, une partition fondée sur ce clivage permet de ventiler 
les déterminants nationaux d'une manière adaptée à l'analyse. 
Les aspects réglementaires 
L'histoire nous montre très clairement que chaque règle engendre des 
modalités plus ou moins sophistiquées pour les contourner. Sans remonter 
à l'Egypte pharaonique où des hyéroglyphes nous indiquent que des régle-
mentations sur le prix de l'huile ou sur l'utilisation des pressoirs ont 
engendré les premières fraudes connues sur l'huile ou sur le vin, sans 
évoquer les textes de Dioclétien sur le travail au noir, sans rappeler 
l'origine de la monnaie frappée, on peut affirmer que les règles ont toujours 
été transgressées chaque fois qu'intérêt général et intérêt particulier 
conduisent à des stratégies opposées (*) 
(*) René SEDILLOT : Histoire des marchés noirs, Tallandier, Paris, 1985. 
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L'existence d'une durée maximale hebdomadaire du travail, de textes 
sur les cumuls, de permis de travail pour les étrangers, de règles de rému-
nération nourrit le travail au noir. Mais, il convient d'insister paral-
lèlement sur les motivations, la plupart du temp fondées, qui suscitent ces 
textes : protéger la santé (horaires), assurer la sécurité et la dignité 
(salaire minimum), etc. 
En péride de crise, le souci légitime de mieux répartir les emplois 
et de lutter contre l'exclusion de certains du marché du travail a sans 
doute conduit à exacerber les contraintes et à alimenter le travail au noir. 
Les textes sur les retraites et les pré-retraites concernent souvent 
des personnes qui ont d'autant plus les capacités physiques et intellectuel-
les de travailler que la durée de vie s'allonge. 
Des études récentes montrent que le sous-emploi - défini comme la 
situation de toute personne travaillant moins que la norme ou que d'habitude 
et cherchant un autre emploi à temps complet - a doublé entre 1982 et 1986. 
Il concernait, en mars 1986 483.000 personnes (*). Les stagiaires 
rémunérés quant à eux étaient 407.000 en mars 1986 dont 59% percevaient 
moins de 2000 francs par mois (**)-; les stagiaires jeunes pour leur part 
ont tous une rémunération inférieure au salaire minimum. Même si les formes 
juridiques des activités de ces personnes sont tout à fait légales, comment 
peut-on considérer qu'il soit possible de vivre décemment avec des situations 
aussi précaires ? Ces 890.000 personnes ne forment-elles pas un vivier de 
travailleurs au noir potentiels ? 
Les interrogations actuelles sur les "petits boulots" reposent sur 
une ambiguïté. D'une part, ils ont pour objet de favoriser l'insertion des 
chômeurs, la formation professionnelle des jeunes et la création d'emplois 
mais d'autre part, ils figent la précarité par des activités à horaires 
réduits, par des contrats de travail temporaire, et par des rémunérations 
insuffisantes. A titre d'exemple, les Associations Intermédiaires créées 
par la loi du 27 janvier 1987 "ont pour objet exclusif d'embaucher des 
(*) Claude THELOT : "Le sous-emploi a doublé en quatre ans", Economie et 
Statistiques, n°193-194, novembre-décembre 1986. 
(**) Jean-Luc HELLER : "Emplois précaires, stages : des emplois faute de 
mieux", Economie et Statistiques, n°193-194, novembre-décembre 1986 
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personnes dépourvues d'emploi pour les mettre à disposition d'utilisateurs" 
(*). Il s'agit concrètement d'un texte qui vise à prêter de la main d'oeuvre 
à titre onéreux pour accomplir des travaux occasionnels. En d'autres termes, 
c'est une légalisation de la flexibilité la plus totale. Il va également 
de soi que les petits boulots peuvent porter en germe certains des éléments 
requis pour que le cercle vicieux de la précarité et de l'exclusion se 
transforme en cercle vertueux de l'innovation technologique. Des projets 
de création d'entreprises, d'adaptation de nouvelles technologies à des 
domaines où elles sont peu répandues sont susceptibles d'apparaître, à 
condition que les obstacles fiscaux ne viennent pas perturber les initiatives 
individuelles ou collectives. 
On fait souvent allusion aux effets pervers des règles d'embauché, 
de promotion ou de licenciements qui régissent les relations sur le marché 
du travail officiel. L'argument consiste à dire que trop de règles tue la 
règle, comme on dit par ailleurs que trop d'impôt tue l'impôt ! S'il_est 
peu contesté que la flexibilité du marché du travail est souhaitable, ne 
serait-ce que pour amortir les fluctuations conjoncturelles deMa produc-
tion, il n'est pas pour autant acceptable d'assimiler le facteur travail aux 
autres facteurs de production. 
Sur un plan plus concret, les rigidités législatives et réglemen-
taires constituent des freins à l'emploi, en particulier dans les PME et les 
PMI où les retournements de conjoncture sont parfois très sensibles. C'est 
une sorte de leitmotiv chaque fois que l'on interroge des artisans, des 
commerçants ou des petits entrepreneurs sur leur politique d'embauché. 
L'enjeu de la déréglementation est d'autant plus complexe à carac-
tériser que la légalité a un fondement économique, ne serait-ce que par 
référence à la gestion rationnelle des coûts de transaction. Le travail au 
noir, dans cette logique, apparaît comme le résultat de la supériorité des 
coûts de la légalité sur ceux de l'illégalité. Les petits boulots tels 
qu'ils sont définis dans les mesures adoptées par les gouvernements succes-
sifs pour essayer d'enrayer la croissance du chômage exprimeraient dans 
(*) Bernard EME et Jean-Louis LAVILLE : Les petits boulots en question, 
Syros/Alternatives, Paris, 1988, page 156. 
(20) 
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cette perspective et pour les fournisseurs d'ouvrage, un excès des coûts de 
l'illégalité sur ceux de. la légalité. Travail au noir et petits boulots 
seraient ainsi alternativement des formes rationnelles de gestion de la 
flexibilité du travail, en particulier pour les entreprises de très petites 
taille. 
Les aspects sociaux 
Le progrès technique et l'élévation de la productivité permettent 
dans tous les pays l'abaissement de la durée du travail et l'allongement 
des périodes de congé. Dans la lignée des travaux de BECKER sur l'alloca-
tion du temps et de LANCASTER sur la consommation de caractéristiques, l'ar-
bitrage travail -loisirs sur lequel reposaient les fonctions traditionnelles 
d'offre de travail est aujourd'hui remis en cause. Les plages de temps 
dégagées soit volontairement, soit involontairement (lien avec les nouvelles 
formes d'emploi) transforment les fondements théoriques des fonctions d'offre 
de travail car elles sont désormais expliquées par des comportements issus 
d'une approche trichotomique (travail officiel-travail non officiel (au 
noir ou pas)-et loisirs) . Derrière cette nouvelle conception du marché du 
travail se cachent deux problématiques complémentaires : celle du travail 
au noir et celle des relations sociales à travers le prisme du tiers-secteur 
(*). Selon que les individus agissent spontanément ou sous contrainte de 
revenu ou de prix, telle ou telle forme d'activité informelle prend l'ascen-
dant sur les autres. 
La thèse proposée à maintes reprises par GERSHUNY illustre également 
les aspects sociaux qui déterminent le développement des activités infor-
melles dont le travail au noir est l'une des composantes (**). Elle repose 
sur l'idée selon laquelle le secteur des services n'absorberait pas dans 
les sociétés post-industrielles toute la main d'oeuvre espérée. Il en résulte 
(*) Sur ce dernier point, non développé ici, on pourra consulter deux articles 
de base : Xavier GREFFE et Jocelyne GAUDIN : "Partage du travail et mode 
de développement", Droit Social, janvier 1980 et Jacques DELORS et 
Jocelyne GAUDIN : "Pour la création d'un troisième secteur", Echange et 
Projets, janvier-mars 1979. 
(**) Jay I. GERSHUNY : "Travail domestique, innovations sociales et dynamique 
du système capitaliste", in Edith ARCHAMBAULT et Xavier GREFFE eds, Les 
Economies non officielles, La Découverte, Paris, 1984, pp 52 à 76. 
Jay I. GERSHUNY : "Technology, Social Innovation and the Informal Economy1 
Annals of the American A.cademy of Political and Social Science", VÒ1.49Z, 
September 1987, pp 47 à 6Z. 
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d'une part une tendance à l'auto-production de services et d'autre part une 
accélération de la demande de biens de consommation finale durable et de 
petits biens d'équipements nécessaires à l'activité domestique. Dans cette 
logique, les politiques de l'emploi apparaissent inefficaces car mal orien-
tées qu'elles soient dirigées vers le secteur industriel ou vers celui des 
services. 
Dans le premier cas, on met en doute l'efficacité d'une politique 
conjoncturelle alors que la nature du problème à surmonter est avant tout stru 
turelle. . Dans le second cas, on se heurte à un point de satiété de la 
demande ; la contrepartie fiscale des subventions à l'emploi rencontre les 
limites traditionnelles à l'accroissement des prélèvements obligatoires. 
Pour cette thèse, les problèmes d'emploi se matérialisent par un 
double effet : la saturation des marchés officiels induit le développement 
des activités non protégées et l'auto-production une amplification des acti-
vités domestiques. 
En d'autres termes, GERSHUNY propose et décrit une dynamique des 
échanges entre l'économie . formelle et les composantes de l'économie infor-
melle qu'il s'agisse de l'économie marginale, de l'économie domestique ou 
de l'économie communautaire. 
Parallèlement à ces deux explications synthétiques fondées respecti-. 
vement sur l'allocation du temps et sur l'innovation sociale, il convient 
plus modestement d'évoquer quelques cas concrets à l'image du coût horaire 
d'un artisan, du faible niveau de certaines retraites, de la facilité plus 
ou moins grande qu'a un entrepreneur potentiel pour créer une entreprise, 
de l'accès de plus en plus facile à des outils de professionnels par la 
prolifération de magasins de bricolage. Sur tout le territoire, les argu-
ments de cette nature sont avancés lorsque l'on interroge les gens sur ce 
qui les pousse à travailler au noir. 
Les aspects culturels 
En analysant les facteurs explicatifs de l'émergence de l'économie 
souterraine, GREFFE propose une démarche orientée dans cinq directions (*). 
Si les trois premières remises en cause de l'intervention publique 
(*) Xavier GREFFE : "L'économie non officielle", Consommation, n°Z, 1981, 
page 99. 
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(analyse de l'emploi à la GERSHUNY et nouvelles aspirations face au travail 
et au temps) recoupent ce que nous avons appelé les aspects réglementaires 
et sociaux, les deux autres propositions, davantage structurelles d'inspi-
ration, correspondent à ce que nous appelons par commodité les aspects 
culturels. 
Par le biais de l'éclatement des cellules familiales élargies, les 
structures démographiques contribuent à expliquer certaines formes d'acti-
vités cachées. Cette idée, classique en analyse de la répartition des reve-
nus, consiste à enregistrer le comportement de dislocation des familles 
traditionnelles en un nombre plus important de ménages. Les indicateurs 
d'inégalité des revenus du type coefficient de GINI, montrent en effet dans 
les pays développés une hausse des disparités lorsque l'unité de calcul est 
le ménage et une réduction des disparités lorsque une autre unité est retenue. 
Si les jeunes quittent plus tôt le domicile de leurs parents et si 
les vieux vivent séparés de leurs enfants, la consommation globale s'accroît 
(*) et les tâches de convivialité assumées par les parents vis"-à-vis de 
leurs ascendants et de leurs descendants ne sont plus à assurer. Par compen-
sation, se met en place une stratégie de recherche d'activités sociales qui 
échappent aux normes du travail salarié. On justifie de cette manière 
l'expansion du travail communautaire, des emplois dans les associations et 
des activités bénévoles. 
les structures d'urbanisation qui jouent elles aussi un rôle moteur 
dans la croissance de la consommation autonome des ménages (cf par exemple 
la critique de SMITHIES à la fonction de consommation de FRIEDMAN) contri-
buent également à expliquer le développement du travail au noir. 
Dans un premier sens, les besoins propres aux habitants des villes 
les conduisant à rechercher des revenus supplémentaires qui peuvent être 
obtenus grâce à des activités au noir. Ce mouvement est accentué par la 
prolifération des acquisitions de maisons individuelles tant à titre prin-
cipal qu'à titre de résidence secondaire. Ce type de logement requiert en 
(*) On sait que la consommation globale d'un ménage est une fonction inverse 
du nombre de personnes qui le composent. 
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amont un capital de départ, en cours de construction la présence de profes-
sionnels et en aval un flux de revenu destiné à l'entretien. Les exemples 
sont nombreux de personnes qui travaillent au noir pour accumuler le capital 
de départ, qui embauchent des travailleurs au noir pour la phase de cons-
truction et qui allient production pour compte propre, entraide et travail 
au noir pour la phase d'entretien. 
Ce mouvement dont l'ampleur concerne toutes les régions et toutes 
les catégories socio-professionnelles prend dans certains départements des 
proportions considérables. Ainsi, en 1982, dans les Hautes-Alpes, le nom-
bre de résidences secondaires correspond à 41,5% du nombre total de logements, 
la moyenne de la région Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur étant de 15,6% et la 
moyenne nationale de 9,6% (*). 
Les personnes vivant en zone rurale ont quant à elles une participa-
tion différente mais pas pour autant négligeable aux activités souterraines. 
Les cas d'entraide sont les plus souvent évoqués car les transac-
tions au noir prennent la forme d'échange de services plutôt que celle de 
rapports marchands. Le troc domine la transaction monétaire lorsque un 
paysan laboure le champ d'un autre ou répare la machine agricole de son voi-
sin. La contrepartie de ces services sera par exemple l'aide à la construc-
tion d'un hangar ou la participation aux travaux des champs. 
Si les déterminants réglementaires, sociaux et culturels suffisent 
pour.expliquer globalement l'ampleur du travail au noir, des particularités 
régionales ou locales doivent leur être associées pour mieux dessiner l'ima-
ge du travail au noir que connaît la France aujourd'hui. 
2b/ Facteurs régionaux et locaux 
Eu égard à nos précédents développements, toutes les régions connais-
sent du travail au noir et chacune des formes qu'il peut revêtir. Aussi, 
l'intérêt de cette approche, complémentaire de la précédente, est de 
s'interroger sur le degré d'homogénéité des régions françaises en matière 
(*) Source : INSEE : Données économiques et sociales Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur, édition 1988, page 165. 
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de travail au noir. Sont-elles toutes affectées de la même façon ou bien 
des facteurs spécifiques comme la structure industrielle régionale ou les 
traditions locales contribuent-ils à spécialiser une région dans un travail 
au noir particulier ? 
Pour tenter de répondre à cette interrogation, nous disposons d'une 
étude consacrée au travail au noir dans les régions françaises, étude qui 
repose sur une adaptation au travail au noir de la méthode composite de 
classement des économies souterraines de FREY et WECK (*). 
Pour déboucher sur un classement des 22 régions françaises, 8 indi-
cateurs ont été retenus en fonction de deux critères : ils doivent refléter 
les structures économiques des régions et être en relation avec les moti-
vations qui expliquent la participation aux activités au noir en tant 
qu'offreurs ou demandeurs. La liste des indicateurs comprend quatre variables 
pour appréhender l'offre de travail (le taux d'activité, le taux de salariat, 
le taux d'absentéisme et le taux de chômage) et quatre variables pour repré-
senter la demande de travail (indicateur : réparation automobile, bâtiment, 
hôtels-cafés-restaurants et artisanat). Chacun de ces indicateurs a été 
construit de manière à être indépendant de la taille des régions étudiées. 
Après traitement statistique et tests de sensibilité des résultats, 
14 régions ont un travail au noir homogène, c'est-à-dire que la forme qu'il 
revêt n'y est pas spécifique et 8 régions ont un travail au noir particulier 
en ce sens que les contextes locaux conduisent les résidents à adopter telle 
ou telle attitude. 
En opérant des regroupements au sein des régions à travail au noir 
spécifique, une typologie en cinq groupes peut être dégagée : 
Type 1 : Auvergne, Limousin et Poitou-Charentes. Ces trois régions dont le 
point commun est d'être des zones essentiellement rurales se caractérisent 
par un travail au noir plus développé dans l'agriculture, l'artisanat et 
les hôtels, cafés et restaurants. Les travailleurs au noir sont des person-
nes non salariées plus que des salariés ayant un deuxième emploi non déclaré. 
(*) Philippe BARTHELEMY : "Economie souterraine et emploi : le travail au 
noir dans les régions françaises", communication présentée au Congrès 
International des Economistes de Langue Française, Nantes, mai 1986. 
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Il s'agit d'une forme très structurelle de travail au noir, profondé-
ment enracinée dans les mentalités. A la limite, le travail au noir flirte 
avec les relations d'entraide et de convivialité. La motivation des parti-
cipants n'est pas la recherche d'un revenu supplémentaire, c'est plutôt la 
traduction d'un art de vivre qui sans intention quelconque de frauder anime 
l'échange réciproque de services. 
Type 2 : Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur. Contrairement au cas précédent, le tra-
vail au noir de cette région, est surtout le fait de salariés et de chômeurs. 
Les travailleurs au noir exercent leur activité dans le bâtiment et 
dans la réparation en tous genres beaucoup plus que dans les autres domaines, 
y compris les hôtels, cafés, restaurants où l'intensité est proche de la 
moyenne nationale. Il y a dans cette région une forte tendance de travail 
au noir chez les particuliers. On peut en déduire que la recherche d'un 
revenu supplémentaire est le déterminant majeur de ceux qui s'adonnent à 
des activités au noir. 
Type 3 : Midi-Pyrénées et Corse. Dans ces deux régions, le travail au noir 
de "professionnels" semble dominant. Les personnes qui pratiquent ces acti-
vités non déclarées le font à titre principal dans des petites entreprises 
pour la région Midi-Pyrénées et tous azimuts pour la Corse. 
S'agissant de Midi-Pyrénées, on retrouve ici avec une démarche diffé-
rente les conclusions de TAHAR sur la maroquinerie tarnaise. Cet auteur 
remarquait en effet la présence d'une forme "italienne" de travai 1 au noir, 
où les travailleurs étaient embauchés par des petits ateliers moyennant une 
rémunération à la pièce. Il paraît opportun d'insister sur l'influence de 
la structure productive en tant que déterminant local du travail au noir. 
Lorsque le tissu industriel est formé de petites entreprises dissé-
minées dans un espace bien délimité, les enquêtes convergent pour montrer 
que les employeurs au noir sont souvent des firmes. Notons que cette propo-
tion n'est pas propre aux régions concernées de la Communauté Européenne 
car, pour reprendre une terminologie explicite "le foisonnement industriel 
asiatique" n'a rien à envier à "l'économie souterraine à l'italienne" (*) . 
(*) Pierre JUDET : "Comment nait un tissu industriel ?", Problèmes Economi-
ques, n°1874, 1984, page 19. 
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Le cas de la Corse apparaît peu différent du précédent si ce n'est que 
les travailleurs au noir exercent leurs talents dans tous les domaines -
bâtiment, réparation, tourisme - et aussi bien en entreprises que chez des 
particuliers. 
Type 4 : Languedoc-Roussillon. Cette autre région de la façade méditerra-
néenne de la France a la particularité d'arriver en première position dans 
l'intensité relative de son travail au noir. Cette région est dotée d'un 
dynamisme particulier sur lequel se sont penchés les spécialistes d'économie 
régionale. "Cas exceptionnel, la croissance, forte de la production associée 
à une croissance médiocre de la productivité ont même permis (en Languedoc-
Roussillon) une croissance positive de l'emploi industriel au cours de la 
période 1974-1980" (*). Même s'il serait caricatural d'affirmer qu'une 
région peut traverser la crise économique sans en ressentir les effets, on 
peut penser que le Languedoc-Roussillon a pu, mieux qu'une autre, en supporter 
les chocs. Une contribution, même partielle, de l'économie souterraine à 
l'explication de cette particularité régionale ne semble pas dénuée de tout 
fondement. 
Type 5 : Nord-Pas de Calais. Par rapport aux 21 autres régions, la région 
Nord-Pas de Calais est totalement atypique. Pour ce qui est des facteurs 
représentatifs de l'offre de travail au noir, c'est une région qui possède 
toutes les caractéristiques requises pour avoir un travail au noir important. 
Pour ce qui est des facteurs' représentatifs de la demande de travail au noir, 
au contraire, cette région est parmi celles où le travail au noir est le 
plus faible. Au total, nous nous trouvons en présence d'un marché du travail 
au noir en situation de déséquilibre au sens de la théorie économique contem-
poraine.Le côté court du marché (short side of the market) étant celui des 
offres d'emploi, il y a par conséquent rationnement c'est-à-dire une demande 
d'emplois au noir insatisfaite. Cette conclusion est dans la lignée des 
résultats de l'enquête menée par FOUDI, STANKIEWICZ et VANEECLOO sur les 
chômeurs de longue durée à Lille qui ne parviennent pas - même s'ils en ont 
(*) Maurice CATIN et Jean-Yves LESUEUR : Mise au point d'un modèle de conjonc-
ture des régions françaises : le modèle MDR", contrat de recherche CGP, 
INSEE et FEA, novembre 1985, page 185. 
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l'intention - à obtenir au noir des ressources complémentaires significa-
tives (*) . 
Au terme de cette revue des facteurs régionaux du travail au noir, 
deux précisions nous paraissent nécessaires pour compléter notre analyse. 
En premier lieu, une carte de France de l'intensité relative du tra-
vail au noir observé dans les différentes régions peut être présentée. Elle 
a été dessinée en reprenant le classement qui est apparu, après traitement 
des huit indicateurs énumérés ci-dessus. On y observe deux partitions du 
territoire : le sud de-.la France dans le relatif travaillerait davantage 
au noir que le nord, et l'ouest, toujours dans le relatif, aurait une inten-
sité de participation aux activités au noir plus marquée que le centre et 
l'est du pays. 
En second lieu, il faut préciser que le classement d'une région ne 
stipule rien quant au degré d'homogénéité de son travail au noir. Un décou-
page plus précis au niveau départemental, voire même cantonal ou communal, 
permettrait de révéler des poches de travail au noir dont la présence est 
occultée par la dimension retenue. A titre de pure illustration, pour la 
région Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, une carte régionale a été établie à 
l'aide de huit indicateurs calqués sur ceux qui ont été retenus dans l'appro-
che nationale (**). Sans développer les conclusions de cette étude, notons 
d'une part la présence de grandes disparités intraregionales et d'autre 
part celle de microcosmes où les travailleurs au noir sont en position 
ultra-favorables. Dans les Alpes de Haute Provence, par exemple la demande 
de travail au noir est l'une des plus élevée de la région alors que l'offre 
de travail est très modeste : les salaires au noir n'y peuvent être qu'éle-
vés .' . 
Si les déterminants nationaux fixent un cadre de référence et les 
déterminants régionaux un environnement plus ou moins favorable, il ne faut 
(*) Cf exemple n°3, première partie. 
(**) Philippe BARTHELEMY, Jean-Pierre GIRAN et Jean-Yves LESUEUR : "L'écono-
mie souterraine dans la région Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur", in G.R.I.F.E. 
Emploi et marché régional du travail, étude pour le Conseil Régional, 
avril 1987, page 39 
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CARTE DE FRANCE 
DU TRAVAIL AU NOIR 
|o <*0°| Intensité relative très forte 
Intensité relative forte 
= Moyenne nationale 
{t«*·» 1 Intensité relative faible 
|* "·*.":I Intensité relative très faible 
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pas oublier que la décision ultime de travailler au noir ou d'embaucher au 
noir est avant tout individuelle. Aussi, est-ce logiquement que nous abor-
dons maintenant les déterminants individuels du travail au noir. 
2c/ Facteurs individuels 
Dans la mesure où le travail au noir n'est que la résultante d'un 
contrat passé entre un employeur (firme ou personne privée) et un employé 
(firme ou personne privée), les deux partenaires doivent y trouver un avan-
tage. Sur un plan plus concret, les exemples de communauté d'intérêt ne 
manquent pas. L'artisan qui fournit sa prestation sans facture en tire un 
avantage fiscal, celui qui lui commande une prestation a un coût moindre 
pour un service rendu identique. L'employeur de personnel domestique au 
noir échappe aux cotisations patronales, la personne employée est générale-
ment couverte socialement par son conjoint ou par elle-même et préfère ne 
pas être déclarée. Le salarié qui occupe au noir un second emploi ne déclare 
pas les revenus qu'il reçoit et celui qui lui fournit un travail à accomplir 
n'a pas de TVA à verser. 
On le voit, les dimensions fiscales (impôt sur le revenu, taxe sur 
les salaires et TVA) et sociales (cotisations patronales et salariales) 
apparaissent essentielles dans les motivations individuelles d'offre ou de 
demande de travail au noir. Il suffit de considérer subjectivement que la 
règle de l'égalité des sacrifices marginaux d'EDGEWORTH n'est pas vérifiée 
pour son propre cas particulier pour qu'aussitôt la fraude se développe. 
Ce raisonnement, tout scientifique qu'il puisse paraître, n'est pas 
suffisant pour expliquer à lui seul l'émergence du travail au noir. En 
interrogeant les travailleurs au noir, qu'ils soient par ailleurs salariés, 
non salariés, chômeurs ou inactifs, une autre motivation est toujours citée : 
"gagner d el'argent". S'il y a un lien entre revenu et impôt, on devrait, 
toutes choses égales par ailleurs, recenser davantage de célibataires que 
de personnes mariées* avec enfants dans l'a population des travailleurs au 
noir : à revenu déclaré identique, le jeu des barèmes fiscaux fait que la 
personne seule a un taux marginal d'imposition supérieur à celui de la per-
sonne mariée avec enfants. 
Les statistiques disponibles montrant que les personnes seules tra-
vaillent beaucoup moins au noir que les autres, on doit pondérer notre con-
clusion provisoire. Pour un travailleur oeuvrant au noir à titre de seconde 
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activité, la recherche de revenu est la motivation première, l'effet fiscal 
apparaît comme une conséquence "agréable" d'autant mieux considérée que le 
taux marginal d'impôt sur le revenu est élevé. 
Ce comportement est très différent de celui qui cherche avant tout 
à frauder, il développe quant à lui une stratégie de dissimulation qui ne 
passe pas par le travail au noir : sa démarche est purement fiscale. Le pro­
blème du contribuable consiste en effet à maximiser l'utilité espérée du 
revenu obtenu s'il décide de frauder. 
soit W : le revenu réellement perçu (connu du contribuable mais pas du fisc) 
θ : le taux d'imposition, C*> 0 
X : le revenu déclaré (la variable de décision du contribuable) , 'X > 0 
ρ : la probabilité que le revenu réel du contribuable soit découvert 
par"le fisc et dans cette hypothèse que le fisc soit convaincu qu'il 
y a eu fraude 
Π : le taux de redressement sur les revenus dissimulés, Π > &" 
Si la fraude fiscale n'est pas détectée par les services fiscaux, le 
revenu disponible du fraudeur est : 
y = W ­&"X 
Si la fraude est décelée, le contribuable aura le revenu disponible 
suivant : 
Ζ = W ­GTx ­ H(W ­ X) 
Le problème du contribuable potentiellement fraudeur consiste donc 
à maximiser l'expression : 
Max E(U) = (1 ­ p) U(y) + p. U(Z). 
Le revenu déclaré s'accroît lorsque Π et ρ s'élèvent, en revanche 
une élévation de Õ*peut induire une amplification, une stabilisation ou une 
réduction de la fraude fiscale, selon les contextes (*). 
(*) La plupart des modèles de fraude^fiscale reposent sur ce canevas ; le 
modèle de base étant celui de Michaël G. ALLINGRAM et Agnar SANDMO : 
"Income Tax Evasion : a Theoretical Analysis", Journal of Public Economics 
November 1972 
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La stratégie des particuliers qui emploient des travailleurs au noir 
est conditionnée indirectement par des aspects fiscaux. C'est l'économie de 
coût qui arrive en tête des motivations (et donc corrélativement l'élévation 
du revenu disponible pour d'autres affectations), mais cette réduction de 
coût n'est pas corrélée dans l'esprit des donneurs d'ouvrage avec des as-
pects fiscaux. Parce qu'il n'y a pas de TVA à payer, le particulier accep-
tera une prestation sans facture mais si, pour un coût identique, c'était 
la rémunération du travailleur qui était amputée au lieu que ce soit celle 
de l'Etat, la motivation financière du particulier resterait probablement 
inchangée. Cette hypothèse n'est pas seulement un cas d'école, n'est-ce 
pas en effet la norme pour l'emploi de travailleurs immigrés clandestins ? 
En résumé, et uniquement pour les relations au noir entre travailleurs 
réguliers et donneurs d'ouvrage personnes privées, la fiscalité est la mo-
tivation principale ni des uns, ni des autres. En revanche, elle est la 
condition permissive du travail au noir. Sans elle, le travailleur ne pour-
rait pas offrir ses services à un prix inférieur à celui d'un professionnel 
oeuvrant régulièrement et toujours sans elle, le particulier ne pourrait 
pas obtenir une prestation à un prix inférieur. A ce stade de l'analyse, la 
fiscalité est une condition suffisante mais elle n'est pas pour autant 
nécessaire. 
Si l'offreur de travail au noir est une entreprise au lieu d'être 
un particulier, la motivation de l'entrepreneur est toujours liée à la vie 
de son affaire. Le niveau des charges fiscales et sociales apparaît alors 
comme la cause des difficultés de l'entreprise et par le biais du travail 
au noir, l'entrepreneur espère en assurer la survie. Les artisans et petits 
patrons que nous avons interrogés dans le département du Var sont unanimes 
pour se plaindre de l'inquisition dont ils font l'objet de la part des 
administrations fiscales, des organismes sociaux et parfois même des enquê-
teurs de l'INSEE ! · 
Pour éviter de déposer patente, certains petits patrons recourent 
parallèlement à l'embauche au noir de personnel pour réduire leurs coûts de 
fonctionnement. Les personnes embauchées de cette manière sont soit des 
travailleurs secondaires, soit des personnes qui ont intérêt pour des rai-
sons diverses à dissimuler à l'administration le fait qu'elles^ travaillent. 
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Nous trouvons ici une population composée d'immigrés clandestins, de 
chômeurs indemnisés qui dépassent les quotas d'activités annexes autorisés, 
de retraités désireux d'accroître leurs ressources, de salariés officiels 
faisant des heures supplémentaires au noir, etc. La motivation du patron 
c'est la survie de son entreprise, celle des travailleurs au noir, c'est 
la nécessité de se cacher. La fiscalité, là encore, n'est'que la condition 
sine qua non d'acceptation par les uns et par les autres d'un "contrat" de 
travail au noir. 
Une partie de l'activité clandestine provient également des rigidités 
et des obstacles associés à la création d'entreprises. L'offreur de travail 
au noir dans ce cas n'est pas une firme installée qui a des problèmes de 
gestion, mais une firme potentielle qui est aux prises avec des problèmes 
d'implantation. On sait, en effet, que des entreprises travaillent "à l'essai' 
de façon informelle pour se régulariser spontanément au terme d'une période 
probatoire si les opportunités de croissance s'avèrent favorables, si les 
débouchés semblent assurés et si le besoin d'être officiellement immatri-
culé apparaît indispensable à la poursuite et à l'extension de l'activité. 
Dans cette analyse des motivations individuelles du travail au noir, 
une mention particulière doit être faite aux trafiquants de main d'oeuvre 
dont la finalité n'est que l'accumulation d'argent sale. Au moyen des mon-
tages ingénieux de sociétés écrans (institution des taxis) (*) entre des 
sociétés donneuses d'ouvrage et des ateliers clandestins, une division du 
travail de fraude s'opère au sein de réseaux dont les victimes sont multi-
ples : l'administration fiscale, les organismes de collecte de cotisations 
sociales et pour notre problématique les travailleurs clandestins. Ces 
derniers contraints de travailler au noir sous peine d'expulsion, sont 
(*) "Le taxi est un prête-nom dont la seule fonction est d'être inscrit au 
registre du commerce pour pouvoir établir, sur du papier commercial à 
en-tête, des factures de ventes fictives. Autrement dit, il dirige une 
entreprise de pure façade, chargée d'émettre des documents commerciaux 
correspondant à des opérations fictives passées avec des entreprises 
réelles et d'apparence irréprochable. 
Son nom lui vient des origines de la fraude de la TVA dans les années 
50. Emetteur de fausses factures, comportant la taxe à récupérer, il 
"fabrique" en quelque sorte de l^x taxe. Il est un "taxeur", terme devenu 
par déformation "taxi", 
cf : Jean-Claude MARTINEZ : La fraude fiscale, PUF, Paris, 1984, page 75. 
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d'autant plus exploités par les chefs d'ateliers clandestins qu'il n'y a 
comme limite à la baisse de leur rémunération que le salaire qui correspond 
à la reproduction de leur force du travail. Il faut préciser que les tra-
vailleurs immigrés clandestins n'ont pas d'autres solutions que d'accepter 
des salaires voisins du minimum vital et que les trafiquants de main d'oeuvre 
se livrent entre eux une concurrence implacable qui a des effets évidents 
sur les coûts de production. A titre d'exemple concret, un façonnier du 
XIIIo arrondissement de Paris propose les prix suivants à ses clients, 
confectionneurs du Sentier : 22 à 26 francs pour l'assemblage et le repassa-
ge d'un chemisier (35 minutes de travail), 30 à 32 francs pour une jupe 
(45 minutes de travail) et 50 à 55 francs pour un manteau (1h30 de travail) 
(*). Eu égard à la marge que le façonnier ne doit pas manquer de se garder, 
au coût des matières premières nécessaires et à l'amortissement du capital 
utilisé, fut-il sommaire, on imagine le salaire des travailleurs clandestins : 
entre 2500 et 3500 francs par mois ! 
Nous venons d'examiner plusieur pratiques différentes de travail au 
noir et donc des stratégies et des motivations adaptées à ces situations 
concrètes. 
Avant de mettre un terme à ces développements consacrés aux déter-
minants du travail au noir, il nous parait indispensable d'examiner l'opinion 
du public vis à vis d'un phénomène qu'il connaît par la force des choses 
assez bien car rares doivent être les individus qui n'ont pas une connais-
sance personnelle poussée en la matière. Une enquête réalisée en 1979 par 
la SOFRES montre que globalement seul 1/5° de la population réprouve le 
travail au noir. Il y a cependant des degrés dans l'approbation en fonction 
de la nature du travail au noir effectué et de la catégorie socio-profes-
sionnelle des personnes interrogées (**). 
attitude de réprobation 
attitude de tolérance 
attitude d'approbation 
sans opinion 
travail au noir 
en général 
22% 
46% 
17% 
15% 
petits travaux 
occasionnels 
20% 
30% 
31% 
19% 
(*) Source : Guy DELORME : Profession : travailleur au noir, édition Ouest-
France, 1986, page 107. 
(**) Les tableaux présentés ici sont tous extraits du sondage de la SOFRES, 
ils sont repris dans l'ouvrage de Rosine KLATZMANN : Le travail noir, 
PUF, Paris, 1982, pages 98 à 104. 
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En ventilant davantage les réponses, le travail au noir en général 
fait l'objet d'une réprobation beaucoup plus vive de la part des personnes 
dont l'activité officielle est directement concurrencée, par son existence : 
tel est le cas des petits commerçants et des artisans. 
taux de réprobation vis à vis 
Catégorie socio-professionnelle .... . . 
du travail au noir en general 
Petits commerçants et artisans 41% 
Agriculteurs 25% 
Cadres supérieurs 21 % 
Cadres moyens 21 % 
Ouvriers 20% 
Employés 18% 
Inactifs 23% 
Lorsque le questionnaire se fait plus précis et que les formes de 
travail au noir sont détaillées, les réponses du public deviennent plus 
sélectives (*). 
(*) Dans le tableau suivant, le critère de partition entre petits travaux 
occasionnels, petits travaux réguliers et gros travaux est celui de la 
rémunération mensuelle obtenue : de 800 francs â 1000 francs de 1979 
pour les premiers, autour de 2500 francs pour les seconds, et de plus de 
3000 francs pour les troisièmes. 
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Emploi de femmes de 
ménage 
Petits travaux occa-
sionnels effectués par 
- des retraités 
-des salariés du 
secteur privé 
—.des fonctionnaires 
- des chômeurs indem-
nisés 
Att itude 
reprobai 
: 
Petits travaux réguliers 
effectués par : 
17% 
17% 
22% 
21% 
20% 
de 
ίοη 
Att itude de 
tolérance 
38% 
26% 
33% 
29% 
31% 
At titude 
d'approbation 
27% 
39% 
26% 
32% 
29% 
Sans 
opinion 
18% 
18% 
19% 
18% 
20% 
- des retraités 
- des salariés du 
secteur privé 
- des fonctionnaires 
- des chômeurs indem-
nisés 
28% 
36% 
39% 
53% 
31% 
29% 
32% 
23% 
25% 
17% 
11% 
8% 
16% 
18% 
18% 
16% 
Gros travaux effectués 
par : 
- des retraités 
- des salariés du 
secteur privé 
- des fonctionnaires 
- des chômeurs indem-
nisés 
62% 
53% 
57% 
63% 
21% 
24% 
20% 
19% 
5% 
9% 
6% 
5% 
12% 
14% 
17% 
13% 
Emploi de salariés 
clandestins par des 
entreprises 
75% 13% 1% 11% 
Sans commenter les tableaux précédents qui sont par eux-mêmes expli-
cites, il est utile de remarquer que l'opinion sur le travail au noir en 
général est assez proche des opinions émises pour les petits travaux 
(réguliers ou occasionnels). Cela peut signifier que le réflexe du public 
lorsqu'on évoque le terme "travail au noir" est de l'assimiler spontanément 
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à ses formes les plus bénignes. Ce n'est qu'en lui montrant les divers as-
pects du phénomène que son opinion se précise et que la variance de ses 
attitudes s'élargit. 
Le travail au noir ayant été mesuré, ses formes spécifiées et ses 
causes appréhendées, il convient de prolonger notre investigation dans une 
autre direction, qui est la suite logique des précédentes, celle des poli-
tiques macroéconomiques prises ou à prendre pour le maîtriser, le favoriser 
ou le réprimer. On montrera qu'à cette question importante, il n'y a pas de 
réponses manichéennes. 
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III - CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS ET EVALUATION 
L'attitude des pouvoirs publics vis à vis du travail au noir nous 
semble animée par une double perspective : une adaptation continuelle de la 
législation et une recherche permanente d'informations. Une pléiade de textes 
tissent une toile de plus en plus serrée autour du travail clandestin (*), 
et un nombre conséquent de rapports ont été présentés aux Présidents de la 
République successifs ainsi qu'à divers ministres ayant en charge les pro-
blèmes d'emploi. 
Immédiatement après les accords Matignon signés le 7 juin 1936 et 
qui instaurent les congés payés, au premier texte de loi du 20 juin 1936 
complété par les décrets du 1er août 1936 et du 26 septembre 1936 interdit 
l'exécution de travaux rétribués pendant la période des congés payés. 
Au début de la guerre, la loi du 11 octobre 1940 sur le cumul d'emplois 
précise dans son article premier que "nul ne peut exercer pour son propre 
compte une profession industrielle, commerciale ou artisanale s'il n'est 
inscrit soit au registre du commerce, soit au registre des métiers et s'il 
se soustrait aux charges sociales et fiscales imposées à cette profession". 
Après la guerre, Antoine ANTONI présente un rapport au nom du Conseil 
Economique en 1950 sur "la lutte contre le travail clandestin" où l'auteur 
souligne "l'extension inquiétante prise par le marché clandestin de la 
main d'oeuvre". 
Finalement, sous la pression des organisations professionnelles qui 
avancent périodiquement l'argument de la concurrence déloyale (**), paraît 
le 11 juillet 1972 la loi relative au travail clandestin. Cette loi, 
aujourd'hui modifiée, est le premier grand texte de référence aussi bien 
pour la France que pour de nombreux pays (Belgique,, Luxembourg, Sénégal, etc.) 
qui s'en sont inspirés pour leur propre législation. 
(*) Le vocabulaire juridique . français connaît l'expression "travail 
clandestin" et ignore l'expression "travail..au noir". Il y a une activité 
non occasionnelle dans le premier cas, rien n'est stipulé quant à la 
fréquence de l'activité dans le second. En toute logique, le travail clan-
destin est un sous-ensemble du travail au noir. 
(**)Par exemple, les rapports VRINAT (avril 1950), et LAMY (avril 1972) de la 
Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Paris, qui dénoncent les insuffi-
sances de la loi du 11 octobre 1940. 
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Pour la loi du 11 juillet 1972, "est réputé clandestin, sauf s'il est 
occasionnel, l'exercice à titre lucratif d'une activité de production, de 
trans"formation, de réparation ou de prestation de services assujettissant 
à l'immatriculation, au répertoire des métiers et/ou au registre du commerce, 
ou consistant en actes de commerce, accomplis par une personne non immatri-
culée au répertoire des métiers et/ou au registre du commerce et n'ayant pas 
satisfait aux obligations fiscales et sociales inhérentes à ladite activité". 
Ce texte, dès sa parution, n'a pas entièrement satisfait les organi-
sations professionnelles qui ont poursuivi leur politique de harcèlement des 
pouvoirs publics pour que soit accentuée la politique de répression. A titre 
d'exemple, la Confédération de l'Artisanat et des petites entreprises du 
Bâtiment (CAPEB) (*), la Fédération Nationale du Bâtiment (**) , la Chambre 
de Commerce et d'Industrie de Paris (.**), ont publié de nombreuses études 
pour dénoncer l'insuffisance des sanctions ou pour réclamer l'extension du 
texte de 1972. 
L'opiniâtreté de ces groupes qui figurent par la force des choses en 
première ligne du combat contre le travail clandestin a conduit à la publi-
cation de plusieurs textes : 
- en 1979, obligation est faite aux entreprises en bâtiment d'afficher 
leur nom sur la voie publique ; 
- en 1985, la loi du 3 janvier stipule une présomption de rémunération 
pour les activités réalisées avec recours à la publicité, dont l'importance 
ou la fréquence est établie ou qui sont effectuées avec un matériel ou un 
outillage pouvant être qualifié de professionnel ; 
- la loi du 25 juillet 1985 rend passible du tribunal correctionnel 
les infractions ; 
- le décret du 14 mars 1986 et la circulaire du 19 septembre 1986 
créent des commissions départementales de lutte contre le travail clandestin, 
l'emploi non déclaré et les trafics de main d'oeuvre ; 
(*) CAPEB : Poursuite de la lutte contre le travail au noir après l'entrée 
en vigueur de la loi du 11 juillet 1972, doc ED -7Z-04-A, Paris, 1973. 
(**) METTON : Rapport sur les moyens à mettre en oeuvre pour lutter contre 
le travail clandestin, Fédération Nationale du Bâtiment, Paris, février 
1979. 
(***) "Le problème du travail clandestin"(10 février 1977) et "le travail au 
noir" (14 février 1980) : rapports présentés par Michel BOUNIOL à la 
Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Paris. 
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- enfin, la loi du 27 janvier 1987 portant diverses mesures d'ordre 
social a redéfini le travail clandestin et élargi son champs d'application. 
Désormais, "est réputé clandestin l'exercice à but lucratif d'une 
activité de production, de transformation, de réparation ou de prestation 
de service ou l'accomplissement d'actes de commerce par toute personne phy-
sique ou morale qui s'est soustraite intentionnellement à l'une quelconque 
des obligations suivantes : 
1°/ Requérir son immatriculation au répertoire des métiers ou au 
registre du commerce et des sociétés, lorsque celle-ci est obligatoire ; 
2°/ Procéder aux déclarations exigées par les organisations de pro-
tection sociale et par l'administration fiscale ; 
- 3°/ En cas d'emploi de salariés, effectuer au moins l'une des 
formalités prévues aux articles L.143-3, L.143-5, L.620-1 et L.620—3 du 
présent code (*). 
Il en est de même de la poursuite d'une des activités mentionnées 
au premier article après refus d'immatriculation au répertoire des métiers 
ou au registre du commerce et des sociétés, ou postérieurement à une 
radiation". 
Notons, pour terminer sur ce point, que la circulaire interministé-.. 
rielle du 8 octobre 1987 dont l'objet est de préciser les modalités d'appli-
cation de la loi du 27 janvier 1987 est co-signée, chose peu habituelle, 
et indice de solennité et de détermination, par huit ministres. Dans un 
communiqué du ministère des Affaires Sociales et de l'Emploi, on peut lire 
que la circulaire "illustre la ferme résolution du gouvernement à lutter 
contre le travail clandestin et marque en même temps l'aboutissement d'un 
processus visant à rendre la lutte plus efficace"... en attendant la pro-
chaine étape ! ! 
En résumé, l'histoire de la législation sur le travail clandestin est 
celle d'un élargissement de son champ d'application et d'un renforcement 
(*) Il s'agit du Code du Travail. L'article L. 143-3 concerne la remise du 
bulletin de paie par un employeur à chacun de ses salariés. L'article 
L.143-5, concerne la tenue de livre de paie. L'article L. 620-1 est relatif 
à la déclaration préalable d'emploi de salariés et l'article L.620-3 a 
trait à la tenue par les employeurs d'un registre du personnel. 
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des sanctions. Concrètement, le dispositif juridique est bien en place, mais 
la difficulté relevée par tous les professionnels concernés est celle de la 
découverte des situations de travail clandestin. Même si le nombre de 
poursuites et celui des condamnations est en perpétuelle augmentation, les 
cas d'infractions suivies de sanctions restent très modestes. 
Parallèlement à cet ensemble de textes dont l'objet est le travail 
clandestin, une autre série de dispositions réglemente l'emploi irrégulier 
de travailleurs étrangers. Le texte de base en la matière est la loi du 
17 octobre 1981, loi promulgée deux mois après la circulaire du 11 août 1981, 
mettant en place la procédure de régularisation des étrangers employés irré-
gulièrement en France. Pour l'année 1985, 3608 infractions ont été relevées, 
dont 1536 concernent directement l'emploi de travailleurs immigrés clan-
destins et 2072 le favorisent indirectement. (*). En ventilant les infractions 
par secteurs d'activité, par nationalité et par zones géographiques, on re-
trouve à quelques détails près les résultats exposés ci-dessus à propos de 
la régularisation de 1981. 
Si l'on ajoute à ces deux principales catégories de textes (travail 
clandestin et emploi d'étrangers en situation irrégulière) un vaste ensemble 
de dispositions visant aussi bien les cumuls entre pensions de retraite et 
revenus d'activité (loi du 30 mars 1982) que les obligations fiscales des 
(*) Concernent directement l'emploi d'immigrés clandestins, les infractions 
aux articles suivants du Code du Travail : L.341-6 sur l'emploi d'étran-
gers démunis de titre de travail ; L.341-9 sur le monopole de l'Office. 
National d'Immigration en matière de recrutement de travailleurs étrangers 
hors du territoire ; L.341-7 sur l'interdiction faite aux employeurs de 
faire rembourser par leurs salariés étrangers la redevance de l'Office 
National d'Immigration et L.Z24-9 et suivants sur l'interdiction du 
travail clandestin (quand il s'agit de travailleur étrangers). 
Concernent indirectement l'emploi d'immigrés clandestins, les infractions, 
1/ aux articles suivants du Code du Travail : L.364-2 sur la fraude ou 
la fausse déclaration en vue d'obtenir ou de faire obtenir à un étranger 
un titre de travail ; R-341-8 sur l'obligation pour un employeur de 
porter sur un registre spécifique les noms de ses salariés étrangers. 
2/ â l'article 21 de l'ordonnace du 2 novembre 1945 visant l'aide â 
l'entrée et au séjour irrégulier des étrangers. 
2/ à la loi du 27 juin 1973 sur l'hébergement collectif. 
4/ aux articles du Code Pénal réprimant les faux et usages de faux qui 
concernent les titres. 
Source : Mission de liaison interministérielle pour la lutte contre les 
trafics de main d'oeuvre : La lutte contre les trafics de main d'oeuvre 
en 1985-1986 : objectif prioritaire, le travail clandestin, La Documen-
tation Française, Paris, 1987, pages 53 à 7Z. 
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entreprises (nombreux articles du Code Général des Impôts), force est de 
constater que la France a pris très au sérieux dans les années récentes, la 
lutte contre le travail au noir. 
Bien qu'il soit outrancier d'écrire que la législation et la gestion 
macro-économique du marché du travail, sont des domaines séparés, nous 
pensons que les progrès accomplis en matière juridique sont plus manifestes 
que ceux qui ont été effectués en matière de politique d'emploi. La fragmen-
tation du marché du travail en emplois salariés à plein temps, emplois 
précaires, emplois temporaires, petits boulots, stages de formation, emplois 
intérimaires, emplois à temps partiels, etc., favorise d'autant moins .une 
politique globale d'ajustement que la frontière est floue entre travail au 
noir et chacune de ces formes d'emploi. 
Si l'instauration de ces diverses formes d'emplois est inspirée par 
la nécessité de gérer les conséquences sociales d'une économie en mutation, 
le risque est grand de promouvoir à travers elles . une sorte de trans-
formation du travail au noir en travail légal. 
Pour prendre un exemple extrême, considérons le cas des Associations 
Intermédiaires qui ont été instituée en janvier 1987 pour lutter simultané-
ment contre les formes les plus aiguës de chômage et contre le travail au 
noir. Où dresser la ligne de partage entre une activité qui serait concurren-
tielle du marché (travail au noir officialisé) et une activité qui ne le 
serait pas (aide aux chômeurs en leur fournissant une activité) ? Comment 
garantir que certaines associations ne se transforment pas, plus ou moins 
consciemment en organismes de prêt de main d'oeuvre sous couvert d'action 
sociale ou caritative ? 
Dans un article sur la flexibilité du travail et les limites de la 
flexibilisation, dont le titre à lui seul résume l'enjeu du sujet, BARTOLI 
note avec justesse que "le vrai problème est de trouver un point d'équilibre 
entre la protection nécessaire des droits des travailleurs salariés et la 
non moins nécessaire flexibilité de l'économie nationale et des entreprises, 
c'est une solution politique qu'il s'agit de lui donner dans le cadre d'un 
système polycentrique où les pouvoirs sont partagés et les oligopoles 
sociaux s'ajoutent aux oligopoles économiques. La recherche par notre société 
d'une plus grande rationalité exige l'adoption d'un projet qui soit l'exprès-
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sion d'un véritable choix collectif servi par une politique rénovée dans 
ses techniques et dans ses fins. En son absence, les solutions qu'il 
convient d'apporter à la crise deviennent indéterminées, et la flexibili-
sation génératrice de plus de conflits ouverts ou larvés que d'expansion 
économique et de paix sociale" (*) 
Une politique macro-économique destinée à "traiter" le problème du 
travail au noir nous parait devoir s'inspirer du "code de conduite" proposé 
par BARTOLI. Ce n'est pas par un saupoudrage de mesures ponctuelles, 
fussent-elles ingénieuses à court terme, que le travail au noir sera éliminé, 
légalisé ou même réduit. 
Il convient de tempérer ce jugement peut-être trop hâtif en remar-
quant que les décideurs ont cherché à s'informer dans les années récentes. 
Un indicateur de cette recherche peut être trouvé dans le nombre de rapports 
commandés par les autorités à des universitaires, des professionnels ou à 
des hauts fonctionnaires (**). 
Le point commun à ces divers rapports est qu'ils mélangent économie 
souterraine et travail au noir d'une part et qu'ils proposent des mesures 
concrètes pour lutter contre le travail clandestin d'autre part. Ces mesures 
vont de la délation pure et simple à des-formes plus sophistiquées de 
répression en passant par la création d'un statut de travailleur occasionnel. 
Nous ne pensons pas que ces propositions soient susceptibles d'éclairer 
utilement les décideurs, car elles relèvent trop du domaine de l'anecdote, 
car elles accordent aux déterminants fiscaux une place à notre sens démesurée 
et car elles ne sont pas adaptées à un phénomène par essence polymorphe. 
Il y a un travail au noir à réprimer, un travail au noir à com-
prendre et un travail au noir à protéger. 
(*) Henri BARTOLI : "La flexibilité du travail et les limites de la flexibi-
lisation", Communication présentée au Congrès International des Economis-
tes de Langue Française, Nantes, mai-juin 1986, page 22. 
(**) Robert DEL0R0Z0Y : Le travail clandestin, rapport au Président de la 
République, Paris, avril 1980. 
Jean FAU : Le travail illégal, rapport remis à Lionel STOLERU, Secrétaire 
d'Etat auprès de Jean MATTEOLI, Ministre du Travail et de la Participa-
tion, Paris, novembre 1980. 
Jean-Jacques DUPEYROUX : Notes sur les activités professionnelles occultes 
Paris, janvier 1983. 
Maurice RAGOT : Le travail clandestin, avis adopté par le Conseil Econo-
mique et Social, Paris, janvier 1983. 
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Le travail au noir systématique, qui repose sur l'exploitation d'une 
partie de la population par une autre, doit être réprimé avec la plus grande 
sévérité. Tel est le cas des ateliers clandestins, des trafics de main-
d'oeuvre, des emplois de mineurs, des personnes qui pretendent vivre dans 
la société et qui refusent d'en assumer les charges. C'est du travail au 
noir organisé à grande échelle et exercé avec préméditation par des employeurs 
souvent eux-mêmes anciens travailleurs clandestins. 
Le travail au noir effectué en franc-tireur de manière plus ou moins 
occasionnelle chez des particuliers ou à la limite en entreprises est une for-
me innaceptable d'activité mais qui a le mérite d'apporter un message. 
"Pour gagner de l'argent", "pour anticiper sur une faillite" côté 
offreurs, "pour payer moins cher", "pour rendre service à une personne en 
difficulté" côté demandeurs, les causes de ces activités au noir individuelles 
prennent leurs racines dans la vie quotidienne et la population n'y est pas 
franchement hostile lorsqu'elles sont pratiquées dans des limites raisonnables 
Certes, des professions en sont directement les victimes mais en sens 
inverse les revenus obtenus par les travailleurs au noir sont le plus souvent 
dépensés et par là même, ils réintègrent les circuits officiels. 
Les débats actuels sur les effets respectifs de la réglementation et 
de la déréglementation sont au coeur de cette problématique. A titre d'exemple 
l'URSSAF (Union Régionale de Sécurité Sociale et d'Allocation Familiale) et 
les CPAM (Caisses Primaires d'Assurance Maladie) ont remarqué que depuis 
quelques années, un nombre croissant d'entreprises, notamment dans les 
secteurs du bâtiment et du travail à domicile, font le choix de remplacer 
le contrat de travail qui les liaient à leurs salariés par des relations de 
nature non salariée (*). N'est-ce-pas la traduction profonde d'un malaise 
des petites entreprises face à des règles trop strictes ? 
La difficulté qui explique à n'en pas douter les atermoiements des 
politiques d'emploi est d'isoler ce qui relève de la conjoncture de crise 
et ce qui appartient à des tendances plus structurelles de nos sociétés. 
(*) Pierre MARIONI : "Les petits boulots", in Colloque Européen sur le travail 
non salarié, tome V, Commissariat Général du Plan et Commission des Com-
munautés Européennes, Paris, novembre 1987, page 243. 
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Un relèvement des bas salaires est-il susceptible de réduire le 
travail au noir de ceux qui s'y adonnent pour gagner de l'argent ? Une 
adaptation de la fiscalité pour les entreprises en difficulté est-elle 
une bonne mesure pour modérer le travail au noir des petits entrepreneurs ? 
La réponse à ces questions n'est pas simple car on est au confluent 
de deux phénomènes : la crise de l'emploi et l'apparition de nouvelles formes 
d'emploi. Il y a crise de l'emploi et donc chômage et petits boulots mais 
il y a simultanément création de nouveaux emplois dans les loisirs, dans 
les services, dans le tiers-secteur, dans les nouvelles technologies, dans 
la préservation de l'environnement, etc. Le travail au noir dans cette logique 
serait l'une des manifestations de l'apprentissage des mutations structurelles 
de la société en période de choc conjoncturel. 
le troisième type de travail au noir n'a rien de reprehensible, c'est 
une manifestation traditionnelle de l'entraide, de la solidarité et de la 
convivialité qu'il importe d'autant moins de réglementer qu'il traduit un 
art de vivre dans des espaces économiques limités. Relevant davantage de la 
culture que de la volonté de dissimulation, il est par ailleurs complètement 
insensible à toute forme de politique économique. 
Proposer des directions de recherche plus précises n'est pas chose 
aisée dans un contexte où les statistiques sont imparfaites, les motivations 
différentes d'un participant à l'autre, les implications sociales mal maî-
trisées et les aspects du phénomène nombreux et contradictoires. D'un côté, 
le travail au noir met en scène des acteurs peu scrupuleux qui profitent 
de la faiblesse ou de la naïveté d'autrui, d'un autre côté il révèle des 
volontés de changement dans les rapports entre individus et entre les 
citoyens et l'Etat. Si des efforts continuent à être entrepris pour combattre 
ses effets négatifs autant que pour répondre aux aspirations légitimes qu'il 
révèle, le travail au noir pourra disparaître, un jour, son rôle historique 
accompli. Les interrogations contemporaines légitimes qu'il suscite font 
cependant penser que le sujet restera encore d'actualité pendant quelques 
années, car la nature humaine est complexe, les problèmes sociaux com-
pliqués et l'imagination des fraudeurs florissante. 
* * * 
* * 
* 
ΑίΠΓΕΧΕ 
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUE A LA POPULATION 
BS 1982, INCITANT LES TRAVAILLEURS 
CLANDESTINS A DEMANDER LA 
REGULA RI SATI OIT DE LEUR SITUATION 
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DOCUMENT RECTO 
MINISTÈRE DE LA SOLIDARITÉ NATIONALE 
SECRÉTARIAT D'ÉTAT CHARGÉ DES IMMIGRÉS 
FAUX P A P I E R S 
vous êtes étranger 
et vous êtes en possession de faux papiers 
jusqu'au 31 décembre 1981 
vous pouvez demander une Prolongation jusqu'au 15 Jan. 
régularisation exceptionnelle 
de votre situation 
à la condition expresse 
de remettre vos faux papiers 
et si vous pouvez prouver votre 
entrée en France avant le 1 e r janvier 1981 
vous devez alors vous présenter 
au guichet unique 
Ι Λ Λ I ■» " . . . I BILGI AOU rE NYININKAU I K I C n D Μ Ρ " 7 _ \ / Γ Μ I Q TRAZITE INFORME NGÊNE LATHTE 
■J EDININIZ KÉFÄAMAWFE U M r u n i V I C t V U U O OBAVESTENJE! ­SE BOU BAKH 
INTER­MIG RANTS 
France­Inter 
SÍ (1)306.13.13 
MARSEILLE 
•a­(91) 95.90.15 
LYON 
(7)854.62.55 
TOURCOING 
s (20) 76.34.69 
RÉDACTION. PUBLICATION. DIFFUSION I C E I INFORMATION. CULTURE ET IMMIGRATION 
43 BIS. R_UE DES.ENTREPRENEURS­ 75015 PARIS 
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DOCUMENT VERSO 
MINISTÈRE DE LA SOLIDARITÉ NATIONALE 
SECRÉTARIAT D'ÉTAT CHARGÉ DES IMMIGRES 
ARASE PORTUGAIS 
(^ Γι-%1 C u l 
5 j j > '^UJ1 J ^ ­ ^J 
1981 j.mM.jj 31 JI^J ¿vi s¿v 
(­­>Γι"Γ<ι n i o lio a­i J Í " I 
i'U ι <-»j niin") | i J 
oLL I « ι t-l" I Il"l , ' t l u' ¿ U ' J 
1981 <UÌùLa. J j l J ^ UuJ^i J l C¿Li.J 
j j ­ Ã a J I ι'Ij If i dJJ Ja.1 ¿ ^ 
BAMBARA 
aou ye dounan ye 
sèbèn lankolonw de bè aou bolo 
fo ka taa se 1981 kaio laban tilé 31 ma 
aou bi se k'a nyini faransi sariya fé 
a k'aou ka sigui sanuya faransi kònò 
a waadjibilaya aou ma o la sa 
aou ka aou ka sèbèn lankolonw bè di sariya ma 
o kà n'aou bi se ka a djira 
k'aou donna faransi sani 1981 ka damine 
a ka kan dou ka se buró la 
min tókó ye guiché unik 
no dayèlèten bè aou tòkòla 
Você é estrangeiro 
e possui documentos falsos 
até 31 de dezembro de 1981 
pode pedir uma 
regularização excepcional 
da sua situação. 
com a condição expressa 
de devolver os documentos falsos 
e de poder provar a sua 
entrada em França antes de 1 ° de janeiro de 1S 
deve entaõ apresentar­se no 
guichet unique 
OUOLOF 
dokhandeme n'gène 
yene dokhandeme yi yor queyite you bakhoule \ 
mane ngène fi beu verou decembour 
ame faniver fane ak bene 1981 
topoto sene m'biroum quéylte 
si koy n'gène délo sène queyite you bakhouley 
si koy tamite mane n'gène vone ney yenangui 
vone si bir reou 
France bala 1 ° sanvié di diote 
légui li lene war moy n'gène déme 
si bireau bi n'ga khame ne yene laflnekal 
TURC .SERBO­CROATE 
sahte kâgirtlar 
siz bir yabancisiniz 
ve fransrz kanunlanna göre 
sahte kâgirt tasimaktasiniz 
girdiginizi ispatliyarak iste'me hakkiniz vardir 
«guichet unique» e bas vurmaniz sarttir 
ve fransaya 1 ocak 1981 tarihinden evvel 
31 aralik 1981 tarihine kadar . 
durumunuzun mustesna olarak diizenli olmasini 
sahte kâgirtlarinizi kesin olarak iade ederek 
stranim gradanima 
koji poseduju laine isprave 
pruza se jedinstvena prilika 
da iste usklade sa zakonom 
do 3 1 . dec. 1981 
' izriCiti uslov za to, jeda 
predate laine isprave 
i da dokazete da ste 
doSli u francuskupre I"9 jan. 81 
u tom slucaju morate se obratiti 
na ¿alter specialno predviden za to 
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R E 5 U M E 
Ce travail, a été divisé en trois parties consacrées respectivement au 
volume, à la nature et à l'évaluation du travail, au noir tant en Belgique qu'au 
Luxembourg. Vans la première partile, sont exposées et analysées les principales 
estimations macroéconomiques de l'ampleur de l'économie souterraine et dz ses 
composante majeures la {¡raude {¡¿scale d'une part, le travail au noir d'autre 
part. Pour dépasAer ceA approches parement quantitatives, le deuxième partie 
a pour objet d'apprécier de {¡açon plus détaillée les caractéristiques structu-
relles du travail au noir. Sont alnAl brossés tour à tour les portraits-robots 
des travailleurs au noir et des donneurs d'ouvrage [leur sexe, leur âge, leur 
procession, leur niveau de revenu et leurs motivations). L'étude Ae termine 
par une évaluation Ayntkétlque du travail au noir dans lei deux pays sous examen. 
Les législations belge et luxembourgeoise relatives au travail clan-
destin sont ainsi pasAées en revue et une attention particulière est portée sur 
le système {¡IACOI qui joue, notamment en Belgique, un râle explicatif ZAAentlet 
dans la décision dz Ae poAter o{¡{¡reur de travail au noir. 
* * * * 
* * * 
* * 
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La connaissance de l'économie souterraine d'un pays passe par un 
ensemble d'approches complémentaires. Les unes, plus macroéconomiques d'ins-
piration situent l'ampleur du phénomène, les autres, plus microéconoiaiques 
d'esprit ou plus directes dans leur façon d'aborder les problèmes mettent 
en évidence les comportements des participants aux activités cachées ou 
des personnes qui en sont encore au stade de participants potentiels. 
Les approches macroéconomiques peuvent être classées en deux groupes. 
Il y a en effet des techniques adaptées à l'estimation de l'ampleur de 
l'économie souterraine et des méthodes davantage orientées vers l'évaluation 
de chacune de ses composantes. Dans le premier cas, les résultats sont 
généralement exprimés en pourcentage du PIB ou du PNB officiel ; dans le 
second, une liste d'activités souterraines peut être dressée : fraude fis-
cale, travail au noir, contrefaçon, corruption, etc. et pour chacune des 
rubriques une quantification est proposée, fût-ce avec une marge d'erreur 
compte tenu des difficultés inhérentes à la nature du sujet. 
Les approches microéconomiques ont le plus souvent comme support 
des enquêtes auprès d'acteurs de telle ou telle branche de l'économie souter-
raine. L'avantage de ces études locales et ponctuelles est de mieux cerner 
le vécu des travailleurs au noir, des donneurs d'ouvrage au noir, des 
"spécialistes" de la fraude fiscale, etc. leur inconvénient est la rançon 
de leur précision : si. des travailleurs au noir agissent de telle ou telle 
façon dans une commune ou un canton, rien ne permet de dire qu'il en est 
de même dans les communes voisines ou les cantons voisins. 
Dans le cas de la Belgique, les mérites respectifs des approches 
macroéconomiques et microéconomiques ont pu être rassemblés dans une analyse 
directe à échantillon national. L'importance du travail au noir peut ainsi 
être appréhendée tant en termes quantitatifs que qualitatifs. Dans le cas 
du Luxembourg, les travaux disponibles sont encore peu nombreux, même si 
en les compulsant, le travail au noir n'apparaît pas comme un problème 
accessoire. 
Ces précisions relatives aux champs d'analyse des diverses études 
étant rappelées, des estimations du volume (§1) et de la nature du travail 
au noir (§2) peuvent être tour à tour proposées. Une évaluation d'ensemble 
servira ensuite de conclusion à ce travail (§3). 
§1 LE VOLUME DU TRAVAIL AU NOIR 
Ce qui fait l'originalité de la Belgique dans la littérature sur 
l'économie souterraine, c'est l'importance des travaux relatifs à la fraude 
fiscale. Cet aspect de l'économie cachée n'étant pas l'objet principal de 
ce travail, nous prenons la liberté de n'en présenter que les conclusions 
les plus significatives : fraude fiscale et travail au noir étant en parfaite 
symbiose dans certains contextes, il va de soi qu'une analyse de la fiscalité 
sera développée dans le texte chaque fois que le besoin s'en fera sentir. 
Le chiffre d'affaire de l'économie souterraine belge a fait l'objet 
de trois études successives. Les deux premières sont des adaptations de la 
méthode de TANZI qui, rappelons­le, repose sur l'estimation économétrique 
d'une expression du type : 
C «. 
où — est le rapport des billets sur un agrégat monétaire (les dépôts (D), 
les disponibilités monétaires (M.) ou la masse monétaire (M_) selon les 
variantes), Τ une variable fiscale et Ζ toutes les autres variables expli­
Q catives de ττ. M 
L'économie souterraine est mesurée de la façon suivante : 
• ­_ (ctZ + 6T ) soit C* ­ e v t t' 
où C* est la valeur estimée des billets pour l'année t, a un vecteur et 
6 un coefficient. 
. _0 (oZ_ + ßTj soit C° = e t 
où C° est la valeur calculée des billets pour l'année t, dans l'hypothèse 
où la variable fiscale T reste au niveau le plus faible enregistré sur la 
période d'estimation (c'est­à­dire T 0), les autres variables explicatives 
conservant leurs valeurs observées Ζ . 
Il suffit alors de multiplier (C* ­ C°) par la vitesse de circulation 
de la monnaie pour obtenir une estimation de l'économie souterraine (*) . 
Dans la première étude, celle de MONT (**),. deux séries de résultats 
sont proposées. Dans la première, la variable fiscale ne se compose que 
des impôts ; dans la seconde, les cotisations sociales viennent s'ajouter 
et la variable fiscale se transforme en taux de prélèvements obligatoires. 
(*) Il est facile de critiquer la méthode de TANZI, (comme d'autres méthodes 
monétaires), car les résultats dépendent de la vitesse de circulation de 
la monnaie choisie. Dans la sphère occulte de l'économie, on peut soutenir 
avec autant d'arguments qu'elle est supérieure à la vitesse de l'économie 
officielle (on se dépêche de dépenser l'argent eale), qu'elle lui est 
inférieure (on dépense plue lentement l'argent sale, pour éviter de se 
faire repérer), ou qu'elle est identique (hypothèse la plus répandue). 
Selon les options choisies, les estimations de l'économie souterraine 
varient dan3 des proportions importantes. 
Cf : Jan Tore KLOVLAND : "Tax Evasion and the Demand of Currency in 
Norway and Sweden : Is there a Ridden Relationship ?", Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, Vol 66, n°4, 1984, page 436. 
(**) José MONT : "De zwarte activiteiten in België : oorzaken, Omvang en 
implicaties", Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, Vol 27, n°3, 1982, 
pages 259 à 273 
Pour les années 1966 à 1980, les estimations sont les suivantes 
ECONOMIE SOUTERRAINE EN % DU PNB 
(variable taux d'imposition) 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
8,5% 
8,7% 
8,7% 
8,9% 
8,8% 
8,9% 
8,9% 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
8,9% 
9,0% 
9,5% 
10,0% 
10,2% 
11,3% 
11,8% 
11,6% 
ECONOMIE SOUTERRAINE EN % DU PNB 
(variable taux de prélèvements obligatoires) 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
11,1% 
11,2% 
11,3% 
11,5% 
11,5% 
11,9% 
12,0% 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
12,3% 
12,3% 
13,2% 
13,8% 
14,9% 
15,4% 
15,5% 
15,2% 
MONT s'est ensuite livré à plusieurs exercices destinés à mesurer 
par exemple les conséquences de l'économie souterraine sur le taux d'infla-
tion et sur létaux de chômage. 
En ce qui concerne le taux de chômage, on observe que sa valeur 
officielle est systématiquement supérieure à sa valeur "réelle". Pour 1980, 
par exemple, le taux de chômage officiel est de 11,8%, alors que le taux 
de chômage calculé s'élève à 8,7% de la population active (*). 
Dans la deuxième étude, celle de GEEROMS (**), deux séries d'esti-
mation sont également proposées. Dans l'une, la variable fiscale retenue 
est une pression fiscale marginale, dans l'autre, c'est un taux moyen 
qui est choisi. Les résultats obtenus avec le taux moyen sont systématiquement 
inférieurs à ceux obtenus avec le taux marginal, mais l'écart entre les 
deux estimations de l'économie souterraine se réduit d'année en année. 
(*) Le mode de calcul du taux de chômage "réel" est le résultat d'hypothèses 
de travail assez fortes. MONT multiplie le nombre officiel de chômeurs 
par (1- la part de l'économie souterraine dans le PNB) et la population 
active par (1+ la part de l'économie souterraine dans le PNB). Ce calcul 
suppose une stabilité de la productivité apparente du travail, quelle 
que soit la sphère de l'économie. Cette hypothèse est l'une des plus 
délicates à soutenir. 
(**) Hans GEEROMS : "De ondergrondse economie in België", Tijdschrift voor 
Economie en Management, Vol. 28, n°l, 1983, pages 77 à 91. 
ECONOMIE SOUTERRAINE EN % DU PNB 
Avec un taux marginal Avec un taux moyen 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
17,0% 
18,4% 
19,3% 
19,4% 
20,8% 
20,7% 
20,8% 
21,1% 
20,8% 
20,4% 
20,8% 
13,5% 
14,5% 
15,8% 
16,7% 
17,4% 
17,4% 
19,2% 
19,5% 
19,9% 
20,0% 
19,4% 
La troisième étude repose sur une version modifiée et élargie de 
la méthode de TANZI (*). Au lieu de retenir comme seules variables expli-
C 
catives du rapport :r les variables traditionnelles dans l'analyse économé-
trique de la demande de monnaie d'une part, et la variable fiscale propre 
à la méthode d'autre part, les auteurs ont voulu ajouter des variables sup-
plémentaires destinées à capter les autres déterminants de l'économie souter-
raine . 
Pour ce faire, cinq variables nouvelles ont été intégrées : le taux 
de prélèvement obligatoire (X.), la durée du travail (X_), le taux de 
chômage (X_), le nombre de travailleurs indépendants (X,) et la part des 
actifs oeuvrant dans, le secteur du bâtiment (X-). Si la relation entre 
(*) Hans GEEROMS et José MONT : "Evaluation de l'importance de l'économie 
souterraine en Belgique : application de la méthode monétaire", in Victor 
GINSBURGH et Pierre PESTIEAU eds, L'économie informelle, éditions Labor, 
Bruxelles, 1987, pages 131 à 150. 
certaines de ces variables et la part de l'économie souterraine dans le PIB 
est connue, pour d'autres la durée du travail et le taux de chômage en par­
ticulier, on ignore a priori si la relation est positive, négative ou nulle. 
Les variables traditionnelles étant le revenu permanent Y et le 
C P 
rapport billet sur dépôt de la période précédente (fr)..., l'expression 
testée est la suivante (*) : 
(§) = a0 + alXl + a2X2 ♦ a3X3 + ^ + a5X5 + a,Y_ + ._(§>__, 
Pour l'année 1985, l'économie souterraine s'élève à 17,5% du PNB, une 
estimation dont l'ordre de grandeur est comparable à celli des études anté­
rieures . 
En examinant plus soigneusement les conclusions de l'étude économé­
trique, plusieurs relations fonctionnelles méritent un développement complé­
mentaire . 
­ Pour la variable X., un accroissement de la pression fiscale et 
sociale favorise les activités souterraines ; 
­ Pour la variable X_, la réduction de la durée du travail a un impact 
négatif sur le développement de l'économie cachée. L'élément déterminant 
n'est pas comme on aurait pu le penser que l'accroissement du temps libre 
génère une hausse des activités souterraines. Un effet d'aviation se met au 
contraire en place, les travaux effectués pour compte propre remplaçant les 
travaux donnés en ouvrage à des travailleurs au noir ; 
­ Pour la variable X­, l'accroissement du taux de chômage ne contribue 
pas à l'expansion de l'économie souterraine. Même si l'on ne peut pas sou­
tenir la position inverse car les coefficients ne sont pas vraiment signi­
ficatifs, on retrouve ici l'idée selon laquelle les chômeurs ne sont pas 
les personnes les plus favorisées pour obtenir grâce à leur travail au noir 
des ressources significatives ; 
­ Pour la variable X,, une hausse du nombre de travailleurs indépen­
dants génère une hausse de l'économie souterraine. On retrouve ici le clivage 
(*) Pour que l'estimation ait une signification économétrique, compte tenu 
du nombre de variables (l'estimation porte sur les années 1961 â 1984), 
des données trimestrielles ont été utilisées dans la régression. 
habituel entre salariés et non salariés en matière d'estimation de la fraude 
fiscale ; 
- Pour la variable X_, une relation positive est trouvée entre accrois-
sement de la part des actifs oeuvrant dans le secteur du bâtiment et économie 
souterraine. Cette relation nous paraît toutefois sujette à caution car 
cette variable n'est peut-être pas la meilleure pour estimer le travail au 
noir (et donc la fraude fiscale), dans le bâtiment. Un indicateur d'activité 
du type chiffre d'affaire du gros oeuvre, nombre de permis de construire 
délivré ou consommation de ciment par habitant, aurait l'avantage de mieux 
cadrer avec les pratiques illégales dans ce secteur. 
Le nombre relatif d'actifs travaillant dans le bâtiment peut très 
bien se réduire sous l'effet d'un mouvement propre au dénominateur du rapport 
(embauches dans le tertiaire ou élévation de la présence féminine sur le 
marché du travail par exemple). 
En résumé, que l'on emploie une méthode monétaire dans sa version 
classique (les deux premières études), ou dans sa version rénovée (la 
troisième), l'économie souterraine de la Belgique représente plus de 15% du 
produit national brut. 
Ces résultats sont à comparer avec l'estimation de FREY et WECK cal-
culée avec la méthode composite où, pour l'année 1978, l'économie souterraine 
belge est estimée à 11,5% du PNB (*). Les écarts entre les diverses approches 
ne constituent pas la preuve qu'une méthode est meilleure qu'une autre, ils 
signifient simplement que les hypothèses sur lesquelles les diverses appro-
ches reposent ne sont pas totalement comparables. Trouver des différences, 
parfois sensibles, n'est en rien le signe d'anomalies. Pour un même pays, 
pour la même année, il est fréquent de trouver dans la littérature des esti-
mations qui varient entre 2-3% et 30-35% du PNB (**). 
Les données globales ayant été présentées, il convient de raisonner 
maintenant dans un champ d'analyse plus restreint, celui du travail au noir 
d'abord, celui de la fraude fiscale ensuite. 
(*) Les principaux traits de cette méthode peuvent être trouvés dans le 
rapport consacré à la France (2° partie, paragraphe la). 
(**) Pour une analyse approfondie des raisons de tels écarts, nous nous per-
mettons de renvoyer le lecteur â notre article : Philippe BARTHELEMY : 
"The macroeconomic Estimates of the Hidden Economy : A critical Analysis", 
Review of Income and Wealth, june 1988. 
En matière d'estimation de l'ampleur du travail au noir, deux types 
d'étude sont actuellement disponibles. La première approche repose sur une 
batterie d'indicateurs indirects, la seconde est une enquête directe auprès 
d'un échantillon représentatif de la population belge. 
La méthode retenue dans l'approche indirecte est une adaptation au 
travail au· noir de la méthode composite d'estimation de l'économie cachée 
de FREY et WECK. Les variables choisies l'ont été en fonction de plusieurs 
contraintes notamment être disponibles pour le nombre maximal possible de 
pays occidentaux car la Belgique et le Luxembourg ne sont dans cette étude 
que deux cas pris dans un ensemble de 18 pays (*). Sans reprendre ici les 
grandes lignes de la démarche, remarquons que parmi les variables explica-
tives sélectionnées, figurent la durée du travail, le taux de chômage et le 
taux de salariat (et donc a contrario la part des travailleurs indépendants). 
Ces trois variables correspondent respectivement aux déterminants 
X^, X- et X, de l'évaluation de l'économie souterraine de GEEROMS et MONT. 
Dans la hiérarchie des 11 pays membres de la Communauté (la Grèce 
n'a pas pu faire-l'objet d'une estimation), qui forment un sous-ensemble des 
18 pays occidentaux de l'étude citée, la Belgique occupe la troisième place 
derrière l'Italie et l'Espagne pour l'ampleur de son travail au noir ; le 
Luxembourg figurant pour sa part en avant dernière position devant le 
Danemark. 
Plus précisément, les résultats étant exprimés en équivalents emplois 
à plein temps, le travail au noir concernait en 1980 10,5% de la population 
active en Belgique soit environ 436.000 personnes et 6% de la population 
active au Luxembourg soit environ 9.700 personnes. Rappelons que ces esti-
mations ne sont que des tentatives, à partir d'indicateurs indirects, les 
pourcentages avancés étant calés sur des estimations exogènes à l'analyse. 
La deuxième estimation du travail au noir ne concerne que la Belgique 
et a l'avantage de reposer sur une enquête auprès de l'ensemble des ménages 
(**). L'échantillon se compose de 1201 ménages choisis de façon aléatoire, 
(*) Philippe BARTHELEMY : L'emploi légal caché dans les pays de l'OCDE : 
analyse méthodologique et essais de quantification, Contrat de Recherche 
pour l'OCDE, G.R.I.F.E., Aix-en-Provence, décembre 1984, pages 36 â 53. 
Pour une présentation plus détaillée de la méthode d'estimation (cf le 
rapport sur la France (2° partie, paragraphe la) 
(**) Victor GINSBURGH et Pierre PESTIEAU : "Le travail au noir en Belgique : 
Estimations, problèmes posés et enseignements", Wallonie, n°82, 1987, 
pages 225 â 239, 
(23J 
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529 ont été interrogés en Wallonie, 482 en Flandre et 190 à Bruxelles. En 
ne développant ici que les résultats globaux, un ménage belge sur quatre 
(25,7%) appartient avec plus ou moins d'intensité au monde du travail au 
noir. 7,4% des ménages pratiquent cette activité de façon intensive et 20,6% 
des ménages avec une fréquence moins élevée. En convertissant ces résultats 
en nombre d'heures consacrées aux activités irrégulières, pour exprimer le 
travail au noir en terme d'équivalents emplois à plein temps, GINSBURGH et 
PESTIEAU avancent pour l'année 1985 le chiffre de 6% de la population active, 
soit environ 300.000 personnes. 
Avant de détailler ces estimations dans le cadre d'une analyse de la 
nature du travail au noir, il convient de présenter brièvement les principales 
évaluations de la fraude fiscale en Belgique, dont l'ampleur est reconnue 
dans tous les travaux. Trois méthodes principales sont adaptées à la mesure 
de cette fraude. La première, macroéconomique, consiste à comparer la 
matière imposable déclarée avec celle qui devrait l'être compte tenu de la 
valeur des agrégats estimée par les comptables nationaux. Il suffit de 
corriger l'écart de matière imposable observé en tenant compte des modalités 
concrètes de déclaration d'impôts pour obtenir un écart de matière imposable 
exploitable. En lui appliquant les taux d'imposition adoptés, on déduit la 
fraude fiscale (*). La deuxième méthode, microéconomique, consiste à "éplucher' 
les déclarations d'impôts d'un nombre représentatif de contribuables et à 
procéder par extrapolation. La troisième méthode est plus directe encore, 
puisqu'elle consiste à interroger les contribuables par voie d'enquête : 
les questions concernant l'attitude du public vis-à-vis de la fiscalité 
obtenant des taux de réponse très supérieurs à celles, plus personnelles, 
relatives aux sommes non déclarées. 
(*) Les aspects méthodologiques de cette technique sont développés dans deux 
articles. Dans chacun d'eux, une application à la Belgique est proposée. 
Max FRANK : "Fraude des revenus -soumis à l'impôt des personnes physiques 
et perte d'impôt qui en résulte pour le Trésor - étude méthodologique", 
Public Finance/Finances Publiques, Vol.31, n°l, 1976, pages 1 à 30. 
Max FRANK and Daniele DEKEYSER-MEULDERS : "A Tax Discrepancy Coefficient 
Resulting from Tax Evasion or Tax Expenditures", Journal of Public Econo-
mics, Vol.8, n°l, 1977, pages 67 à 78. 
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S'agissant tout d'abord de l'impôt des personnes physiques, les données 
les plus récentes, relatives à l'année 1984, font apparaître que la perte 
d'impôt résultant de la fraude et de la sous-estimation des revenus est 
estimée à 322,6 milliards de francs belges, soit 35,4% du produit de l'impôt 
perçu par le Trésor (*). Ce résultat global masque des comportements spécifi-
ques à chaque type de revenu. Pour les revenus cadastraux, le taux moyen 
de sous-estimation est de 50% ; pour les revenus mobiliers, le taux moyen 
de fraude s'élève à 90% et pour les revenus professionnels, le taux moyen 
de fraude est évalué à 15,4% (**). 
En fait, ces taux moyens cachent d'importantes disparités en fonction 
de la catégorie socio-professionnelle des contribuables. Une enquête par 
sondage dont les réponses sont purement qualitatives pour un motif d'effica-
cité évident montre les résultats suivants (***) : 
Retraités 
Ouvriers 
Employés 
Commerçants 
Agriculteurs 
Professions libérales 
Sans profession 
FRAUDE RECONNUE 
faible 
45% 
28% 
40% 
12% 
7% 
6% 
13% 
EN % PAR LES 
INTERROGEES 
moyenne 
55% 
61% 
55% 
67% 
64% 
65% 
37% 
PERSONNES 
élevée 
0% 
11% 
5% 
21% 
29% 
29% 
50% 
(*) Max FRANK : "La fraude et la sous-eetimation fiscales .et leur impact sur 
la distribution des revenus", in Victor GINSBURGH et Pierre PESTIEAU eds, 
L'économie informelle, éditions Labor, Bruxelles, 1987, page 30 
(**) Définition : "La sous-estimation fiscale résulte de la fixation par 
l'Administration de certaines composantes de la matière imposable à un 
niveau manifestement inférieur à la réalité et ce en non conformité avec 
les intentions du législateur". Cf Max FRANK : "Pour 1979, la fraude 
fiscale pourrait coûter plus de 200 milliards au Trésor Belge", Cahiers 
économiques, Bruxelles, n°81, 1979, page 20, foot note 1. 
(***) Source : H. GEEROMS en H. WILMOTS : "Belastingsontduiking en - ontwij-
king : theoretische aspekten en empirische verificatie", Economisch en 
Sociaal Tijdschrift, n°5, 1984, repris in FRANK (1987), op. cit. 
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Dans la mesure où il y a une liaison entre catégories socio-profession-
nelle et niveaux de revenu, une autre étude montre que la fraude fiscale 
atténue de façon très significative le caractère redistributif de la pro-
gressivité de l'impôt (*). 
S'agissant des autres types d'impôts et en l'absence d'estimations 
plus récentes, nous nous limitons à reproduire des pourcentages de fraude 
fiscale relatifs à l'année 1979 : Impôt sur les sociétés (4,5%), TVA (8,0%), 
Droits de succession (41,4%) et Droits sur transactions immobilières (10,0%). 
A titre de comparaison, le taux de fraude et de sous-estimation de 
l'impôt des personnes physiques de la même année était de 25,7% (**). 
Parvenu au terme de cet examen de l'importance quantitative du travail 
au noir, de la fraude fiscale et de l'économie souterraine, en Belgique, 
et dans la mesure du possible au Luxembourg, l'impression qui se dégage est 
celle d'une activité occulte particulièrement importante, notamment si l'on 
compare la situation belge à celle des autres pays du nord, membres de la 
Communauté et si l'on met davantage l'accent sur la fraude fiscale que sur 
le travail au noir. 
Pour tenter d'expliquer ce cas d'espèce, sans s'éloigner de l'objet 
de ce travail, il convient de noter que la fiscalité marginale des personnes 
est relativement élevée en Belgique alors que celle des entreprises est com-
parativement beaucoup plus faible que dans les autres pays occidentaux en 
général et de la Communauté en particulier (***). Cette remarque nous semble 
(*) Source : Ch. VALENDUC : "Description et analyse de certains types d'iné-
galité"', in Les niveaux de vie des Belges, 7e'Congrès des Economistes 
Belges de langue française, Charleroi, 1987. 
Cette étude est citée in OCDE : Etudes économiques de l'OCDE : Belgique-
Luxembourg, OCDE, Paris, 1988, page 44. A propos de la fraude fiscale 
en Belgique, l'étude de l'OCDE note : "Les possibilités légales d'éviter 
l'impôt ont été largement exploitées, avec l'apparition de toute une 
ingénierie fiscale II" (op. cit. page 44). 
(**) Max FRANK : "Pour 1979, la fraude fiscale pourrait coûter plus de 200 
milliards au Trésor Belge", Cahiers Economiques, Bruxelles, n°81, 1979, 
page 21. Remarque : tous les pourcentages du texte ont été calculés en 
divisant les impots non déclarés par la somme d'impôts déclarés plus 
impôts non déclarés. 
(***) Cf M.J. Me KEE, J.J.C. VISSER et P.G. SAUNDERS : "Taux marginaux d'impo-
sition du travail et du capital dans les pays de l'OCDE", Revue Economique 
de l'OCDE, automne 1986. 
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susceptible d'expliquer trois particularités de l'économie souterraine belge : 
- le niveau de la fraude fiscale est plus important que dans d'autres pays 
comparables ; 
- la distribution de cette fraude fiscale est telle que les particuliers 
fraudent de façon beaucoup plus intensive que les entreprises ; 
- les travailleurs au noir sont principalement embauchés par des particuliers 
et très rarement par des entreprises. 
Cette dernière proposition nous invite naturellement à étudier les 
diverses formes que le travail au noir peut revêtir. 
§2 LA NATURE DU TRAVAIL AU NOIR 
Nous disposons pour la Belgique de deux enquêtes dont les question-
naires respectifs permettent d'analyser la nature du travail au noir. La 
première, réalisée en 1983, concerne un échantillon de 330 personnes résidant 
dans l'arrondissement de Liège (*), la deuxième, réalisée en 1985, couvre 
l'ensemble de la population belge car les personnes ont été interrogées 
aussi bien en Flandre et en Wallonie qu'à Bruxelles (**). 
Certaines caractéristiques de la population liégeoise n'étant pas 
reprises dans la population de l'échantillon national et réciproquement, 
nous ferons référence, selon les contextes, à l'une ou à l'autre des enquêtes. 
Par ailleurs, il est essentiel de se rappeler que dans la première 
étude, l'échantillon se compose d'individus alors que dans la deuxième il 
s'agit de ménages. Il est donc logique que des questions relatives au sexe, 
à la situation matrimoniale ou à l'opinion politique des personnes interrogées 
aient un sens dans la première enquête et aucune signification dans la 
deuxième. 
(*) Pierre PESTIEAU : "Belgium's Irregular Economy", in Wulf GAERTNER and 
Alois WENIG eds, The Economics of the Shadow Economy, Springer Verlag, 
Berlin and Heidelberg, 1985, pagee 144 à 160 
(**) Victor GINSBURGH, Sergio PERELMAN et Pierre PESTIEAU : "Le travail au 
noir", in GINSBURGH et PESTIEAU eds, op. cit. pages 37 à 52. 
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En adoptant la même démarche que pour la France, nous allons déve-
lopper tour à tour les principaux clivages qui permettent de structurer la 
participation aux activités au noir, que ce soit à titre d'offreur ou de 
demandeur. Il importe au préalable d'opérer une distinction entre le travail 
au noir organisé et le travail au noir individuel. Dans le premier cas, 
l'initiative revient à l'employeur et l'activité est par définition exécutée 
sur le lieu de travail avec l'infrastructure matérielle de l'entreprise. Dans 
le second cas, c'est une personne qui décide, parallèlement à son activité 
principale, d'oeuvrer au noir le plus souvent pour le compte d'un particulier. 
Sur la population belge dans son ensemble, 7,4% des ménages partici-
pent au travail au noir organisé et 20,6% d'entre eux ont une activité 
relevant du travail au noir individuel. Au total, compte tenu des doubles 
participations, 25,7% des ménages belges travaillent au noir, estimation 
qui a déjà fait l'objet de commentaires. 
Structure par âge 
Si l'on commence par raisonner globalement, il ne semble pas y avoir 
de relation significative entre âge et demande de travail au noir alors que 
l'offre de travail au noir est d'autant plus élevée que les personnes sont 
jeunes. Cette assertion mérite toutefois d'être amendée en fonction de plu-
sieurs paramètres. 
Les personnes dont l'âge est compris entre 40 et 60 ans sont moins 
nombreuses à travailler au noir que les personnes plus jeunes mais le 
nombre d'heures au noir qu'elles réalisent est très supérieur, qu'elles 
soient effectuées sous la forme de travail organisé ou sous celle de travail 
individuel. L'explication de ce qui pourrait apparaître comme une curiosité 
réside probablement dans le fait que d'autres paramètres que l'âge doivent 
être pris en considération, en particulier le niveau de revenu et la caté-
gorie socio-professionnelle. 
Le nombre, d'heures consacrées au travail au noir est également important 
pour les personnes âgées de plus de 60 ans...11 faut y voir sans doute la 
traduction concrète de la faiblesse de certaines retraites et du désir de 
s'occuper pour des personnes dont les capacités physiques et intellectuelles 
ne sont pas fondamentalement différentes de celles des actifs. 
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Structure par professions 
Les personnes qui travaillent au noir de façon organisée oeuvrent 
dans leur domaine d'activité professionnelle. A ce titre, certaines personnes 
sont employées dans des branches plus sensibles que d'autres et sont donc 
"favorisées". Cette remarque est intéressante car la fonction occupée dans 
l'entreprise ne parait pas caractériser la participation : cadres supérieurs 
et ouvriers seraient logés à la même enseigne ! 
Si le travail au noir individuel est présent dans les mêmes 
secteurs sensibles : les travaux ménagers et domestiques, le second-oeuvre 
du bâtiment, la réparation automobile, les travaux de bureau, etc. la 
recherche de revenu supplémentaire devient la motivation des participants 
et les personnes qui travaillent au noir sont surtout celles qui exercent 
dans leur entreprise des fonctions d'exécution. Pour toutes les professions, 
la participation au travail au noir individuel dépasse la participation au 
travail noir organisé... sauf pour les cadres supérieurs. 
Une deuxième preuvre de cette affirmation est fournie par les contri-
butions au travail au noir en fonction du niveau de scolarité des chefs 
de ménage. Dans le domaine du travail organisé, il y a une relation positive 
entre travail au noir et niveau scolaire, dans le travail exercé à titre 
individuel la relation est négative. 
Si la profession est un critère apte à structurer la participation 
au travail au noir, la durée du travail de l'activité principale se révèle 
être un mauvais critère de partition. A durée de travail fixée, la partici-
pation est plus ou moins élevée en fonction d'autres variables, en particulier 
le revenu. Il convient toutefois d'insister sur un cas limite, celui de la 
durée du travail nulle. On observe en effet que les personnes qui sont dans 
cette situation - les chômeurs et les inactifs - ont un indice de partici-
pation très inférieur aux activités cachées. Si c'est une évidence pour le 
travail au noir organisé, c'est plus intéressant pour le travail au noir 
individuel. En effet, les chômeurs et les inactifs qui ont, par la force 
des choses, un environnement moins favorable que les personnes actives pour 
entrer en contact avec des donneurs d'ouvrage, sont proportionnellement moins 
nombreux à travailler au noir. Par contre, les enquêtes montrent que le 
nombre d'heures qu'ils fournissent au noir, lorsqu'ils parviennent à négocier 
à titre individuel, un contrat est sensiblement supérieurs à la moyenne. 
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Χ. 
Structure par niveau de revenu 
La variable niveau de revenu ­ duménagedans l'enquête à échantillon 
national, et de l'individu dans l'enquête sur l'arrondissement de Liège ­
est celle qui structure peut­être le mieux les activités souterraines. On 
peut affirmer qu'entre le revenu et l'offre de travail au noir il y a une 
relation négative et qu'entre le revenu et la demande de travail au noir il 
y a une relation positive. 
Les personnes à revenus faibles travaillent au noir pour obtenir 
des ressources complémentaires ; elles le font, toutes choses égales par 
ailleurs, d'autant plus que leurs revenus initiaux sont faibles. Le travail 
au noir se pratique davantage dans les catégories sociales les plus défavo­
risées où il sert de revenu d'appoint. Les travaux exécutés au noir avec les 
plus grandes fréquences (travaux d'entretien, bricolage, réparation), sont 
précisément ceux pour lesquels la qualification des titulaires de revenus 
principaux modestes est la mieux adaptée : un ouvrier du bâtiment fera au 
noir de la peinture, de la pose de carrelage ou de la maçonnerie, une secré­
taire frappera des thèses au noir, etc. 
Si les personnes à revenus plus élevés sont davantage donneuses 
d'ouvrage, c'est en raison de plusieurs facteurs. Tout d'abord, elles ne 
sont pas forcément compétentes pour réaliser les travaux qui font l'objet 
de la majorité des transactions au noir ; ensuite leurs revenus principaux 
leur permettent de ne pas faire l'investissement en capital humain requis 
pour bricoler ou travailler pour compte propre ; enfin, elles sont par 
ailleurs les mieux placées et les plus actives dans la fraude fiscale. Il 
semble à la lumière de ce qui précède que la quasi­totalité des belges 
participent à l'économie souterraine même si les uns sont plus actifs dans 
la fraude fiscale et les autres dans le travail au noir. Les revenus 
soustraits au fisc par les premi ers servent à rémunérer les seconds,; ces 
derniers, par leurs dépenses, contribuent à réinjecter dans le circuit offi­
ciel une partie des sommes qui ont été momentanément écartées. 
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Autres partitions 
Au cours de nos précédents commentaires, plusieurs allusions ont été 
faites pour remarquer qu'une variable - l'âge, la durée du travail, la 
profession par exemple - était insuffisante pour expliquer le taux de parti-
cipation aux activités au noir d'un groupe cible. Dans la réalité, les 
déterminants du travail au noir relèvent d'une pluralité de facteurs qui 
interviennent concomitamment. Le revenu d'un individu n'explique rien si 
l'on ne précise pas que cette personne est mariée ou célibataire, en activité 
ou retraitée, qualifiée ou non qualifiée, belge ou étrangère, jeune ou 
âgée, etc. 
Pour surmonter les erreurs d'interprétation liées à des interactions 
de cette nature, des modèles statistiques correctement choisis permettent 
d'appréhender simultanément l'ensemble des variables explicatives lorsque 
pour chacune d'elle deux valeurs seulement peuvent être prises (modèles 
dichotomiques). Par rapport à une constante de référence qui représente 
dans notre contexte la probabilité de travailler au noir pour un individu 
ayant des caractéristiques données, on obtient la probabilité de travailler 
au noir de tout individu doté d'un ensemble quelconque de caractéristiques : 
les modèles probitr logit et tobit correspondent à ces exigences (*) . 
Nous nous sommes permis de faire cette brève incursion dans 1'econome-
trie, car. dans son enquête sur l'arrondissement de Liège PESTIEAU commente 
ses résultats en utilisant les modèles logit et tobit et dans leur enquête 
à échantillon national, GINSBURGH, PERELMAN et PESTIEAU font de même avec 
le modèle logit. 
Sans reprendre ici tous les cas possibles de chacune de ces enquêtes 
(plusieurs centaines), il nous a paru utile de présenter les cas les plus 
extrêmes, c'est-à-dire les divers profils d'individus ou de ménages qui ont 
une activité au noir exceptionnellement forte ou particulièrement faible 
par rapport à une norme. 
(*) Pour une analyse des fondements de ces modèles, cf : Christian GOURIEROUX . 
Econometrie des variables qualitatives, Economica, Parie, 1984. Dans le 
modèle probi t, la fonction de répartition suit une loi normale centrée 
réduite ; dans le modèle logit, elle suit une loi logistique. Le modèle 
tobit est plus complexe car un modèle quantitatif de régression est couplé 
avec un modèle qualitatif. La fonction de répartition suit dans ce modèle, 
une loi normale centrée réduite. 
Enquête sur l'arrondissement de Liège 
La norme retenue par PESTIEAU correspond à un belge, du sexe masculin, 
marié, d'un âge compris entre 25 et 39 ans, de sensibilité politique de 
gauche, résidant dans une maison individuelle et étant travailleur indépen-
dant. 
Cette personne travaille entre 30 et 40 heures par semaine dans son 
emploi principal, gagne annuellement entre 200 000 et 500 000 francs belges 
et a fait des études longues. 
Par rapport à cette fiche signalétique, et compte tenu du fait que 
les valeurs prises par certaines variables ne sont pas significatives eu 
égard à des seuils de confiance convenables, les traits suivants peuvent 
être avancés : le travail au noir décroît avec l'âge ; il est davantage 
pratiqué dans les professions salariées et chez les inactifs (chômeurs ou 
étudiants) ; il concerne des personnes ayant fait moins d'études, qui dis-
posent de revenus inférieurs et qui ont une durée du travail hebdomadaire 
plus faible dans leur emploi principal. Il semble par ailleurs et de façon 
inattendue concerner davantage les gens de gauche que les gens de droite ! 
En matière d'embauché de travailleurs au noir, les liaisons apparais-
sent moins typées à trois exceptions près. Les catégories professionnelles 
qui donnent des ouvrages au noir sont celles qui travaillent peu au noir et 
réciproquement les personnes qui disposent de revenus élevés sont celles 
qui fournissent au noir le plus d'ouvrage et la demande de travail au noir 
est d'autant plus forte que le niveau scolaire est faible. Pour assurer 
une compatibilité entre ces deux dernières assertions qui vont à 1'encontre 
des conclusions habituelles de la théorie du capital humain, il suffit de 
raisonner à revenu donné. Ainsi, comme le souligne avec justesse PESTIEAU (*), 
un professeur d'université et un boucher qui le même revenu annuel n'ont 
pas les mêmes facilités pour embaucher du personnel au noir : le premier 
étant moins favorisé que le second dans son environnement professionnel pour 
rencontrer des travailleurs au noir auxquels faire appel en cas de besoin. 
(*) Pierre PESTIEAU, op. cit. page 154. 
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Enquête à échantillon national 
La norme adoptée par GINSBURGH, PERELMAN et PESTIEAU correspond à 
un ménage d'une seule personne, âgée de moins de 30 ans, de niveau scolaire 
primaire, dont le revenu mensuel est inférieur à 25 000 francs belges et 
dont la durée hebdomadaire du travail de l'emploi principal est inférieur 
à 38 heures. 
Par rapport à cet ensemble très précis de caractéristiques, la pro-
babilité de travailler au noir à titre individuel décroît avec l'âge et 
avec le revenu mensuel. Celle d'embaucher des travailleurs au noir croît quant 
à elle avec le revenu et semble plus importante pour les personnes ayant 
un niveau d'étude secondaire ou technique que pour celles qui ont un niveau 
primaire ou supérieur. Notons enfin que les personnes seules font davantage 
appel à des travailleurs au noir que celles dont le ménage d'appartenance 
se compose d'au moins deux personnes. 
Ces deux incursions dans des travaux économétriques assez complexes 
nous ont permis d'amender quelque peu les termes de nos premières ventila-
tions structurelles sans pour autant infirmer telle ou telle conclusion 
provisoire. Les portraits-robots des travailleurs au noir et des donneurs 
d'ouvrage sont mieux affinés, mais les grands principes qui permettent 
d'apprécier la nature du travail au noir ne sont pas altérés. 
Il convient de remarquer pour terminer que, sur les points importants 
et susceptibles d'être comparés, il y a une parfaite convergence entre les 
deux analyses logit. Cela signifie que le travail au noir exercé à Liège 
est représentatif du travail au noir belge dans son ensemble. Cela ne signifie 
pas en revanche que les formes que revêt le travail au noir en Flandres, 
à Bruxelles ou dans les autres provinces wallones soient représentatives. 
Il faudrait vérifier la disparité des réponses en fonction du seul 
critère géographique pour porter un jugement précis sur cette question. La 
moyenne, comme le soulignait André LIESSE dans les années 30, est une 
"niveleuse implacable, forcément egalitaire !". 
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§3 EVALUATION DU TRAVAIL AU NOIR 
Nous avons eu l'occasion de souligner à maintes reprises, que le 
travail au noir n'était pas un phénomène homogène. Ses acteurs sont aussi 
bien des salariés que des non salariés, des actifs que des inactifs. Ses 
modalités vont du bricolage individuel au trafic de main d'oeuvre en passant 
par tous les degrés intermédiaires d'intensité. Sa répartition géographique 
obéit à la conjonction de facteurs locaux plus ou moins favorables à son 
émergence et à sa prolifération. Son importance quantitative est liée au 
degré de flexibilité du marché du travail et à la nature plus ou moins 
prégnante des régies fiscales ou sociales. 
Observer une grande hétérogénéité n'est pas une raison suffisante 
pour renoncer à dégager quelques lignes directrices susceptibles de rendre 
compte de facteurs essentiels, de raisons déterminantes et de modalités 
principales. Dans le cas de la Belgique, il nous paraît important de mettre 
en évidence le système fiscal et le travail au noir effectué à l'instigation 
des particuliers. 
En commençant par raisonner au plan macroéconomique, si la Belgique 
et la France ont des taux de prélèvements obligatoires assez voisins (46,9% 
du PIB en Belgique et 45,6% en France) (*), il ne faut pas en déduire que 
les motivations fiscales et sociales du travail au noir sont identiques dans 
les deux pays. La structure de ces charges par type de prélèvement diffère 
fortement d'un pays à l'autre et sous l'hypothèse provisoire que la fiscalité 
catalyse le travail au noir, les déterminants belge et français ne s'appliquer 
pas dans les mêmes conditions. 
L'intensité du besoin de se soustraire à l'impôt sur le revenu est 
certainement plus marquée en Belgique où le poids de cet impôt dans le PIB 
est de 16,2% qu'en France où il n'est que de 5,9%. Inversement, la tentation 
pour un employeur de ne pas payer de taxe sur les salariés est sans objet 
en Belgique, alors qu'elle est forte en France. De même, les cotisations 
(*) Toutes les statistiques relatives aux prélèvements obligatoires et à leur 
structures concernent l'année 1985. Cf : Statistiques des recettes 
publiques des pays membres de l'OCDE 1965-1986, OCDE, Paris, 1987. 
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sociales sont proportionnellement plus lourdes en France (19,9% du PIB) 
qu'en Belgique (15,5%). Ajoutons que la ventilation entre cotisations sociales 
des salariés et cotisations sociales des employeurs fait que, dans le relatif 
toujours, les cotisations patronales sont moins élevées en Belgique qu'en 
France, l'inverse était vrai pour les cotisations salariales. 
En ne considérant que le cas des fraudeurs rationnels - ne le sont-ils 
pas tous ? - la tentation pour un employeur de travailler au noir serait 
plus élevée en France et celle de travailler au noir à titre individuel 
plus marquée en Belgique. 
Si l'on tient compte de paramètres supplémentaires, la même conclusion 
s'impose d'elle-même. Les coûts salariaux unitaires relatifs sont pour toutes 
les années postérieures à 1980, plus élevés en France qu'en Belgique et 
au Luxembourg (*). le coût salarial moyen pour l'employeur, exprimé en 
écus par mois, est quant à lui, pour l'année 1981, de 1719 écus en Belgique, 
de 1734 écus en France et de 1574 au Luxembourg. Le gain net pour un salarié 
marié avec deux, enfants s'élève quant à lui à 1009 écus en Belgique, à 
1096 écus en France et à 1217 écus au Luxembourg (**). 
En. conséquence, tous ces aspects fiscaux et sociaux se conjuguent pour 
montrer que le salarié belge est davantage enclin à travailler au noir que 
le salarié français, lequel l'est davantage que le salarié luxembourgeois. 
L'entrepreneur luxembourgeois pour sa part, n'est pas incité à 
travailler au noir ; l'entrepreneur français l'étant plus que son homologue 
belge. 
Au plan microéconomique, les mêmes tendances peuvent être observées 
en analysant les taux marginaux d'imposition sur le travail et sur le capital. 
Là encore, la Belgique possède le record d'Europe du taux marginal maximal 
le plus élevé (86,7% en 1986), pour l'impôt sur le revenu. Pour un salarié 
moyen, le taux marginal de prélèvements obligatoires est quant à lui égal 
(*) Source : Commission des Communautés Européennes : Europe Sociale, 
Luxembourg, 1988, page 67. 
(**) Source : ibidem, page 86. 
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à 62,7%. Les taux correspondant pour la France, et pour la même année, sont 
respectivement de 58,0% et de 51,2% ! (*) . 
Si l'on présente des arguments dynamiques au lieu de se cantonner 
à des propositions statiques, la même conclusion s'applique à savoir que les 
ménages sont de plus en plus incités à travailler au noir en Belgique, même 
s'il serait abusif de dire que les entreprises sont de moins en moins inci-
tées à le faire. 
Nous avons calculé entre 1965 et 1985, l'accroissement des prélèvements 
obligatoires en points de pourcentage du PIB pour la Belgique et pour la 
France. Les charges supportées par les ménages se sont accrues de 14,3 
points de pourcentage du PIB en Belgique et de 7,7 points de pourcentage 
en France, ces charges (impôts sur le revenu, sur le patrimoine et cotisations 
sociales employés) étant en 1965 plus élevées en Belgique (9,2% du PIB), 
qu'en France (6,3%). 
Les charges supportées par les firmes se sont accrues de 3,7 points 
de pourcentage en Belgique et de 3,6 points de pourcentage en France. Notre 
rubrique qui comprend les impôts sur le bénéfice des sociétés, les cotisations 
sociales des employeurs et les impôts sur les salaires représentait, en 1965, 
en France (13,1% du PIB), .alors qu'elle ne correspond en-1985, en Belgique 
qu'à 12% du PIB ! 
Les autres charges sont:supportées par les consommateurs (TVA) : 
hausse de 0_,3 points de pourcentage du PIB dans les deux pays pour des niveaux 
de départ voisins (11,1% du PIB en Belgique et 13,1% en France, en 1965) ; 
les autres charges sont des prélèvements divers (-2,6 points de pourcentage 
en Belgique et -1 point de pourcentage en France, sur la période). 
Si l'on résume en quelques lignes,ces développements, force est de 
constater que les ménages belges subissent une telle pression fiscale que 
le travail au noir qu'ils réalisent en est la conséquence "obligée". Les 
ménages français, en contrepartie, sont beaucoup moins sensibles à ce fac-
teur et, s'ils travaillent au noir, comme on l'a dit dans le rapport sur 
la France, c'est pour "gagner de l'argent". S'il y a pour eux un_effet 
(*) Source : OCDE,: Etudes économiques de l'OCDE : Belgique-Luxembourg, 
OCDE, Paris, 1988, page 42. 
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fiscal, il apparaît comme une conséquence "heureuse", mais non recherchée 
pour elle-même. 
Les entreprises belges sont placées dans un contexte beaucoup plus 
favorable que les firmes françaises en matière de charges fiscales et sociales 
leur intensité de participation aux activités cachées est donc logiquement 
moins forte. 
Ces conclusions ne signifient pas que tout est "blanc" pour les 
entreprises et que tout est "noir" pour les ménages. Le travail au noir 
organisé par des firmes est une chose courante en Belgique, mais c'est une 
forme d'activité qui concerne moins de personnes que le travail au noir indi-
viduel (*) . 
Pour exprimer par un exemple concret que les firmes peuvent être 
au centre de réseaux de travail clandestin, nous allons développer de façon 
détaillée la situation du bâtiment. 
Les enquêtes sur le travail au noir dans ce secteur qu'elles soient 
menées dans un pays membre ou dans un pays non membre de la Communauté, 
débouchent toutes sur une conclusion similaire : les activités au noir sont 
davantage exercées dans le second oeuvre que dans le gros oeuvre (**) . Dans 
le cas de la Belgique, deux indices nous invitent à penser que la répar-
tition des tâches entre travailleurs déclarés et travailleurs au noir 
s'effectue sur le même modèle : d'une part, les phases de reprises d'activité 
dans la construction de logements sont plus marquées dans le gros oeuvre que 
dans les finitions et d'autre part, les recettes de TVA pour les activités 
d'amont, à barèmes fixés, s'accroissent plus rapidement que celles qui 
concernent les activités d'aval. 
Même si l'on peut expliquer ces.curiosités (le bricolage individuel 
se développe dans le second oeuvre, par exemple), la suspicion d'une activité 
au noir d'ampleur non négligeable ne peut pas être écartée a priori. 
(*) On rappelle que travail au noir organisé concerne 7,4% des ménages belges, 
contre 20,6% pour le travail au noir isolé : cf GINSBURGH, PERELMAN, 
et PESTIEAU, op. ait. page 42. 
(**) Pour la France : cf Partie I, exemple n°l, (région parisienne) et Partie 
II, §lb, (département du Var). 
Pour l'Autriche : cf Herbert NEUBAUER : "Schwärtzarbeit und Eigenleistung 
in der österreichischen Bauwirtschaft", in Jiri SKOLKA ed : Die Andere 
Wirstahaft, Signum Verlag, Wien, pages .131 à 160. 
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Il semble qu'existe en Belgique, une sorte de tradition de travail 
au noir organisé dans le bâtiment, tradition ayant débuté au début des années 
70 dans la province du Limbourg (*). Des recruteurs de main d'oeuvre illé-
gale résidant aux Pays-Bas, les "koppelbazen" franchissaient quotidiennement 
la frontière et embauchaient du personnel, le plus souvent immigré et licencié 
en raison de la fermeture des charbonnages. Ces travailleurs non déclarés, 
ouvriers peu ou pas qualifiés étaient "mis à la disposition" des entreprises 
locales dont les carnets de commande étaient remplis. Concrètement, c'est 
la pénurie de main d'oeuvre et le boom de la construction qui avait permis 
à ce trafic de main d'oeuvre de proliférer. 
Depuis la crise et la montée du chômage en Belgique, un trafic de 
nature similaire a repris d'abord dans le Hainaut, puis dans la province 
de Namur et à Bruxelles. La motivation des nouveaux trafiquants n'est plus 
la même : il s'agit aujourd'hui de gérer la réduction des programmes de 
travaux publics et la hausse des cotisations sociales patronales. Pour ce 
faire, les entreprises officielles qui obtiennent des chantiers sous-
traitent à des firmes "provisoires" une partie des travaux à réaliser. Les 
contrats de sous-traitance se négocient sur la base de prix cassés, les 
sous-traitants étant les employeurs de la main d'oeuvre, par ailleurs régu-
lièrement déclarée à l'Office National de la Sécurité Sociale. En cours 
d'exécution des travaux, l'entreprise de sous-traitance est déclarée en 
faillite pour non paiement des salaires et des charges fiscales et sociales, 
et le personnel embauché régulièrement est couvert par le fonds de garantie 
ad hoc. Un autre sous-traitant se substitue alors au premier en embauchant, 
toujours régulièrement, la même main d'oeuvre. Ce sous-traitant est déclaré 
à son tour en faillite et le système se perpétue... 
L'originalité de ce trafic de main d'oeuvre provient du fait que ce 
ne sont pas les ouvriers du bâtiment qui travaillent au noir, mais les entre-
prises de sous-traitance. Ces dernières font, en effet, rémunérer leurs 
employés par la collectivité. S'il est difficile de chiffrer le coût global 
(*) Guy DEPAS : "La saga dee négriers", in Victor GINSBURGH et Pierre PESTIEAU 
eds, L'économie informelle, éditions Labor, Bruxelles, 1987, pages 87 à 
94. 
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d'un tel trafic, deux estimations permettent d'avancer des hypothèses. Pour 
le seul tribunal de Charleroi, 7 faillites de pourvoyeurs de main d'oeuvre 
ont été enregistrées en 1983. En additionnant tous les cas, plus de 200 
millions de francs auraient été soustraits au fisc. L'autre évaluation con-
cerne le "bénéfice" moyen des entrepreneurs-pirates, il s'élèverait à 
60 000 francs par ouvrier occupé et par mois d'activité. 
En conclusion, ce cas d'espèce montre les mécanismes qui sous-tendent 
un travail au noir organisé. Outre son intérêt propre - le bâtiment dans 
certaines provinces -, c'est le rôle de la sous-traitance qui est mis en 
évidence lorsque tous les partenaires sont "gagnants" et la collectivité 
"perdante". L'entrepreneur officiel obtient des marchés dans une conjoncture 
difficile, l'organisateur du réseau de sous-traitance frauduleuse reçoit 
au noir des revenus en échange des "services" qu'il rend, les travailleurs 
sont couverts socialement et preçoivent leurs salaires, fût-ce avec retard. 
Cette longue parenthèse consacrée à une forme organisée de travail 
au noir, ne doit pas nous faire oublier l'essentiel à savoir que la fiscalité 
sur les personnes est telle que le travail au noir réalisé par des parti-
culiers est quantitativement le plus important. Comme le soulignent 
GINSBtraca, PEÏIELMAN et PESTIEAU : "Pour une variété de raisons légales, 
institutionnelles et culturelles, le travail au noir n'a pas le même profil 
dans tous les pays. Ainsi, en Belgique, il est rare que le travailleur au 
noir soit lui-même engagé par un employeur clandestin. C'est là une pratique 
fréquente en France et en Italie, dans les ateliers clandestins de confection, 
par exemple" (*). 
Dans le cas du Luxembourg, les quelques informations disponibles 
convergent pour montrer que le travail au noir est également très présent 
dans le secteur du bâtiment. Dans le rapport de la commission spéciale 
chargée d'examiner le projet de loi sur le travail clandestin, on peut lire : 
"il convient de souligner qu'aujourd'hui,.selon des estimations prudentes, 
près d'un tiers des maisons, notamment les résidences secondaires, sont 
(*) Cf .: GINSBURGH, PERELMAN, et PESTIEAU, op. cit. page 40 
(24) 
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construites sans avoir jamais fait l'objet d'une facturation régulière, ni 
d'une déclaration afférente aux assurances sociales, à la caisse de maladie 
ou à l'administration de l'enregistrement responsable de l'encaissement de 
la TVA" (*) .· 
Que ce soit en Belgique ou au Luxembourg, une série de mesures légis-
latives ont été prises pour lutter contre le travail clandestin. Dans ces 
deux pays, les textes ont un libellé très proche de la loi française du 
11 juillet 1972, loi de référence dans le domaine. 
En Belgique, la loi du 6 juillet 1976 concerne la répression du travail 
frauduleux à caractère commercial ou artisanal. "Le travail est "réputé fraudu-
leux, lorsqu'il est effectué à la suite d'un recours à la publicité visant 
à s'assurer une clientèle, ou en offrant des prix particulièrement avantageux 
par la non application de la TVA ou des arguments similaires". (**). Ne 
sont pas concernées par le texte de loi, "les activités à usage personnel 
dans le aadre familial ainsi que les travaux accomplis par les organisations 
socio-culturelles". 
Au Luxembourg, la loi du 3 août 1977 vise l'interdiction du travail 
clandestin. Son article premier précise : "est considéré comme travail 
clandestin : 
1/ l'exercice à titre indépendant de l'une des activités professionnelles 
énumérées à l'article premier de la loi du 2 juin 1962, déterminant les 
conditions d'accès et d'exercice de certaines professions ainsi que celles 
de la constitution et de la gestion d'entreprises, telle qu'elle a été modi-
fiée dans la suite, sans être en possession de l'autorisation y prévue, 
2/ la prestation d'un travail salarié lorsque celui qui s'y livre : 
a) sait que l'employeur ne possède pas l'autorisation prévue par la 
loi précitée du 2 juin 1962, 
b) ou sait que sa situation de salarié n'est pas régulière au regard 
de la législation concernant les retenues sur salaires et traitements ou de 
la législation relative à la sécurité sociale". 
(*) Rapport de la Commission spéciale chargée d'examiner le projet de loi 
ayant pour objet d'interdire le travail clandestin, Chambre dee Députés, 
session ordinaire 1976-1977, document n°2081-4, Luxembourg, 5 juin 1977 
page 2. 
(**) Source : Moniteur belge (Journal Officiel), n°140, 20 juillet 1976, 
page 9273. 
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Son article deuxième complète le champ du travail clandestin : "il 
est également défendu : 
a) d'avoir recours aux services d'une personne ou d'un groupe de 
personnes pour l'exécution d'un travail clandestin au sens de l'article 
premier, sub 1, compte tenu des exceptions formulées à l'article 3, 
b) d'engager du personnel salarié pour l'exécution d'un travail 
étranger au ménage ou à l'objet de l'entreprise de l'employeur, lorsque ledit 
travail ressortit à l'une des professions énumérées à l'article premier de 
la loi précitée du 2 juin 1962". 
Enfin, comme dans le cas de la loi belge, la loi luxembourgeoise 
précise dans son article troisième : "Ne constitue pas un travail clandestin 
au sens de la présente loi : 
a) une activité exercée personnellement pour son propre compte et 
sans l'aide d'autrui ; 
b) une activité occasionnelle et de moindre importance exercée pour 
compte d'autrui, 
c) une activité isolée exercée pour compte d'autrui n'excédant pas 
le cadre de l'entraide usuelle entre proche parents, amis ou voisins" (*). 
Le texte luxembourgeois dresse implicitement une typologie du travail 
au noir en fonction d'un "degré de gravité" par rapport à deux normes : 
la concurrence déloyale et l'embauche "en mauvaise et indue forme". L'appli-
cation de ce texte pose à l'évidence une série de difficultés concrètes. Où 
commence le travail clandestin ? Quels sont les critères de l'entraide ? 
Qu'est-ce qu'une activité de moindre importance ? (**). 
(*) Source : Mémorial (Journal Officiel), Recueil A, n°45, 8 août 1977. 
(**) A titre d'illustration, lorsque la loi du 11 juillet 1972 qui distinguait 
activité occasionnelle et activité non occasionnelle, était en vigueur en 
France, les tribunaux avaient des difficultés considérables pour apporter 
la preuve d'un travail clandestin. Ces réflexions prononcées par des 
employeurs ou leurs avocats en témoignent : "C'était mon neveu, je ne l'ai 
pas fait travailler. Il apprenait, c'est tout", "C'est la famille .'.", 
"Dans mon esprit, c'était un dépannage", "Il travaille par plaisir !", 
"C'était l'épouse de l'un des salariés, elle venait deux â trois jours 
par semaine, pour s'exercer sur une machine. Ce n'est pas une employée: 
travailler sur une machine, ne veut pas dire qu'on est salarié !". 
Source : Edwy PLENEL : "Treize petite patrons condamnés pour l'exemple", 
Le Monde, 18 janvier 1984. 
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En Belgique, la loi du 6 juillet 1976 a été complétée par une série 
de textes visant à en étendre le champ d'application ou à rendre plus aisées 
les poursuites par la définition de critères objectifs. Un arrêté royal de 
1978 rend les donneurs d'ouvrage solidairement responsables des dettes 
envers la sécurité sociale et l'administration fiscale. La loi du 15 décembre 
1980 précise les conditions d'accès, de séjouryd'établissement et d'éloi-
gnement dee étrangers. La loi du 25 janvier 1985 quant à elle instaure une 
carte de sécurité sociale obligatoire pour tous les salariés. Un travailleur 
surpris sans sa carte est qui ne la présente pas dans les délais requis est 
passible de peines correctionnelles. 
Sans développer les implications macroéconomiques du travail au noir 
qui sont semblables à celles qui ont été détaillées à propos de la France, 
il convient de rappeler en conclusion la nature particulière des activités 
au noir exercées par des particuliers en Belgique. Le poids relatif de la 
fiscalité des personnes par rapport à celui qui pèse sur les entreprises 
place la fraude fiscale au premier rang des activités qui appartiennent à 
l'économie souterraine et explique pourquoi le travail au noir est principale-
ment motivé par le désir d'échapper à une fiscalité peut être trop contrai-
gnante . 
Dans un article purement théorique, ADAM et GINSBURGH ont essayé de 
tester l'impact des politiques macroéconomiques sur l'économie belge, 
laquelle est divisée en deux secteurs l'un officiel, l'autre souterrain (*). 
Les firmes du secteur officiel embauchent des travailleurs de façon 
régulière, payent les impôts auxquelles elles sont contraintes et versent 
un taux de salaire rigide à la baisse. Dans le secteur souterrain, aucun 
impôt n'est versé et le taux de salaire est parfaitement flexible. Les 
firmes du.secteur officiel offrent la gamme complète des biens et services 
produits en Belgique, le secteur souterrain ne produisant pour sa part qu'un 
nombre restreint de biens et services, ceux qui relèvent traditionnellement 
du travail au noir. 
(*) Marie-Christine ADAM et Victor GINSBURGH : "The effects of Irregular 
Markets on Macroeconomic Policy: some Estimates for Belgium", European 
Economic Review, Vol 29, 1985, pages 15 à 33. 
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Sous l'hypothèse que l'économie est fermée, les principales conclu-
sions du modèle - pondérées selon que la nature du chômage relève du cas 
classique ou du cas keynesien - (*) se conjuguent pour montrer d'une part 
que la fiscalité est l'un des déterminants majeurs d'entrée dans la sphère 
souterraine de l'économie et d'autre part que les politiques de relance 
de l'activité et de lutte contre le chômage se heurtent à des effets pervers 
dûs au travail au noir. A titre d'exemple, les multiplicateurs keynesiens 
jouent avec moins d'amplitude, car une partie de leurs effets stimulent 
l'économie cachée au lieu d'atteindre pleinement le secteur légal de l'économi. 
En d'autres termes, sauf cas très particulier ADAM et GINSBURGH 
mettent en évidence des conflits d'objectifs chaque fois que les autorités 
agissent simultanément pour lutter contre le chômage et réduire l'importance 
de l'économie au noir. 
Cet examen des situations fiscales, des conditions réglementaires 
et des politiques macroéconomiques nous invite à penser pour conclure que 
le travail au noir est une pratique profondément enracinée dans les menta-
lités des belges et dans une moindre mesure dans celles des Luxembourgeois. 
Si les autorités sont pleinement conscientes de son ampleur, elles 
semblent se heurter à un problème classique : comment concilier politique 
socio-économique, règles juridiques et phénomène structurel ? 
Avec l'avènement du Grand Marché Intérieur, des mesures structurelles 
seront nécessairement prises par la Belgique, ne serait-ce que pour adapter 
sa fiscalité aux exigences communautaires. Si dans cette hypothèse, le 
travail au noir ne disparaît pas spontanément, on peut en revanche s'attendre 
à ce que les. modalités spécifiques qui Le caractérisent aujourd'hui se rap-
prochent des formes qu'il revêt dans les autres pays, comparables. 
(*) a) Dans une économie qui se compose d'un marché de biens et services, 
et d'un marché du travail : 
- il y a chômage keynesien si l'on observe un excès d'offre. sur les deuL 
marchés : les ménages sont rationnés (ils ne trouvent pas d'emplois) 
et les entreprises sont rationnées (elles ne trouvent pas de débouchés) 
- il y a chômage classique, si l'on observe un excès d'offre sur le 
marché du travail et un excès de demande sur le marché des biens et 
services. Les ménages sont doublement rationnés (ils ne trouvent pas 
d'emplois et ils n'obtiennent pas des. entreprises tous les biens qu'ils 
demandent) 
Cf : Edmond MALINVAUD : Reexamen de la théorie du chômage, Calmann-
Levy, Paris, 1980. 
b) L'économie belge étant très ouverte, les conclusions du modèle seraient 
vraisemblablement altérées si les équations étaient modifiées dans ce 
sens. 
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Introduction 
Research on the black economy in the United Kingdom has been carried 
out at the macro and micro levels. In general the work done by 
economists has been the least satisfactory: it has been well reviewed by 
Smith (1986) and more recently Thomas (1988a) has added a devastating 
critique. Typically economists do not gather their own data and, when 
they do, inadequate research methodologies can produce spurious results 
(e.g. Mathews and Stoney, 1987). 
Micro studies undertaken by social anthropologists, sociologists and 
social psychologists are closer to empirical reality but the greater the 
detail often the aore difficult it is to generalise free the results. 
Studies carried out in Belfast, Brighton and Bradford will produce 
distinctively different results related to differences based on religion, 
socio-economic status and ethnicity or race. Nevertheless, some 
cumulative understanding has emerged over the last decade and this has 
influenced the work of Smith and Thomas mentioned above. 
A peculiar difficulty that has made it more difficult to gain an 
objective understanding of the black economy is the popular obsession with 
what are often referred to as "welfare scroungers". It is true that a 
very small proportion of welfare claimants also engage in remunerated 
activity which they do not declare. Most of this activity takes up few 
hours and is very poorly rewarded. The number of regular "working 
claimants" is tiny and they account for an infinitesimally small part of 
the black economy. However, it seems that a few colourful anecdotes gain 
more credibility than more sober reporting of statistics. It has been 
known for some years that the self-employed provide the core of the black 
economy and it is those in work - such as the firemen described below -
who have the greatest opportunity to take on second, undeclared jobs. 
However, despite such knowledge, the force of the myth about "welfare 
scroungers" prevails. 
A further difficulty that applies particularly, perhaps, to the UK is 
that most part-time, temporary and casual workers, together with an 
increasing proportion of double job holders are unable to engage in the 
black economy, even if they wanted to. The extension of the PAYE net to 
temporary workers - i.e. taxing people at source on every week's work as 
if such people were working regularly at that job throughout the year -
ensures that there is much less scope for underdeclaring income by these 
categories. The legalized deregulation of the peripheral work force 
combined with putting such workers on PAYE means that the so-called 
flexible work force in the UK is actually fairly tightly constrained. 
Since those on low incomes are unlikely to reach the tax threshold, many 
workers who would be classed as illegal in other European countries are 
good, law-abiding - but poor - citizens of the UK. 
The black economy in the UK is thus largely taxation-policy led and 
not employer led as seems to be the case in Southern Europe. Thus a 
concern with process rather than pattern would focus on the changing ratio 
between PAYE and Schedule D tax payers. Insofar as there is growth and 
encouragement of self-employed workers declaring their own income under 
Schedule D, so also is the black economy likely to grow. 
Part I of the Report presents three vignettes drawn from case studies 
of which a larger number are listed in the references. Part II is an 
attempt to be more quantitative but it is hard to improve on Smith's 
conclusion that the UK black economy is unlikely to be less than 3 per 
cent or more than 5 per cent of GDP. (Smith 1986: 191) Indeed he 
considers that 5 per cent is probably too high: a figure of 4 per cent 
would fit better with many local studies. 
Part I CASE STUDIES 
(1) Doing the Double in Belfast 
Dr. Leo Howe of the Department of Social Anthropology at the 
University of Cambridge conducted surveys in two areas of Belfast - Mallon 
Park, where the unemployment rate was 56 per cent and Eastlough where it 
was 26 per cent. Some interesting differences between the two areas were 
discovered, based on interviews with 20 unemployed and 20 employed working 
class married men aged between 20 and 50. Each respondent was 
interviewed on a number of occasions and this was supplemented by a more 
formal survey and informal research based on participant observations 
carried out over a two year period. (Howe nd-1985?) 
In Eastlough the most overwhelmingly important factor is the 
continuing significance of manufacturing industry for structuring the 
lives of both the employed and the unemployed. The latter's job hunting 
activity is devoted almost entirely, even ritualistically, to the 
established manufacturing and engineering firms of east Belfast. "Doing 
the double" involves getting some remuneration for work whilst receiving 
the dole: 11 out of the 20 unemployed had done such work from time to 
time. However, very few of the men see doing the double as a long-term 
prospect: they all claim that opportunities are few, the rewards are small 
and it is not a practical long-term alternative to getting a legitimate 
job. There are a number of reasons for this. First, most jobs in East 
Belfast are concentrated in large firms and in public administration - in 
which doing the double is impossible - but that is where the unemployed 
hope to find employment. For such people a period on the dole is still 
seen as an interruption to employment. 
Secondly, opportunities for doing the double in Eastlough are mainly 
in construction or repair and renovation and this constitutes a small 
proportion of the workforce. Thirdly, for those who do work on the side 
it is more a matter of doing jobs to help with pressing financial 
problems. It frequently arises out of contacts with friends and 
relatives. Fourthly, there is a widespread fear of DHSS inspectors and 
the likelihood that they will be informed on by "squealers". Finally, 
the DHSS fraud investigators are likely to be less inhibited in their 
activities in a Protestant area than they might be in a Catholic area. 
Thus, on the Eastlough housing estate realistic opportunities for doing 
the double were small. 
'Doing the double is inferior in status, morally 
dubious (to some), dangerous, and thus, at best, a 
temporary expedient. Whilst unemployed, benefits 
enable people to subsist, and doing the double as a 
long-term prospect has not become a serious option 
practically or ideologically, even for those with 
readily saleable skills.' (p.6) 
The situation in Mallon Park, and in Catholic West Belfast generally is, 
as Dr. Howe remarks, quite different. The area has a much higher 
unemployment rate and there is now no large manufacturing firm in Catholic 
West Belfast. Hence the residents of Mallon Park do not have the 
infrastructural supports to shape and to sustain attitudes and values 
based on legitimate employment. "The local economy is fragmented and 
uncoordinated. The area is replete with small clubs, back street 
garages, private taxi firms run from homes or temporary cabins, small 
building firms, office and school cleaning, security, street traders, 
scrap dealers and many more. Those working in these enterprises are 
often part-time, many are female and some are either registered unemployed 
or are women married to unemployed men." (p.7) Some men get work over 
the border and, in general, there is a much greater moral acceptance of 
doing the double, with the practical advantage that the DHSS fraud 
investigators have much greater difficulty in policing West Belfast. 
Finally, there are more construction workers in the area and "the 
construction industry is riddled with malpractice. Employers (sub-
contractors mainly) will often not take on workers legitimately but insist 
that they work the double" p.8. Dr. Howe acknowledges that the work that 
is obtained in West Belfast is often irregular and short term. "It has 
to be stated that it is a minority who are able to take advantage of 
opportunities; the young, unskilled and older men have great difficulty 
in finding openings" p.8. 
In general Dr. Howe concludes that, despite such differences between 
the Protestant and the Catholic areas, doing extra jobs is not an 
alternative to the dole but rather a survival strategy forced upon them by 
poverty. Such activity is part of the black economy to be sure, but it 
is a small and relatively insignificant part. It may ensure that those 
involved keep warmer and eat meat more frequently and it also perhaps 
ensures that their children, the next generation of -corkers - or at least 
potential workers - grow up in better health. 
(2) Forms of Work on the Isle of Sheppey in Kent 
In 1981 a random sample survey of 1 in 9 of all households on the 
Isle of Sheppey produced a total of 730 households with a 79 per cent 
response rate. One of the basic aims of the survey was to discover who 
did what work for whom, and for how much if it was paid. This was a 
study essentially focussing on the demand side of the irregular economy, 
although some questions were asked about the informal work done for 
others. A list of tasks was drawn up based on a previous period of 
fieldwork on the Island. The most astonishing result to emerge from the 
analysis of these tasks was just how much work outside employment was 
being done. For example, of the full sample of 730 households, 80 per 
cent had done indoor painting themselves but perhaps more remarkably 8 per 
cent had put in a Rolled Steel Joist (RSJ) themselves. Most of the 
(25) 
labour involved in the work was unpaid - the overwhelming amount was being 
done inside the household. Even quite a complex job, such as doing work 
on a car's brakes, was more likely to be done by members of the household 
than by paying someone informally. Typically it was those on the lowest 
income who were most likely to pay someone informally, presumably because 
the cost of formal labour in the garage is too much for them to afford. 
Those supplying the labour were typically those already in employment 
who worked in their own time to earn a "little extra money on the side". 
Self-employed builders, mechanics or people with spare time during the day 
such as firemen or milkmen were most likely to do extra work for those 
households who could not do such tasks for themselves or who were too 
poor to pay for the task to be done through the formal economy. There 
were three reasonably well-defined categories that were most likely to use 
informal sources of labour 
(i) lone-parent households, with no other adult in the household; 
(ii) married couples with children under 15, particularly those 
where the mother is under 30; 
(iii) single persons aged 65 and over living on their own. 
The category least likely to supply informal labour to these people were 
the unemployed. Typically they lacked the resources - tools, materials, 
transport, telephone - and thus were too much in fear of being informed on 
by neighbours. Someone in employment 'doing a favour' would not attract 
suspicion and no one would ask questions if he were paid. Also many of 
the tasks done for young mothers and elderly women were more likely to be 
done by other women. Child-minding, going shopping, cleaning, cooking 
and caring were done by women generally for no payment, although these 
tasks often took more time and effort than tasks done by men, such as 
repairing a broken window or fixing a fuse, for which payment is expected 
to be offered if not always accepted. 
The Sheppey survey provided information on the supply side of 
informal labour. Four per cent of the complete sample answered in the 
affirmative to the question "Do you currently do any work on your own 
account to get extra money?" and a further 1 per cent of respondents 
acknowledged that they did other work for an employer or firm for which 
they got paid (in cash or some other informal way). Since respondents 
were alternately male and female the numbers of each sex in those 
categories were very small. Of the 11 male informal workers, 10 were in 
full-time employment and only one was unemployed. This was the single 
"honest scrounger" revealed by the survey 1 The tasks that were done for 
other varied by sex: men were more likely to do repairs, gardening, 
carpentry and the like, whereas women were more likely to do shopping and 
personal caring. 
Other, more informal styles of research, focussing specifically on 
the unemployed, revealed that a high proportion could do a little job now 
and again. A man might help to strip the engine of a neighbour's car one 
Sunday and may be given _5 to "buy yourself a drink". Indeed some 
respondents complained that because they were unemployed they were more 
likely to be paid token amount?, well below market rates. The garage 
mechanic who promises to help a friend out for a couple of hours one 
evening expects a rate that reflects his skills, although less than the 
"formal" rate at the garage. There was often talk of irregular work in 
the pubs but when this was tracked down the scale of the activity was very 
small indeed. 
The overwhelming conclusion of the Sheppey survey was that households 
were very busy doing extra work outside employment for their own household 
or those of their relatives. Friends who worked for builders might find 
their "cheap" materials from time to time and there was a modest degree of 
occupational theft, which had been part of the occupational culture of the 
Island since the eighteenth century when Sheerness had an important 
Admiralty Dockyard. It is said that houses in the oldest part were built 
by dockyard workers with wood they had brought out of the dockyard. It 
is important to recognise that even in an area with a long tradition of 
informal work the amount that would qualify in any formal measure of le 
travail au noir would be miniscule. 
There were, indeed, some people who systematically did irregular work 
for cash and there were men with time free from their main job to engage 
in lucrative moonlighting and women, unable to get more secure employment, 
who were obliged to do extra cleaning jobs or serving behind the bar in 
pubs and clubs simply to get a little extra cash "to pay the bills". 
Some women might do a couple of hours in the mornings cleaning up and then 
two or three evenings bar work as well. Such a pattern is not unusual 
and whilst it may give the impression that much informal work is going on, 
the actual size of a putative black economy is miniscule. Sheppey is 
unusual in having a small proportion of small businesses and self-employed 
people. Thus despite its initial reputation for being "an island on the 
fiddle" some ten years detailed research failed to find evidence for such 
a view. In the more prosperous areas of the UK where small businesses 
flourish the actual tax loss is likely to be much more substantial. 
3. Moonlighting Firemen 
The previous two case studies have been place-oriented in Belfast in 
Northern Ireland and the Isle of Sheppey in Kent in the South East of 
England. Whilst it is true that irregular work is very locality specific 
there are, nevertheless, certain national opportunity structures offered 
by the characteristics of particular occupations. A detailed study of 
firemen by Hart (1982) is the basis for a more general consideration of 
their role in the irregular economy (Edgell and Hart, 1988). The crucial 
point about the fire service is that the shift system allows considerable 
free time during "normal working hours". Thus, to take an example 
provided by Edgell and Hart, if a fireman were to start his duty on Monday 
at 9 a.m. he would finish at 6 p.m. and work the same hours on Tuesday, 
but on Wednesday and Thursday he would start at 6 p.m. and finish at 9 
a.m. the following morning, sleeping at the station. He would then be 
completely free from Friday morning and his next duty would begin on 
Tuesday. Assuming that there were no night-time call-outs the fireman 
would only work two days in the week. He would be "paid for sleeping" on 
a further two nights and be bright and fresh for up to five days' work in 
a second job each week. 
Nearly all the firemen in Hart's sample of 80 had been employed in 
other work before joining the Fire Service and thus already had a range of 
skills - almost a quarter had worked previously in the building trade, 
either as a skilled worker (e.g. carpenter, plumber, bricklayer) or as 
unskilled general labourers. As part of their occupational regulations 
firemen are forbidden to hold a second job. However, it is well known 
that many firemen do undertake informal work on a regular and consistent 
basis. In a report on the Fire Service published by HMSO in 1969 it was 
reported that 26 per cent of junior ranks "spontaneously mentioned doing a 
part-time job in their off-duty time" (Thomas 1969:33)· Hart's research 
indicates that the proportion may be much higher: 60 per cent of his 
sample did work in the black economy. The proportion of those on the 
shift system mentioned above who worked in the black economy rose to 75 
per cent and, in answer to the question, "Have you ever done other kinds 
of work in your spare time?" the proportion increases to 91 per cent for 
all firemen and 95 per cent for those on the shift system. 
At the time of the fieldwork both day-manning and shift workers had 
four full days and nights in every eight off duty and shift workers also 
had six free days in every eight (including the two days they work the 
night shift), and were not 'on call' on their nights off. Over two 
thirds of the sample worked weekly or more, which could range from once a 
8 
week to "every free day", as one fireman put it. "Fiddle jobs" are a 
normal part of a fireman's life: the following table indicates the type 
of job done by all who had ever had them. 
Main Types of Informal Work Undertaken by Firemen 
Driving 
Agricultural/General Manual 
Building 
Window Cleaning 
Painting and Decorating 
Carpentry/Plumbing 
Undertaking 
Other 
Per cent 
Il U 
37 
22 
21 
1H 
IH 
10 m 
As Edgell and Hart remark "Undoubtedly the Heavy Goods Vehicle licences 
held by many men and the general association of firemen handling 
cumbersome appliances with speed and safety are considered to be 
appropriate qualifications by employers looking for part-time/occasional" 
drivers" (p.29). Firemen are also well-suited to agricultural work, 
building work, window cleaning and the like, where the employment 
relationship is casual and the activities are hard to detect by the Inland 
Revenue. 
"The suitability and availability of firemen for work as 
assistant undertakers is recognised by employers, at least in 
South East England. According to the firemen in this study, 
they are seen by employers as reliable, strong, upright and 
neat. Moreover they are often free during the day. Thus 
part-time undertaking by firemen seems to be to the mutual 
advantage of both employers and employees." (ibid:30) 
Only 9 per cent of the firemen working in a second job said that they 
paid taxes on the payments they received. They simply did not declare 
their earnings. Some two-thirds of the men found their fiddle jobs 
either wholly or partly through their contacts in the service. Typically 
also firemen work on fiddle jobs with other firemen and firemen setting up 
in business typically 'employ' or sub-contract work to station colleagues. 
"Thus it is the fact of being a fireman which both allows and indeed 
encourages the men to engage in non-Service work" (ibid:32). Inevitably 
fiddle jobs have to be flexible to fit in with the rota system and the 
unfortunate propensity for fires and other emergencies to occur. 
However, there must be a certain tension between the formal and the fiddle 
job so that on occasions there are sleepy undertakers who have 
unexpectedly spent the previous night fighting a fire. 
This study illustrates very clearly that the incidence of le travail 
au noir can reach very high proportions in certain occupations and that 
focussing on specific localities or employment statuses can lead to the 
neglect of more appropriate frames for case studies. There have been a 
number of such studies of particular occupational milieux (see Mars 1982) 
and it is probably a summation of these activities that provides the solid 
core of "off the book" or "cash in hand" work in the U.K. 
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Part II 
Quantitative Aspects: The Volume and Nature of the Black Economy 
A. Estimations of Total Amount 
Economists have used a variety of methods in attempting to provide 
some overall indication of the size of the black economy. Competing 
estimates range between 2 and 22 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product of 
the United Kingdom. Some economists have used some of the larger 
estimates of the black economy to argue that official economic statistics 
may give a misleading impression of the 'true' level of unemployment, 
since such economists assume that the black economy must involve those who 
do not have formal employment. As will be shown below, this is a false 
assumption and, indeed, in the opinion of one economist who has recently 
reviewed the work of his colleagues "All of the macroeconomic measures of 
the size of the black economy are based on assumptions that are either 
«intestable or implausible" (Thomas 1988(a): 170). Some of these indirect 
macroeconomic measures may be mentioned since, however implausible, they 
are frequently referred to by those who do not understand them. 
Monetary Measures 
Economists in the United States developed a number of methods in the 
late 1970s: some of these were later applied to the UK. Gutman, for 
example, analysed the ratio of cash to deposit accounts. He argued that 
where there was more cash in circulation than would be predicted in the 
absence of the black economy, then such extra cash could be seen as a 
measure of black economic activity. Evidently this method is based on 
the assumption that at some previous point in time there was little or no 
black economic activity. Gutman took the base period for his studies in 
the United States as 1937-19^1. Work along similar lines has been done 
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at the University of Liverpool by Dr. K. Matthews and fellow monetarist 
economists. For reasons that are not at all clear Matthews and Rastogi 
(1985) decided that 1960 was a year when the irregular economy in the UK 
was negligable. This same base year was adopted by Feige, whose approach 
aimed to estimate all monetary transactions that cannot be predicted in 
the absence of the black economy. 
These various approaches are analysed by Thomas (1988a) who plotted 
the various estimates by Feige (1981) Matthews (1983) and Matthews and 
Rastogi (1985) (See Figure 1). Substantial discrepancies appear between 
the various estimates. In 197^ Feige's approach produces a peak of 22 
per cent of GDP, whereas Matthews (1983) suggests that there was a trough 
in that year so that he estimates a black economy of a mere 2 per cent of 
GDP. How is this discrepancy of 20 percentage points to be explained? 
Dr. Thomas valiently attempted to discover the reasons for the 
discrepancies by corresponding with Dr. Matthews who unhappily could not 
help because he no longer had the data file. It is also very unclear why 
Matthews makes the assumption that the ratio of the unrecorded economy to 
the GDP was about 1/£ per cent prior to 1971. 
Since Dr. Matthews has not been able to elucidate the discrepancies 
first between the two studies originating in his own department and 
secondly between his estimates and those of Dr. Feige, it is difficult to 
disagree with Dr. Thomas that these competing estimates could be 
disregarded as "harmless numerical games on the part of economists" were 
it not for the fact that such economists use their guesses and estimates 
to make further guesses and assumptions about who is working in the black 
economy. Quite evidently the nature of the method makes such guesses 
irrelevant, if not improper - but that does not discourage such monetarist 
economists from making them. 
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It is truly astonishing how far certain economists are prepared to 
make arbitrary assumptions about who is working in the black economy when 
there is nothing in their data to support them. In one case "Matthews 
seems to have assumed that the £16,480 millions of unrecorded income (at 
1975 prices) he estimated for 1983 was produced entirely by people who 
were officially unemployed but were actually working full-time in the 
black economy. Using the Liverpool microeconomic Bodel he estimated this 
to be 1.29 million or 41.6 per cent of those who were officially recorded 
as unemployed in 1983. These figures imply that on average each of these 
workers was earning £12,775 (i.e. 16480/1.29) in 1983". (Thomas 1988b) 
Anyone that can believe that can believe anything! It is unclear why the 
link with unemployment is so consistently made when all discrepancies 
noted by economists can be much more plausibly accounted for by 
moonlighting and the under-reporting of work by the self-employed. 
In another survey of studies, using the demand for cash as an 
indicator of the scale of the black economy, Smith (1986) notes that the 
pattern of payments in cash matches very closely that in the economy as a 
whole. Smith shows that after allowing for inflation the real value of 
cash in circulation stayed broadly constant in the 1960s and early 1970s 
but has declined since then so that in real terms the value of notes and 
coin in circulation with the public was about 20 per cent less in the mid 
1980s than it was in the years both Feige and Matthews take as their base 
(Smith 1986, Fig.10.1). Hence Smith notes "Some of the indicators that 
have been used to show a growing black economy in the United States appear 
to point to a rapidly shrinking one in the U.K." (ibid: 93) 
Given the inconsistencies, unexplained assumptions and the 
devastating critiques by fellow economists it is hard to place any 
reliability whatsoever in these macroeconomic methods. Smith tabulates 
the ratio of cash to consumers' expenditure in 1981 and whilst UK, USA and 
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Canada are at the bottom of the table, Switzerland tops the table with 21 
per cent - three times that of the UK. It is unclear what the citizens 
of Switzerland do with all their spare cash! 
As Thomas concludes, after his detailed comparisons of the estimates 
of Feige (1981) Matthews (1983) and Matthews and Rastogi (1985) "Since 
none of these models of measurement are based on any economic theory, 'you 
pays your money and you takes your choice'." (Thomas 1988b) 
2. Indirect Studies of Microeconomic Behaviour 
Economists have used the National Accounts and the Family Expenditure 
Survey in the hope that an exploration of discrepancies between income and 
expenditure will provide some overall measure of the black economy. 
(i) Assessing the demand for le travail au noir by asking the 
customers: demand side. 
Pahl's Sheppey Study (1984) showed that nearly all paid house 
improvement and renovation work was done by firms rather than 
moonlighters. The importance of those in employment doing work 
for themselves was stressed. The unemployed are less likely to be 
involved in the black economy (no tools, car, telephone, funds for 
materials, social contacts etc.) (See case study 2, above). 
(ii) Evidence from Survey Discrepancies. 
Comparing of households' income and expenditure may indicate 
whether a proportion of households appear to be living beyond their 
(declared) means. Dilnot and Morris calculated the gap between 
reported income and total reported expenditure for individual 
households. They concluded that under-reporting of income might, 
in 1977, be equivalent to 2.5 - 3 per cent of GNP. 
The second approach, which has been based on the 1982 Family 
Expenditure Survey, analyses households' spending on particular 
groups of commodities, rather than households' total spending. 
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The aim is to see whether particular groups of the population, 
believed likely to have particular scope for concealing earnings, 
spend more on various products than other people with similar 
incomes. It appears, for example, that the self-employed spend 
more on household services and on food than employees who report a 
similar level of income. In other words, compared with employees, 
the self-employed appear to be enjoying a higher standard of living 
than their declared income warrants. In the absence of any 
obvious reason that the self-employed might wish to buy more 
household services or spend more on food than employees with 
similar incomes, we might conclude that the self-employed in fact 
have higher incomes than they report to the survey. The extent to 
which the self-employed under-report incomes appears on this 
evidence to be broadly in line with the adjustments made in the 
national accounts: somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent of 
self-employed income may, on average, be concealed. (Smith 1986: 
139) If the self-employed to understate at that order of magnitude 
then that level is broadly in line with the level of understatement 
assumed in the UK accounts, 
(iii) Analysis of The Family Expenditure Survey 
Smith assumes a figure of 30 per cent for black economy provision 
of services (which I think is certainly on the high side) and 
estimates an average weekly expenditure of _3·47 per household in 
1983, (see Table 1). This is no more than 2.5 per cent of the 
overall expenditure of an average household. Such an estimate can 
be no more than an informed guess and does not cover the whole 
range of travail noir. However, as Smith notes, "it does ser\e to 
put into perspective some of the larger estimates of the extent of 
the black economy". Economists, such as Kent Matthews, to whom we 
have already referred, have concluded from the analysis of monetary 
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trends that the black economy amounted to 14.5Ï of GDP in 1983. 
This would imply that the average household was spending between 
£2,000 and £2,500 pa on black economy goods and services. This is 
well beyond the figures suggested in Smith's table and extends well 
beyond the products normally associated with the black economy. 
3. Measures of Tax Evasion 
An alternative approach to the black economy is to assess the amount 
of tax that is lost through the evasion - by omission or under-reporting -
of gainful economic activity. 
It is clear from the Report of the Keith Committee that when the 
Inland Revenue does investigate Schedule D and company accounts it finds a 
considerable level of tax evasion. Only about 3 per cent of Schedule D 
returns are investigated each year: in 1981 87 per cent of cases 
investigated resulted in some adjustment being made to profits. Evidence 
provided by the Report of the Board of Inland Revenue for the year ending 
31.12.85 indicates that from 1980 to 1985 there was a 400 per cent 
increase in the yield from special investigations. Smith concludes "Tax 
inspectors believe that at least one-fifth of self-employed income returns 
probably understate income; in the cases actually investigated in 1980/1 
the average tax evaded was around £1000. If typical of self-employed 
taxpayers as a whole, these figures might point to a total loss of tax on 
Schedule D incomes of the order of 10 per cent of the actual tax yield 
from self-employed taxpayers." (pp.61-62) (For further discussion of this 
point see Committee of Public Accounts 22nd Report Session 1981-82, 13 
July 1982, HMS0, London: paragraph 2249 et seq.) 
As a result of information gathered from Parliamentary Answers 
between November 1987 and June 1988 some general indication of the level 
of tax fraud can be assessed (Figure 2). The Inland Revenue considered 
the size of the black economy as a whole represented a tax loss of some £4 
16 
billion a year and this seems to be the best estimate available. In the 
early 1980s a tax loss of some £140 million a year could be attributed to 
tax evasion by casual and agency workers which is evidently small in 
relation to the black economy as a whole. 
The most common type of frauds connected with unemployment and social 
security benefits fall into three main categories: 
- working while claiming i.e. misrepresentation of employment 
status 
- other misrepresentation of personal circumstances e.g. 
claiming for non-existent children, undeclared habitation 
etc. 
frauds connected with the payment mechanism e.g. forgery or 
alteration of Giro cheques. 
The last named is the most frequent type of case considered for 
prosecution accounting for more than a half of the total cases. Twenty 
four per cent of cases - 23,000 in 1983/84 - were of the first type of 
fraud, namely working while claiming. 
In order to detect such crimes the DHSS employs some 2,200 staff on 
fraud work at the local and regional level. A further 650 staff are 
employed on fraud work by the Department of Employment. The number of 
people convicted for fraud against the DHSS declined from 21,797 in 
1979-80 to 9,349 in 1985-86. 
Studies by Coffield et al (1986), Miles (1983), Pahl (1984), Trew and 
Kilpatrick (1984) among others show why so few unemployed people are able 
to engage in the black economy. Smith summarises their conclusions thus: 
"Most of the unemployed are poorly equipped for work 
in the black economy, having generally lower skill 
levels than those in employment or skills that are 
typically not in demand in the black economy. For 
example, there are likely to be few opportunities for 
the unemployed former coal miners in the north-east to 
use their skills in casual jobs; moreover, such 
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opportunities as do arise will be shared amongst a 
large number of former miners with the same skills". 
(1986: 72) 
Clearly the scope for occasional work while claiming benefit will be 
least in areas of high unemployment. As unemployment increases, the 
black economy is likely to decline. (See O'Higgins 1985 and Pahl 1984). 
Smith concludes "One pound spent on enforcement by the DHSS appears 
to recover no more than £3 of benefit, compared with an average of £6 from 
income tax investigation". This point has been made repeatedly by the 
Inland Revenue: in 1981 each member of the Inland Revenue staff produced 
an average £92,000 in extra tax. Customs and Excise staff engaged on 
control visits to VAT registered traders found in 1980-81 under-
declarations amounting to about £150 million or £37,500 per official. 
About the same amount was attributed to the activities of extra staff 
deployed by the DHSS to combat social security fraud in the same period. 
It is understandable that Government should be reluctant to investigate 
the self-employed more thoroughly when it is anxious to reduce the numbers 
unemployed by encouraging many of them to become self-employed. 
4. Evidence from Time Budget Studies 
Official statistics are not as helpful as other sources of data in 
assessing the nature and incidence of le travail au noir. One excellent 
source is time budget data which is now becoming available for a number of 
European countries. Professor Gershuny has kindly made available data 
from the 1983/84 ESRC Survey. There are similar data sets available for 
the Netherlands and elsewhere. Full details of the British survey are 
not yet published. Basically it was a national sample yielding 474 men 
and 691 women. For present purposes analysis was limited to the 537 
cases who were classified before they completed their self-report diary as 
'not In employment'. It will be seen from table 15 that 80 per cent of 
those not in employment do no further paid work. Two thirds of the 
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unemployed do no paid work but a quarter do up to 6 hours work a week 
(which may not be illegal) and a further 8 per cent do between 6 and 12 
hours a week. Only 2.6 per cent of the unemployed are very likely to be 
in the black economy. This is an underestimate, as those employed people 
who work in the irregular economy may be less likely to complete the 
diaries for a time-budget survey. However, even doubling the proportion 
to allow for non response the proportion is still only between 5 and 6 per 
cent, which matches very well with the results of other studies. 
B. The Irregular Economy Defined by Categories of Persons 
Here numbers of people are emphasized, sometimes at the expense of 
the amount of income they severally or collectively acquire. Thus, if 
200,000 people illegally gain, say £30 a head per week each, that would be 
a very small net tax loss, depending on the rate at which those 
individuals are assessed. By contrast, a handful of people responsible 
for corporate fraud of some millions may represent a very considerable tax 
loss. 
The following would appear to be the main headings: 
(i) Individuals on PAYE (Schedule E) who do not reveal that they 
have a second job which should be assessed under schedule D. 
These are illegal 'moonlighters'. (Note moonlighting per se 
is not necessarily part of the irregular economy.) 
(ii) Individuals who do not register for Schedule D who are, in 
fact, self employed or employ others (e.g. family members) on 
a 'cash-in-hand' basis. These are known to the Inland 
Revenue as 'ghosts', 
(iii) Individuals on Schedule D who substantially underdeclare the 
full amount of their earned income to the Inland Revenue, 
(iv) Individuals who claim benefits but who also earn extra 
undeclared income. 
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(ν) Individuals in the labour force who use their position as 
directors, managers or employees to use their skill, inside 
knowledge or range of patronage to secure for themselves 
illegal financial advantage at the expense of the tax 
authorities, shareholders or other employees. Such 
individuals may be in private companies or government 
departments. (Note A distinction is being made here between 
corporate involvement in the irregular economy and individual 
involvement). 
(vi) Individuals who are primarily involved with avoiding VAT, 
customs and excise duties and other specialized taxes, 
(vii) Individuals who illegally employ minors, prisoners and other 
categories who are protected or prevented from engaging in the 
labour force. 
Two main categories of workers in the irregular economy are of 
overwhelming importance: the first are those who are employed but who 
take a second or further jobs and who either omit to declare or who under­
declare their earnings from this extra economic activity; the second are 
the self-emplopyed who under-declare part of their earnings. The latter 
may also employ those who are multiple job holders but neglect to report 
this activity. Thus the first may be connected with the second. Some 
part-time workers may accumulate two or more part time jobs and employers 
and employees may collude - the former gains by not having the 
responsibility to full time workers and the latter by having more flexible 
working and payment arrangements. It was once suggested that unemployed 
people who work in the black economy are a significant element. It is 
now commonly understood that this is not the case but some consideration 
will nevertheless be given to this third category. 
(26) 
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1. Multiple Job Holders or Moonlighters 
Table 2 based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) shows women are now 
more likely than men to have second jobs, their number having increased by 
a third from 324,000 In 1984 to 445,000 in 1987. However, women with 
more than one job are still less than 5 per cent of the labour force and, 
overall, multiple job holders are less than 4 per cent of the labour 
force. These are, however some interesting variations. Detailed 
analysis of the 1985 LFS undertaken for this Report reveal some 
interesting differences. The fact that double job holding is more common 
outside the conurbations and in the South East and South West indicates 
that it is more a product of affluence than poverty. (See Table 3) 
Evidently opportunities for second jobs vary between regions and 
between men and women. For men there are more opportunities in Northern 
Ireland and for women in the South West. The former may be attributed to 
the distinctive cultural and religious situation in Northern Ireland, 
whereas women's multiactivity in the South West may be attributed to the 
opportunities arising out of tourism, although the proportions of second 
jobs are much the same in the industrial order 'Health Education and 
Welfare' as 'Distribution, Hotels and Catering'. In Northern Ireland, by 
contrast, men's second occupation would be most likely to be in 
agriculture and their first job to be in the public sector or construction 
and distribution. The pattern for the UK as a whole is shown in table 4 
where the dominance of the service sector is clear for both men and women. 
It should be noted that the third most important industrial order for 
second jobs for both men and women is in Financial and Business Services. 
2. The Self Employed 
There has been a substantial increase in self-employment in recent 
years. From 1979-1984 there was an increase of 32 per cent in the number 
of self-employed. The total of 2.66 million in June 1986 comprised the 
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highest proportion of the work force self-employed since 1921. A third 
of all those classified as managers were self-employed in 1983. Nearly 
40 per cent of the self-employed had employees. The total of self-
employed men is equivalent to 12.5 per cent of all men in employment. 
Evidently, correlation does not imply causation but it would be very 
surprising if the growth of tax avoidance and the growth of self-
employment were not related by more than chance. It will be seen from 
Table 5A that there has been a steady increase during the 1980s of the 
proportion of the self-employed with second jobs. It will also be noted 
that an increasing proportion of all second jobs are self-employed. Thus 
the category "self employed" can include those whose only status is self 
employed, employees whose second job is self-employed and self-employed 
people who have a second self-employed job. It is sometimes claimed that 
the growth of self employment in the UK in recent years is an indication 
of the growth of small businesses. In fact four-fifths of the growth is 
due to the expansion of people working on their own. (Table 5B) It may 
well be that part of the growth of what may be termed own-account workers 
is due to the possible tax advantages of being assessed under Schedule D 
rather than PAYE. Table 6 shows clearly that over half of all self-
employed women workers without employees are part-time which is a greater 
share (54 per cent) than for all women workers (40 per cent). The 
so-called entrepreneurial revolution looks very different when seen in 
this light. Table 7 shows which industries the self-employed without 
employees are engaged in. It will be seen that in 1975 14 per cent of 
all the self-employed without employees were in construction which rose to 
23 per cent by 1985. Perhaps the most striking finding that is 
illustrated by Table 7 is the dramatic fall in the proportion of the 
self-employed with employees in manufacturing industry in relation to the 
total self-employed. The growth of own account workers in chemicals and 
metal manufacturing, engineering and other manufacturing industry has 
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implications that deserve to be explored by further research. The shift to 
self-employment reflects less a growth of small businesses and more a 
growth of categories such as self-employed construction workers and others 
anxious to control their own tax returns. Statistics are frequently 
presented showing increases in the number of self-employed by industrial 
sector and assumptions are then sometimes made about the growth of small 
businesses. In the light of the fact that such statistics also reflect 
the growth of own account workers an equally plausible interpretation of 
the data could be in terms of an increase in irregular economy work. 
3. Unemployment and Supplementary Benefits Claimants 
In 1982 the Economist Intelligence Unit produced a Report on Coping 
with Unemployment based on a quota sample. Respondents were selected at 
a total of 106 sampling points selected on a national basis with 
probability proportional to the number of registered unemployed and a 
total of 1,043 respondents were interviewed. These respondents were 
looking for either full or part time work and were registered as 
unemployed at a Jobcentre, Employment Office or Careers Office. The 
interviews were carried out by trained interviewers working for a market 
research organisation. Every attempt was made to ensure that the sample 
was soundly based and the interviews were subject to rigorous quality 
controls. Ten per cent of the completed questionnaires were subject to a 
telephone check back and 15 per cent were subject to a postal check back. 
One interview in ten was undertaken in the presence of a supervisor. 
Respondents were assured that all their replies would be treated in 
strictest confidence and were told that the survey was not in any way 
connected with any governmental or official body. Thus reassured, 23 per 
cent of the sample said that they did do jobs for other people - painting 
and decorating and gardening being most frequently mentioned. Other jobs 
mentioned were wall papering, housework, shopping, babysitting, car 
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repairs and general odd jobs. Interviewees were asked how many days they 
spent doing casual work for other people since they were unemployed and 9 
per cent said they had done 25 days or more. (61 per cent had done none). 
However, it is most important not to assume that all the unemployed people 
who did extra jobs for other people were paid. Most received no payment 
and overall only 4 per cent of the total sample had had cash payment 
(rising to 12 per cent of those with further education) 2 per cent had 
payment in kind and 2 per cent had a favour in return. The proportion 
receiving cash payments increased to 7 per cent in London and the South 
East and the North West. It must be remembered that such payments might 
be simply for only one day's work in the last month. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit concluded 
'The survey thus indicates just how limited paid casual 
work among the unemployed actually is. Of the 
admittedly fairly substantial proportion of unemployed 
doing casual work for other people, few are receiving 
any payment whatsoever - contrary perhaps to popular 
belief'. 
The proportion of 4 per cent fits with other studies such as the detailed 
study of the Isle of Sheppey carried out at about the same time. It is 
difficult to get time-series data, since the rules relating to claimants 
rights and obligations have been changed frequently. However, in 1985 
the LFS indicates that 6 per cent of claimants of unemployment and 
supplementary benefit were also doing some paid work. Apparently women 
are much more likely to be working whilst receiving benefits (8.8 per cent 
as against 4.6 per cent for men) but it does not follow that they are 
doing anything illegal, since they are likely to be working very few hours 
for very little pay. Table 8 shows that the overall proportion in 1983 
for UK was just over 5 per cent but this was due to higher proportions of 
women working in the midlands and the north of England. 
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Table 9 indicating the number of hours worked by claimants in the 
previous week, shows that two thirds of all female working claimants 
worked less than 20 hours and one third less than 10 hours. For those 
who want to put a firm figure on the proportion of claimants who are also 
working to any substantial degree, it can be seen that 0.9 per cent of men 
and women do appear to be so doing. 
Quite clearly unemployed people play a negligable role in the black 
economy and do not merit any further discussion. The reasons for their 
low participation have been discussed by Miles (1983) and Pahl (1987) 
amongst others and these conclusions are now generally acceptable (See 
Thomas 1988). 
4. Temporary Workers 
It will be seen from Table 10 that, in 1987, 5.6 per cent of the 
employed labour force were temporary workers of which the majority were 
women. Such workers are more likely to be employed in small firms (Table 
11). Tables 12 and 13 show the distribution of temporary workers by 
industry and occupation. It does not follow that all these temporary 
workers are in the black economy. However, there are strong indications 
that in some areas - such as contract cleaning - employees have been 
obliged to move from permanent to temporary work, often with no written 
contract of employment and with little, if any, entitlement to holiday 
pay, sick pay and other benefits (see Table 14) 
The British Government removed Schedule II of the Employment 
Protection Act in 1980 and in 1983 abolished the Fair Wages Resolution 
which had helped to ensure that contractors paid rates comparable to those 
paid in direct employment. In a survey published in Labour Research 
(July 1986) it was estimated that many contractors in the cleaning 
industry regularly infringe the Health and Safety at Work Act and are 
often unaware of their responsibilities and liabilities. 
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The Labour Force Survey (1984) identifies two kinds of temporary 
work. Firstly, work which is 'seasonal, temporary or casual* where it is 
understood by both employer and employee that the termination of the job 
is fixed. Secondly, the LFS includes in the same category respondents 
working under contract or for a fixed period of time including those with 
a specific training contract such as apprentices. In all cases the 
definition is supplied by the respondent« These two categories may be 
referred to as 'casual' and 'contract' respectively. 
Another source is provided by the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey 1984 (WIRS) and a further survey of employers by Meager. He 
defines temporary workers as 'Those whose employment at the organisation 
in question is recognised by both sides to be on a temporary basis, 
irrespective of whether the individuals are employees of the organisation 
(they may be self-employed, or employees of an employment business, that 
is, a type of employment agency which employs and hires out temporary 
workers). ' 
There is substantial dispute about the changes over time of the 
numbers of temporary workers. WIRS 1984 reported little increase in 
temporary forms of work but this survey was confined to workplaces of at 
least 25 employees. Meager found that only 17 per cent of employers with 
fewer than 25 employees used temporary workers, conpared with 91 per cent 
of employers with 100+ employees. The 1984 LFS shows that 50 per cent of 
temporary workers work in firms with fewer than 25 employees. The larger 
the firm the more likely it will employ temps but nost temps are in small 
firras. 
Table 15 shows that temporary workers are clustered in certain 
occupations. A quarter of contract temps are in professional; health, 
education and welfare occupations and a further quarter are skilled 
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craftsmen. By contrast a third of casual temps are in clerical, 
secretarial and sales jobs and a further quarter are in personal service 
work as school helpers, cleaners, waitresses and bar tenders. 
Male and female casual and contract workers differ from permanent 
workers in distinctive ways. Male casual workers are much more likely 
to be under 20 - about a third of all male casual workers in 1986 being in 
that age range. They are also more likely to be over 60 than male 
permanent workers - presumably supplementing their pension with part time 
work or doing extra work to keep active. Women casual workers were also 
more likely to be under 20 but less likely to be aged over 50. Typically 
female casual workers fit the stereotype of being married with domestic 
work limiting their capacity to do a permanent job. About 40 per cent of 
women with a temporary job said that they did not want a permanent job but 
between a fifth and a quarter had a temporary job because they could not 
find a permanent job. (Table 16) 
It should be remembered that self-employment is more common amongst 
temporary workers than among permanent workers. In 1986 only 11 per cent 
of permanent workers were self-employed compared to 13 per cent of casual 
workers and 23 per cent of contract workers. The predominance of 
seif-employment in the construction industry is well known but it is not 
so well understood that the proportion of male managers in casual jobs is 
also very high (King 1988) 
5. Child Labour 
The Employment of Children Act of 1973 is on the statute books but is 
not yet law. Section 3(4) of this Act provides that the Act shall only 
come into force "on such a day as the Secretary of State may appoint by 
order made by statutory instrument." This has not yet happened. To 
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implement it effectively would involve extra administrative time and 
effort by local Authorities and the British government wishes to reduce 
the powers and expenditure of local government. 
A survey by the Low Pay Unit of over 1700 school children in London 
and Luton, Bedfordshire in 1982-83 showed that 41 per cent of the boys and 
38 per cent of the girls aged between 11 and 16 were in employment. 
Children were employed in a wide range of jobs, though predominantly in 
services such as retailing, catering, cleaning and, overwhelmingly, 
newspaper deliveries. Table 17 shows the overall distribution of 
children's employment, counting separately all jobs reported by individual 
children. About 1 in 10 children surveyed had more than one job and half 
of these more than two. Clearly, a large proportion of school children 
do work on a part-time, and even a full-time basis. The majority of 
children appear to be working illegally. The London survey found that 
over 4 out of 5 children working were illegally employed, either because 
they were under-aged, working illegal hours or working in jobs they should 
not have been doing. Health and safety regulations were typically 
ignored. Nearly one third of all boys and 29 per cent of girls reported 
some accident or injury. The main causes included heavy weights 
-specifically prohibited under the Children and Young Person's Act -
broken glass, slipping or falling and injuries caused by materials or 
machinery. 
Discussion 
In the above assessment of the informal economy a number of 
categories have been mentioned as being most likely to be actively 
involved. These are 
(i) The self-employed who underdeclare part or all of their 
economic activities. Those whose second job is self-employed 
are likely to be most prone to such tax evasion. Those with 
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a seasonal or a service Job with a fluctuating demand such as 
farmers' wives who provide bed and breakfast are typical 
examples, 
(ii) Temporary or casual workers who get paid in cash out of 
takings. These are considered to be the classic 'off the 
books' workers in the black economy and are most likely to be 
students and women, 
(iii) Children who are employed illegally. 
These are the putative main categories and they appear to be increasing. 
A tiny proportion of claimants work illegally but this is at the most 2 or 
3 per cent of a declining number. Part of the difficulty in coming to 
firm estimates of the size of the irregular economy is that those who are 
most active in it - such as firemen - are being legal workers most of the 
time. The self-employed plumber does not evade all VAT or income tax; 
those with second jobs are not all hiding them. Discrepancies between 
declared income and expenditure will be least amongst those entirely 
dependent on PAYE and most amongst those who are full-time self-employed 
or who are self-employed in a second job. 
It is important to register here a crucial caveat. There is a 
danger when discussing the black economy of assuming that those who are 
paid cash in hand or who do temporary casual and seasonal work must, 
almost by definition, constitute the core of le travail au noir. This is 
a complete misconception and the widespread uncritical acceptance of this 
notion has led to inflated estimates of the black economy in the U.K. 
Casual or part-time workers enter the black economy only when their 
earnings reach the income tax threshold and not before. In 1987 the 
personal tax-free allowance for a single person and a married woman was 
£2,425 (or ¿'46.50 a week) and National Insurance contributions only become 
payable on earnings of £39 a week or £2,028 for employees (with a slightly 
higher threshold for the self-employed). Thus some people will pay 
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National Insurance contributions but will not pay income tax if they do 
not reach the threshold. A very large proportion of workers will, quite 
legally, pay no tax at all. Thus someone could quite legitimately earn 
well over £200 a week for 8 weeks in the summer and, if there are no other 
earnings during the tax year, be quite free from any liability to pay tax. 
Those who earn substantial sums at infrequent intervals or who earn less 
than £46.50 a week in a part-time job will be seen to be earning by 
neighbours but it will not always be recognised that such employment 
carries with it no liability to pay tax. A recent unpublished study of 
the number of earning workers who are below the tax threshold calculated 
that there could be in the order of 3 million legal non-taxpayers in the 
workforce mainly part-time workers; that there could be 4 million people 
with small (even trivial) earnings below the National Insurance threshold 
and that there might be, in all, some 5 million people who are in danger 
of being misconstrued as working in the black economy. 
This is a very serious point and casts doubt on Pahl's estimate that 
some 5 per cent of the population of the Isle of Sheppey may be working in 
the black economy. Certainly in the case of women workers Pahl had no 
evidence to suggest that they individually earned more than their 
individual tax-free allowance. The true estimate of the proportion of 
the population of Sheppey who were working and evading taxes is thus 
likely to be substantially less than 5 per cent. Much would depend on 
the number of men in the truly "fiddle prone" occupations who were engaged 
in undeclared second jobs. 
Variable earnings are inherent in casual, seasonal and temporary work 
and, as these forms of work have been increasing in the UK in recent years 
so the proportion of the workforce who legitimately need pay no tax will 
also be increasing. Unless this point is more widely known and 
understood "people in 'traditional' permanent full-time jobs may (quite 
incorrectly) suspect their neighbours of working in the black economy 
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because the neighbour claims to pay no tax, despite quite obviously 
earning large amounts at times. What is only too readily left out of the 
picture are the many weeks when earnings are low or non-existent (hence 
not paraded exultantly). This is only one of the reasons for attaching 
little credance to the results of surveys of the black economy which in 
fact rely on stereotyping, hearsay and conjecture about how many 
neighbours (unemployed or working are active in the black economy - but it 
is a very important one." (Hakim 1988) Such criticisms are particularly 
applicable to the work by Matthews and Stoney (1987) whose wildly 
inaccurate guesstimates received wide press publicity in July 1987. (See 
Thomas 1988b). 
As was shown above in the discussion of second jobs, there is a 
substantial regional variation and differentiation by sex. Local demand 
and cultural factors are important. The tradition of women's employment 
in the north and of supplementing the income of farming households in the 
west country are reflected in their higher activity rates. Men in the 
north east perceive a distinction between 'a proper job' (mining or 
building ships) and 'Mickey Mouse jobs' (many service sector occupations). 
This reduces their involvement in many second jobs. 
The demand for casual or temporary work varies regionally and 
manifests itself at a micro-level below the level of the labour markets 
conventionally analysed by economists. Thus there are highly localised 
parts of London that are being rehabilitated by young unmarried 
professionals on relatively high incomes. ("Gentrification by Yuppies"). 
Such people typlically work long hours and create a demand for decorating 
and minor building works. When such high earners marry and have children 
they will move to selected places in the south east and south west and 
spread the demand for nannies, gardeners and yet more building and 
decorating in certain small towns and villages. This is essentially 
short-term or casual work and labour recruitment strategies that served in 
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Islington or Fulham are transferred to rural Suffolk or Avon. This is, 
of course a small and specialised demand. A much more common and 
widespread demand is created by poor people who cannot afford to pay full 
market rates. Such people could include pensioners living in their own 
homes which need repair and decoration or lone parents on low incomes. 
Most poor people are women and some of the services they need are most 
effectively done by other women - shopping, informal home helps. Such 
informal work, if it is remunerated, is a hidden subsidy to state welfare 
services. Other work, such as decorating that is done by men is 
frequently done well below market rates ("I hadn't the heart to charge the 
old dear more - she still thinks a £1 is worth what it was twenty years 
ago" or "I wouldn't want someone to rip off my old mum so I keep the price 
down"). If this irregular work becomes part of the black economy it is 
because people resent the impersonality and rationality of the market and 
wish to assert their own altruistic or redistributive values. Such work 
represents values associated with communal sharing and responsibility and 
it is deeply ironic that it is precisely this work - that has to be cash 
in hand but may not be illegal - that is under attack by Governments who 
wish to control it. 
A third source of demand for non-permanent employment is in the 
spheres of tourism and recreation where seasonal fluctuations almost 
inevitably makes much work temporary or casual and students, young men 
under 20 and married women constitute the main labour supply. In some 
places such as Bath, York or Canterbury shopping is a major tourist 
attraction and extra casual labour is required during an increasingly long 
tourist season. Large multiple stores now dominate most of the 
commercial centres of such places and their hiring practices are legal if 
not always generous. The self-employed owners of wine bars and boutiques 
are more likely to pay 'out of the till' and in kind. 
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These three sources of demand for non-permanent employment - the 
young and affluent, the old and poor and the areas and sectors of tourism 
and recreation do not constitute any serious problem. Looking for the 
black economy in the United Kingdom is rather like salmon fishing in a 
river in which there are only a few minnows. The situation may be much 
more exciting in other countries of the European Community not so firmly 
committed to legalised deregulation as the U.K. Hence, whilst it is true 
that there has been a growth of temporary, casual and part-time work 
giving it amongst the very highest ratios of part-time to full-time work 
in the community, the level of the tax threshold and the lack of any great 
restraints on employers ensures that very little of such 'flexible' work 
is in the irregular economy. The UK may be different from her partners in 
this respect. Similarly there is very little clandestine immigration 
which may create problems in other countries of the Community. 
The main factors in the UK that reduce the irregular economy are 
(i) Legalized deregulation of temporary, part-time casual and 
contract work, 
(ii) Lower levels of income tax and increasing tax thresholds, 
(iii) Difficulty in engaging in paid employment by claimants (partly 
because of social and political sanctions but also because of 
lack of opportunities in areas of high employment). 
The main factors in the UK that are increasing the black economy are 
(i) The growth of own account workers as both first and second 
jobs, 
(ii) The growth of an individualistic entrepreneuring culture in 
which tax evasion is not seen as an abnegation of collective 
and communal responsibility. If tax evasion is seen as 
'smart' or 'street wise' and at the same time the Government 
also has an ideological commitment to reducing the 'tax 
burden' then the self-employed who evade taxation may see 
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themselves somewhat cynically as practising 'self help'. The 
Government is caught between wanting to encourage such a 
spirit of entrepreneuring and self-help and recognizing the 
potential divisiveness of the access to tax evasion being 
inequal as between employees and the self-employed. Its 
solution appears to be to adopt diversionary tactics by 
focussing on a negligable part of the problem (working 
claimants) and to choose to believe blatantly unreliable 
'guesstimates' of the size of the problem, rather than the 
more reliable sources used here, 
(iii) The Government's reluctance to implement legislation 
prohibiting the employment of children. 
Conclusions 
The UK's irregular economy is almost entirely a problem of tax 
evasion by those, mainly the self-employed, who are in work. Given the 
Government's enthusiasm for self-help and enterprise is unlikely to 
provide the extra staff that the Inland Revenue requires if the size of 
the irregular economy is to be reduced. Nor is it likely to extol the 
virtues of collective and communal responsibility in an effort to make 
entrepreneurs more conscious of their social obligations. 
Large scale corporate fraud has not been considered in detail here 
despite the fact it has been estimated that it costs Britain about £1 
billion a year (The Independent 6.4.88). 
It would be valuable to explore in more detail the attitudes towards 
the taxation of own account workers and to document in more detail in 
which areas of the economy they are expanding. If a future Government in 
the UK was seriously concerned to reduce the irregular economy, then more 
detailed research on the context and attitudes towards tax evasion and 
fiscal fraud would be necessary. if the values of the current folk 
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heroes need to be changed and the social costs of an enterprise culture 
explored, then qualitative research should have precedence over the 
remarkably unrevealing, if not positively misleading, macroeconomic 
approaches to the irregular economy. 
The clear and unequivocal conclusion is that any increase in the 
black economy in the U.K. in recent years is overwhelmingly due to an 
increase in self-employment. Since such an increase is in line with 
Government policy, then the Government must share some of the 
responsibility if the growth of the black economy is seen as unwelcome. 
The assumption by some economists that unemployed people make any 
significant contribution to the black economy is unquestionably false and 
this conclusion is confirmed for France, Germany and most other EC 
countries. However, unlike the situation in the southern EC countries, 
the black economy is not demand-led in the UK. Nor, as a result of 
legalized deregulation, is the growth in the black economy employer-led. 
The black economy in the UK is largely a product of taxation policy. So 
long as a large proportion of the tax paid by self-employed workers is 
voluntary, so long will the incentive to become self-employed remain high. 
Until such time as the honest declaration of income for taxation purposes 
is perceived as an accepted part of a concept of citizenship that is 
strongly reinforced by Government, the tendency to prefer to be a lone 
pirate will continue. 
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Figure 2 
1.NUMBER OF CASES OF TAX EVASION INVOLVING MORE THAN £100,000 
1979 1987 
£100,000 - £499,999 53 229 
£500,000 - £999,999 - 13 
Over £1,000,000 - 6 
2.ΤΉΕ AMOUNT OF MONEY RECOVERED FROM TAX AND BENEFIT FRAUD CASES 
TAX FRAUD DHSS BENEFIT FRAUD 
MONEY RECOVERED (1987) £741m £55m 
3.NUMBER OF OFFICERS EMPLOYED TO INVESTIGATE TAX AND DHSS BENEFIT FRAUD 
TAX FRAUD DHSS BENEFIT FRAUD 
NO.OF OFFICERS EMPLOYED 2,600 2,724 
4.NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS FOR TAX AND DHSS BENEFIT FRAUD 
TAX FRAUD DHSS BENEFIT FRAUD 
NO.OF PROSECUTIONS (1986/7) 326 6,603 
5.RATE OF PROSECUTION OF CASES OF TAX EVASION INVOLVING OVER £100,000 
MONEY RECOVERED NO.OF CASES NO. OF CASES PROSECUTED 
£100,000-£499,999 229 · 18 
£500,000-£999,999 13 0 
Over £1,000,000 6 4 
SOURCE:PARLIAMENTARY AKfWFJKS NOV. 1997 -JUNE 1933 
42 
TABLE 1 
Household Spending on Typical Black Economy Items 
Total spending 
on item 
(£ per week) 
Assumed spending 
in black economy 
(£ per week) 
Structural alterations and 
additions to dwellings 
Payments to contractors for repairs, 
maintenance, and decorations 
Ice-cream and iced lollies 
Meals out (tips element in black 
economy) 
Repairs to TVs, radios, etc. 
Repairs to gas and electric 
appliances 
Vehicle repairs 
Taxi fares 
Contribution towards cost of travel 
in friend's car, etc. (100% in 
black economy) 
Other travel and transport 
(removals, etc.) 
Theatres, sporting events, and other 
entertainment 
Domestic help, etc. 
Hairdressing, manicure, etc. 
Repairs to footwear, etc. 
Laundry, cleaning and dyeing 
Private tuition and other 
educational'fees 
Cash gifts and tips not allocated 
(tips element in black economy) 
Miscellaneous expenditure on 
services (e.g. newspaper 
advertisements, public baths, etc.) 
2 . 
0 . 
0 . 
2 . 
0. 
0. 
1 ; 
0, 
0. 
0. 
1. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
39 
94 
19 
92 
08 
.20 
:63 
■ 30 
08 
.12 
.14 
• 53 
.98 
.28 
.23 
.51 
.00 
.78 
Total, these items 
o as % of total household 
expenditure 
£14.30 
10% 
0.72 
0.28 
0.06 
0.29 
0.02 
0.06 
0.49 
0.09 
0.08 
0.04 
0.17 
0.16 
0.29 
0.08 
0.07' 
0. 15 
0.30 
0. 12 
£3.47 
2.4% 
Source: Family Expenditure Survey, 1983, Annex A 
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Table 2 Workers With More Than One Job 1984-1987 
Numbers (thousands) 
Men 
Women 
1984 
379 
324 
1985 
397 
382 
1986 
408 
406 
1987 
391 
445 
% of Employed Labour Force 
Men 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 
Women 3.4 3.9 4.1 4.4 
N.B. The total percentage figures for earlier years were as follows: 
1975 1.6 
1977 1.6 
1979 1.5 
1981 2.1 
1983 2.4 
Source: LFS, different years. 
44 
TABLE 3 
Percentage of workers with more than one job by region 
Males Females Total 
Greater London 
Rest of South East 
South West 
East Anglia 
East Midlands 
West Midlands 
Yorks & Humberside 
North West 
North 
Wales 
Scotland 
Northern Ireland 
Conurbations 
Non-Conurbation Areas 
United Kingdom 
2.6 
3.4 
3.8 
3.4 
2.7 
2.8 
3.2 
2.6 
2.7 
1.8 
2.1 
4.1 
2.4 
3.2 
3.0 
3.4 
5.1 
5.0 
4.2 
4.6 
3.7 
4.1 
3.8 
3.3 
2.6 
2.6 
3.1 
3.3 
4.2 
3.9 
3.0 
4.1 
4.3 
3.7 
3.6 
3.2 
3.6 
3.1 
3.0 
2.2 
2.3 
3.7 
2.8 
3.6 
3.4 
Source: LFS 1985 
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TABLE 4 
Workers with Second Jobs by Industry of t h e i r F i r s t and Second Jobs 
MEN 
Agriculture 
Mining and Energy 
Metals, Mineral and 
Chemicals 
Engineering 
Other Manufacturing 
Construction 
Distribution, Hotels 
and Repairs 
Transport 
Finance and Business 
Services 
Public and Other Services 
Workers with 
Industry of 
Main Job 
4.0 
2.1 
3.1 
9.4 
9.9 
8.0 
14.8 
5.6 
9.4 
33.7 
Second Jc 
Industry 
>bs 
of 
Second Job 
7.4 
0.1 
0.4 
1.9 
4.5 
2.6 
25.5 
3.3 
8.8 
44.4 
All Workers 
Industry of 
Main Job 
3.4 
4.3 
4.3 
14.3 
10.8 
11.7 
16.0 
8.1 
8.2 
18.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
WOMEN 
Agriculture 
Mining and Energy 
Metals, Minerals and 
Chemicals 
Engineering 
Other Manufacturing 
Construction 
Distribution, Hotels 
and Repairs 
Transport 
Finance and Business 
Services 
Public and Other Services 
2.3 
0.7 
0.6 
2.8 
6.8 
1.2 
22.1 
1.2 
9.6 
51.8 
2.7 
0.0 
0.9 
0.7 
5.5 
1.4 
36.3 
1.9 
5.6 
45.4 
1.3 
0.9 
1.8 
4.9 
10.3 
1.4 
25.3 
2.9 
9.8 
41.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: LFS 1985, Spec i a l Tabula t ion 
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Table 5 A Double Job Holding by Employment Status 
1981 
Main Job Employee 
Self Employed 
1983 
Main Job Employee 
Self Employed 
1985 
Main Job Employee 
Self Employed 
1987 
Main Job Employee 
Self Employed 
Second 
Employee Se 
320 
33 
350 
34 
455 
50 
498 
54 
Job 
If Employed 
96 
32 
111 
42 
18C 
77 
177 
89 
X of Second 
Jobs Self 
Employed 
23.1 
49.2 
24.0 
55.0 
28.0 
60.6 
26.0 
62.2.. 
% With 
Second Job 
2.0 
3.0 
2.2 
3.4 
3.1 
4.7 
4.2 
4.8 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1981-1987. 
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TABLE 5B 
Patterns of Self Employment 1975-1985 
Percentage of all Workers 
1975 
1977 
1979 
1981 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Change 
1975-1985 
Self Employed 
With Employees 
Males Females Total 
3.1 
3.0 
2.6 
3.0 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
+0.3 
0.6 
0.7 
0.5 
0.7 
0.9 
0.9 
1.0 
+0.4 
3.7 
3.7 
3.1 
3.7 
4.0 
4.2 
4.4 
+0.7 
Self Employed 
Without Employees 
Males Females Total 
3.6 
3.9 
3.5 
4.6 
4.8 
5.4 
5.3 
+1.7 
0.8 
1.0 
0.9 
1.3 
1.5 
1.8 
1.9 
+1.1 
4.5 
4.9 
4.4 
5.8 
6.3 
7.2 
7.2 
+2.8 
All 
Self 
Employed 
8.2 
8.6 
7.5 
9.5 
10.3 
11.4 
11.6 
+3.4 
Source: LFS Various Years, 
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TABLE 6 
Percentage of Workers who are Part Time (<30 hours) 
By Employment Status 1985 
Men Women 
Self Employed With Employees 2.9% 26.0% 
Self Employed Without Employees 8.4% 54.2% 
All Workers (Employees and 
Self Employed) 4.0% 40.2% 
Source: LFS 1985. 
TABLE 7 
Agriculture etc. 
Mining and Energy 
Chemicals, Metal 
Manufacturing etc. 
Engineering 
Other Manufacturing 
Construction 
Distribution, 
Hotels, etc. 
Transport 
Finance and 
Business Services 
Public and Other 
Services 
Ali 
Self Empio 
1975 
With 
Employees 
17.9 
0.1 
0.6 
1.0 
1.7 
6.6 
8.5 
1.8 
6.0 
1.5 
3.7 
yed worke 
Without 
rs with and withot t emp 
Percentage of Industrie 
All With Employees 
Employees as % of Total 
26.3 
0.2 
0.3 
0.6 
1.5 
14.0 
7.5 
4.0 
3.9 
2.4 
4.5 
Se 
44.2 
0.3 
0.9 
1.6 
f Employed 
40 
33 
65 
63 
3.2 52 
20.6 
1 
32 
1 
16.0 53 
5.8 31 
9.9 
3.9 
8.2 
61 
39 
45 
oyees by indi 
il Employment 
1985 
With 
Employees 
18.7 
0.3 
0.8 
1.1 
2.1 
7.4 
8.9 
2.0 
5.8 
2.1 
4.4 
jstry, ! 
Withou 
Employ 
31.4 
0.7 
2.6 
1.7 
3.9 
23.4 
8.5 
5.8 
6.8 
4.7 
7.2 
and 1! 
All 
50.1 
1.0 
3.4 
2.8 
6.0 
30.8 
17.4 
7.8 
12.6 
7.8 
11.6 
Î85 
With Employees 
as % of Total 
Self Employed 
37 
30 
24 
39 
35 
24 
! 
51 
! 2 6 ¡ 
46 
31 
38 
• 
-o 
Source LFS 1975 and 1985 
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TABLE 8 
Percentage of Claimants Working - 1983 
Men Women Total 
Tyne and Wear 
Rest of North 
South Yorkshire 
West Yorkshire 
Rest of Yorkshire and 
Kumberside 
East Midlands 
East Anglia 
Greater London 
Rest of South East 
South West 
West Midlands Conurbation 
Rest of West Midlands 
Greater Manchester 
Merseyside ;■ 
Rest of North West 
Wales 
Scotland 
Northern Ireland 
4.1 
6.5 
3.3 
3.1 
5.2 
6.5 
7.7 
5.1 
6.5 
4.1 
3.3 
6.5 
4.6 
4.0 
3.5 
2.9 
2.9 
3.8 
7.1 
10.4 
6.7 
7.8 
5.0 
9.3 
7.7 
5.2 
9.1 
8.4 
9.6 
9.1 
7.5 
7.3 
8.2 
7.5 
5.6 
4.9 
4.8 
7.5 
4.3 
4.3 
5.1 
7.4 
7.7 
5.1 
7.3 
5.5 
4.8 
7.4 
5.4 
5.0 
4.9 
4.1 
3.8 
4.2 
United Kingdom 4.6 7.5 5.4 
Source: LFS 1983, 
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TABLE 9 
Total Hours worked in the Previous Week by Unemployment 
and Supplementary Benefits Claimants by Sex, 1985 
Men Women 
All Claimants Working % of All % of Working 
% Claimants Claimants Claimants 
Not work' 
1 -
10 -
20 -
1 -
30 -
40 + 
9 
19 
29 
29 
39 
ing 
hours 
hours 
hours 
hours 
hours 
hours 
95.4 
0.8 
0.9 
0.8 
2.5 
0.5 
0.4 
--
17.8 
18.5 
18.1 
51.4 
11.1 
9.8 
91.2 
-2.8 
2.9 
1.2 
7.0 
0.7 
0.2 ~ 
--
32.0 
33.5 
13.9 
79.3 
7.5 
1.9 
Hours not Stated 1.1 21.7 1.0 11.3 
Source: LFS 1985. 
(za) 
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Table 10 Workers in Temporary Seasonal, Casual or Fixed Period Jobs 
Numbers (thousands) 
Men 
Women 
1984 
567 
744 
1985 
557 
771 
19S6 
520 
802 
1987 
585 
807 
% of Employed Labour Force 
Men 
Women 
4.2 
7.8 
4.1 
7.9 
3.9 
8.1 
4.3 
8.0 
Source : LFS Various Years. 
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TABLE 11 
Temporary Workers by Establishment Size - 1985 
MEN 
Establishment Size: 
More than 25 Workers 25 or Less Total 
Permanent 96.6 94.6 96.0 
Seasonal, Casual 1.7 3.6 2.3 
Contract for Fixed Period 1.7 1.8 1.7 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 
WOMEN 
Permanent 93.7 
Seasonal, Casual 4.6 
Contract for Fixed Period 1.6 
All 100.0 
TOTAL 
Permanent 95.5 
Seasonal, Casual 2.9 
Contract for Fixed Period 1.6 
All 100.0 
9 1 . 0 
7 .7 
1.3 
0 0 . 0 
92 .6 
5.9 
. 1.5 
100.0 
92 .8 
5.7 
1.5 
100.0 
94.4 
3.9 
1.6 
100.0 
Source: LFS 1985 
Table 12 Percentage of workers in each industry who are casual and contract workers, by sex, 1986 
Industry (SIC 1980) 
All industries 
0 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
1 Energy and water supply 
2 Extraction of minerals, etc'metal 
; manufacturing 
3 Metal goods, engineering, etc 
4 Other manufacturing industries 
5 Construction 
6 Distribution, hotels and repairs 
7 Transport and communications 
3 Banking, finance, etc 
9 Other services 
Workplace outside UK 
Casual workers 
All 
4 0 
5­1 
1­3 
Males 
23 
2­6 
0­5 
0­8 
1­1 
1­7 
2­1 
4­9 
1­5 
1­7 
2­8 
5­9 
Females 
6­4 
14­5 
6­9 
5 
4 
5 
4 
8 
2 
4 
6 
29 
Fixed term contract workers 
All 
1­6 
0­7 
1-4 
0.-6 
1-3 
0-5 
3­4 
0­4 
0­7 
1­2 
3 0 
22­3 
Males 
1­6 
0­8 
1­4 
Ο­
Ι 
0­
3­
0­
Ο­
Ι 
2­9 
17­9 
•6 
•4 
■5 
■6 
■3 
■7 
■6 
PerWtf" 
Females 
1­6 
0­5 
1­8 
0­5 
0­9 
0­5 
1­0 
0­4 
0­5 
0­9 
3­1 
49­5 
tn 
■Ρ» 
joure; EMPLOYMENT GAZETTE: Apr i l 1988 
Per een 
Occupation 
I Professional and related— 
managerial and 
administration 
II Professional and related— 
education, etc 
III Literary, artistic and 
sports 
IV Professional and related— 
science, etc 
V Managerial 
VI Clerical and related 
VII Selling 
VIII Security, etc 
IX Catering, cleaning, etc 
X Farming, fishing and related 
XI Processing, etc (excluding 
metals and electrical) 
XII Processing, etc (metals 
and electrical) 
XIII Printing, assembling, etc 
XIV Construction, mining, etc nes 
XV Transport operating, etc 
XVI Miscellaneous 
Source: EMPLOYMENT GAZETTE: April 1988 
Permaner 
All 
7-2 
8-8 
1-1 
4-6 
9-8 
•16-3 
6-8 
1-9 
11-5 
1-5 
6-7 
9-9 
3-9 
3-1 
5-7 
1-2 
t workers 
Males 
9-5. 
5-3 
1-2 
7-2 
12-6 
6-0 
4-7 
3-0 
3-9 
2-2 
8·0 
16-1 
3-9 
5-3 
9-3. 
1-8 
Females 
4-0 
13-9 
0-9 
0-7 
5-8 
'31-0 
9-8 
0-4 
422·4 
0-5 
4·9 
0-9 
4-0 
0-0 
0-5 
0-2 
Casua 
All 
1-5 
11-0 
2-2 
1-1 
1-8 
16-8 
14 7 
0-6 
'25-9 
' 3-6 
4 4 
2-8 
5-5 
2 0 
3-7 
2-4 
workers 
Males 
2-4 
4-8 
3-3 
2-8 
1-7 
8-5 
14-8 
1-6 
14-6 
6-4 
5·3 
7-5 
4-1 
5-9 
10-5 
6 0 
Females 
1 0 
14-1 
1-7 
0-2 
1-9 
20-9 
14-6 
0-2 
[31-4 
2-2 
4 0 
0-6 
6-3 
0 0 
0-4 
0-7 
Fixed te 
All 
6-4 Λ 
[27-5 ' 
6-8 
9-4 
1-6 
7-8 
2-1 
1-4 
8-5 
2-1 
3-4 
8-6 
3-4 
7-7 
2 0 
'1-5 
rm contract workers 
'Males 
7-6 
13-2 
6-4 
f 14-5 
2-3 
2-5 
1-2 
2-2 
2-7 
3-4 
4·9 
t14-6 ' 
4-9 
r)3-5 
3-5 
2-4 
Females 
4-8 
Γ46·4 " 
7-2 
2-6 
0-7 
14-7 
3-3 
0-3 
16-1 
,0-4 
1-4 
0-6 
1-4 
0 0 
0 0 
0-2 
Ι Λ 
(_n 
Source: See :soie l 
TABLE 13 
56 
Tabie 14 Rights at work l inked to service 
Working hours per week 
less than 
8 hours 
8 but ¡ess 
than 16 hours 
16 or more 
hours 
Written statement 
Redundancy payment 
Unfair dismissal (except as below) 
Dismissal/action short of dismissal for 
TU membership/activities 
Sex/race discrimination 
Guarantee pay 
Medical suspension pay 
Maternity pay 
Right to return to work after maternity 
leave 
Itemised pay statement 
Time off for TU duties 
Time off for TU activities 
Time off for public duty 
Time off for redundant workers to seek 
work 
Time off for safety reps 
Time off for antenatal appt. 
Written statement of reasons for 
dismissal 
Exclusion or expulsion from TU in 
closed shop 
+ 
1 3 weeks 
+ 
+ 
1 month 
1 month 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
6 months 
+ 
no right 5 years + no quali fying period 2 years 
Source: Labour Research Department 
1986 
Table 15 Occupational Distribution of (1) Temporary and Permanent Workers a 
Full and Part-Time Working 
2) Temporary Workers by 
Column percentages 
KOS Groups 
Prof, and supporting 
Health, ed. & welfare 
Literary, art 
Science, tech. & eng. 
Managerial 
Clerical and related 
Selling 
Security, protection 
Personal service 
Farm & fishing 
Materials processing 
Metal & electric 
Painting & assembling 
Construction 
Transport, storage 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Source: LFS 1984 , Dale 
(1) Temporary and Permanent 
Temp. 
Casual 
1 
10 
1 
1 
2 
17 
15 
1 
25 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
100 
(2838) 
and Bamford, 
Temp. 
Contract 
5 
21 
3 
8 
2 
10 
4 
2 
8 
5 
5 
11 
3 
10 
2 
3 
100 
(1494) 
1988, Table 3. 
Permanent 
5 
9 
1 
5 
10 
16 
6 
2 
12 
2 
7 
11 
4 
4 
6 
2 
100 
(63228) 
(2) Temp 
Full-
Casual 
2 
11 
1 
2 
2 
21 
5 
1 
11 
4 
7 
10 
5 
9 
6 
5 
100 
(867) 
time 
Co 
(1 
y Workers 
Part-
:t Casual 
1 
10 
1 
1 
2 
15 
20 
1 
32 
5 
4 
1 
3 
1 
2 
2 
100 
(1966) 
time 
Contract 
5 
41 
4 
4 
1 
11 
3 
1 
13 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
4 
100 
(370) 
Table 16 Temporary j obs—t ime se r i es ' 
Employees and self-employed 
Whether ¡ob permanent or temporary, and reason 
for taking temporary job 
All employees and self-employed** 
of which: 
Permanent job 
Temporary, seasonal, casual or fixed period/contract job 
= 100 per cent, of which: 
Reason for taking temporary, etc job 
Had a contract which included a period of training 
Could not find a permanent job 
Did not want a permanent job 
Other reasons 
Men 
1984 
6-4 
38-7 
19-9 
34-9 
Great Britain, spring each year 
Women 
1985 1986 1987t 1984 1985 
12,949 13,045 13.008 13.059 
567 557 530 585 
5-5 
37-9 
18-3 
38-3 
4-8 
36-6 
19-1 
39-4 
5-7 
37-6 
18-0 
38-7 
8,814 
744 
3-3 
26-1 
427 
27-9 
8,971 
771 
2-7 
22-6 
39-4 
35-2 
1986 1987t 
13,515 · 13,602 13,538 13,644 9,557 9,742 9,895 
9,093 
802 
30 
23 i 
37-7 
36-2 
Thousands 
10,123 
9.316 
807 
Per centít 
2-8 
20-7 
41-5 
350 
U1 
00 
Source: LFS lime series estimates 
Errpl oyment Gazette 
• " I n c l u d e s ^ " ' (Sherman on^overnmenl employment and training schemes) who were working but did not state whether they were employees or sell-employed. March 1988 Table 
t t Percentages are based on those who gave a reply. 
Time series estímales. ad|usted lor cases where permanent/temporary, etc. status was not known, 
t Preliminary estimates (1987 only) 
59 
Table 17 Chi ldren ' s Jobs, London, Luton and Bedfordshire 
Job 
Delivering newspapers 
Milk, round or other deliveries 
Shopwork; 
Newsagents or tobacconists 
Grocery, bakery or other foods 
Clothing or department store 
Shoe shop 
Other type of shop or store 
Hairdressers 
Launderette or drycleaners 
Cleaning offices, hotels etc. 
Furniture making or removals 
Building construction, decoration 
or repair 
Garage or petrol station 
Sewing or making things to sell 
Typing, filing or bookkeeping 
Pub or off-licence 
Hotel, restaurant, cafe, etc. 
Street market or fair ground 
Modelling, acting or dancing 
Stable, kennel or riding school 
Other work with animals 
Farming 
Miscel laneous 
Total working 
Boys 
172 
45 
15 
27 
7 
7 
11 
4 
1 
25 
10 
40 
30 
4 
1 
26 
11 
31 
7 
7 
16 
60 
33 
436 
Girls 
52 
7 
. 15 
14 
3 
5 
10 
6 
4 
28 
1 
5 
4 
14 
11 
14 
9 
11 
6 
36 
21 
32 
45 
242 
Total 
224 
47 
30 
41 
10 
12 
21 
10 
5 
53 
11 
45 
34 
18 
12 
40 
20 
42 
13 
43 
37 
92> 
78 
678 
% 
33.0 
6.9 
4.4 
6.0 
1.5 
1.8 
3.1 
1.5 
7.4 
12.8 
1.6 
6.6 
5.0 
2.6 
1.8 
5.9 
2.9 
6.2 
1.9 
6.3 
5.5 
13.6 
11.5 
100.0 
Source: MacLennan, E. e t . al 1985. 
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Qualitative Studies 
In general, whilst there have been a number of studies in rural 
Ireland there has been a considerable neglect of urban studies and many of 
the locality studies which could provide valuable insights are unfinished 
or unpublished. In a review of anthropological studies in Ireland it was 
noted "Only about a third of the thirty-odd dissertation research projects 
undertaken on Ireland have been completed and accepted; and only eight of 
the total number have appeared in any published form. Indeed fewer than 
half of the approximately fifty anthropologists who have done work in 
Ireland is available in print" (Kane et al in O'Dowd, 1988:98). There 
have been some interesting studies done in Northern Ireland (Jenkins and 
Harding, 1988) but there is a real lack of case study material in Ireland. 
This is not surprising given that "Only two anthropologists are employed 
as full-time academic anthropologists in the republic" (O'Dowd:104). 
Quantitative Studies 
The single substantial attempt to provide some objective measurement 
of Ireland's black economy was put forward by Boyle in 1984. He argued 
that the "only feasible means" of gauging the extent of the black economy 
in Ireland is by using the monetary method. Whilst the average size of 
bank notes in circulation increased just over two-folc between 1960 and 
1983, the price level increased almost nine-fold, so there would not 
seem to be much of a case on which to argue for an increasing black 
economy. Boyle is equally sceptical about using the currency/current 
account ratio to quantify the size and growth of the black economy. He 
rightly doubts the rationale for choosing a particular year as the base 
year when the black economy is purported to have barely existed. 
Secondly, it is questionable to follow a methodology which asserts, rather 
than proves, that the black economy is the cause of the discrepancy 
between actual and forecasted currency holdings that appeared in Ireland 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Alternative explanations might 
include the fact that this period coincided with Ireland's entry to the 
EMS, which meant that sterling balances with the public had to be replaced 
by Irish pounds. As Boyle notes "This factor alone could explain the 
abrupt increase in currency holdings in 1979 and 1953". (ibid 38). Thus 
the average estimates of the black economy as 6 per cent of GDP between 
1975-1983 might be nearly right or wildly wrong. 
Boyle is more honest than many of his opposite numbers in the USA and 
the UK. He notes that "Unfortunately, the methodologies in use cannot 
provide conclusive answers, nor can they provide results with margins of 
error useful for decision making" (ibid 42). A siiilar conclusion has 
recently been reached by Thomas dealing with similar studies (Thomas 
1988). Too often people extrapolate anecdotal evidence on black economy 
activity and then relate this to superficially rigorous quantitative 
measures. 
Introduction to the Irish Economy 
One of the most striking aspects of the Irish labour force is the 
continuing secular decline in the numbers employed in agriculture. 
Through the 1960s the average annual decline in agriculture was over 
10,000 slowing to about 6OOO p.a. in the 1970s and ir. the first half of 
the 1980s. However, the average annual percentage decline was greater in 
1981-86 than in 1971-81 (Table 1). It may be notei, though, that with 
the increasing incidence of part-time farming, the trend rate of decline 
in labour inputs in agriculture has been less than the trend rate of 
decline in the number of persons who are principally engaged in 
agriculture. O'Neill (1985) shows that between 1975 and 1980, a period 
when the proportion of part-time farms increased from 26.4 per cent to 
30.3 per cent, the number of annual work units (a measure of labour input) 
in agriculture fell by 1 per cent a year, on average. By contrast, in 
the same period the number of persons engaged in agriculture fell by 2.6 
per cent a year. 
In the 1970s in Ireland, a relatively fast increase in the labour 
force by EC standards (with an average annual increase of 1.2 per cent a 
year between 1971 and 1981) combined with a moderate rate of growth in 
employment, meant that the unemployment rate (unemployment as a proportion 
of the labour force) increased from 6.7 per cent (mid-April 1971) to 10.5 
per cent (mid-April 198U- There has been quite a different trend in 
public sector employment in the 1980s than in the 1970s, associated with 
fiscal deflation. Between 1977 and 1982, total public sector employment 
had increased by 12.1 per cent. By contrast, in the period 1982-87, 
employment fell by 4.2 per cent (OECD, 1987, Table A1 ). 
By 1987. the unemployment rate had reached 17.6 per cent. At the 
same time, the incidence of long-term unemployment increased markedly. 
In April 1980, 35 per cent of the registered unemployed had been on the 
register for a year or more. By October 1987, 46 per cent were on the 
register for a year or more. Tables 2A, 2B show the trends in 
unemployment over time. The state of the labour market in Ireland cannot 
be inferred from trends in unemployment alone. Between 1981 and 1986, 
net emigration amounted to 2.1 per cent of the population, and most of the 
emigration was concentrated in those of young working ages (15-24). 
In the 1960s the rate of decline in numbers engaged in agriculture 
was more than offset by increases in manufacturing, building and services. 
In the 1970s there was a very large increase in services which went up by 
an annual average of nearly 14,000 over the decade. Within services, the 
(23) 
most rapid rise of employment in a major sub-sector was in the health 
services where the numbers at work increased by 18,200 or 64 per cent 
during the decade. 
Ireland now has a rate of unemployment amongst the highest in the EC 
with a rate of 19.2 per cent in 1987 exceeded only by Spain. (Eurostat, 
1988) While the participation rate of women in the labour force has 
increased (from 28.2 per cent in 1971 to 31.9 per cent in 1987), Ireland 
has a relatively low participation rate - 60 per cent - compared with ?4.3 
per cent for the UK and 69.4 for all OECD countries as a whole (OECD 1986, 
Table F). The rate of increase in the labour force in the 1981-87 period 
slowed down to 0.5 per cent a year. 
Rural Ireland 
In common mythology Ireland has always been understood to be a 
society where, because informal economic activity has been common, 
particularly in the rural areas, therefore, it was assumed, the black 
economy must be flourishing. Furthermore, given the remoteness and 
caution of much of the Irish rural population, any attempt to measure the 
black economy would, it may be thought, be singularly fruitless, 
particularly in the light of the approximate standards of estimation used 
by economists. In default of hard evidence a large black economy may be 
assumed without question. Such a view would be based on a very serious 
fallacy. Whilst it is true that until recently those employed in 
agriculture have been a very high proportion of the employed labour force 
- 36 per cent in 1961 which had nevertheless dropped to 17 per cent by 
1981 - the fact is that before the 1975 Finance Act, Irish farmers were 
exempt from tax. Surplus labour was either underemployed in agriculture 
or was forced off the land and, indeed, out of Ireland - typically to 
Britain - and much of the west of Ireland was primarily subsistence 
farming. As recently as 1963 the West Cork Resource Survey estimated 
that over West Cork as a whole only £19 was earned for every £100 of gross 
output, indicating that the range of annual net earnings from these farms 
was from £5 to £45 a year. A study published in 1973 concluded 
"Much of the farming in the west is still not based on 
market or even the earning of money. But the 
households depend more on money than ever in the past. 
It is of course remittances from abroad and 
supplementary income from relief and local employment 
which remove this apparent paradox." (Brody, 
1973:139) 
Successive Governments were more concerned that the rural population 
should survive rather than be taxed and understandably, the cultural 
expectation of most of those living in the west of Ireland is that if they 
can earn a little extra from fishing, tourism or whatever, this is simply 
some compensation for enduring a hard and not very rewarding life of toil. 
One reflection of this has been the existence of "farmer's dole": that is 
the provision whereby small farmers living in specified areas, mainly in 
the west, north west and north east of the country, and whose land 
valuations do not exceed a certain amount, can, for the purpose of the 
means test for Unemployment Assistance, have the income from their 
holdings assessed in a notional manner. On average in 1985 there were 
17,500 smallholders applying for Unemployment Assistance. In effect this 
has meant that these farmers would work and draw Unemployment Assistance. 
While some (non-agricultural) workers frowned on this practice, this was 
in effect a minimum income scheme for people who had a very low standard 
cf living, and was unexceptionable in that regard. 
Even though Irish farmers are now liable for tax, in practice it 
hardly exists and this is now giving rise to increasing resentment (see 
below). Income tax is based on farmers making their own declarations and 
only the obsessively honest or obviously wealthy farmers would even 
consider submitting a return. The people of rural areas in Ireland are 
simply practising traditional survival strategies and they would not 
consider they were doing anything illegal. This applies as much to 
various other kinds of small-scale self-employment and there would be 
considerable resentment by the practitioners if earnings from these extra 
jobs were taken into account when assessing social benefits. There are, 
however, now signs of an anti-scrounger mentality developing in rural 
areas, where there may be greater opportunities for getting more 
substantial extra earnings. 
Even if there is some undeclaring of income by the agricultural and 
non-agricultural self-employed in rural areas, the total tax loss would 
still be miniscule: it would be ludicrous to attempt to put any firm 
measure on this tiny aspect of a putative black economy. 
There are, however, structural changes that are leading to a greater 
potential for irregular work. Small family businesses or the 
self-employed worker with a small number of employees are much better 
placed to engage in more serious tax evasion. Until recently large 
cooperatives in the rural areas did much of the on-farm servicing. They 
owned the milking plant, provided various support services, collected the 
milk and so on. Now, increasingly these services are being privatised 
and the contractors are able to lay people off at slack time. Those 
doing temporary or casual jobs may be taking second jobs or they may be 
working whilst receiving benefits. While it is difficult to put numbers 
on the growth of contractual forms of employment, in Ireland as in other 
EC countries there does seem to have been a shift from "employee" forms of 
work to contract employment. The shift towards a more service economy is 
opening up more opportunities for tax evasion. 
The Core of the Black Economy in Ireland 
The distinction between those on PAYE and those who are self-employed 
is extremely significant for urban workers. The total Irish labour force 
is 1.3 million of which 1.1 million are employed and of these about two 
thirds are PAYE workers. If one includes the agricultural sector Ireland 
has the third largest proportion of self-employed in Europe. From 1979 
to 1986 the effects of higher direct taxes, that is income taxes and 
employee social insurance contributions, has led to a situation where real 
after-tax earnings (for a worker on average industrial earnings) have 
actually fallen by 10 per cent. Marginal tax rates in Ireland are 
particularly high - 65.75 per cent for a single worker earning the average 
wage. Even if a man is married with two children and his wife has 
typically a lower paid job, he would still pay tax at 55.75 per cent. 
"A recent OECD study that compared the situations 
prevailing in different OECD countries found that no 
other OECD country had a tax system as biased against 
the use of labour as the Irish." (OECD 1987:48) 
There is now considerable resentment in Ireland amongst those 
employees who are obliged to pay their full rate of tax through PAYE and 
those who are self-employed and are able to arrange their tax payments in 
a more favourable manner. 
There are a number of bases for these perceptions: 
a) The self-employed pay their tax on a lagged basis, although the 
extent of this advantage was eroded in the Budget of 1980. Up 
to that point, Schedule D tax on the self-employed was payable 
in two instalments on 1 September and 1 January in the year of 
assessment. With the exception of full-time farmers, from 1980 
all income tax other than PAYE would now be payable in one 
instalment in the year of assessment. 
b) There is a more generous treatment of expenses against taxable 
income in the case of self-employed people than in the case of 
those on PAYE. 
c) Self-employed people are seen as having an opportunity to 
conceal taxable income from the Revenue Commissioners, which is 
not available to those on PAYE. 
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It should be noted, though that much of the advantage which 
self-employed people have over PAYE taxpayers will disappear in 1988-89. 
With the shift towards self-assessment, the opportunities which the 
self-employed had to protract the period over which estimates of tax 
liability were made and possibly appeals made, have vanished. Now the 
main responsibility for ensuring that tax is paid has shifted to the 
self-employed, there is no appeal against preliminary tax, and payment 
must accompany the return of the notice of preliminary tax. There are 
also severe penalties for failure to file a tax return by end-December. 
Moreover, the decline in the rate of inflation has greatly reduced the 
advantage which the self-employed had of paying tax on a previous year 
basis. 
Table 3 shows the industrial distribution of the self employed. 
Two-fifths (40.4 per cent in 1984) of all non-agricultural self-employed 
workers in Ireland are in wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and 
hotels. These are typically 'fiddle-prone' industries (Mars 1982). 
However, overall, just over 7 per cent of all employment is self-
employment in non-agricultural industries. The most rapid area of 
growth between 1979 and 1987 was in the sphere of professional services. 
(Table 4) 
Ireland is very heavily dominated by the Dublin sub-region, which has 
29 per cent of the country's population. It is there and in the other 
large towns that most of the black economy takes place. It is extremely 
hard to judge what the effect on tax loss has been from the growth in 
self-employment in the non-agricultural sector in recent years. In the 
judicious words of one authority. -"One cannot conclude that this was due 
solely to the increasing burden of personal income tax making self-
employment, which has greater scope for evading or avoiding tax more 
attractive, but it is likely that it was a contributory factor" (Conniffe 
and Kennedy 1984:246). In every budget speech in recent years mention 
has been made of the tax advantages that the self-employed have over 
taxpayers in the PAYE sector. In 1980 a special allowance of £400 was 
granted to PAYE taxpayers "for the generally more favourable basis of 
assessment applied to other taxpayers" (Budget Speech 1980). The current 
value of the PAYE allowance (1988/89) is £800. In 1982 a special 
Pay-related Social Insurance tax allowance was introduced to improve the 
take-home pay of those who pay the higher rates of contribution. While 
the allowance was intended to apply for 1982/83 only, it has remained in 
force, at a slightly reduced amount in nominal terms: £286 in 1988/89. 
It should be noted that the relative position of the self-employed by 
comparison with those on PAYE will change from 1988/89 as from that time 
the self-employed will be liable for social insurance contributions. 
It will be seen from Table 5 that the PAYE tax payers are providing 
an increasing proportion of all taxation and the farmers are providing a 
declining proportion. This is giving rise to considerable social 
resentment so that whether or not farmers are being honest they still seem 
to be doing unreasonably well. 
In 1987 the PAYE taxpayers provided 80 per cent of the total income 
taxation paid in the previous year and farmers paid only 1.3 per cent. 
Even if all the farmers were underdeclaring by 50 per cent the extra tax 
gained would still be tiny. Similarly, if the other self-employed also 
underdeclared by an arbitrary 30 per cent the total tax lost would be in 
the order of 0.6 per cent of GNP. Unless there are hidden ways of 
avoiding taxation in Ireland that are "inique in Europe it must be the case 
that the black economy in Ireland, contrary to popular impression, is 
insignificantly tiny. 
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Unemployment and the Black Economy 
Labour Force Survey data (Table 6) shows that the proportion of 
benefit claimants who also report that they are "at work" has dramatically 
declined during the last decade. Evidently these figures should not be 
seen as any indication of the magnitude of working claimants since they 
reflect the speed of flow into and out of unemployment as much as 
anything. However, the extent of the decline is probably some indication 
of a decline in benefit fraud. 
There has been considerable discussion amongst economists in Ireland 
whether the relatively high levels of unemployment are related to the 
disincentive effects of high levels of taxation. The general conclusion 
is that this is not the case "The great majority of unemployed persons 
suffer a severe reduction in disposable income vis a vis earnings from 
their previous employment...the income-replacement ratios for persons on 
UA (who account for almost one-half of those_on the Live Register) is of 
the order of 50 per cent. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the 
majority of the unemployed suffer a substantial reduction in their living 
standards." (Conniffe and Kennedy 1984:21) 
A survey by Blackwell (1986) while showing that the replacement ratio 
(the proportion of after-tax income which is replaced by unemployment 
compensation) did rise in the 1970s for someone on average industrial 
earnings, it tended to fall from the early 1980s. Moreover, not all the 
unemployed were in receipt of benefit and not all those in receipt of 
benefit were on anything like the highest rates. Of all males who were 
unemployed in mid-1984, 23 per cent were receiving neither Unemployment 
Benefit nor Unemployment Assistance. (Admittedly, some of this was due 
to the lags which can occur between being unemployed and receiving a first 
payment). And the majority of benefit recipients were not on the highest 
replacement ratios. For instance, 60 per cent of the recipients of 
Unemployment Benefit at mid-1984 were single; and only 8.4 per cent of 
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recipients of Unemployment Benefit had 4 or more children, the family size 
category where replacemtn ratios tend to increase markedly. The 
conclusion was that much of the marked rise in unemployment since 1979 
could not be due to increases in unemployment benefits relative to net 
earnings - especially when it is borne in mind that long-term unemployment 
increased as a proportion of the total. The "disincentive effects" are 
most unlikely to be present with the 'long-term unemployed. 
However, the Government has inevitably been concerned at the 
possibility of social welfare fraud on the part of those claimning 
benefits but illegally working at the same time. The Department of 
Social Welfare appointed a firm of Management Consultants to assist them 
in finding the most cost-effective way of reducing fraud. Somewhat 
surprisingly, perhaps, the consultants did not discover a substantial 
amount of welfare fraud. 
"A limited sample of payments was carried out, which 
estimated that 2 per cent of unemployment payments and 
1 per cent of the disability payments in the Dublin 
area are based on claims which contain some clear 
element of fraud. The value of such over payments 
could be in the region of £3~6m in a full year. 
Additionally the review showed that 7 per cent of the 
sample gave rise to suspicion on the ground that the 
facts of the case did not check out at the initial 
interview. Later investigation of these cases showed 
that two thirds were found to be actually bona fide, a 
minimal number were clearly fraudulent and no definite 
conclusions could be drawn about the remainder." 
(Government Press Release 1.6.88) 
These conclusions are quoted at length, since they do much to counter 
speculation and myths about the activities of the unemployed in Ireland. 
There is some fraud to be sure, but at such a low level that it cannot be 
said to make any substantial contribution to the black economy. 
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It should perhaps be noted that Ireland has one of the highest rates 
in the EC of inflow into self-employment from unemployment: in 1983 23 per 
cent of the Irish self-employed had previously been unemployed, with 
comparable proportions of 8.9 per cent for France, 9.3 per cent for 
Germany and 6.2 per cent for Greece in that year. 
Flexible Work Patterns: Part-time, Seasonal and Casual Employment 
Ireland has a relatively low proportion of regular jobs that are part 
time compared with most other EC countries having only 5.3 per cent in 
1986 compared with well over a fifth of all jobs in the case of the UK. 
This low proportion may be partly related to the still very low level of 
labour force participation by married women, who account for only 12 per 
cent of the labour force. Nevertheless, female regular part-time workers 
are increasing faster than male workers of the same category. Table 7 
shows that in 1986 the total number of married women in part-time jobs was 
almost double the total of all men in regular part-time jobs. 
The proportion of the labour force described as "temporary employees" 
rose from 6 per cent in 1973 to 8.5 per cent in 1986 mainly in the service 
sector and most of such workers claimed that they were really seeking 
permanent jobs. Table 8 shows that three quarters of all female 
temporary jobs are in either distribution and catering or services in the 
public sector. 
There has been considerable resistance in Ireland towards the greater 
flexibility in work patterns that has developed in some EC countries. 
During the 1970s extensive legislation was enacted to protect employees' 
rights and conditions of employment. This legislation established rights 
for most employees in many aspects of their employment: for instance, as 
regards equal pay, equality of opportunity and treatment in employment, 
protection against arbitrary dismissal, consultation procedures with trade 
unions and staff associations in cases where a company proposes to lay off 
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workers. In many respects, this legislation involved bringing Ireland up 
to par with other EC countries or (as in the case of the Protection of 
Employment Act) putting into effect an EC Directive or EC principles. 
The Unfair Dismissals Act has been criticised by some employers who claim ■ 
that it makes labour expenses a virtually fixed cost. A survey of 
employers' perceptions of employment legislation and its effects on 
employment (Department of Labour, 1986) concludes: "the overall pattern of 
the survey responses seems to us to suggest that the extent to which 
employment levels are being dampened by the existing legislation is 
somewhat limited. Practically no firm sees the legislation as one of the 
main problems facing them and only a small minority cite it as having 
caused them a problem in the past year" (p.36). It is the case, though, 
that relative to other pieces of labour legislation, the Unfair Dismissals 
Act is seen by employers as easily the most onerous piece of employment 
legislation. 
Furthermore, Ireland has had a form of corporatism since the the 
1960s that has lingered longer than in other EC countries. In the 1970s, 
employer organisations, trade unions and the government all participated 
in a series of National Wage Agreements between 1970 and 1978 producing a 
fairly formal incomes policy based on full-time workers. While some 
earlier agreements embodied a flat-rate element in pay increases, designed 
to improve the relative position of those on low pay, it seems as if 
traditional relativities asserted themselves and that there was little cr 
no shift in the wage structure towards the low paid. The high point of 
corporatism occurred at the turn of the decade. The first National 
Understanding for Economic and Social Development of April 1979 (between 
Government, employment and industry organisations and the Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions) embraced policies on employment, pay, taxation, 
education, health and social welfare. The second National Understanding, 
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using the sxame framework, dated from September 1980. Following the 
demise of centralised pay bargaining, there was a move to plant level 
bargaining in the 1980s. 
In October 1987 the Government issued a Programme for National 
Recovery covering the period to end-1990. The Government, the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions, the Federated Union of Employers, the 
Confederation of Irish Industry, the Construction Industry Federation and 
farmer organisations, all participated in the discussions which led to the 
Programme and agreed on the programme. In turn, the programme was 
heavily influenced by a report of the National Economic and Social Council 
(National Economic and Social Council, 1986). That Council, which 
provides a forum for discussion and advises the Government, includes 
persons nominated by agricultural organisations, the Confederation of 
Irish Industry and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. 
Turning now to second jobs it is again striking that men are much 
more likely to have second jobs than women and these are concentrated in 
agriculture and services (Table 9). Women's pattern of second job 
holding follows very closely their pattern of part-time employment, with 
the same dominance in public sector services. However, it should be 
noted that there are, in all, only 17,400 second job holders out of a 
workforce of 1,075,200. 
Thus, although there is some growth of what may be seen to be more 
flexible working patterns (Blackwell 1986, OECD 1987) these tendencies are 
much less marked in Ireland than in other EC countries. 
Concluding Discussion 
There seems little doubt that the main core of the Irish black 
economy must lie with the self-employed and those PAYE workers who have an 
undeclared second job. In the absence of detailed sociological and 
anthropological studies - such as do exist for north of the border - the 
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size of the black economy in Ireland must be a matter of pure speculation. 
The move towards more self-employment outside agriculture, particularly in 
the service sector is probably the main element in any putative increase. 
Marginal tax rates are disproportionately high in Ireland and, on the face 
of it, so are the incentives for tax evasion. It is possible that 
cash-in-hand work is fairly widespread and is largely condoned but that 
the total amount is not of sufficient magnitude to cause any real concern. 
However, given the sources of information available in other EC countries 
such as Denmark or the Netherlands, it does seem tc be an urgent research 
priority to explore this issue in more detail in Ireland. Two or three 
detailed case studies are required at least one of «hich should be in 
Dublin and one should be of a particular occupation where the 
opportunities for moonlighting may be expected to re high - either because 
of a distinctive work pattern, allowing extra time for moonlighting, or 
because of the difficulty of maintaining surveillance, as in tourism and 
the catering industry. 
The resentment regularly expressed by PAYE taxpayers at the perceived 
advantages of the self-employed and farmers clearly has some foundation as 
the previous discussion shows. However, it is very unlikely that many 
people in Ireland are getting very rich in the black economy. The most 
likely conclusion is that a fairly widespread but relatively minor level 
of fiddling ensures that the high marginal tax rat=s are more tolerable. 
One impact of the high marginal tax rates has been to contribute to 
the pressures which have led to net emigration. «hilst no detailed 
analysis of Irish emigration was undertaken for this paper, there does 
seem to be widespread concern about the outflow of people with higher 
qualifications such as accountants. In the 1950s and 1960s, Irish 
emigrants tended to be young unskilled workers. Sow they are older and 
more highly qualified than before. There are, of course, a number of 
elements at work behind emigration: "pull" factors in the form of job 
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availability in South East England, "push" factors in the rise in 
unemployment rates in Ireland, tax rates, among others. But it may be 
that higher marginal tax rates have encouraged migration at all levels of 
society which in other countries might have produced a much more 
substantial black economy. If emigration is Ireland's safety valve the 
local black economy may be Ireland's myth. 
Curiously, the traditional acceptance in rural areas of getting a bit 
extra and keeping quiet about it - for long an essential survival strategy 
- has produced a cultural pattern that has now moved to the towns and 
cities, where the opportunities are not universally available. Much of 
the resentment about irregular work in Ireland is thus based on the 
frustration of not being able to do more, rather than there being in fact 
a substantial black economy. The Irish are probably suffering from 
relative deprivation. Informal work is culturally acceptable but 
practically elusive. It is perfectly plausible that the size of the 
black economy in Ireland is amongst the lowest in the E.C. 
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Table 1: Changes in Sectoral Employment, 1961/1971, 1971/1981, 1981/1987, 
Sector Change 1961/1971 
'000 
Change 1971/1981 
'000 
Change 1981/1987 
'000 % 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Building, etc. 
Services 
Public Sector 
Other Services 
-102.0 
+41.1 
+24.4 
+49.1 
+32.7 
+16.4 
-28.3 
+21.2 
+42.1 
+12.1 
+27.8 
+5.7 
-57.1 
+27.6 
+14.6 
+135.7 
+84.7 
+51.0 
-22.1 
+11.7 
+17.7 
+30.0 
+56.3 
+16.8 
-32.0 
-29.0 
-30.0 
+29.0 
-13.0 
+42.0 
-16.3 
-12.2 
-29.7 
+4.9 
-4.2 
+15.3 
Total +12.5 +1.2 +120.8 +11.7 -66.0 -5.8 
Note: The breakdown between public and private sector services for 1981/1987 
comes from OECD (1987) and is on a different basis from that in Conniffe 
and Kennedy (1984). It is assumed that the employment in public 
services in 1981 equals that in 1982 in OECD (1987). 
Source: Conniffe and Kennedy (1984), Table 1.6; Labour Force Surveys 1985, 
1987; OECD (1987). 
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Table 2A: The Trends of Unemployment by Sector, 1971/79 
Sector 
­ ■ ■ 
Agriculture, etc., 
Industry 
Food, Drinks, etc., 
Textiles, Clothing, etc., 
Metals, etc., 
Odier 
Building 
Services 
Total 
Unemployment rate 
1971» 
3 1 
4­5 
5­7 
4 .0 
4­3 
4­1 
1 2 . 1 
4.O 
4.G 
0/ /o 
1979 
2.8 
7­3 
7­4 
10.6 
7­5 
5­4 
»5­5 
4·Ί 
G.i 
Annual 
average 
% change 
1971/79 
-1-3 
+6.2 
+ 3-3 
+ 13 .0 
+ 7.2 
' + 3-5 
+3·» 
+ 1 . 2 
+ 3.6 
Source: Conniffe and Kennedy 0984), Table 1.7 
(30) 
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Table 2B: The Trends of Unemployment by Sector, 1978/87 
Outside Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing by Sector, 1979/87 
Average 
Unemployment /?ü U a l 
Ζ* % Change Rate 
% in Numbers 
Sector 1979 1987 Unemployed 
Manufacturing industry (a) 6.6 13.0 7.6 
Building and Construction 14.7 25.0 3.9 
Services 4.7 7.1 7.0 
Total 6.5 16.9 14.3 
Note: Data exclude first job seekers. In 1987, unemployed 
persons who had not worked in the preceding three 
years were not asked about the industry in which they 
had not worked. They are included in the "total" 
calculations and are all assigned outside agriculture, 
forestry and fishing. 
(a) Includes a small number in mining, quarrying 
and turf production. 
Sources: Labour Force Surveys, 1979 and 1987, 
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TABLE 3 
IRELAND: Distribution of Non Agricultural Self-empioyment by Industry, 1987. 
Manufacturing, etc. (a) 13.4 
Building and Construction 16.3 
Communication and Storage 8.3 
Commerce, Insurance, Finance and Business Services 39.7 
Professional Services 11.9 
Public Administration and Defence 0.1 
Others 10.3 
All non-agricultural Industries 100.0 
Note: (a) This includes a small amount of mining, quarrying and turf 
production. 
Source: Labour Force Survey 1987. 
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TABLE 4 
Ireland: Non-Agricultural Self-Employment, 1979-1987 
Industry 
All non-agricultural 
Industries 
Manufacturing, etc. (a) 
ßuilding and Construction 
Transport, Communication 
and Storage 
Commerce, Insurance, 
Finance and Business 
Services 
Professorial Services 
Public Administration 
and Defence 
Others 
Proportion of 
self-employment 
to employment 
within Industry 
1987 
7.3 
3.9 
15.4 
8.5 
12.5 
4.2 
0.1 
8.4 
Growth of 
sei f-empioyment 
by industry 
Average Annual Growth 
1979-87 
% 
0.7 
2.3 
-1.3 
2.2 
0.4 
3.2 
(b) 
-0.5 
Note: (a) As in note to Table 3. 
(b) Numbers too small in 1979 to be shown. 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1979, 1987. 
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TABLE 5 
Average tax paid per person per annum in the following categories: 
1979 Relativities 1983 Relativities 1986 Relativities 
PAYE 
Farmers 
Other self-employed 636 
IR£ 
915 
488 
6
PAYE = 
100 
53 
70 
100 IR£ 
1911 
705 
1510 
PAYE = 
100 
37 
79 
100 IRÎ 
2768 
629 
2005 
PAYE = 
100 
23 
72 
Sources: PQ No.48, 15 October 1987; PQ No.45, 7 April 1987. 
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TABLE 6 
Proportion of 
Year Applicants for UA or UB 
"At work" 
1975 39.3 
1977 35.7 
1979 30.0 
1983 21.8 
1984 14.3 
.1985 12.2 
1986 10.6 
Source: LFS and Walsh 1987 
(TABLE 7 I-REGULAR PART TIME JOBS BY SEX, USUAL HOURS AND MARITAL STATUS, 1985. 
Usual hours uorked 
1-9 
10-19 
20-29 
30-34 
33-39 
40-44 
45 or over 
Not stated 
TOTAL 
MALE : FEMALE 
SI n'gl e : Ma rr .-: 
: ed : 
I 
: 0.4: 0.3 
1.9: .9 
Ì 3.4: 2.3 
: .6: .5 
: .3: .3 
: .2: .1 
: . . 1 : .0 
: 1.8: 1.9 
: 8.8: 6.4 
Sepa- : 
rated : 
0.0 
- . 1 
.0 
V 
: . 1 
: B 2 
Wido- : 
wed : 
0.0 
. 1 
. 1 
.0 
. 1 
: .4 
Total ::Single 
0.7: 0.8 
2.9: 2.6 
6.0: 3.0 
1.2·. .5 
.7: .3 
: . 2 : .0 
: . 1 : 
: 3.9: . .9 
: 15.8: 8;. 2 
Marri-
ed 
3. 1 
10.1 
11.8 
1 .9 
1 .0 
2.3 
30.3 
Sepa-
rated 
000 
0. 1 
.4 
.3 
. 1 
.0 
.9 
Wido-
wed 
0.3 
.9 
1 .0 
.2 
. 1 
. 1 
2.6 
Tote 
I 
I' 
U 
] 
4: 
T o t a l 
l n g l « M a r r i -
ed 
Sepa-
rated 
Wido-
wed 
Total 
1 .2 
4.4 
6.5 
1 .2 
.7 
.2 
. 1 
. 2.7 
17.0 
3.4 
1 1.0 
14.1 
2.4 
1 .3 
.1 
.0 
4.2 
36.6 
0. 1 
.4 
.4 
. 1 
-
-
-
. 1 
1 . 1 
0.4 
1.0 
1 .1 
.2 
. 1 
-
-
.2 
3.0 
5.1 
16.£ 
22.: 
3.S 
2.C 
. 3 
. 1 
7.3 
57.7 
SOURCE: Labour.Force Survey 1986. 
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TABLE 8 
Ireland: Distribution of temporary Jobs by Industry 1986 
Temporary Jobs 
Industry 
0 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
1 Energy & water supplies 
2 Mineral extraction 
3 Metal Goods & Engineering 
4 Other Manufacturing Industries 
5 Construction 
6 Distribution, Hotels & Catering 
7 Transport & Communication 
8 Banking & Business Services 
9 Other Services: Public Sector 
All = 100Ï 
(8.5 per 
Males 
4.8 
2.5 
4.0 
4.8 
8.2 
20.3 
15.6 
4.8 
12.2 
20.3 
35.3 
cent of all 
Females 
0.9 
0.3 
1.1 
4.0 
6.9 
0.9 
23.7 
2.3 
8.4 
50.0 
34.6 
Source: 
Eurostat 
Sp 
jobs) 
All 
2.7 
1.4 
2.6 
.4.4 
7.6 
10.6 
19.6 
3-6 
10.3 
35.0 
69.9 
ecial Tabulations 
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TABLE 9 
Ireland: Distribution of Second Jobs by Industry 1986 
Industry 
0 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
1 Energy & water supplies 
2 Mineral extraction 
3 Metal Goods & Engineering 
4 Other Manufacturing Industries 
5 Construction 
6 Distribution, Hotels & Catering 
7 Transport & communication 
8 Banking & Business Services 
9 Other Services, e.g. Public Sector 
All 100% 
Males 
Second Jobs 
Females All 
18.7 
2.1 
3.6 
5.7 
9.3 
12.2 
18.7 
6.4 
6.4 
16.5 
13.9 
8.3 
-
-
5.5 
5.5 
2.7 
22.2 
5.5 
5.5 
44.4 
3.6 
16.6 
1.7 
2.8 
5.7 
8.6 
3.7 
19.5 
6.3 
6.3 
22.4 
17.4 
Source Eurostat 
Special Tabulations 
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THE SHADOW ECONOMY IN THE FEDERAL REBUBLIC OF GERMANY 
I. Introduction 
During the last decade the political interest in the 
phenomenon of the shadow economy has grown considerably 
in the FRG. In the I960's the former chairman of the 
SPD and chancellor W. Brandt could still rather ironically 
explain that the achievement of shorter working 
hours is desirable also because the employees could 
provide more shadow activities then(l ) . Politicians 
today take a much more serious stand in this matter. 
This change in the public opinion obviously reflects 
the unfavourable development towards a persistantly 
high rate of unemployment which has taken place in West 
Germany since then. 
Yet there probably does not exist another issue in the 
current political debates on which so little information 
is available. The purpose of this paper is to overcome 
this lacuna as much as this is possible given the extreme-
ly limited data on this subject. In an attempt to gather 
the available information on the West German shadow economy 
it will proceed as follows: First, the nature of the shadow 
activities in the FRG will be highlighted by a number of 
examplifying case studies. The utilization of case studies 
is not unproblematic though. In general one may say that 
the more authentic the cases reported are the more specific 
and hence the less descriptive they may turn out to be. 
Thus this study will explore the available statistical 
information in the sections to follow. The focus here is 
on the volume, the growth, and the structure of the West 
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German shadow economy. In addition, the determinants of the 
shadow activities are analysed. Due to the extremely com-
plicated structure of the rules and regulations governing 
the oficial supply of labour in the FRG this paper will 
present a rather stylized outlook on the legal facts. The 
study concludes by examining the West German policy 
approach towards the supply of shadow services. 
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II. The qualitative aspects of the shadow economy in the FRG: 
A collection of case studies 
The first group of people on which one must focus in some detail 
is the group of the self-employed in small-scale firms (in parti-
cular, in craft-firms). Apart from the mere tax-evasion by claim-
ing private consumption as operating costs2 the self-employed 
also provide black labour services. This is illustrated by the 
following example: 
Case 1 (3): 
A self-employed joiner in a rural area of the FRG runs 
about one fifth of his total business "off the books". 
These transactions obviously do not interfere with the 
traditional society still existing in this area nor do 
the joiner's rather conservative political views restrain 
him from participating in the shadow economy. The provi-
sion of shadow services is quite natural in the rural 
society. The shadow arrangements are characterized by 
the fact that the joiner knows his customers personally. 
The payments are made in cash. 
However, the provision of shadow services by the self-
employed cannot be assumed to be restricted to rural 
areas only. In addition such transactions are often inter-
linked with shadow services from one or more other businesses 
This can be assumed to be true in particular when certain 
prerequisites for the provision of the service need to 
be purchased. 
Case 2: 
An undertaker in a city in the FRG buys a large number of 
coffins from his retailer off the books. These coffins are 
then used for funerals of relatives of friends. The under-
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taker himself does not charge the official price for 
these funerals neither. 
In addition to the direct provision of shadow activities by the 
self-employed this group also participates indirectly by allow-
ing their employees to enter the shadow economy. The acceptance 
of their employees' participation amounts to a fringe benefit 
which secures the attachment of these workers to their firm 
even when the wage paid is lower than in large companies. 
Case 3 : 
Most of the employees of a Munich auto-repair shop provide 
shadow services after official working hours. This fact is 
well-known to the owner and also to everyone else in this 
business. Still they all accept these activities (despite 
the fact that the employees' services could be viewed as 
an unfair competition). The owner of the shop is noted 
to only once in a while fire an employee who has overdone it. 
In many cases the employers even provide the tools and the 
equipment needed. 
Case 4 : 
A car dealer and repair-shop owner lets his employees use 
the varnishing equipment on Saturdays. He claims that if 
an employee repairs the cars of relatives and friends on 
weekends this should not be called "black labour". 
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In most cases the activities of the employees of the small-
scale businesses are of the same type as their official job 
occupation. 
Case 5: 
The employee of a self-employed roofer in Hamburg states 
that he provides roofing as black labour as well. However, 
his shadow services are specialized in anthracite jobs and 
smaller repair jobs. He claims that his employer knows 
about these activities but has no interest in acquiring 
these jobs for his own business. 
Shadow activities by officially employed persons are not only 
restricted to the employees of craft-firms. Government officials 
can be assumed to be engaged as well, for instance. Again the 
type of the activity is the same as in the official job. In 
addition the shadow service is often provided during the 
official office hours. 
Case 6: 
An architect complains that a considerable large fract-
ion of the business is acquired by the employees of the 
local planning authority. If one wants to build a one- or 
multiple-family home there are enough experts here who are 
willing to do the whole job (e. g. including planning and 
site supervision) somewhat cheaper than the private busines-
ses. In addition they are able to speed up the process of 
obtaining the different building permissions. There is al-
ways a colleague in the office responsible for the respective 
approvals. 
Un 
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Government officials (e. g. policemen, soldiers, etc.) are also 
noted to constitute the stock of the "auxiliary" bus drivers for 
West German tourist agencies. 
Case 7: 
The owner of a bus agency from Waiblingen, Bavaria, states 
that a driver who was officially employed by the federal 
train system was driving a bus on 48 days between May and 
July. A Stuttgart travel agency reports that the number of 
its "auxiliary" drivers exceeds the number of its officially 
employed drivers. None of these second-job drivers has 
handed in a tax sheet. A driver admits that not only the 
taxes and social security contributions are evaded but also 
the safety rules for professional drivers are violated in 
most cases. "Keep your mouth shut and drive" is stated to be 
the slogan among the second-job drivers. 
While cases of officially employed workers providing shadow 
activities are well documented this is not so for the officially 
unemployed. An exceptional situation may exist in the construct-
ion industry however. 
Case 8 : 
The officially employed brick-layer Friedrich W. organizes 
brigades of black labourers which consist of colleagues but 
also of officially unemployed persons. Two brothers from 
Dortmund who have been unemployed for three years already 
and together collect social benefits of DM 1900,— per month 
are specialized in gutter and concrete jobs. Their revenue 
per month can amount up to DM 30.000,—.Of course, taxes and 
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social Security contributions are evaded, 
The employment of illegal immigrants plays a particular 
role in this context. This "modern slavery" more and more 
develops into organized crime. 
Case 9: 
In Stuttgart an organization specialized on the illegal 
personnel leasing of workers from Yugoslavia was detected 
by the police. It turned out that this organization had 
hired more than 1.000 workers in Yugoslavia including 
the total male worker population of a village near the 
Albanian border line. The wages paid to these workers were 
only between DM 8.-- and DM 12.-- per hour. 
Focussing on the demand side the extreme price differentials 
between the official and the black supply of the services 
appear to be the predominant factor of influence. In addition 
low incomes (for instance of new entrants to the official 
labour market) often make it necessary to employ black labourers 
Case 10: 
The teacher Ursula P. had to move from Cologne to Hamburg. 
A painter offered to renovate the new appartment for the 
official price of DM 623,--. She had it done by the em­
ployee of a local authority for only DM 300,-- then. 
The work was done on three consecutive weekends. The 
official price for getting her washing machine hooked up 
was DM 8 0 , — . A neighbourhood electrician did the job 
for DM 2 0 , — in his spare-time. Afterwards Ursula P. wanted 
to get her car fixed. The repair of a minor damage was 
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supposed to cost DM 250,— officially. An auto-mechanic 
who ran a small shop in his private garage only charged 
DM 15o,— to do the job. 
The account of case studies which has been provided in this 
section may serve to illuminate the nature of the West Ger-
man shadow sector. However it is also a rather limited insight 
which can be gained by such case studies. In order to assess 
the overall significance of the shadow economy in the FRG other 
sources of information must be taken into account. This task 
will be performed in the following sections. 
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III. The quantitative aspects of the shadow economy in 
the FRG 
III.l The volume and the growth of the West German 
shadow economy 
By the very nature of the shadow activitites it is 
rather hard to obtain reliable information on the 
shadow sector by statistical methods. Basically we 
find two different approaches in this field of re-
search. The indirect investigation methods utilize 
data which can be officially collected and can 
serve as proxies for the underground economy. The 
problem with such approaches is that they lead to 
large variations in the estimates according to which 
of the various indirect methods is used. (4) 
This deficiency of the indirect methods is clearly 
illustrated by the list of research in this field 
reported in table 1 on the next page. 
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Table 1: Estimates for the volume of the West German 
shadow economy using indirect estimation techniques (5) 
Estimates 
based on 
year of 
focus 
volume in 
% of GNP 
Name and year 
of publication 
The discrepancy 
between National 
Expenditure and 
Income Statistics 
1961 
1968 
1971 
1974 
1968 
16.7 
12.6 
6.5 
4.8 
8.9 
Peterson (1982) 
Albers (1974) 
The demand for 
currency 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1976 
1978 
1980 
4.3 
3.1 
6.0 
10.3 
12.1 
11.8 
12.6 
Kirchgässner (1982 
Langfeldt (1982) 
on the volume 
of monetary 
transactions 
1970 
1976 
1978 
1980 
16 
17.5 
24 
27.5 
Langfeldt (1982) 
on a formal model 
of the shadow 
economy 
1978 8.3 Week (1982) 
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On the first sight the results listed in table 1 seem to be 
more confusing than enlightening. However, this im-
pression alone serves well to illuminate the extreme 
difficulties associated with estimating the shadow economy. 
The presentation of the results highlights the two major 
problems of these statistical approaches: 
-They are very sensitive with regard to the data-base 
used: Peterson (1982) and Albers (1974) both utilizing 
the discrepancy approach estimate a volume of 12.6 
% and 8.9 % of the GNP, respectively, for 1968. 
-They are very sensitive with regard to the estimation 
method used: Langfeldt (1982) estimates the volume 
of the shadow economy in 1980 at 12.6 % of the GNP 
utilizing the currency demand approach and at 27.5 
% utilizing the transactions approach. 
Hence the use of the results of such studies for policy is highly 
restricted. One should always be aware of the problems associat-
ed with the indirect methods when using the results of such 
studies in political arguments. Not only their potential value 
in determining the size of the shadow economy is limited though. 
In addition these studies do not allow a clear-cut conclusion 
concerning the growth of the shadow economy in the FRG over 
the last decades. It can even be disputed that there has been a 
growth of the shadow economy at all. 
There still exists a definite virtue in reporting these results 
in this study though: The figures provided in table 1 con-
stitute a warning for all policy-makers who feel alarmed 
by reports on the existence of a large and rapidly growing 
shadow economy in the FRG. It may well be that the particular 
method employed in the research in this area yields such 
exaggerated and rather unreliable figures. The whole scope of 
studies on the volume and growth of the West German shadow 
economy does not support any clear-cut conclusions. (6) 
- 12 -
An aiternavtive to the indirect methods of estimation are 
direct investigations into the nature of the shadow econo-
my. These are based on the results of interviews. Of course, 
such studies are problematic as well. They must account for 
possible false answers and select the people to be interviewed 
as representative as possible. For the Federal Republic 
three direct investigations have been conducted. Their 
results concerning the overall size of the shadow economy 
are reported as follows. 
Niessen and Ollmann (1986) who report the results of a 
non-representative questionnaire among 800 households state 
that 30 % of the interviewed persons claimed to have been 
engaged in shadow activities. The Institut für Demoskopie -
Allensbach (1975) reports that in 1974 31 % of the inter-
viewed stated to hold second-jobs often or regularly. On a 
representative day in this year it was found that 7.5 % of 
the population provided second-job activities. The average 
number of hours spent in these jobs was 3 hours per day. 
Using the average hourly wage of an industrial worker 
(1974: DM 9.67) the Allensbach-study calculated the income 
derived from second-jobs at 35 billion DM per year. This 
figure constitutes 3.6 % of the GNP. 
The most recent direct investigation into the shadow economy 
was taken from the household panel of the Sonderforschungs-
bereich III of the Universities Frankfurt and Mannheim con-
ducted in 1983/1984. The results are reported in Hellberger -
Schwarze (1986, 1984). The overall significance of the 
second-job activities is illustrated in table 2. 
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Table 2: The significance of the West German shadow economy (7) 
second job 
activities 
among those are 
multiple job 
holdings 
Number of persons 
volume in hours 
in % of total 
working hours 
Income per year 
in % of the GNP 
4.96 million 
1530 million 
3.51 % 
2o.ol billion 
DM 
1.14 % 
2.27 million 
579.3 million 
1.33 % 
9.42 billion 
DM 
0.5 % 
Despite the fact that the work provided in second-job activi-
ties constitutes 3 - 5 % of the total work provided in the 
West German economy these activities only generate an income 
of roughly 1 % of the GNP. This figure was calculated utiliz-
ing the information about the distribution of the income 
earned in such jobs. Schwarze (1986) calculates the work 
provided in second-jobs with an average hourly wage of 
DM 9.00. This makes the figures roughly comparable to the 
Allensbach-study for 1974. The volume of the second-job 
sector then amounts to 3.0 % of the GNP. Hence this sector 
appears not to have grown between 1974 and 1984. However, 
we must keep in mind that these calculations are based on 
the notion that the second-job earnings could be calculated 
utilizing the average hourly wage in first-job activities. 
It turns out though that the actual pay in second-jobs is" 
much lower. Thus the volume of 1 % of the GNP reported in 
table 2 which is calculated utilizing the actual incomes 
in second-job activities appears to be more descriptive 
for the overall significance of the second-job holdings in 
the West German economy. 
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In addition both, the Allensbach-study (1975) and the results 
reported in Hellberger-Schwarze (1986, 1987), do not allow 
for conclusions concerning the amount of shadow services in 
the FRG. Only a fraction of the reported second-job holdings 
must be considered as shadow services. Utilizing additional 
information Hellberger-Schwarze (1987) estimate the provision 
of shadow services at about 40 % of the second-job activities 
This figure is likely to increase though if the mere tax-
evasion is accounted for as well. However, one should note 
in this context that the figures reported in these direct 
studies constitute upper bounds on the provision of the 
shadow activités in the FRG. 
- 15 -
111.2. The structure of the shadow economy in the FRG 
Information about the structure of the West German shadow 
economy can only be derived from the questionnaires on the 
second-job activities of the population. As pointed out 
above already the results reported in Hellberger-Schwarze 
(1987, 1988) analyze the most recent representative house-
hold survey for the FRG. Hence they will provide the basis 
for our investigation into the structure of the West German 
shadow economy. 
The first point of interest is to achieve a classification 
of the activities by the employment status of the suppliers. 
This is given in table 3 below. 
Table 3: Participation rates of people of age 14 and above 
holding multiple job in 1984, 
classification by employment status (8) 
employed 
-full-time 
-part-time 
-apprentices 
not employed 
-temporarily unemployed 
-school students 
-university students 
-housewives/men 
(including the perma-
nently unemployed) 
-pensioneers 
9 . 6 
7 . 7 
2 0 . 0 
16 .9 
9 . 3 
16 .7 
3 0 . 3 
22 .9 
5 . 8 
3 . 8 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
average over all groups 9.4 % 
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The most striking feature of the results listed in table 1 is 
that the participation rate of the officially employed and 
the rate of the non-members of the official work force are 
almost equally high. In both groups approximately 9 % are 
engaged in second-job activities. The above average partici-
pation rate of the temporarily unemployed (defined as persons 
receiving public transfer payments such as unemployment 
benefits, social aid, etc.) seems to be most alarming. Also 
as will be shown later the legal situation in the FRG would 
imply that the fraction of actual black labour services 
should be higher for this group than for the officially 
employed persons. On the other hand since the number of the 
temporarily unemployed is much smaller than the number of the 
employed one can maintain that the contribution of the 
unemployed to the shadow economy in absolute terms signi-
ficantly falls short of the contribution by the officially 
employed persons. Hence from this point of view the parti-
cipation of the temporarily unemployed does not appear to 
be particularly alarming. In addition since the 16.7 % 
participation rate for this group again must again be 
considered as an upper bound on the participation in the 
shadow economy it is clearly not true that the vast majority 
of the temporarily unemployed are employed in the shadow 
sector as it is often stated. The participation rate of the 
permanently unemployed which is contained in the 5.8 % figure 
for housewives/men appears to be particularly low. This is 
probably due to the fact that this group has been driven out 
of the labour markets completely (thus also out of the in-
official labour market). 
As noted above already one has to weigh the participation 
rates with the respective number of people in these groups 
in order to calculate the contribution to the total second-
job activities. Hellberger-Schwarze (1986) report the following 
figures: 30.7 % of the second-job activities in West 
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Germany are supplied by the officially full-time employed 
persons. The next largest contribution (18.5 %) is supplied 
by the university students followed by the housewives/men 
with 16.4 %. Officially part-time employed persons contri-
bute 10.2 % to the second-job activities, school students 
7.8 % and pensioneers 6.0 %. The contribution of the tempo-
rarily unemployed is calculated with 5.5 % and only under-
cut by the contribution of the apprentices with 4.9 %. 
These figures provide a more illustrative insight into 
the second-job activities of the West German population. 
The bulk of such activities is clearly provided by the of-
ficially employed persons. 
If the participation and the contribution of the officially 
employed persons is further disaggregated table 4 yields 
the following impression: 
Table 4: The relationship between the employment type and 
second-job activities 
occupation participation 
rate 
contribution to the total 
amount of second-job acti-
vities by the officially 
employed persons 
farmers 
self-employed 
blue-collar 
employees 
white collar 
employees 
government 
officials 
7.0 % 
3.5 % 
11.6 % 
7.1 % 
12.1 % 
1.5 % 
2.9 % 
51.0 % 
32.0 % 
12.6 % 
average : 9.1 % 100.0 % 
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The low participation rate and contribution of the self-
employed seems to be somewhat astonishing. However, again 
we have to point out that the figures reported above only 
relate to the classification as second-jobs. It is rather 
likely that the contribution of the self-employed to the 
shadow economy is underestimated in this study since the 
shadow activities of this group take place on the first-
job. Also the low figure for the farmers may not reflect 
the true participation due to the legal definition of 
full-time farming in the FRG. More than half of the farms 
in the FRG are run as part-time occupations nowadays. 
The propensity to find employment in second-jobs can also 
be thought to be influenced by the per-capita income of the 
household in which the supplier of the service lives. Table 5 
presents a rather interesting picture in this respect. 
Table 5: The relationship between the per-capita household 
income and the supply of second-job activities 
DM Participation 
rate 
Fraction of the Fraction of the 
total second-job total population not 
employment employed in second-
jobs 
Below 500 
500-750 
750-1000 
1000-1500 
1500-2000 
2000 and 
above 
38 % 
11.4 
10.1 
5.1 
5.8 
3.7 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
average : 
9.1 % 
23.9 % 
22.4 % 
21.2 % 
17.7 % 
11.8 % 
3.0 % 
total: 
100 % 
3.9 % 
17.3 % 
19.0 % 
32.8 % 
19.2 % 
7.9 % 
total: 
100 % 
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The interpretation of the figures in table 5 is as follows: 
Line 1 tells us that those who have a per-capita income of 
DM 500,— and lower are characterized by a participation 
rate of 38 %. They hold 23.9 % of the second-jobs in the 
FRG. This group constitutes 3.9 % of the total population 
which is not engaged in second-job activities. These figures 
allow a conclusion concerning two rival hypotheses as far 
as second-job involvements are concerned. One hypothesis 
is that higher incomes are to be associated with more human 
capital which should also yield more opportunities to acquire 
second-jobs. The other is that low incomes should generate a 
stronger necessity to acquire such occupations. Hence by the 
first hypothesis the second-job activities should be an increasing 
function of income while by the second hypothesis the exact opposite 
relationship should be found. The figures provided in table 5 
support the second hypothesis to a large extent. Lower income 
groups are more engaged in second-job activities. Hence 
the "necessity"-factor seems to be more important than the 
"opportunity"-factor in determining the propensity to engage 
in second-jobs in the FRG. 
However, the "opportunity"-factor influences the ability of 
the second-job employees to receive particularly high incomes. 
Hellberger-Schwarze (1986) report that the average hourly 
wages in second-job activities are DM 8.90 for persons with 
elementary school education but without apprenticeship 
(Hauptschule ohne Berufsabschluß). For persons of the same 
school education but with completed apprenticeship the average 
hourly wage is DM 19.06. The completion of a secondary school 
alone leads to an hourly wage of DM 13.58. University graduates 
can make an average of DM 22.01. Also table 6 can be seen to 
support the notion that men are generally able to capture 
higher wages than women. Hence the relationships between the 
income opportunities and formal education and sex in second-
jobs duplicate the relationships found for official first-job 
employments. If this is attributed to discrimination practices 
we must conclude that the discrimination is not restricted to 
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the official labour market but also works in the secondary 
labour market. 
Table 6 (11): Average hourly wages in second-jobs 
DM per hour 
below 5 
5 - 8 
8 -10 
10 -12 
12 -15 
above 15 
percentage of 
job 
second-
in this income 
bracket 
7.4 % 
12.7 % 
10.2 % 
21.0 % 
10.7 % 
38.1 % 
pe rcentage for 
men 
7.1 
3.9 
9.2 
24.9 
12.9 
42.0 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
percentage for 
women 
7.9 % 
28.5 % 
11.9 % 
14.1 % 
6.6 % 
31.0 % 
100 100 100 
The distribution of monthly incomes in second-jobs is illustrated 
in table 7. 
Table 7 (12): Monthly incomes derived from second-jobs 
DM 
per month 
percentage re-
ceiving this 
income 
percentage of 
full-time em-
ployed persons 
percentage of 
part-time em-
ployed persons 
below 100 
100 - 200 
200 - 300 
300 - 500 
above 500 
31.2 % 
24.8 % 
13.1 % 
15.6 % 
15.3 % 
32.8 % 
22.7 % 
14.0 % 
14.5 % 
16.1 % 
27.1 % 
30.4 % 
10.7 % 
18.6 % 
13.2 % 
100 % 100 % 100 % 
The average monthly income was DM 247.60 for full-time employed 
persons and DM 273.12 for part-time employed persons (13). The 
first impression that part-time employed persons benefit relatively 
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more from second-job activities vanishes when it is taken 
into account that they also provide more work hours than 
the full-time employed workers. Hellberger-Schwarze (1986) 
report that the full-time employed provide more hours per 
day if providing second-job services (4.9 hours per day 
compared to 3.8 hours per day for the part-time employed 
persons). But they work on less days per month (4.6 days 
compared to 7.9 days) and provide in total less hours per 
week and per month than the part-time employed persons. 
Hence the part-time employed persons can easily be observed 
to receive lower wages per hour. 
Again this observation supports the assertation that the 
second-job labour market provides a mirror-image of the 
first-job labour market. In the FRG "real" work is still 
considered to require a full-time employment. Thus those 
who are only part-time employed probably consist to a large 
extent of people who are not able to allocate a full-time 
occupation for various reasons. In addition differentiating 
by sex yields an interesting result as well. The average 
monthly income of full-time employed men derived from 
second-jobs is DM 258.98 compared to DM 107.16 for part-time 
employed men. For women this relationship is exactly 
reversed (DM 195.68 for full-time employed women vs. 
DM 310.80 for part-time employed women) . It seems to be 
somewhat paradoxical that the part-time employed men receive 
a lower average monthly income in second-jobs than the part-
time employed women. However, full-time employment is tra-
ditionally the main type of work for men. Hence the men who 
are only part-time employed can be guessed to be particularly 
disadvantaged with regard to their skills and/or physical 
condition. On the other hand the part-time employment of 
women is traditionally well developed. It merely reflects the 
fact that women still do most of the housekeeping in the FRG. 
Hence the part-time employed women can be guessed to possess 
more or less average skills. The full-time employment of 
(32| 
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women on the other hand is still restricted to a consider-
able extent to young women in low-skill occupations in the 
FRG. Thus the figures reported above may after all be very 
well in line with the general assertation that the incomes 
in the second-job occupations reflect the income possibili-
ties in the first-job occupations. 
The last personal characteristic which can be guessed to 
influence the propensity to engage in second-job activities 
is the age of the individual. However, the figures reported 
in table 8 actually only allow to conclude that the bulk of 
the second-job workers is at the height of their working 
lives. The very young and the very old are underrepresented, 
At the same time, however, the individual propensity to 
hold second-jobs can be observed to decrease with age. 
Table 8 (14): Multiple job holdings by age 
Age Participation Percentage of the 
rates second-job activities 
below 19 19.2 % 6.1 % 
20 - 29 16.0 % 28.6 % 
30 - 39 8.0 % 20.9 % 
40 - 49 9.0 % 27.2 % 
50 - 59 8.4 % 15.9 % 
above 60 4 . 4 % 1.3% 
average: 9.1 % total:100 % 
Turning to the type of activities which are provided in second-
jobs we can find the following classification illustrated in 
table 9. 
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Table 9 (14): The type of second-job activités 
Occupational 
type 
farming (total) 
thereof : 
-part-time farm. 
-gardening 
-farm.occupations 
Percentage of 
of all second-
job holders 
12.3 
.6 
1.3 
10.5 
% 
% 
% 
% 
the total second-
of the male 
second-job 
holders 
15.7 % 
.3 % 
.7 % 
14.8 % 
-jobs 
of the female 
second-job 
holders 
6.2 % 
1.1 % 
2.3 § 
2.8 % 
Production sector 
(total) 
thereof : 
- crafts 
- construction 
- Prod, of goods 
35.8 % 
19.3 % 
13.7 % 
2.9 % 
49.3 % 
30.1 % 
18.4 % 
.8 % 
11.8 % 
-
5.3 % 
6.5 % 
Service sector 
(total) 
thereof : 
- child/old people 
care 
- cleaning 
- restaurant/ 
bar services 
- education 
- office jobs 
- salesmen 
- drivers 
- shop keeping 
- janitors 
- writers 
- household services 
- consulting 
- marriage consulting 
- chief magistrate 
- help in barber shops 
- help in shops 
- others 
51.9 
7.9 
7.3 
5.4 
5.2 
5.2 
5.1 
4.8 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
2.5 % 
2.1 
1.8 
1.5 
.9 
.6 
.5 
.5 
.2 
.4 
100 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
35.0 
4.0 
1.3 
2.4 
4.0 
5.7 
6.3 
2.5 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
1.4 % 
2.2 
2.4 
-
.6 
1.0 
.8 
-
-
.3 
100 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
82.0 % 
15.0 % 
17.9 % 
10.9 % 
7.3 % 
4.5 % 
3.0 % 
8.7 % 
4.6 % 
1.8 % 
.7 % 
4.3 % 
1.3 % 
-
-
1.3 % 
.5 % 
.4 % 
100 % 
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It is quite obvious that men predominantly chose second-
jobs in the production sector while women preferably pro-
vide labour in the service sector. This mostly reflects 
the traditional division of labour in the West German 
society. One can also verify that the correlation between 
the type of the first-job occupation and the type of the 
second-job occupation is rather strong. Table 10 reports 
the relationship between the type of the first-job employ-
ment and the respective second-job occupations. Obviously 
blue-collar employer provide manual work in the second-job 
as well. On the other hand white collar employees and 
government officials prefer to provide labour in second-
jobs which are to be characterized as services. 
Table 10 (15): The relationship between first and second-
job occupations 
type of the Blue-collar White-collar Government 
second-job workers workers officials 
farming 17.1% 4.7% 4.0 
Production sector 53.1 % 14.4 % 26.1 % 
- crafts 30.4 % 5.4 % 14.5 % 
- construction 18.6% 6.2% 11.5% 
- production 
of goods 4.2 % 2.3 % 
Service sector 29.8 % 81.0 % 70.0 % 
- trading/sales 2.5 % 3.5 % 
- social services 4.1 % 12.4 % 49.1 % 
- other 23.2 % 65.1 % 20.9 % 
100 % 100 % 100 % 
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From both, table 9 and table 10, it is easily observed 
that the shadow sector in West Germany is very underdeve-
loped as far as the production of goods is concerned. 
Thus black labour can be seen not to compete with the 
employment in the manufacturing sector of the economy. 
Focussing on the average work provided in second-jobs 
by the type of the jobs the figures do not allow clear-cut 
conclusions (see table 11). 
Table 11 (16): The average work hours per month in second-
jobs by type of occupation 
type of average hours 
second-job activity per month 
farming 32.4 
crafts 11.15 
construction 19.12 
trading/sales 12.7 
social services 19.9 
other 24.2 
Helberger-Schwarze (1986) state that these averages pos-
sess only a very limited significance for the description 
of the secondary economy. The variations in the hours 
worked per month are too large. The only significant dif-
ference exists between the categories crafts/construction 
and the service sector. The former are characterized by 
a lower average labour supply in hours per month in se-
cond-jobs than the latter. 
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III. 3. The determinants of the supply of shadow services 
in the FRG 
III.3.1. The legal situation in the FRG 
The first step into an investigation of the determinants 
of the supply of shadow services in the FRG must be to 
examine the legal restrictions upon the official labour 
supply. The starting point of this analysis is the legal 
definition of black labour given in the "Gesetz zur Be-
kämpfung der Schwarzarbeit" (law for the prosecution of 
black labour) and in the "Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der ille-
galen Beschäftigung" (law for the prosecution of the ille-
gal employment). Both laws do not primarily define the 
illegal labour supply with regard to the evasion of taxes 
or social security contributions associated with the „pro-
vision of shadow services. § 1 of the "Gesetz zur Bekämp-
fung der Schwarzarbeit" states three kinds of violations 
of laws which classify a labour service as black labour: 
Violations of the "Gewerbeordnung" (factory act). 
Violations of the "Handwerksordnung" (crafts act). 
Violations of § 60 part 1, No. 2 of the first book 
of the "Sozialgesetzbuch" (social law book). 
The "Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der illegalen Beschäftigung" 
adds two more categories: 
The illegal personnel leasing. 
The illegal employment of foreigners. 
In the following sections we will therefore focus on 
these regulations in some detail. 
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III. 3.2 The illegal employment of foreigners 
The employment of foreigners is illegal if the employees 
do not possess valid residence permissions and/or working 
permissions. Foreigners who wish to stay in the Federal 
Republic of Germany generally need to obtain a residence 
permission. Citizens of certain countries are freed from 
this necessity if they wish to stay for less than three 
months. Employed citizens of the EEC countries and their 
families possess a right to obtain this permission. In 
addition all foreigners - except citizens of the member 
states of the EEC - need to apply for a working permission 
if they wish to work in the FRG. This permission is only 
granted if the employment of German citizens or foreigners 
who possess equal rights as Germans (for instance, citi-
zens of EEC member countries) is not endangered. Since 
the government of the FRG decided on a "hiring stop" for 
foreigners in 1973 this permission is only issued in very 
few exceptional cases. 
Due to the fact that the labour incomes in the FRG exceed 
those in many other countries of the world the inflow 
of illegal immigrants constitutes a crucial issue. Apart 
from the deportation of the illegal foreigners an illegal 
resident can be sentenced to up to one year of imprison-
ment or a fine. An illegally employed foreigner is threa-
tened by a fine of up to DM 1,000.-. 
The fines for the employers of illegal foreigners can 
amount up to DM 100,000.-. If the employment conditions 
of the illegal foreigners are extremely hazardous compared 
to the employment of German workers in the same job the 
employer is threatened by imprisonment of up to three 
years or fines. In grave cases the employer must be sen-
tenced to an imprisonment between six months and five 
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years. Repeated or multiple employments of illegal foreig-
ners and their transportation is penalized additionally. 
Also the hiring of foreigners in their home countries 
for the purpose of obtaining an employment in the FRG 
can lead to an imprisonment of up to three years or fines. 
The harsh punishment of the employers reflects the fact 
that the suppliers of the shadow services - the illegal 
foreigners - are mostly in a rather desperate situation. 
They cannot resort to the social security system, for 
instance. Hence they must be able to find employment re-
gardless of the employment conditions. The motive of the 
employers of the illegal foreigners is clearly to evade 
the taxes and the social security contributions and, pos-
sibly also, to violate costly safety regulations. 
III.3.3. The illegal personnel leasing 
Personnel leasing occurs when an employer rents out an 
employee to another employer. The "Bundesverfassungsge-
richt" (the supreme court of the FRG) has ruled that this 
is generally legal. However personnel leasing can only 
be carried out if a permission of the "Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit" (federal labour administration) is obtained. Per-
sonnel leasing without a permission can be fined with 
up to DM 50,000.- for both employers involved. The person-
nel leasing of illegal foreigners constitutes a crinimal 
offense and is penalized much more harshly (imprisonment 
of up to five years in grave cases or fines). In the con-
struction business such practices are generally not allo-
wed and violations are penalized with fines of up to 
DM 30,000.-. No permission for the personnel leasing has 
to be obtained if such employments are chosen in order 
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to prevent layoffs or short hours in the first employment 
("Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz", 1985). The other condi-
tion which has to be met in order to avoid having to ob-
tain the permission is that the employment must be within 
firms for which the same collective bargaining agreement 
("Tarifvertrag") is valid. 
Despite the fact that the "Bundesverfassungsgericht" has 
stated that the personnel leasing is generally legal the 
legal ways of utilizing this instrument are highly re-
stricted in the FRG. In order to obtain the permission 
the employment relationship between the worker and the 
leasing firm must meet the standards of the "Arbeitnehmer-
überlassungsgesetz" (law for personnel leasing). The re-
spective employment contracts must basically contain the 
same rules applying to "regular" labour contracts in the 
FRG. Hence persons who have lost their steady employment 
are rather unlikely to be able to legally compete on the 
labour market via a personnel leasing employment. The 
illegal personnel leasing will therefore most likely in-
volve persons who are unable to find an employment in 
regular jobs. The suppliers of shadow services violating 
the personnel leasing law are thus those who are at a 
disadvantage in the official labour market for regular 
jobs. Personnel leasing in the FRG can hardly function 
as a means to legally find new employment opportunities 
for those who have been layed off. This group is driven 
into the illegal provision of services by the very nature 
of the regulations. 
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III.3.4. Violations of the "Gewerbeordnung" 
§ 14 of the "Gewerbeordnung" requires that every business 
in the FRG must be registered. In addition § 55 states 
that travelling businesses must apply for a "Reisegewerbe-
karte" (a card for the registration of a travelling busi-
ness). § 6 contains some exceptions from this rule which 
apply mainly to agricultural businesses. If these excep-
tions do not apply the provision of a service is conside-
red to constitute a business if it is intended to be supp-
lied for an enduring period of time and supposed to gene-
rate profit. By § 1 of the "Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der 
Schwarzarbeit" the non-registration of a business indi-
cates that the services provided constitute black labour. 
The effect of these regulations is that any non-registe-
red business is considered as a shadow activity regard-
les of whether it is additionally intended to evade taxes 
and social security contributions. It is very likely 
though that the non-registration of the business is main-
ly chosen for this reason. However the violation of the 
"Gewerbeordnung" can be fined with up to DM 50,000.-. 
This sum then adds to the fines and possible imprison-
ment which can be imposed as a result of the violations 
of the tax and social security laws. 
III.3.5. Violations of the "Handwerksordnung" 
The concept of crafts applied in the FRG entails a very 
broad class of activities. It includes many types of pro-
duction which would be considered as light industry in 
the other member states of the EEC. A craft business has 
to be registered by the local craft chamber. In order 
to do so the self-employed craftsman has to satisfy a 
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number of highly restrictive formal conditions. In gene­
ral only those craftsmen are allowed to run a business 
who have passed the "master"­examination of their particu­
lar craft. 
Providing labour services in a craft without having obtai­
ned the registration can again be fined with up to 
DM 50,000.­ by § 1 of the "Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der 
Schwarzarbeit". In addition employees who provide shadow 
services in the same craft as their employer can be fired 
and are liable for the possible loss in their employer's 
revenue which can be attributed to their activities. 
Due to the extremely limited possibilities to legally 
operate a craft­firm the illegal activities can to a lar­
ge extent be supposed to be chosen in order to circum­
vent these restrictions. In addition taxes and social secu­
rity contribution will most likely be evaded as well. 
Due to the well developed cooperation between the inland 
revenue offices and the craft­chambers another possibility 
usually does not exist. 
III.3.6. Violations of the § 60 of the first book of the 
"SoziaIgesetζbuch" 
This part of the § 1 of the "Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der 
Schwarzarbeit" applies to the social benefit fraud. By 
§ 60 of the first book of the "Sozialgesetzbuch" the re­
cipients of social benefits must declare additional inco­
me immediately to the agency in charge of the benefit 
payment. By § 1 part 1 No. 1 of the "Gesetz zur Bekämp­
fung der Schwarzarbeit" it is ruled that the non­declara­
tion of additional income by the recipients of unemploy­
ment benefits ("Arbeitslosengeld" and "Arbeitslosenhil­
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fe") must be considered to be particularly objectionable. 
Hence these cases must be treated as grave cases as far 
as the punishment is concerned. Fines may again range 
up to DM 50,000.-. 
III.3.7. Problems of the legal definition of black labour 
The laws describe five types of black labour for the FRG. 
However an activity must in addition generate a conside-
rable economic advantage for its supplier in order to 
be classified as black labour. The question whether the 
supply of labour services actually yields a considerable 
economic advantage is sometimes rather hard to be decided 
upon. Clear definitions only exist for the violations 
of the § 60 of the first book of the "Sozialgesetzbuch". 
In addition there exist a number of exceptions. The neigh-
borhood help is considered to be such an exception, for 
instance. In general the supply of services must take 
place for a longer period of time on a unilateral basis 
between individuals with little or no personal relation-
ship in order to be considered as black labour. 
III.3.8. Taxes and social security contributions 
As stated above the legal definition of black labour in 
the FRG does not primarily aim at the evasion of taxes 
and social security payments. However due to the fact 
that the activities are defined to be illegal per se and 
since the cooperation between the inland revenue offices 
and the administrations in charge of these regulations 
is very tight it can be assumed that the provision of 
black labour generally involves the evasion of taxes and 
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social security contributions. Hence in most cases the 
penalties imposed by the black labour laws add to the 
fines and other punishments associated with the tax and 
social security laws. Since we have seen before that the 
average income earned in the shadow economy is rather 
low the tax and social security regulations concerning 
the so-called "geringfügige Beschäftigungsverhältnisse" 
(minor occupations) appear to be of particular importan-
ce. Table 12 illustrates the rather confusing legal re-
strictions on minor occupations. Non-recipients of public 
transfer payments can hold jobs within these limits and 
receive a special treatment as far as the taxes and so-
cial security contributions are concerned. The observable 
lack of coordination has basically three effects: 
- Jobs can be regarded as minor occupations by the 
tax laws while on the other hand social security 
payments must be payed. Hence a certain amount of 
the second-job activities of the officially employed 
and non-members of the work force is probably black 
labour but the suppliers of these services do not 
know about this. 
- The special role of the minor occupations generates 
a desire to use this employment relationship in or-
der to evade the taxes and contributions. The false 
declaration by the firm owners can be seen to be 
particular profitable. A. Weber (1988) notes the 
following example: A firm claims to have employed 
20 employees for DM 430,- per month. Actually it 
employs 10 workers for DM 840,- per month. It simply 
invents a few more names on the payroll in order 
to be able to utilize the regulations for minor occu-
pations (17). 
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Table 12: Regulations for minor occupation in the FRG 
Payments Time spent on 
the job 
Earnings Possibility to 
hold more than 
one job 
Taxation 
Social 
security 
payments 
except 
unemploy-
ment in-
surance 
Unemploy-
ment in-
surance 
general tax 
rate 10% 
payed by 
employers 
a) none 
b) none 
c) only the 
employer 
pays his 
share 
none 
a) 20 hours 
per week 
b) non-regular 
work on less 
than 18 conse-
cutive days 
a ) 15 hours 
per week 
b) short-term 
employment of 
less than 2 
months 
c) no restric-
tion 
18 hours per 
week 
a) Max. 
DM 120.-
per week 
b) Max. 
DM 41.-
per day 
a) Max. 
DM 440.-
monthly 
b) no re-
striction 
c) DM 440.-
to DM 600.-
no res-
triction 
YES 
NO. The sums 
taken over all 
jobs must be 
within the 
legal limits. 
Sums are only 
taken over jobs 
of one and the 
same job type 
(types a-c). 
YES 
Legal full pay-
accident ments 
insurance 
no free range no free 
range 
The employer 
must pay fully. 
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The control over the shadow activities of the non-
recipients of transfer payments is extremely limited. 
The observation of a worker must cover a longer pe-
riod of time in order to be able to prove that the 
minor occupation regulations have been violated. 
In addition to the regulations listed in table 12 minor 
occupations are also treated specially in the "Kündigungs-
schutzgesetz" (law for the protection against layoffs) 
and the "Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz" (law for prolonged pay-
ments in cases of illness). The "Kündigungsschutzgesetz" 
only applies to firms with five or more employees and 
payments according to the "Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz" are 
refunded for firms with less than 20 employees. Workers 
who provide less than 10 hours per week or 45 hours per 
month are not counted in this respect. Hence there exists 
an additional incentive for the false declarations of 
the jobs as minor occupations especially in small firms. 
The recipients of transfer payments will always have to 
declare their additional income to the respective trans-
fer agency. As noted in section III.6. fines are imposed 
if they do not declare this income. However they are also 
treated differently with regard to their tax burdens. 
The minor occupation limits do not apply to these per-
sons. Unemployed persons are taxed for incomes which ex-
ceed DM 15.- per week. The tax-rate is 50% for incomes 
below 80% of the "Bemessungsgrundlage" (the income which 
is used to calculate the amount of the benefit). Incomes 
above this limit are taxed at a rate of 100%. The unem-
ployed loose their benefits totally if the working time 
exceeds 18 hours per week regardless of the respective 
income. 
Persons receiving "Sozialhilfe" (social aid) are generally 
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taxed at 100%. Retired persons will have to pay the full 
social security contributions (e.g. the employer's and 
the employee's share) if their income is above a certain 
level. In addition all recipients of transfer payments 
are threatened by the loss of their benefits if they do 
not declare the income derived from secondary jobs. 
III.3.9. Sociological factors influencing the propensity 
to supply shadow activities 
The West German society is characterized by the fact that 
being employed not only provides a financial basis for 
the individual. In addition it symbolizes success in life 
as such and the individual's ability/willingness to con-
tribute to the well-being of the society. Thus unemploy-
ment demonstrates the "uselessness" of the individual. 
Not being able to participate in the "work life" also 
means that the individual is socially inactive in other 
respects. The resulting psychological stress from which 
the unemployed suffer provides an additional incentive 
to engage in shadow activities. The black labour restores 
the individual's self-confidence to some extent. 
However there are also a number of reasons why the unem-
ployed are socially restrained from providing such acti-
vities. The officially employed net-payers into the so-
cial security system have the strong suspicion that the 
transfer recipients are "loafers". This is of course due 
to the fact that the level of the benefits payed to the 
unemployed allow for a reasonable standard of living in 
the FRG. Hence the social control over the shadow activi-
ties of the unemployed can be assumed to be particularly 
strong in the FRG. 
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Moreover the shadow sector in the FRG seems to be more 
traditionally organized than has been realized so far. 
The ability to allocate a shadow job is largely reserved 
to those who also are officially employed. The shadow 
economy has been noted to present a mirror image of the 
official economy. Hence also the discrimination exercised 
in the official labour markets carries over to the market 
for illegal labour services. 
The West German society is also characterized by the fact 
that law compliance in general is still very strongly 
developed. There exist significant moral objections 
against the provision of shadow sercives which influence 
the individual's decision. Though the development towards 
higher tax burdens in the last decades can be assumed 
to have had its deteriorating effect on the moral re-
straints (18) one can maintain that they bear a consider-
able impact still. 
III.10. The incentives and disincentives to supply shadow 
labour: Some general remarks 
The regulations imposed on the official supply of labour 
by the "Gewerbeordnung" and (in particular) the "Hand-
werksordnung" provide strong incentives to provide shadow 
labour services. It is virtually not possible to compete 
legally with the registered craft-firms. The permission 
to operate in this sector is tied to formal examinations. 
The individual's ability to provide such services in ac-
cordance with the safety standards and other regulations 
for these jobs does not open legal opportunities in this 
field. The employees of such firms must provide their 
(33) 
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services illegally. The resulting extreme price-diffe-
rentials serve to increase the incentives to provide sha-
dow activities additionally. This is reflected in the 
structure data provided earlier by the fact that there 
exists a high correlation between the type of the offi-
cial job and the type of the shadow activity. Also the 
fact that craft-jobs constitute the main types of activi-
ties for men can be attributed to the regulation policy. 
The financial incentives to move into the shadow economy 
have been demonstrated to be significantly larger for 
the transfer recipients than for employed persons. This 
is due to the fact that the relative tax burden for the 
transfer-recipients in second-jobs is much higher than 
for the average employee. In addition the lower incomes 
of the transfer recipients give rise to a necessity to 
provide shadow services. The fact that the participation 
rates of the recipients of benefits are not so overwhel-
ming and that the bulk of the shadow services are pro-
vided by the officially employed must be attributed to 
the extreme risk for the unemployed. The possible fines 
are much higher and this group risks its primary income 
source, the benefit. In addition control is much easier 
to be exercised since the mere fact of not having decla-
red the additional income to the benefit agency is suffi-
cient to classify the labour supply as black labour. This 
is not so for the officially employed persons who possess 
better opportunities to hold second-jobs legally. The 
rather confusing structure of the regulations applying 
to these so-called "minor occupations" deteriorates the 
possibility to monitor the shadow activities of the offi-
cially employed persons. 
These regulations are probably also responsible for the 
fact that small-scale businesses and their employees are 
- 39 -
most likely to be involved in the shadow economy. The 
special role of the minor occupations in the labour legis-
lation gives rise to considerable shadow profits. 
The brief discussion concerning non-financial incentives 
and disincentives has demonstrated also that the shadow 
activities to a large extent constitute a privilege of 
the offically employed persons. The existence of signifi-
cant moral restraints in the West German society may con-
tribute to the overall small size of the shadow economy 
in the FRG as well as the well-developed system of fines 
and other punishments. 
The West German shadow economy to a large extent reflects 
the traditional discrimination in the official labour 
markets. Two reasons have been identified to contribute 
to this effect very clearly: the social discrimination 
of the "loafers" and the stronger prosecution of transfer-
recipients who can be considered to be disadvantaged. 
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IV. Policy implications 
IV.1. The characterization of the current West German 
policy approach towards the shadow economy _^ 
Of the three sorts of possible policy reactions to the 
shadow economy the West German government has clearly 
chosen to reduce the scale of the shadow sector by impo-
sing penalties and monitoring the labour markets. However 
this classification does not describe the West German 
policy approach sufficiently. The structure of the laws 
and regulations does not imply that the government at-
tempts to actually control the shadow economy per se. 
It is quite obvious that most of the efforts are directed 
at the prosecution of the supply of shadow services by 
the recipients of public transfers. 
This policy reflects the political pressure which arises 
due to the fact that on the one hand the level of the 
benefits in the FRG are supposed to allow for a reasonab-
le standard of living while on the other hand the offi-
cially employed net-payers into the social security sy-
stem call for an increased control against benefit fraud. 
The introduction of the social security card proposed 
for the near future clearly works in the same direction. 
It introduces a new instrument for controlling the shadow 
sector which only addresses the group of officially not 
employed persons. All others will possess such a card 
and hence its introduction will not increase the control 
over the shadow services of the officially employed per-
sons (19). 
The West German policy is further to be characterized 
as containing too many regulations which make the provi-
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sion of a service illegal for a particular person while 
the service itself may be perfectly legally done. The 
possibility to run a business legally is often not tied 
to the individual compliance to safety standards, environ-
mental control laws, tax and social security laws, etc. 
Rather it is connected to some kind of a formal educa-
tion. Instead of determining how a job should be done 
in accordance with the law the regulations determine who 
can do the job. This effect is further strengthened by 
the fact that the permissions to operate in a craft can 
exclusively be issued by the craft chambers. At the same 
time the chambers are also very active in controlling 
the black labour in this area. There exists a strong sus-
picion that the control exercized is to a large extent 
directed at the non-members of the official craft-
firms (20 ) . 
From a more general point of view there appears to be 
a large discrepancy between the amount of public interest 
which has been devoted to the shadow economy in West Ger-
many and its actual significance for the economy. This 
seems to result from a misinterpretation of the concept 
of supply-side oriented economic policy. This concept 
stresses the adverse allocative effects of regulation 
policies. Only one aspect of this policy concerns the 
possible disincentive effects of public transfer payments 
upon the supply of labour. The West German policy however 
seems to be almost exclusively concerned with this pro-
blem. The further deregulation of the labour market it-
self plays a minor role in this policy. 
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IV.2. Perspectives for a policy towards the shadow 
economy 
In the current situation which is characterized by a per-
sistantly high rate of unemployment any contribution which 
can serve to reduce this problem should be welcomed. Thus 
even the rather small West German shadow sector should 
be viewed as providing a potential for new employment 
opportunities. In order to assess this potential the dere-
gulation of the goods and labour markets must gain more 
weight in the political decision-making. 
In addition the social security system should be general-
ly reformed. What is needed is a system which does not 
generate adverse allocative effects due to the fact that 
the prices for goods and services are subject to rigidi-
ties which arise from the regulation. The system should 
be transformed into a subsidy system which guarantees 
incomes and not the attachment to a particular job. It 
should allow for more job competition while at the same 
time securing the income of the employed persons. 
For the Federal Republic of Germany this must mean: The 
laws should be restricted to determining the conditions 
under which certain jobs must be carried out. The safety 
standards, environmental control standards, etc. must 
be defined properly. Laws which determine who should do 
a particular job should be abolished as much as this is 
possible. The remaining regulations must be controlled 
extensively then to avoid possible negative external ef-
fects. Also the opportunities for the unemployed to parti-
cipate in the official labour market competition must 
be increased. The benefits should be treated like any 
other income source and not tied to the requirement not 
to take up other (especially, lower paying) jobs. 
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This policy proposal obviously constitutes a "legalizing"-
strategy as far as the shadow services are concerned. 
The argument that "legalizing" may lead to "social dum-
ping" should not be overemphasized. As stated above there 
must exist laws which determine the legal ways of provi-
ding a service (e.g. work safety regulations, environmen-
tal control regulations, health controls, etc.). The com-
pliance to these laws can be much easier monitored if 
the activities which now must be carried out in the shadow 
are allowed to be supplied officially. These laws should 
also be considered to reflect the true social progress 
which has taken place in the FRG. Most of the regulations 
however are presently aimed at limiting the competition. 
Hence they secure the incomes of certain groups by dete-
riorating the price-mechanism for the supply of and de-
mand for labour services. It must be clearly said though 
that guaranteed prices for services have nothing at all 
to do with the provision of a social security for the 
members of the society. 
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ENDNOTES 
(1 ) S.F. Franke (1988) 
(2) The mere tax-evasion is excercised in large compa-
nies as well where fringe benefits to employees 
are claimed to constitute operating costs. One can 
also observe that part-time self-employment is cho-
sen for the sole purpose of utilizing this form 
of tax-evasion. (Examples can be found in "Steuer-
ordnung", Wirtschaftswoche (No. 8), Feb. 1981, re-
printed in E. Lauschmann (1983)). 
(3) The examplifying case studies of this section are 
taken from various newspaper and journal articles 
reprinted in E. Lauschmann (1983). 
(4) For a description of the indirect methods see 
E. Langfeldt (1984), F. Schneider (1986). 
(5) See H. Bonus, E. Landsberg and H. Mücke (1984) 
(6) See also J. Jessen, et al. (1985). 
(7) Source: Hellberger - Schwarze (1987). 
(8) Source: Hellberger-Schwarze (1987). 
(9) Source: Hellberger - Schwarze (1986). 
(10) Source: Hellberger - Schwarze (1986). 
(11) Source: Hellberger - Schwarze (1986). 
(12) Source: Hellberger - Schwarze (1986). 
(13) The average monthly income in second-jobs amounts 
to DM 254.49. 
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(14) Source: Hellberger - Schwarze (1986) 
(15) Source: Hellberger - Schwarze (1986). 
(16) Source: Hellberger - Schwarze (1986). 
(17) A. Weber (1988) also notes that minor occupations 
can be assumed to be used extensively in newly foun-
ded firms. 
(18) See G. Schmölders (1978) 
(19) See G. Faupel (1988) 
(20) There exists some evidence for this suspicion as 
well. "Die Welt" ("Bönhasen landen selten vor dem 
Kadi", Dec. 30, 1980) reports that the craft cham-
ber of Wetzlar found some 600 cases of violations 
against the "Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Schwarzar-
beit" in 1974. Only six cases were tried though 
and in only one case the person was sentenced. 
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THE SHADOW ECONOMY IN THE NETHERLANDS AND DENMARK" 
b y 
A l o i s W e n i g 
F e r n u n i v e r s i t ä t H a g e n , FRG 

I. The outline of this investigation into the shadow economies 
in the Netherlands and Denmark 
The main problem in examining the shadow sector of the two 
Northern Member States of the EEC, Denmark and the Netherlands, 
is that there is very little information available at the time 
being. This holds for both, the statistical information about the 
size and the structure of the shadow economies and their 
determinants. Hence this paper had to be based on only two 
sources to a large extent: 
- An experimental research utilizing various types of 
questionaires in the Netherlands for 1983. The results are 
reportet in P. H. RENOOY (1984), R. VAN GEUNS, J. MEVISSEN and 
P. RENOOY (1987), and a collection of discussion papers of the 
workshop on the informal economy research and policy in 
Nijmegen (19 87) . 
- A questionaire among large and representative samples of the 
Danish population for 1980, 1983, and 1984. The respective 
results are contained in G. V. MOGENSEN (1985a, b, 1986). 
Both sources possess very specific features though which make 
direct comparisons rather problematic. The Danish report provides 
only very little information concerning the determinants of the 
shadow economy while the statistical information is more 
detailled. In many respects the Danish investigation provides 
figures which are roughly comparable to those reported in the 
direct studies of the West German shadow economy. (Institut für 
Demoskopie - Aliensbach (1975), C. HELLBERGER and J. SCHWARZE 
(1986)). This possibility for comparisons is very limited as far 
as the Dutch studies are concerned. 
The fact that emphasis is put on different issues in these 
studies yields the necessity that this overview over the shadow 
economies in the two countries remains rather fragmentary. For a 
number of reasons we suggest that there are strong paralells to 
the situation in the FRG, though. This will become clear when the 
statistical information about the structure of the shadow 
economies of the Netherlands and Denmark is explored. In addition 
focussing on the determinants of the shadow activities and 
analyzing the policy recommendation given in the Dutch and the 
Danish studies support this assertion. 
Since authentic case studies could not be obtained for the 
countries in focus the possibility to gain an insight into the 
qualitative features of the shadow economies is very limited. In 
order to overcome this lacuna at least to some extent the 
examination of the structure of the Dutch black economy will be 
enriched by reporting a number of selected answers from the 
respective questionaires. (Such information is not (yet) 
available for Denmark though.). 
II. The shadow economy in the Netherlands 
II.l The volume and the growth of the shadow economy 
For macro-economic policy it is of particular importance to know 
whether the existence of a shadow economy yields considerable 
distortions in the official statistics. BROESTERHUIZEN (1985) 
provides a sensitivity analysis which is particularly aimed at 
this problem. The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of the 
Netherlands mainly utilizes the production method to estimate the 
GDP and its growth rate. In this process the office has to use 
indirect methods in order to estimate certain productive 
activities. Consequently the calculations concerning the GDP are 
at least partly insensitive to shadow activities. 
BROESTERHUIZEN concludes that the bias in the official GDP which 
can be attributed to the existence of the shadow economy is most 
likely below 5% of the GDP. The distortion of the official growth 
rate is most likely to be smaller than 0.5%. It could exceed this 
value only in the improbable events of either a very large 
distortion of the GDP or an excessively high growth rate of the 
shadow sector. Thus the concern of the economic policy advisers 
that the official figures may provide a very unrealistic picture 
of the true economic condition because of the impact of the 
shadow activities does not find support by this study. 
The total volume of the shadow economy in the Netherlands has 
only very rarely been analyzed yet. P. RENOOY (1984) reports the 
results of a study by the central bank of the Netherlands carried 
<*) 
out in 1984. Utilizing an indirect method of estimation based on 
the volume of the cash transactions the size of the Dutch shadow 
economy in 1982 is calculated at about 12.7% of the GNP. This 
figure is noted to be particularly astonishing since for 1974 a 
shadow sector is found to be virtually non-existent. (However one 
should be aware that the estimation technique utilized could be 
responsible for this extreme growth of the Dutch shadow economy. 
In indirect studies on the West German shadow economy this 
particular estimation method yields the largest figures for both, 
the volume and the growth of the shadow economy, of all indirect 
methods. See LANGFELDT (1984)). FREY and WECK- HANNEMANN (1984) 
estimate the Dutch shadow economy in 1978 at 9.6% of the GNP 
utilizing the model approach. 
Direct investigations (by means of house-to-house inquiries) have 
been carried out by the CBS. Again some of the results are 
reported in P. RENOOY (1984): 12% of the car repair and 
maintenance jobs were inofficially carried out in 1982. On more 
than 7% of the payments for home repairs and improvements taxes 
were evaded. The inquiry which provides the basis for RENOOY"s 
paper yields the following picture: In 1984 the activities in the 
official economy constituted 43.3% of all activities of the 
househoulds. Only 9.5% of the activities were classified as 
having taken place in the shadow economy. The rest of 47.2% is 
consumed by the domestic activities of the households. 
II.2 The structure of the Dutch shadow economy: qualitative and 
quantitative aspects 
RENOOY ' describes the organization of the shadow activities as 
being clearly distinguishable into two types: The officially 
employed persons" shadow activities are organized in accordance 
to the way they work in this official job. Here the only 
difference between "white' and "black' labor (apart from the 
evasion of taxes) seems to be the time when the job is done. 
"Official painting' takes place between 9.00 am and 3.00 pm while 
"inofficial paint jobs' are arranged for between 3.00 pm and 5.00 
pm, for instance. The shadow activities of the officially non-
employed are mostly individual actions. Cooperation and work in 
groups is only found in exceptional cases. Such exceptions apply 
mainly to the so-called "moonlighting'(including activities 
classified as plumbing, bath-room installation, repairing locks, 
etc.) Here the work is often organized in "moonlighting circuits" 
for the officially non-employed persons as well. 
The "moonlighting'-jobs are very strongly represented in the 
samples. Thus minor repair or maintenance jobs in the 
construction industry seem to be of particular importance for the 
Dutch shadow economy. RENOOY finds that the shadow activities 
included in the sample can be classified as in table 1. It is 
noted that the production of goods is clearly underrepresented in 
the responses. Most of the activities are directly aimed at the 
consumers. 
Table 1: Types of inofficial activities in the samples 
Services 
insulating 
catering 
garage 
baby-sitting 
modelling 
hairdressing 
tutoring 
canteen 
car-rent 
rehearsal-room 
painting 
1 
rent 
electrical repairs 
cruises 
"moonlighting' 
Trade 1 
books 
watches 
tools 
furniture 
paintings 
medical instruments 
various (street sales) 
Production 
vegetables 
robot 
toys 
windmill sails 
furniture/cupboards 
printing 
paintings 
resonance equipment 
In the questionaires the people were also asked to classify their 
household"s activities as being formal, informal, or do-it-
yourself jobs. Table 2 lists the results by the type of 
activities. RENOOY points out though that due to certain 
limitations of the inquiry the results may not be representative 
(The interpretation of the figures in table 2 is as follows: Line 
1 tells us that the households responded that 27.8% of the paint-
jobs were done by official businesses, 13.0% by shadow workers 
and 59.1% in "do-it-yourself"-work. The column "total' is the sum 
of informal and "do-it-yourself"work and thus represents all 
activities not accounted for in the official statistics.) 
Table 2: Activities by method of operation 
Activity 
Painting 
Carpentry 
Wallpapering 
Plumbing 
Electrics 
Repairs to electrical 
equipment 
Domestic cleaning 
Provision of clothing 
Minor repairs to 
clothing 
Major repairs to 
clothing 
Laundry 
Baby-sitting 
Hairdressing 
Car repair and 
maintenance 
Books and records 
Administration 
Averages 
Formal 
27.8% 
34.5% 
19.4% 
72.3% 
53.7% 
78.3% 
7.0% 
73.6% 
3.8% 
23.3% 
6.5% 
8.3% 
67.3% 
76.5% 
96.5% 
28.0% 
43.3% 
Informal 
13.0% 
18.2% 
17.4% 
8.0% 
12.0% 
4.7% 
8.8% 
3.9% 
8.6% 
18.9% 
3.7% 
25.0% 
7.8% 
9.9% 
1.2% 
2.8% 
9.5% 
Do-it-yourself 
59.1% 
47.3% 
63.6% 
19.6% 
34.3% 
16.0% 
84.2% 
22.5% 
87.6% 
57.8% 
89.8% 
66.7% 
24.3% 
13.6% 
2.3% 
69.2% 
47.2% 
Total 
72.1% 
65.5% 
80.7% 
27.6% 
46.3% 
20.7% 
93% 
26.4% 
96.2% 
76.7% 
93.5% 
91.7% 
32.1% 
23.5% 
3.5% 
72.0% 
56.7% 
Slighty astonishing (and not in line with the results for West 
Germany, for instance) is the finding that skills or the 
(former/current) type of employment show no relationship to the 
type of activities provided inofficially. The shadow activities 
are mainly minor repair or maintenance jobs which do not require 
particular skills. In many cases it was noted that the number of 
specialized tools and equipments nowerdays offered allows for an 
increasing number of activities to be carried out untrained. The 
way in which skills are acquired by the shadow workers is 
illustrated by the following typical responses to the 
questionaires: 
- "So I said, well, I simply can"t paint. But that didn"t make 
any difference. It was just a matter of slapping it on. Most 
people seemed to be reasonably satisfied ..." 
- "... if people were altering a building somewhere, company 
people I mean, and they were doing the plastering, I"d just 
stand and watch for »half an hour to see how they did it". 
The formal employment sector is very important for the shadow 
workers. It provides the information and advice needed for the 
accomplishment of the shadow job. This advice is often noted to 
be given by official contractors, garages, and do-it-yourself or 
hardware businesses. 
The only skill which is clearly needed by the shadow workers is 
the ability to engage in conversations with the potential 
customers. The acquisition of shadow jobs predominantly works 
through mouth-to-mouth propaganda. This is illustrated by the 
following typical responses : 
- "When you"re starting out you just tell everyone you chat to 
that your"re "moonlighting' and ... straight away people start 
saying "Oh, I know a job for you" ..." 
- "The people you go to, you have a drink with, you talk about 
the work, how it was done, whether they have ordered this or 
thought about that". 
The customers are often referred to as being "friends of 
friends". Conversational skills are probably also very important 
in bargaining over the price of the shadow services. The "black' 
laborers turned out to very flexible in this respect as is 
illustrated by the following responses: 
- "If, for instance, I spend ten hours mucking about, then I"11 
only charge for seven". 
- "I can afford to have a bit of a social conscience. I don"t 
have to worry about competition and I"m not dependent on it for 
my bread and butter". 
The average hourly pays however reflect the skills required on 
the job. RENOOY finds that low-skill activities (baby-sitting, 
for instance) are payed with f 5,- per hour on average. Simple 
repairs, etc. are rewarded with less than f 10,-. For jobs which 
require very specific skills the hourly wage can amount up to f 
30,-. This raises questions as to who supplies these activities. 
In two thirds of all cases included in the questionaire the 
participants in the shadow economy had different income sources 
as well. These consisted of official jobs, students aid, social 
security payments, or parental income. It turned out that the 
fraction of activities which were provided inofficially was 9.9% 
for officially full-time employed and only 9.0% for people 
relying on social security payments. Payments were predominantly 
calculated on an hourly basis. Only in very few cases the shadow 
services involved exchanges in kind. Table 3 further indicates 
that those who are living alone (either being full-time employed 
or on benefits) are the most active consumers in the informal 
sector. 
to 
Table 3 : Consumption of activities by source of incomes 
income source Formal Informal j do-it-yourself 
u .·-.,4 ....-«.v. -;~κ Α Λ Λβ. α ία A c oa. Married with job 44.0% 
Living alone with job 44.2% 
Married with benefit 40.7% 
Living alone with benefit 45.6% 
9.3% 
12.6% 
7.8% 
11.9% 
46.8% 
43.2% 
51.4% 
42.5% 
Unfortunatly RENOOY does not report average incomes earned in the 
shadow economy. Two bechmarks are reported though: f 450,- per 
week in the catering business and f 300,- on a "good'day for 
street sales (f 200,- for a "bad'day). LAMBOOY and RENOOY (1985) 
conclude that the income possibilities in the shadow economy more 
or less reflect the opportunities in the official employment 
sector. Being unemployed is noted to provide a bad start in the 
shadow sector as well. RENOOY also focuses on the investments 
into the shadow businesses. Two cases can clearly be 
distinguished in this respect. Those who eventually wish to enter 
the formal sector invest up to f 30.000,-. Persons who do not 
have this perspective never invest more than f 10.000,-. They 
make extensive use of scrap-yards and second-hand shops to 
acquire the necessary tools and equipment. 
- "We bargained a little; I got one of those car pulleys at the 
Noorder market. Only paid forty guilders for it". 
In only one case the shadow worker responded to make regular 
savings in order to finance the investments. In many cases 
however the formal employer provided the tools. This was very 
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often noted to be done, with the explicit permission of the 
employer. 
- "If I happened to be using the boss"s car to visit clients in 
the day, I didn"t bring it back at night; I would just use 
everything that was in the car". 
Investments in large, expensive tools and accomodations are 
avoided as much as possible. 
The study by R. v. GEUNS, J. MEVISSEN and P. RENOOY (1987) 
explores the regional and sectorial dispersion of the Dutch 
shadow economy. Table 4 attempts to summarize the information 
about the regional diversity of the shadow economy in the 
Netherlands. The results concerning the sectorial differentiation 
are presented in table 5. These descriptions stem from a 
research in the Amsterdam urban area. 
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Table 4: Some results concerning the regional dispersion of the 
Dutch shadow economy 
Region 
Eften-Leur 
Characterization 
of the shadow 
economy 
Large informal sector 
concentrated in the 
construction industry. 
Participants are mainly 
employed with modal or 
above modal income. 
Proposed explanation 
The participation in the 
vbuilding explosion' 
during the 50's and 60's 
¡was very large. Thus the 
workers are very mobile. 
Also formal labor 
contracts were not the 
rule during this time. 
Mentality of self-
industriousness is well 
developed. 
Goes Small informal economy 
mostly in aggriculturai 
goods trade and related 
labor. 
The mechanisation and the 
automatisation of the 
aggricultural sector has 
reduced the inofficial 
employment opportunities 
in this rural area. 
Landgraaf Very vivid informal economy 
covering a wide scale of 
activities. 
The strong ties in this 
society of coal-miners and 
the sense for social 
coesion which is developed 
very well open many 
opportunities for "black' 
labor. 
Laren Smallest informal economy 
found. Childcare and 
cleaning jobs constitute 
the main shadow activities 
Many other forms of 
tax evasion exist though. 
High incomes and older 
persons were 
overrepresented in the 
survey. 
Lelystad Mostly do-it-yourself and 
unpaid neighborhood aid 
concentrated on home 
improvements, gardening, 
etc. Participants are 
families with children. 
The structure of this area 
with many suburbs and its 
isolated location has led 
to the creation of 
neighborhood assistances. 
Oude 
Pekela 
(Suprisingly) small shadow 
economy. 
Almost 60% of the 
residents are unemployed. 
Hence there is very little 
demand for shadow labor. 
The construction business 
is underdeveloped. Mostly 
low-skill or unskilled 
blue collar employees in 
the sample. 
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Table 5: Some results concerning the sectorial differentiation of 
the Dutch shadow economy 
industry jCharacterization of the 
I shadow activities 
Proposed explanation 
garment 
industry 
A large contribution from 
shadow activities. Working 
conditions and pays are 
rather bad for the shadow 
workers. 
The garment industry has 
recently experienced a 
considerable growth again. 
Large number of workshops 
owned by immigrants, 
mostly from Turkey.) Many 
female immigrant workers 
who have very limited 
opportunities in the 
official labor markets. 
The strong position of the 
buyers of the clothes puts 
pressure on the prices. 
cleaning 
business 
Fewer shadow activities 
than in the garment 
industry but many 
qualitative sumilarities 
Prices for their services 
are under an enormous 
pressure. The employees 
posess a weak position in 
the official labor market 
printing 
industry 
Hardly any considerable 
"black'work. The shadow 
activities are restricted 
to supplementary payments 
to high-income employees or 
"off the record' payments 
to home workers. 
Employers pay much 
attention to high quality 
standards. 
typing and 
word-
processing 
agencies 
All operate somewhere in 
between being totally 
formal or informal. 
The demand for high 
quality is less developed. 
Individual contractors and 
government organizations 
are noted to be major 
consumers of these 
services. 
special 
delivery 
agencies 
Same as above. Informal 
work usually takes the form 
of illegal subcontracting. 
Mostly unintentional 
consumption of the illegal 
services. Cost factor is 
most important for the use 
of inofficial labor. 
II. 3 The determinants of the Dutch shadow economy 
P. RENOOY (1984) attempts a classification of the factors which 
provide incentives or disincentives to participate in the shadow 
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economy as either influencing the necessity or opening up 
opportunities to acquire shadow jobs. Among the "necessity'-
factors financial problems turned out to be most important. Here 
the reliance on grants, social benefits, or parental income 
accounts for the shadow activities. Again this is stressed by 
providing some typical responses from the questionaires: 
- "I get f 707,- a month, f 300,- goes on rent. Well ... f 400,-
to live on; the cats cost f 25,- a week ... it"s just 
impossible". (19 year old on long-term unemployment benefit). 
Also debts and changes in the financial situation which arise due 
to divorces are noted to give rise to the necessity to move into 
the shadow economy. This additional income amounted to at least 
40 - 50% of the households"total income in these cases. The labor 
provided "black'is not experienced as positive: 
- "It"s a horrible uncertain way of life. That worries me. If a 
contractor comes along and says: "You can start tomorrow', I"ll 
do it". 
The dissatisfaction with the official job which provides too 
little opportunities to be creative also contributes to a wish to 
participate in the "black'market. In addition the social 
isolation especially of those who are not officially employed is 
an important "necessity'-factor: 
- "The feeling that you"re actually working is still quite a 
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kick. The money is not the most important thing, it"s mainly 
chatting during the breaks, having a drink afterwards etc." 
Besides these problems the government regulations which severely 
restrict the possibilities to open new businesses play a 
significant role. The extremely complex structure of the 
different permissions needed to operate a business is may be even 
more important than the restrictions themselves. The 
overdeveloped bureaucracy is also considered to be most 
discouraging. 
- "The last generation has organized it so perfectly that you can 
hardly get a foot in the door any more". 
In the Netherlands the possibility to work in a particular job is 
often tied to some kind of formal education (diploma). The 
individual's ability to do a job does not count. P. RENOOY 
describes the case of a ship carpenter (yachts) who was not 
allowed to work with hard wood because he did not possess a 
diploma in furniture design. Also there exist Collective Labor 
Agreements which either forbid (in the printing industry, for 
example) or regulate (in the garment industry, for instance) the 
home work. The regulations applying to certain jobs are 
additionally formulated in periodical regionally organized 
meetings between the employers and the trade unions. The 
individual possesses only very limited possibilities to negotiate 
freely in the official labor markets as wage-levels, working 
conditions, etc. are spelled out in these regular meetings. (See 
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van GEUNS, MEVISSEN and P. RENOOY (1987)). 
The subjective pressure of taxation and the distrust in the 
government's spending of the tax-money also provide strong 
incentives to supply "black' labor. (See P. RENOOY (1984)). The 
benefit recipients are on the other hand very strongly restrained 
from participating due to the risk of loosing the benefit. The 
fact that this group actually calculates the possible risk is 
further strengthened by the observance that the benefit 
recipients who also have a considerable debt are even more 
restrained. The loss of the primary income source, the benefit, 
would result in a financial desaster for these people. 
Small businesses virtually rely on the provision of shadow 
services. They cannot keep a regular workforce large enough to 
account for the peeks of the business due to the high costs of 
labor. In addition the small businesses cannot profit from the 
tax-deductibility of major repairs. Thus they must resort to the 
shadow economy in order to get these jobs done. New businesses 
are usually founded in the shadow sector for this reason. They 
need to avoid financial and bureaucratic commitments in the 
beginning. 
Among the factors influencing the opportunities to acquire shadow 
jobs the family life turned out to be important. Individuals were 
more likely to offer "black' labor if this was frequently done in 
their family. The skills which provide a good basis in the 
official labor market also open better opportunities in the 
shadow sector. Besides this the number of social contacts as such 
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(through friends, relatives, local neighborhood, etc.) appears to 
be very important. 
Within some groups or communities the provision of shadow 
services is very much encouraged. RENOOY notes the region of 
Northwest-Brabant, for examplet where it is perfectly normal to 
work for a labor sub-contractor. This is actually considered to 
be the only "real' occupation in this area. Van GEUNS, MEVISSEN 
and RENOOY (1987) also note significant differences in the local 
authorities concern over the shadow activities which may account 
for the regional dispersion. The Municipal Social Services (GSD) 
exercized varying degrees of control over the compliance to the 
General Social Security Laws (ABW) and the National Group 
Regulation Unemployed Employees (RWW). In some areas there was 
virtually no control while in other areas several civil servants 
were engaged in tracking down the black laborers. There also 
existed differences as far as the control over particular types 
of shadow services is concerned. In addition within one and the 
same area there were differential treatments of certain 
population groups. The authors also note that the religious 
environment had an impact on the individual's participation in 
the shadow economy. The predominance of the Roman Catholic Church 
was observed to give rise to a vivid informal sector. 
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II.4 The Duch policy towards the shadow sector: Description and 
Evaluation 
The policy of the Dutch government towards the shadow economy can 
be characterized as attempting to reduce its scale by increasing 
the controls. Van GEUNS, MEVISSEN, and RENOOY (1987) note that 
"the policy has been primarily based on general assumptions of 
the damaging effects of this phenomenon on government, trade, and 
industry". For a number of reasons this policy does not appear to 
be suitable in the Dutch situation though. A closer look at the 
structure and the determinants of the Dutch shadow economy 
reveals that the shadow economy exhibits considerable positive 
effects. These are mainly associated with the reduction of the 
labor market tensions which have emerged in the past. As far as 
the recipients of transfer payments are concerned the shadow 
economy provides opportunities for those who are unable to 
allocate jobs in the official economy given the present 
regulative policy. Also the shadow economy is highly integrated 
into the daily life and there exist strong relationships between 
the formal, and the informal sectors. Hence attempting to reduce 
the scale of the shadow activities can be assumed to have 'adverse 
feedback effects on the official economy. 
Still, merely ignoring this phenomenon does not appear to be a 
suitable policy neither. It has been noted that for some people 
it is a pure necessity to enter the shadow economy. For these 
persons the social problems are not solved if their participation 
is ignored. Rather a reconstruction of the Dutch social security 
system should be considered. The potential of the shadow economy 
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should be developed by pursuing a legalization policy which is 
accompagnied by a social security system encouraging the people's 
wish to take up jobs. Simple cut-backs in the social security 
system without opening up new employment opportunities through a 
legalization policy can be assumed to yield a growth of the 
shadow economy since the impact of the "necessity'-factors is 
increased. RENOOY (1984) and van GEUNS, MEVISSEN, and RENOOY 
(1987) support this view very clearly by suggesting to "rethink" 
the present tax and social security system thoroughly. They also 
propose that the VAT tariffs should be lowered. 
The Dutch policy has only begun to consider these arguments yet. 
RENOOY (1987) points out that the government's proposal to 
utilize more informal activities in the health sector which is 
supposed to overcome the financial problems of the health system 
is to a large extent still obstructed by other policy measures. 
Also in this sector particularly the government should carefully 
examine what informal work can and cannot achieve. The general 
level of health care could be influenced adversly if one attempts 
to resort to more informal activities. Other sectors seem to be 
much more promising areas for experiencing the positive effects 
of a legalization policy. 
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III. The shadow economy in Denmark 
III. 1 The volume and the growth of the shadow economy 
Using indirect methods of estimation the Danish shadow economy 
was calculated to reach about 6% of the GNP for 1974 and 1975 by 
the Danish Council of Economic Advisers2). FREY and WECK-
HANNEMANN (1984) utilizing an explicit model estimated 11.8% of 
the GNP for 1978. The most recent research using an indirect 
method (based on the demand for currency) was carried out by F. 
SCHNEIDER (1986). The volume of the shadow economy averaged 11.3% 
in several different specifications of the estimation equation. 
It ranged from 8.0% to 13.2% depending on various assumptions 
concerning the impact of taxes. 
MOGENSEN (1985) discusses the results of a direct study based on 
house-to-house inquiries. The size of the shadow economy in 1984 
is calculated with 3.9% of the GNP. Adding the usual one-sided 
non-declaration of taxable income this figure is likely to 
increase to 5.5% of the GNP. This figure resembles 200 million 
hours of work in the Danish shadow economy. The individual black 
laborer provides between 215 and 500 hours of work per year. In 
terms of participation rates the shadow economy appears to have 
grown between 1980 and 1984. The fraction of positive answers in 
the questionaires (indicating the individual's involvement in 
shadow activities) rose from 8% to 13% in this period. 
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II.2 The structure of the Danish shadow economy 
The structure of the Danish shadow economy can only be assessed 
from the direct study using questionaires"3). An important issue 
always concerns the activities of the unemployed. MOGENSEN (1985) 
states that the unemployment rates for Denmark can actually be 
viewed as being exaggerated. If the shadow activities of the 
unemployed would be added the official unemployment rate of 10.8% 
for 19 83 would in fact decrease. However the necessary correction 
is very small (from 10.8% to 10.3%). This indicates that the 
involvement of unemployed persons in the Danish shadow economy is 
anything else than being alarmingly large. The frequency of 
positive responses in the questionaires is noted to be more or 
less identical for the officially employed and the unemployed 
persons. 
The type of the shadow activities is analyzed as follows: In the 
1983 inquiry 19% of the population responded to have bought 
shadow services during the last 12 months. The types of 
activities bought are listed in table 6. 
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Table 6: Types of shadow activities purchased in 1983 
type activity 
building sector 
house services 
(childcare, garding, 
cleaning, etc.) 
other 
(mainly repair jobs 
- especially car 
repairs) 
Relative share of all shadow work 
46% 
29% 
25% 
Within the building sector in which the bulk of the shadow work 
was consumed the repair works and in particular paint-jobs were 
the most dominant activities. 
The average payment for these services was Dkr 770.-. This figure 
stresses the extreme price differentials between the shadow labor 
services and official labor services. MOGENSEN reports that the 
same services purchased in the official market would on average 
have to be payed for with Dkr 1385.-. In 40 - 50% of the cases 
the payments were made in cash. The rest consisted mainly of 
exchanges in kind. 
Age, house ownership, and the length of the work week exhibited 
the most significant impact on the propensity to consume shadow 
services. MOGENSEN (1985) states: "The typical consumer on the 
Danish black market in 1983 was a person in the age-group 20 -
40, who owned his dwelling, and who worked long weekly hours". 
Age was also a significant determinant of the propensity to 
supply shadow activities. The 1984 survey showed that the 
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frequency of involvement in the shadow economy decreased with 
age. While 31% of the persons below age 20 responded to have 
supplied shadow labor this figure decreased to 15% for persons 
between 30 and 39 years of age and to 6% for persons who were 
between 60 - 69 years old. The participation rates by type of the 
occupational status which were found in the 1984 inquiry are 
listed in table 7. 
Table 7 : Selected participation rates by occupational status 
occupational status 
school student 
university student 
skilled blue-collar 
worker 
Partie ipation rate 
29% 
26% 
25% 
farmers 
pensioneers 
10% 
5% 
The participation rates for white-collar employees and the self-
employed were found to be particularly low. Other personal 
characteristics proved to have only minor impacts on the supply 
of shadow services. Women were less likely to be involved than 
men (Participation rates: 7% vs. 10%, respectively). Also the 
frequency of participating in the shadow economy showed a slow 
decrease from Copenhagen (17%) to the rural areas of Western 
Jutland (10%). The participation was found to be suprisingly 
constant over all income groups though. Interestingly the 
frequency of participation increased with income if the impact of 
age was corrected for. Thus "opportunity' seems to have more 
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influence than the "necessity'-factors in Denmark. 
III.2 Policy implications 
MOGENSEN (1985) notes that if the 200 million hours of black 
labor provided in 1984 could be converted into jobs for the 
unemployed some 110.000 new full-time jobs could be created. This 
would have lowered the unemployment rate of 10.8% in 1984 to 
approximatly 7.8%. However it is stated that this possiblity is 
rather limited. It could only be achieved if the extreme price-
differentials between the official and the black supply of labor 
services would be abolished. The respondents in the questionaire 
would rather resort to do-it-yourself jobs (34%) or simply not 
consume the services (30%) than paying the official price. Hence 
the whole regulative and tax policy would have to be altered in 
order to legalize the shadow activities. 
1 
MOGENSEN dismisses a policy which only relies on a legalization 
by pointing out that this would decrease the government's 
possibility to influence the income distribution in the society. 
Reducing the income taxes and restoring the competitiveness of 
the labor markets by pursuing this policy would mean that the 
income distribution also resembles more or less the market 
opportunities of the individuals. Hence MOGENSEN suggests to use 
a policy mix instead. The combination of instruments 'including 
increased control should aim at a more realistic goal than 
attempting to eliminate the black market completely. 
To our mind MOGENSEN"s conclusions cannot be supported in every 
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respect. They point out the difficulties associated with a 
legalization policy though. In fact the pure legalization without 
at the same time introducing a thoroughly modified social 
security policy would give rise to the problems described by 
MOGENSEN. However the government does not need to give up its 
distributive policy in the process of pursuing a legalization 
policy. What is needed is a social security system which 
subsidizes the income if the individual fails to receive a 
suitable market income by offering his services while at the same 
time the system should not deteriorate the market mechanism. This 
can be achieved by abolishing the rules contained in the social 
security system which currently require the transfer recipients 
to stay away from the labor market in order to be eligible for 
the benefits. The transfer and the income tax system must be 
integrated. This way the government could pursue its (income) 
distribution policy further without interfering with the price-
mechanism which equates the labor supply and demand in the 
market. We agree with MOGENSEN that increased control should be 
part of the policy mix. However this control should focus only on 
those rules which provide a protection against possible adverse 
external effects associated with certain technologies (e.g. 
pollution control, safety standards, etc.). 
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IV. The shadow economies in the Northern Member States of the 
EEC: Are they comparable? 
So far this study has extracted the available qualitative and 
quantitative information about the shadow economies in the 
Netherlands and Denmark. It is quite clear that the sources on 
which this report had to rely are not directly comparable with 
regard to the information which is provided. On the other hand 
the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the Dutch shadow 
economy and the quantitative results of the Danish investigation 
suggest that such comparisons are valid. In addition the policy 
discussion provided in these country studies points at the fact 
that the determinants of the shadow economy can be assumed to be 
quite similar. To our mind both discussions also suggest strongly 
that the shadow economies in the Netherlands and Denmark show 
parallels to the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 
this section we wish attempt to explore this assertation more 
thoroughly. 
A first look at the way how the social security systems are 
financed in the three countries (the Netherlands, Denmark,· and 
the FRG) suggests that the structures are quite different. (See 
Commission of the European Community (1984)). The main 
differences can be stated as follows: 
- In Denmark the social security system is to a large extent 
financed via taxes while in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Netherlands contributions are payed to different social 
security agencies. 
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- Between the FRG and the Netherlands there exist differences 
with regard to the employer's and the employee's share of the 
contribution. While in the FRG the shares are equal the 
employee's share is higher than the employer's share in the 
Netherlands. Also the amount of the contributions are not equal 
between the two countries. In addition the unemployment 
benefits in the Netherlands are financed by the government 
while in the FRG there exists a compulsory unemployment 
insurance. 
These are rather clear differences in the structure of the social 
security systems (even if the details are not analyzed further). 
However the first-sight impression may be misleading. In fact 
there exist no differences with regard to a tax financed or a 
contribution funded social security system if the contributions 
are compulsory. This is the case for the FRG and the Netherlands 
though. In addition in both countries the governments subsidize 
the social security systems if the contributions do not cover the 
expenditures. The fact that the relative shares for employers and 
employees are not structured equally in the Netherlands and the 
FRG also does not indicate that there must exist differences in 
the incentives to move into the shadow economy. In an economic 
sense both shares together constitute the respective wage-bill 
component which must be accounted for. 
Rather than focussing on the structure of the social security 
financing one should therefore analyze the tax and social 
security burdens. This is done by FREY and WECK-HANNEMANN (1984) 
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for 17 OECD countries. From this study one can infer the 
following tax and social security burdens for the FRG, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. 
Table 8 : Shares of taxes, social security contribution in the 
GDPs 
... . 
Share of direct taxes 
Share of 
indirect 
taxes 
Share of social 
security 
contributions 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1978 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1978 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1978 
FRG 
9.3% 
10.2% 
10.7% 
12.0% 
13.1% 
14.3% 
14.1% 
12.8% 
12.3% 
12.8% 
9.6% 
9.7% 
10.9% 
13.5% 
14.0% 
Denmark 1 
11.7% 1 
13.4% 
20.4% 
26.0% 
23.8% 
12.2% 
13.9% 
17.1% 
16.1% 
16.2% 
1.5% 
1.8% 
1.8% 
0.7% 
0.5% 
Netherlands 
12.3% 
12.8% 
13.8% 
16.5% 
16.1% 
9.9% 
10.0% 
11.4% 
11.3% 
12.7% 
8.0% 
11.2% 
14.7% 
18.4% 
18.2% 
It is easily observed that the differences in the structure of 
financing the social security systems show up in table 8. The 
suprisingly low share of the social security contributions in 
Denmark is made up by a significantly higher tax burden. This is 
further strengthend by the fact that Denmark experienced the 
largest increases of the direct tax shares of the three 
countries. It can be assumed that this had to compensate largely 
for the increases in the social benefit expenditures which have 
led to the strong increases in the Dutch and the West German 
social security contribution shares. (See table 9) 
Table 9: Change of the direct tax share over a five year period 
Country 
Denmark 
FRG 
Netherlands 
1955 - 60 
0.4% 
0.1% 
1.3% 
1960 - 65 
1.7% 
0.9% 
0.5% 
1965 - 70 
7.0% 
0,5% 
1.0% 
1970 - 1975 
5.6% 
1.3% 
2.7% 
1973 - 78 
0.0% 
-0.4% 
0.7% 
FREY and WECK-HANNEMANN (1984) also report indices for the degree 
of regulation and the tax immorality. These are listed in table 
10. 
Table 10: Regulation burden and tax immorality 
Country 
Denmark 
FRG 
Netherlands 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1978 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1978 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1978 
Share of public 
employees in 
total employment 
9.9% 
13.1% 
16.8% 
22.1% 
22.8% 
7.9% 
9.7% 
11.1% 
13.3% 
13.9% 
11.6% 
11.4% 
12.0% 
12.9% 
13.9% 
index of 
tax immorality4, > 
2.2% 
2.7% 
3.6% 
4.2% 
4.4% 
5.5% 
6.7% 
9.0% 
10.6% 
10.9% 
5.5% 
6.7% 
9.0% 
10.6% 
10.9% 
According to the "Sozialschutzstatistik" of EUROSTAT the three 
countries under consideration here exhibit the largest shares of 
expenditures on social security within the EEC. (See table 11): 
io 
Table 11; Expenditures on social security in % of the GDP and 
rank within the EEC member states 
H 1970 i 1975 I 1980 
Denmark 19.6% (3) 25.8% (3) 28.0% (3) 
FRG 21.4% (1) 27.8% (2) 28.3% (2) 
Netherlands | 20.8% (2) | 28.1% (1) 30-7% (1) 
Source: Sozialschutzstatistik - 1970 - 1980, EUROSTAT 
All sources together indicate that the three northern member 
states of the EEC are leading in terms of tax and social security 
burdens and as far as the volumes of expenditures are concerned. 
However Denmark has experienced the largest increases in these 
figures. On the other hand it is also characterized by a strong 
tax morality. However the FRG and the Netherlands are 
characterized by upper medium indices of tax morality as well. 
We would therefore expect that the Dutch shadow economy should 
have experienced the largest growth rates in the last decades. 
The volume of the shadow economy should also be greater in 
Denmark and the Netherlands than in the FRG. However we would not 
expect these differences to be particularly large. These 
assertions of course take into account that the country-specific 
structure of the shadow economics are similar in these member 
states of the EEC. 
The analysis by FREY and WECK-HANNEMANN supports the 'hypotheses 
raised above. The Danish shadow sector has passed those of the 
Netherland and the FRG between 1960 and 1978. The volumes for 
1978 are estimated with 11.8% of the GNP for Denmark, 9.6% for 
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the Netherlands, and 8.6% for the FRG. Rather than the absolute 
figures the ranks appear to be important. They clearly support 
our assertions from above. Also the 95% - confidence intervals 
calculated by FREY and WECK-HANNEMANN show that the shadow 
economies of the three countries could be even more similar than 
these figures would suggest. It appears as if the Danish shadow 
economy is overestimated rather than underestimated while the 
reverse is true for West Germany and the Netherlands. 
V. Concluding comments 
In this paper we have attempted to illustrate the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the Dutch and the Danish shadow 
economies. Based on the idea that the situations in both 
countries are quite similar the survey over the Dutch studies 
stresses different issues than the review of the Danish report in 
order to obtain a more detailed insight. The results also seem to 
be quite well in line with the studies on the West German shadow 
economy. In Chapter IV we have therefore pointed out some more 
similarities and differences among these three countries in order 
to assess the size and the growth rates of the respective shadow 
economies. 
The policy conclusions drawn in the Dutch and the Danish studies 
also show that the determinants of the shadow economies in these 
two countries are very likely to be similar to the determinants 
in the FRG. The main problems seem to be an extensive regulation 
policy pursued by the government and a social security system 
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which does not allow for the transfer recipients to compete in 
the official labor market. The governments have been noted to 
have chosen a policy which aims at decreasing the scale of the 
shadow economy by increasing the control. In contrast we suggest 
that for a number of reasons (economic and sociological) a 
legalization policy would be better suited for these countries. 
This policy does not have to deteriorate the distribution policy 
pursued by the governments as it is stated in MOGENSEN (1985). 
However as pointed out in the Dutch studies the social security 
system must be reorganized thoroughly. Merely legalizing the 
shadow economies does not suffice to overcome the social problems 
associated with the role of the transfer recipients in the shadow 
economy. Instead the incomes derived in the labor markets must be 
subsidized for those people who are unable to obtain an income 
which allows for a reasonable standard of living. Yet those 
people should be allowed to participate in the labor market 
freely in order to eliminate the social discrimination associated 
with being a "drop-out" from the official labor market. If the 
policy would be altered accordingly there still exists a need for 
control though. The laws governing the ways how certain jobs 
should be exercized given the existence of external effects 
(health hazards, pollution, etc.) must be enforced rigorously. 
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ENDNOTES; 
1) In this section the basic results from Ρ RENOOY (1984) will be 
reported. Unless otherwise indicated the figures and quotes 
are taken exclusivly from this report. 
2) Okonomiske Rad: Dansk Okonomi, Trykning Kontor, 
Copenhagen, 1977. 
3) The results reported in the following are documented in G. V. 
MOGENSEN (1985a, b and 1986). 
4) For the calculation of this index see FREY/WECK-HANNEMANN 
(1984). 
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PART I 
CASE STUDIES 
1. Sabadell' 
The Catalan city of Sabadell forms, together with Terrassa, Spain's largest textile 
producing centre. This means that the city has been deeply affected by the crisis in the in-
dustry, as can be seen in its extremely high rates of registered unemployment. It would 
nevertheless seem paradoxical that social absorption of this situation has involved rela-
tively little major protest or mobilisation, and that certain sectors of the city in fact appear 
to be relatively prosperous. This must cast some doubt on the "official" figures. All the 
studies carried out indicate a glorious rebirth of informal or hidden activity, which has 
moreover always been present to one extent or another. 
Quantitative Estimates 
Although there are no precise estimates of the extent of informal work, some ex-
perts who have been in direct and continuous contact with the phenomenon consider that 
it could be generating between 30% and 50% of the city's wealth. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the active work force was 38% of the total popula-
tion, whereas the percentage corresponding to the potential work force was 63%. Bearing 
in mind that 27% of the active work force was registered as unemployed, it must be con-
cluded that only extremely high levels of informal economic activity could maintain the 
situation. 
Determining Factors 
The following are considered to be the factors determining the phenomenon on the 
pan of the employers: reduction of labour costs, gaining of greater flexibility, reduction 
of costs which are directly related to production and follow market fluctuations, and re-
duction of costs collateral to the work process, especially those resulting from the control 
and supervision of tasks. 
Tradition has thus once again become a preponderant factor, going back to the 
days when, before the recession of the 1970s, many of the present types of informal 
work had already established themselves in Sabadell. The phenomenon has however 
become more intense, with a more sophisticated organisation and coupled to conscious-
ness of the fact that, for many people, it is the only mode of work possible. 
Features of the Market 
Sabadell could be defined as having a relatively autonomous economy, with a 
considerable degree of openness to the exterior. The city's firms buy and sell on the re-
gional, national and international levels, and decentralisation of production has moved 
phases of the production process —especially in some textile firms— beyond the limits of 
the city. 
Typology of Informal Labour 
Although at-home work has always been extensive in Sabadell and is perhaps the 
type of informal work par excellence, numerous other types of hidden activities are in fact 
to be found, depending on the production sector concerned. We shall thus leave a more 
systematic typology for our section on the textile industry. 
Work Conditions 
Research indicates that work conditions have deteriorated with the growth of in-
formal work: "the workers interviewed receive less pay than legally employed workers 
for the same hours of work; their conditions are worse, their working weeks are longer 
and they have less job security". 
2. Andalusia2 
Quantitative Estimations 
Within the research limitations peculiar to this case, it may be affirmed that the 
level of undeclared work in Andalusia is relatively higher than the Spanish average, af-
fecting at least 17% of the registered work force, a figure which maximising hypotheses 
raise to as high as 30%. 
Determining Factors 
Here we once again see evidence of the generally cited causes of informal work: 
tax and duty avoidance, reduction of labour costs, flexibility of labour, etc. Some of these 
factors are however clearly related to Andalusia's economic structure, which presents a 
perfect combination of features for the generation of high degrees of informal work: 
- The reduced size of firms, which in some sectors should be termed artisanal, is 
associated with low technological levels and thus a higher labour intensity than the na-
tional average. 
- The high proportion of seasonal demand sectors such as tourism and associated 
services absorb considerable levels of informal and temporary labour. 
- Salaries are low in all sectors, especially those based on agriculture, in which 
much of the population is employed. 
- The low scholarity level leads to a lowly qualified labour force. 
- The reduced rate of female employment contrasts with the considerable number 
of women working in artisanal and agricultural activities. 
Situation of the Market 
The Andalusian firms using informal labour are usually less present in interna-
tional markets than are comparable firms in Catalonia or Valencia. This may be because 
they have not formed potent distribution and marketing networks within the appropriate 
legal structures, much of their activity thus remaining within clandestine networks. 
Typology of Informal Work 
Most informal work is carried out by women and young people employed on a 
part-time basis in industry, services and at-home work, as well as on family farms. 
The catering, tourism and construction sectors absorb considerable levels of part-
time, temporary or totally informal labour. 
Agriculture is one of the defining elements of the Andalusian economic structure, 
and it is here that working conditions have long been the most unstable of the region. It is 
quite probable that the number of completely informal day labourers has tended to decline 
since the introduction of unemployment benefits for seasonal agricultural workers in 
1984, given that the workers have to declare their periods of employment in order to fulfil 
the conditions for receiving unemployment benefits. The low number of declared working 
days needed to have access to these benefits nevertheless suggests that infonnal employ-
ment persists and has in fact only been redefined. 
Work Conditions 
Work conditions are generally bad. Agricultural work is hard and subject to days 
of undetermined length and low wages. It should also be noted that seasonal harvest em-
ployment is highly unstable, obliges the agricultural worker to move constantly from 
place to place, and is generally carried out without work contracts, especially in the case 
of young people, women and family help. 
In industry, construction and sectors associated with tourism, work conditions are 
also inferior to those prevailing in situations of legal employment: the working week is 
longer and the wages are lower. 
In tourism sectors like catering, informal employment is often accorded to groups 
of workers, usually families including women and children, which receive lump sum 
salaries for the work of the group as a whole. 
3. Textile and Clothing Industry3 
Determining Factors 
In addition to the factors generally prevailing in other sectors, we should note the 
following points: 
- Government intervention in the sector through successive reconversion plans has 
not led to any real restructuring of the industry, but has rather established the bases for the 
development of informal and unstable employment. 
- The sector's traditional industrial structure is made up of small units involved in 
a process which allows fragmentation into relatively autonomous production phases. 
- The recession has greatly increased the labour supply. 
Researchers believe that the labour market and industrial relations are undergoing a 
restructuring process which involves a return to as much suppression as possible of in-
stitutional mediation between capital and labour as well as the possibilities for organised 
labour. 
Features of the Market 
The sector's present transformations are tending to produce a concentration of 
major capital in the beginning and end of the production process, that is, in firms treating 
raw materials and those commercialising final products. The intermediary phases tend to 
be carried out through unstable or informal employment and are becoming increasingly 
dependent on the larger firms —national or multination— operating at either of the two 
ends of the process. 
With respect to regional distribution, the Spanish textile industry is highly con-
centrated, with almost all the production being carried out in the district of Vallès Occi-
dental and the Llobregat and Ter valleys in Catalonia, and in some districts of Alicante. It 
is nevertheless true that the decentralised and informal manufacturing phases are often to 
be found in other regions. 
Finally, special mention should be made here of the impetus that some commercial 
firms are giving to exports by raising their international standing through the incorpora-
tion of design and fashion into the manufacture of high quality cloth. 
Typology of Informal Work 
The exceptionally high diversification of the textile industry's decentralised activi-
ties is due to the high number of production phases which can be performed outside the 
factory, either in private homes or in clandestine workshops. Infonnal or unstable em-
ployment covers the following typology of situations: 
- legal workers in legal firms who do not declare all the hours worked (mainly 
overtime) 
- informal workers in legally established firms (cases have been reported, but they 
are becoming less frequent) 
- at-home workers (traditionally common in the textile industry) 
- self-employed workers who have been dismissed and have received as compen-
sation a machine which is then installed at home or in a personal workshop (thus making 
the worker a "business owner" who generally suppLies the orders of the machine's former 
owner, who retains the commercialisation of the product and guarantees the supply of raw 
materials) 
- itinerant informal workers specialised in specific and traditional phases of the 
production process but, unable to find permanent work because of the size of the firms, 
usually work through agents who find them short-term work in various workshops and 
small and medium firms. 
Quantification 
Experts pointed out some years ago that the percentage of informal labour in the 
textile and clothing industry could be between 25% and 50%. This level has however 
since decreased because of the growing employment of short-term or part-time workers. 
4. Footwear and Toy-Making Industries in the South of Valencia Province 
(Alicante)4 
Quantitative Estimates 
At first sight, it appears that there is as much or more informal work in these sec-
tors than there is officially declared employment. This is basically due to the extent of 
hidden female work, which in all cases exceeds the legal employment of females. 
Extent of Informality (%) 
Hidden Production / Total Production 
Firms using some degree of informal labour / Total firms in sector 
Informal Employment / Total Employment (official and informal) 
Men 
Women 
Informal Employment / Official Employment 
Men 
Women 
Footwear 
33.0 
91.0 
54.8 
37.7 
71.6 
121.5 
60.5 
251.5 
Toys 
47.0 
94.5 
45.4 
32.9 
55.5 
83.2 
49.0 
124.7 
Determining Factors 
Footwear and toy-making are labour intensive sectors in which labour costs are 
the main factors which would at first sight appear to determine the development of infor-
mal employment. 
Government policy over the past decade has nevertheless not been directly aimed 
at mitigating the effects of this growth. Despite the fact that the labour market has gained 
extraordinary flexibility and company social security payments have in fact decreased over 
this same period, the informal economy has by no means been reduced as a result of these 
measures. 
This means that factors like market rigidity and labour shortages are of limited ex-
plicative value in this case. We instead turn to three factors which determine informal 
work in these sectors in Spain as a whole and in Alicante in particular: 
- the increase in the active population, mainly due to women and young people 
entering the labour market and creating an excess of labour. 
- the specificity of the Spanish economy's development model, which was long 
based on protectionism and subsidy-affected paternalism which allowed the formation of 
a docile and cheap.labour market within a system of inexcusable rigidity and low annual 
and short-term profits, and this in labour intensive sectors with flexible capital and rela-
tively low labour costs. 
The protectionism and subsidies which allowed the system to yield assured profits 
without incurring any great risks have now been replaced by informal work and activities 
which guarantee that the profits are not reduced in the short term and that the forms of 
productive behaviour do not have to be transformed. 
Market Features 
The south of the province of Valencia contains most of Spain's footwear and toy 
manufacturing activities, with 51.6% of the firms, 49.7% of the employment and 63.7% 
of the total exports of the Spanish footwear sector being located in Alicante, together with 
31.2% of the firms, 48.8% of the employment and 41.4% of the national exports in the 
toy-making sector. In regional terms, this produces two basic features: 
- high concentration in certain population centres and districts, 
- a high degree of monoproduction in population centres where these activities are 
carried OUL 
Whole productive spaces are characterised by one or other of these two activities, 
with one or several extremely specialised production centres surrounded by a production 
context which, for reasons of proximity, communicability and accessibility, complement 
the activities of the centres to produce what Ybarra has termed a polar spatial typology. 
Work Conditions 
As might be expected, one again finds the unstable and inferior conditions associ-
ated with the informal economy in general: low salaries, long working weeks, abuse of 
overtime, etc. 
5. Retailing5 
Factors Determining Unstable and Informal Work 
Payroll reduction, staff flexibility and new forms of control over labour and the 
production process are three of the factors which explain these different forms of work. 
Analysis is not helped by reference to retailing in general, since this is not a ho-
mogeneous sector and is in fact differentiated internally by two main variables: the size of 
the business and the specific commercial activity in which it is engaged. 
Small businesses or "shops" run by self-employed workers or owners, when they 
cannot depend on family help, traditionally turn to informal labour, mainly to young peo-
ple and women who, without any kind of legal control, carry out all kinds of jobs. The 
labour relations in these small businesses is generally strongly paternalistic. 
Another important factor for this informal economy is the actual structure and 
content of the activity: the need to have someone present for long hours, through seasonal 
variations and at busy times of the day means that the kind of labour required is not easily 
fitted in to the classical forms of permanent work contracts. 
In large shops, department stores, supermarkets and chains of shops, the most 
significant process is not so much informal employment but rather undeclared overtime 
and the generalised practice of unstable employment. 
Typology of Informal Labour 
Although the available studies reveal three basic kinds of labour, these analytically 
useful categories should not be seen as rigid compartments. The range and variety of 
situations inevitably means that the one worker may be involved in more than one of the 
following types of employment: 
- Informal employment: This group is mainly made up of family workers without 
fixed hours or salaries, and young people of both sexes who carry out partial jobs (sales, 
packing and unpacking, cleaning, etc.) in the larger establishments. 
- Strictly unstable employment: These workers are considered not to be included in 
the above group because they have work contracts, even though they do not declare all the 
work they actually do. The work conditions are practically the same and the group con-
cerned is almost exclusively made up of occasional workers, who could represent up to 
50% of the total staff, with a tendency to increase. 
- Part-time employment: These workers may sometimes benefit from the social 
security corresponding to their job even though they only work for part of the normal 
hours. 
The most pertinent way to address this phenomenon with respect to retailing as a 
whole is perhaps to consider the undeclared work that all employees carry out, whether 
they are informal or not: overtime, undeclared worked hours, etc. 
Work Conditions 
We have al'ready noted some of the work conditions resulting from the growth of 
unstable employment in this sector. 
The extensive deregulation of commercial establishments is clearly evinced by the 
number and variety of existing collective agreements, and by their relatively scant 
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application. This results in extremely long working hours, indiscriminate use of overtime 
(some of which are unpaid), arbitrary distribution or sometimes complete lack of holi-
days, and salaries which, if measured in terms of affective dedication, are simply miser-
able. To this should be added the fact that non-permanent employees do not benefit from 
long service grades, nor from most of the commissions on sales. The salaries of the sec-
tor as a whole are well below those of comparable sectors with respect to both average 
earnings per hour and monthly salaries per person. 
Finally, we should indicate one further factor which may explain how these con-
ditions are maintained in a sector where business strategies are based on concentration: 
namely, the lack of institutional structuration, resulting in an absence of government in-
tervention, low union membership, weak and isolated business associations and a multi-
plicity of management-labour agreements. 
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6. Message Services6 
Message services clearly constitute a growth sector. Since the number of busi-
nesses is increasing rapidly and established firms are steadily becoming larger, it is not 
difficult to find work as a messenger. 
There can be no doubt that the development of this sector is due to the inadequacy 
of Spain's postal services, in which late deliveries and even loss of mail are common. 
Message services form a relatively new sector which remains almost entirely un-
studied from the perspective of its labour relations. Up to the beginning of 1987, it was 
entirely deregulated, with absolutely all the work carried out on an informal basis and 
with no collective labour agreements, nor indeed contracts between firms and workers. 
The messengers provided their own means of transport, usually a motorbike, and had to 
cover all the costs —insurance, petrol, repairs, etc.—,m receiving a fixed sum for each 
delivery. 
The high degree of risk involved in this activity, coupled to a complete lack of so-
cial security coverage, gave rise to a series of protests on the part of the messengers, and 
this in turn led to the signing of an agreement for the sector. All firms now have to adhere 
to this agreement and do in fact do so, since its terms remain very much in their favour. 
The situation of the sector is presently as follows: 
- Work contracts are signed which are of the same kinds as those existing in the 
rest of the market: temporary, part-time and indefinite. 
- The agreement envisions fourteen obligatory pays per year, that is, two special 
pays and one month of holiday pay. 
- Since most of the messengers now have a formal work contract, they are covered 
by the social security system. 
- Remunerations have increased, with from 125 to 135 pesetas now being paid in 
Barcelona for trips within the city, plus from 20 to 25 pesetas for each kilometer travelled 
beyond the city limits. Some firms have established "fixed" wages. 
- The agreement obliges the firms to have a reserve of motorbikes available to the 
messenger for at least three working days if his own motorbike should need repairs. 
Despite these measures, unstable working conditions still persist: the motorbikes 
are still owned by the messengers themselves; the workers still have to cover all transport 
and repair costs, etc.; the firms have no insurance to cover the high risk of accidents; re-
munerations remain so low that many trips have to be made throughout the day in order to 
earn a decent salary, and the messengers thus mostly ride around the city as fast as possi-
ble, taking considerable risks. The fact that remuneration is based on the number of trips 
carried out means that wages are formulated in a special way: an inter-professional mini-
mum wage is normally declared, to which is added a series of bonuses until the amount 
corresponding to the actual trips is reached. There is no fixed bonus for high risk. 
37) 
12 
7. The Madrid Electronics Industry7 
The electronics industry constitutes a fast growth sector in which advanced tech­
nology means that it is more capital intensive than labour intensive. This makes it quite 
different to sectors like footwear, toy-making and textiles. 
Quantitative Estimates 
Although there is no exact information on the subject, the maintenance and even 
growth of employment in this capital intensive sector (together with the creation of new 
firms) suggests that the total number of informal workers is not scandalously high. On the 
other hand, the Madrid electronics industry is notorious for its use of informal employ­
ment as a tactic when starting up new businesses, with a tendency towards legalisation 
when the firm has established itself in the market. There is nevertheless an important de­
gree of family help (especially during the initial phases of an activity), "excessive dedica­
tion", hidden part-time employment of highly skilled labour and some forms of unstable 
employment. 
Determining Factors 
The general causes of informal employment can always be deduced as being based 
on labour cost reduction and tax avoidance. It is nevertheless true that, if it is profitable to 
employ an electronics worker —who is qualified and often highly qualified— on an in­
formal basis, it is more for reasons of dedication and flexibility than simply ίο reduce 
labour costs (which may in fact be above those of the regular market). 
The important point here is to observe the actions and reactions of a capital inten­
sive economic structure which is very much dependent on the State and on foreign in­
vestment, and in which the production process is highly concentrated in extremely large 
firms. Considering the reductions in the number of workers and drops in the level of in­
vestment in the older, larger firms, expansion in the sector must be explained by the cre­
ation of numerous small and medium firms. Very few of these —probably less than 
20%— are associated with international capital or with the CTNE, the INI or other larger 
concentrations of national capital. They tend to be self-financed businesses created by 
working professionals able to take advantage of the opportunities opening up in spe­
cialised markets beyond the control of the large companies. 
These new firms have opted for highly decentralised structures. Most of them 
subcontract the main phases of production and assembly, retaining for themselves techni­
cal processes like design, installation, testing, maintenance, in fact all aspects of commer­
cialisation together with the concentration of considerable research capacities. This means 
that they remain of reduced dimensions. 
Many of these firms began as informal enterprises. Qualified workers often ac­
cepted occasional work in addition to their normal jobs. Others began in their own 
houses, in small sheds or even by paying for the use of machinery installed in other 
workshops. 
One of the aspects allowing the survival of many of these firms was their constant 
search for new and diversified markets. This means that, whilst they remain suppliers of 
electronics, they also work for other sectors (automation, construction, etc.). 
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8. At-Home Work in the Region of Valencia8 
Quantitative Estimates 
Within the varied range of informal labour, at-home work is perhaps the most dif-
ficult to measure. All empirical estimates of the phenomenon nevertheless indicate that this 
is a highly traditional activity with a wide extension. 
In the case of at-home work in the region of Valencia, we shall attempt to offset 
the lack of rigorous quantification by presenting some highly significant indices: 
- The high degree of stratification found by Sanchis in a sample population of farm 
workers, together with the reduced dimensions of the group, indicate that the activity is 
easily localised. 
- In Ibi, the capital of the Spanish toy-making industry, some 100 clandestine 
workshops were to be found. 
- In the 1960s, in Castellón alone, more than 2,000 knitting machines were sold 
for the production of knitted garments in the home. 
Determining Factors 
In the conclusions of his survey, Sanchis lists the following as causes generating 
at-home labour: 
- Lack of alternative jobs in the local conventional market, due to either marginal 
geographical localisation or economic recession. 
- Inability to engage in available jobs because of inadequate professional forma-
tion. 
- Need for compatible economic activities, especially with respect to rural em-
ployment. 
- Reluctance on the part of employers to offer conventional jobs to married 
women. 
- Lack of social facilities —eh il d-m in ding centres, etc.— needed if women are to 
work away from home. 
- Force of traditional ideas about the family and the role of women in society. 
- Breakdown of the model of spontaneous industrialisation as a result of large in-
creases in salaries, taxes (social security) and the price of raw materials, together with an 
increase in the competitivity of exterior markets resulting from changes in the international 
division of labour. 
At-home work does not however provide an instant panacea for all the difficulties 
listed above. What we are really seeing is rather a new stimulus for an activity which in 
fact existed prior to the industrialisation of the Valencia region and continues to exist in 
support of industrialisation. 
Market Features 
The conceptual division between official and informal economies overlooks the 
real connections existing between these forms, and thus cannot explain the relatively inte-
grated system constituted by firms from both camps which make up the backbone of Va-
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lencia's widespread industrial structure. Firms which are amongst the world-wide leaders 
in their fields —in manufacturing, textile, toy-making, osier-work and footwear— di-
rectly instigate at-home labour across the whole of Spain. 
Typology of Labour 
At-home work is one of the classic types of informal labour. In practice, at-home 
work and informal work are interchangeable terms 
The typical at-home worker is a middle-aged woman who is married to an indus-
trial worker and also does the domestic work; that is, most of them are housewives. Full-
time at-home workers are generally young girls. The level of education is very low. 
Attempts at Legalisation 
At-home work remains informal and is by no means being rooted out. The institu-
tionalised social agents (unions, employers and government) are very cautious about the 
subject and are fully aware of the negative reactions that any move in this direction would 
arouse amongst at-home workers, who usually stand to lose their jobs if legalisation 
comes about 
Work Conditions 
Study of the various cases shows that one of the defining traits of informal work 
in Spain is the atrocious conditions in which this work is carried out. At-home work is 
one of the clearest examples of this general degradation of work conditions: the working 
hours are unlimited and their duration may be equal to or even more than the officially es-
tablished limits. The wages are the lowest of all, and there are no measures of security or 
hygiene. 
To this should be added the complete lack of direct social protection. The hus-
band's social security affiliation guarantees health assistance, but no woman working at 
home is entitled to unemployment benefits or her own pension. 
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PART II. QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand the characteristics and evolution 
o-f irregular work in Spain, it is necessary to summarize 
some general traits of the labour market during these 
last decades. 
During the 60' . two very different charactetisti es are 
present in the labour market. Firstly, creation of 
employment in industry, in building and in some 
subsectors in services; secondly, massive emigration from 
agriculture to other sectors. However, creation of 
employment was not sufficient to absorb the whole active 
population; a low rate of unemployment was only due to 
the opportunity of emigration to other european 
countries. 
On the other hand, between 1976 and 1984 more than 2 
million jobs have been eliminated and the workforce 
reduced of more than 1 million people (not entering the 
labour market, or going out of it), according to official 
figures. Only from 1985 creation of new employment is 
evident, but now with very different traits (precarious 
or part-time jobs). 
The rate of activity is been always below the average 
rate of EEC countries, with a tendency to go further down 
from 1975 till 1985 as a consequence of the crisis. It is 
particul1 ari y low with respect to females ( this group 
represents only the 307. of the whole active population). 
Today it is evident that irregular female work is hidden 
behind this weak officiali participation of women in the 
labour market, a work combined, generally, with the 
reproductive tasks. 
The unemployment rate was in Spain over 207. in 1987, 
above the EEC average rate for the last few years. It is 
not only industrial unemployment, because it affects 
also, and very strongly, agrarian regions as Andalucía. 
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To finish this introduction, we have to remember that 
small firms are dominant in workforce volume over any 
other EEC country, with the exception of Italy. 
VOLUME AND NATURE OF IRREGULAR WORK 
a) Estimated volume of irregular work 
Several attemps were made in the early 1980' to mesure 
the percentage of the Spanish national income produced by 
irregular work, with methodologies (Gutman, Tanz i) 
previously used in other countries (Molto, 1980, 
Lafuente, 1980). The results were however far from 
convincing, mesured in terms of percentage of the 
industrial product. (Sanchis, 1981). Investigations have 
since been carried out into the factors determining the 
phenomenon and the characteristics of the population 
involved in irregular work, and studies of certain 
sectors or regions have allowed estimates to be made of 
the percentage of the labour force in this situation. In 
this report we shall evaluate irregular work as something 
different , stricto sensu, of tax evasion (tax evasion 
can accompany, of course, irregular work but is not the 
same thing) and of criminal economic activity (trafic of 
drugs, prostitution etc.) 
Evaluations of the percentage of irregular work have been 
made above all with respect to those sectors in which 
this form of work is highly traditional: footwear and 
toymaking in Valencia (more than 807) (Sanchis, 1932, 
Ybarra,1986) and the textile industry in Catalognia 
(between 25 and 507.) (Miguelez, 1982). Other evaluations 
have been made of the degree to which unemployment is 
associated with irregular work (several studies 
concerning Andalusia and Catalognia indicate that at 
least 307. of those officially unemployed do in fact work) 
(Migélez-Recio, 1988). These studies show that the 
phenomenon generally concerns workers who. having lost 
their normal employment or not having had acces to their 
first employment and not receiving unemployment benefit, 
take on very unstable jobs (temporary, part-time or 
hourlv—based). 
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In 1985 the Spanish Ministry of Economy carried out an 
important survey (sample 65.000 people) which classsified 
workers as either regular or irregular according to 
whether or not their relation with the Social Security 
system was correct. (CIS y Secretaría General de Economía 
y Planificación, 1986). This survey showed that 297, of 
the workers were in irregular situation. But there are 
two criticisms we must do to this study: first, the 
authors consider an incorrect relation with the Social 
Security system when people: are working and do not have 
Social Security, when they have Social Security but do 
not pay, when they have Social Security but not properly, 
when they work meanwhile perei ving unemployment benefit. 
In my opinion only the first and the last of these 
assumptions are to be considered irregular work 
equivalent to 707. of the detected irregularity; second 
the study overevaluates the number of irregular workers 
because considers employed people those who work 1/3 of 
the regular working hours, not using the last week as 
reference -what is usual in these survey-, but the last 
three months. 
Considering these two -factors of reduction, the real 
level of irregularity could be, in my opinion, about 207. 
of all active workers. 
Note that only 118.000 people perceiving unemployment 
benefit do work, that is the equivalent to the 127 of all 
unemployed having this benefit. This 1 ast information is 
very important to understand that, also in Spain, 
relationship between unemployment and irregular work is 
really irrelevant. 
b) Relationship with tax evasion 
In this issue we have to distinguish evasion by not 
declaring work and evasion by not declaring real income. 
Most of unemployed doing irregular work -in general 
occasi anal y— do not evade taxes, except Social Security 
payments for this occasional work, because they do not 
receive unemployment benefit neither reach minimum annual 
exempt of taxation; when there is this incompatibility -
if they receive unemployment benefit and do work— their 
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evasi on 
ranks of 
is 1ow, 
income. 
because they are placed in the lowest 
A second group of irregulars is made of. people 
theoretically out of the labour market: housewifes, 
students, people looking for their first job, people over 
the 65s (age of retirement). Most of them evade some 
taxes -not Social Security payments because do not 
benefit of it- but at low level, once more, because they 
are placed in lowest ranks of income. 
A third and very important group is people doing not 
declared overtime or having a second not declared job. In 
the first case we find normally people with stable 
employment: employers and employees -sometimes these last 
are forced to accept extra hours as much as the same 
Comittees do- benefit from this concealment. In the 
second case are particularly medium and higly qualified, 
public employees, employees in banks and other services, 
mannual very qualified; tax evasion in this cases may be 
high, but difficult to control, because they can do their 
second job as sei f—empioyed. 
Finally we can consider self-employers (liberal 
professionals and others) and employers in small firms 
(also familial helpers); tax evasion in these cases can 
be high and referred to the principal subject or to some 
of his collaborators. 
Accordi ng 
research, 
real i zed 
empi oyers 
instance, 
mi 11i on 
deciared 
average 
to the Ministry of Economy and some private 
tax evasion in terms of personal income is 
particularly by three social groups: farmers, 
and liberal professionals. In 1987, for 
the average taxable personal income was about 1 
pts for salaried workers, meanwhile farmers 
under 500.000 pts and employers 650.000 pts as 
ioni y of them declared more than 5,5 million 
pts of personal income). 
In terms of enterprise income, 
many double accountings or has 
many clandestine operations. But after 
traditional Spanish behavior in front "* 
coming back, by two different wav 
declaring a part of the sales or 
prices. 
ecent TAV has eliminated 
brought to the surface 
some ¿ars 
of the taxes is 
according experts: not 
declaring them at lower 
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In any case tax evasion in terms of personal or 
enterprise income is enormously higher than that in 
irregular work, with the only exception of some kinds of 
mul ti jobhol ders. 
c) The nature of irregular work 
According to different studies and surveys, we can 
summarize the characteristics of irregular work at the 
present time and detail afterwards the condition of 
different types of irregular workers. 
Present characteristics 
Irregular work is at the moment more concentrated in 
agriculture and services than in industry and building 
(till now it was studied almost only in these last 
sectors); but in the first sector is probably a 
traditional way of wor k ing. 
Most of this irregular work is "organized" in enterprises 
parti cui 1 ari y in small firms. But there is an important 
part of "individual" irregular work in which we can 
distinguish different groups; more than one third of 
irregulars are self-employers, fami l'i al -hel pers or 
empi overs,i n this order; according to national surveys 
(Ministry of Economy, 1986) , multiple jobholders reach 97. 
of the work—force, meanwhile regional studies (Enquesta 
Metropolitana de Barcelona 1986) show that os'ertime is a 
common practice for 407. of the work force. Part-time 
agriculture is extremely important in areas close to, or 
well communicated with, large urban agi ornerati ons or with 
industrial areas; between 307. aind 457., according to 
regions, -this percentage is increasing during last 
years (Etxezarreta 1985)- ¿ire part-time beeing the 
agricole the second, and often not declared, employment. 
A very important amount of irregular work (not always of 
irregular workers) is to be found in these groups. 
On the contrary there is no evidence of significant 
irregular work by unemployed having unemployment benefit; 
only 57. according the national mentioned survey. (Ministry 
of Economy 1986). Another category is to be considered, 
the immigrants; according to some research (Documentación 
Social, 66, 1987) more than 657. of the 720.000 immigrants 
are working irregularly, not having identification papers 
neither contracts or beinq registered as students or 
2ο 
tourists; they work in agriculture, catering, tourist 
services. 
From the supply's point of view the main characteristics 
of this irregular work force are the following. Most of 
the irregular "organized" are young people, females, with 
low level of studies, low qualified, in few words, 
flexible,cheap and secondary workers. Most of the 
irregular "individuals" are fixed or qualified workers, 
that is,workers placed in the primary segment of the 
labour market. In other words, also in irregular work 
some kind of segmentation can be found. 
Nowadays irregular work is all over the country, but with 
different characteristics according economic and social 
structure of the regions. In Valencia, Catalonia and 
Madrid irregularity is important in traditional (textile, 
footwear, metal transformation) and in new industries 
(electronics) (Benton, 1986). In big-metropolis and in 
highly populated touristic areas,irregulari ty is 
significant in personal services and in services to 
enterprises: Madrid, Bilbao, Barcelona, Sevilla, 
Mad 1 orca. Irregularity in agriculture is remarkable in 
Andalusia (1atifundism), Galicia and Santander 
(mi ni fundism) , Valence, Catalognia, Asturias and Euskadi 
(part-time agriculture). In building industry 
irregularity is higher in regions with low level of 
industrialisation (Murcia, Castilla, Andalusia). 
- Main types of irregular workers 
Now I'll consider in some more detail the most important 
types of i r regu1ar war k er s. 
(sel f-em,unempi oyed,black,mul tiple) 
First of all sel f-empioyment has to be considered. Not 
taking into account the agricultural sector where 
traditionally a part of sei f-empioyment is irregular in 
terms of tax declaration, irregular sei f—empioyment is 
present. in commerce, other services, construction and 
industries like clothing and footwear. We should 
emphasise that the expansion of sei f-empi oyment over-
recent years has mainly been in the service sector, thus 
breaking with the traditional image which previously 
related informal work to industry. But two kinds of self-
employment has to be distinguished: false and true self-
ernpl oyment. 
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In the first sei f—employed group workers do not work in 
an enterprise, but they are not really independent from 
it. This is the traditional position of the housewife 
working at home, sometimes with complicated tools 
sometimes without, for external enterprises in textile, 
toymaking, footwear and other industries,, combining 
productive external work with reproductive internal tasks 
(Sanchis 1933, Miguelez 1932, Ybarra 1986). With the 
economic crisis and the increase of decentralisation this 
type of worker appears in other industries (paper, 
plastics). In any case considerations of this work as 
"typical femenin" contributes to its social acceptance. 
The work generally requires skill, but not advanced 
formal qualifications. Many women work fairly regularly 
on a full-time basis, either in terms of months-year, 
days—week or hours—day work, wereas others work. on a 
seasonal ar temporary basis. (Recio, Miguélez, Alós, 
1988). 
But there are also new sei f-empioyment with these 
characteristics of dependence. It is found in buiding 
industry,in textile, transport and in some other sectors. 
Many reasonably qualified salaried workers who have lost 
their jobs and sometimes get some amount of capital -
through indemnities or through capi tal i sati on of 
unemployment benefit- buy the tools from their ancien 
enterprise and become self-employed. But the 1 iason with 
the enterprise remains really strong. The large 
construction ar.H transport firms, for example, have 
reduced their personnel levels by between 607. and 807. in 
the last 8 years and yet continue to have high business; 
an important part of their activities is subcontracted to 
former employees. Main firms usually oblige these self-
employed workers to legalise their activities in order to 
avoid problems with government controls, but this does 
not mean that all the workers in the small business 
involved have been declared: collaborators like family 
members, friend and trusted workers may remain in 
irregular situation. Other times, anyway,these self-
employed can remain irregular for a long period or can 
appear on the surface after a short time if they have got 
alresidy substantial economic capability. 
In the same line of argument we have to consider 
traditional small scale activities more independent in 
services (catering, commerce) more subordinate to big 
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enterprises in industry. An important part of work force 
used in these firms is irregular family labour, working 
on occasional or temporary basis. But these small 
entrepreneurs employ also irregular workers, in general 
young people and females, in the periods of peak 
acti vi ty. 
Summarising characteristics of self-employed we can 
stress the following points: Self-employed workers have 
in many cases been salaried workers, with the obvious 
exception of those, usually young people or women, who 
enter the labour market for the first time through one of 
the above modalities. Irregular work has in general not 
been accepted out of free choice, but because of the need 
to find an alternative to salaried work. Exceptions to 
this may however be found in high technology sectors 
where the appropiate "business decisions" have been made. 
These self-employed workers or artisans generally have 
little capacity for technological innovation. The 
exceptions are usually found in manufacturing or services 
in which the presence of well prepared individuals makes 
such innovation possible, although there are areas in 
which unionisation or formation of collective groups 
stimulates the capacity for innovation (Recio, Miguelez, 
Al os, 1988) . 
Finally, and perhaps that is the most remarkable aspect, 
as a result of the decentralisation processes, many of 
these self-employed workers are in some sense 
"organised" by a network of larger legal enterprises. 
In second place we refer to read "black wer ker s", that 
is, dependent workers without any contract. In general 
people in these conditions are young students or in 
search of their first job, unemployed without 
unemployment benefit, all of them in general working in 
small enterprises. According to some authors there is an 
i mpor t an t i η c r ease of this k ind of irregular work er s from 
the beginning of the economic crisis and till the early 
80'; hsiving this labour force, smaul enterprises faced 
competence coming from bigger or more organised firms. 
In the last 6 yeairs these? irregul air workers are 
decreasing, thanks to some cha^nge in their contractual 
status: many of'them can be legal with temporary or part-
time contracts. 
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In third place we may speak of multiple jobholders: 
Second and third job holders, part-time farmers, 
o/erti mers are the main groups in this type. 
We could distinguish two different cases in people having 
a second or a third job. For low-income earners in their 
first job, the most common second job is a family 
business: usually they are salaried workers who either 
dedicate a few hours to their own business having another 
family member looking after it;. or are self-employed in 
repair work, door-to-door selling, accounting, teaching, 
doing research,etc. This kind of work is usually 
temporary and irregular. 
High-income earners usually engage in a more regular 
second job which they undertake either as dependent 
either as independent workers. This is the case for 
administrative and professional staff in both the public 
and the private sectors. Some studies show (Enquesta 
Metropolitana de Barcelona 1936) that in these cases the 
second job is usually not in the same sub-sector as the 
first job, although it normally involves the same 
occupation. This is probably because the second job tends 
to be more flexible and totally, or partially, irregular. 
Second job normally involves some degree of "self— 
employment", even in cases where it is done as an 
employee, since a certain degree of freedom is necessary 
to combine both jobs. It is in this freedom where some 
kind of irregularity in terms of not declared work or in 
terms of not declared income can appear. People with 
second or third jobs are normally qualified to a certain 
degree, either with manual skills (mechanics, 
bricklayers) or professional expertise (bank and public 
service employees, liberal professions) and can make 
their second job highly profitable even when it only 
requires a few hours. 
A special case of second jobholders is reffered to part-
time farmers whose volume is strongly increasing in Spain 
in the last years, as we stressed above. There are two 
typological combinations of employment in the case we 
spesik about: when the job in industry or services i s a 
regular or fixed employment, part-timing in agriculture 
is the secondary activity, usually producing goods -for 
domestic consumption; when the job in industry or 
services is occasional or seasonal, part-time farming 
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tends to constitute the primary activity, producing an 
important amount of family income. 
Overtime is similar to multiple jobholding from some 
points of view, parti cui 1arly in the aspects of extra 
work and extra earnings. We mentioned above the 
significant increase of this work in Spain in last years. 
Now we can add that, beeing a rigid regulation of 
extrahours, an important part of this time of work is 
wrongly declared (as if they were conjuntural hours when 
they are structural hours) or directly not declared; in 
this sense we are dealing with irregular work not with 
irregular workers. 
According to some avalaible research, overtime is made 
more in small than in big enterprises and significantly 
more by male, staible qualified workers. 
Finally we have to speak about the relationship between 
unemployed and irregular work. At present, and for the 
last 3 years, 3 million people, the 207 of the 
workforce,is unemployed. Only a minority, a third part, 
receives unemployment benefit, beeing this benefit, in 
average, under minimum pay. There is not only an 
important amount of free workforce to be hired at any 
condition, but also a public "morality" open to this 
solution, because it can be the only way of surviving. 
Several studies show that most of unemployed working,do 
it in very precarious jobs (Izquierdo, Miguélez, Subi rats 
1986), with low earnings (Gs^rcia de Bl as—Ruesgai 1983) or 
with very long working hours when their income is 
comparable to regular workers (López 1986), with 
exceptions in very sidvancecl sectors (Benton 1986). 
Often irregular workers, of different types, are 
officially inactive people: women who work at home 
(Sanchis, 1983, Ybarra, 1986), what raises the real 
activity rate; family helpers not declared as such, 
because they work few hours or simply to evade taxes, 
parti cui 1 ari y in semi-artesanal activities (López, 1986, 
Casais-Recio-Vi dal Villa, 1986, Ybarra 1986); students 
and retired workers (Enquesta Metropolitana de Barcelona, 
1986). 
As a conclusion we have to underline that most of the 
irregular work is made by regular workers or by people 
officially inactive, not by unemployed particul 1 ari y if 
we think of unemployed receiving some benefit. 
25 
i. DETERMINANT FACTORS OF IRREGULAR WORK 
In order to understand the complexity of the factors 
which contribute to this kind of work, we shall present 
two different approaches: one historical one systematic. 
The historical approach 
The evolution of irregular work in Spain over the past 20 
years may be analysed in terms of three phases: 
- First phase: traditional irregular work. 
Irregular work was traditionally found in mono-industry 
areas and in zones of latifundio agriculture where 
salaried workers, generally temporary, were contracted 
illegally during different phases of production. With 
respect to industry, traditional irregular work was 
largely based on the social role played by the family: 
women ait home carried out undeclared work for textile, 
toymakinq and other industries at the same time they did 
their domestic work. Small artisans and entrepreneurs 
found most of their informal labour m their immediate or 
related families. The family and the role of women also 
accounted for much of the irregular work in the service 
sector, mainly in relation with undeclared domestic 
services (maids, cleaning women) and undeclared family 
help in commerce and catering. 
The main factors determining irregular work prior to 
1970s would appear to be the low cost of this labour, the 
economic and cultural situation ensuring its ready 
availability (some researchers have tail ked about "trapped 
labour") and the lack of social and state control over 
the enterprises concerned by both unions and governement. 
It should also be pointed out that second and third jobs 
were also traditional modes of informal work, 
particularly in occupations associated with the public 
service and the liberal professions. 
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- Second phase: Expansion in the 1970s 
Researchers agree that although economic crisis did not 
introduce irregular work in Spain, it played a role in 
its increase, which was very important in the 70'. 
There are several factors determining this fact. The 
first would be the subjective-individual desire to obtain 
an adequate supplement to increase low salaries or 
pensions, for which there is sometías no other way than 
the informal economy, because the only available jobs for 
some workers in a very segmented labour market are these 
irregular jobs. 
For some social groups, specially employers, the main 
factor to be emphasized would be the excessive rigidity 
of the labour market which, inherited from francoism, did 
not allow business to confront international competition; 
that concerns both the cost of labour and the supposedly 
excessive fiscal constraints on enterprises. This could 
be real in some cases, but not as a general issue, 
because level of taxation in Spain is much"lower than the 
european average, as indeed are labour costs. Moreover, 
the lack of government and union control over the 
implementation of agreements and laws means that the real 
labour market flexibility -as distinct from the 
theoretical regulation reflected in agreements and laws-
is much higher than is sometimes indicated. 
There is nevertheless one phenomenon which I believe 
provides a basic explanation for the growth of irreqular 
work in the 1970s and early 1980s. The restructuring of 
production in this period involved an enormous 
decentralization process and considerably accentuated the 
segmentation of the labour market. This segmentati or. 
resulted in the creati or. of many precarious and not 
regulated jobs for which the "adequate" labour force was 
found amongst women, young unemployed people, lowly 
qualified workers excluded from production processes and 
retired people unable to live on their excessively low 
pensions. This in turn led to a huge increase in 
irregular work. 
The new feature to appear over these years was 
"organized" irregular work, that is, the extension to 
employees through jobs without contracts and undeclared 
overtime. The work conditions of these people were 
«) 
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generally at the lower end of the scale, with low wages, 
long working weeks and little security and hygiene. 
The traditional forms of irregular work were also 
accentuated in this period: many people, not only women, 
worked a^ t home and there was a rise in sei f -empi oyment, 
partly legal but also often informal in sectors like 
construction, transport, commerce and catering. Little 
innovation can be detected in these areas, although there 
are exceptions to be found in electronics, certain 
services to enterprises,etc. 
— Third phase: ch am ges in 1980s 
The fundamental change to be detected in recent years is 
what. might be termed ais "legalization of deregulation". 
This concerns the apρerance of new forms of work 
contracts involving training, apprenticeships, part-time 
employment and, above ail, temporary work. These new ways 
of engaiging personnel, the most predominant of which are 
those involving less than six months of work, naw account 
for almost 907 of the work contracts signed in Spain and 
particularly involve young people of both sexes and 
women. 
These new contract forms bear on irregular work in two 
ways. Firstly, the ease with which they allow employees 
to be engaged and dismissed means that firms can replace 
their old informal 1abour with new unstable labour. But 
it is cleair that these new employees are frequently 
contracted for a few months and then work informally -for 
the same or another firm- for si certain period before 
returning to legally contracted employment. This ensues 
from an employer strategy designed to create an 
extraordinarily flexible labour market finge —generally 
young people, women and lowly quail if i ed adult men- whose 
work conditions are not very dissi mi lar in both legal and 
irregular situations; of course a legalised situation is 
not at all to be underestimated, but the all condition of 
work goes further this legaility. 
Processes of subcontracting to the sei f-empioyment area 
have increased enormously in recent years. Sel f—empioyed 
workers constitute a highly mobile sector which may be 
either informal or legal but, when legaU, usually 
involves at least some marginal informal work for family 
members, friends and trusted people who work on a part-
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time basis. The same process has led to an increase in 
double employment, above all in highly secure sectors 
like the liberal professions, the public service and bank 
workers. This doble employment is often irregular,, 
requires only a few hours and is carried out as an 
independent job. 
This same period has seen the addition of other factors 
which determine the type and characteristics of informal 
labour. Modern metropolitan areas generate a significant 
amount of personal and business services which may be 
carried out by people placed at the lower levels of the 
labour market or by people who accept them for a short 
period (e.g. students working in post-express). Social 
and cultural atti tudes have changed: many people accept 
irregular work as a different but now quite normal way of 
working. 
Irregular work is in some case? a waiy of starting up new 
businesses, cooperatives and study groups which may thus 
minimize the initial risks whilst fully intending to 
declare and legalize themselves later. This process is 
obviously only possible for those who have some capital 
or a certain qualification level, and it is particularly 
in theses cases that innovation is associated with 
irreg u1ar war k. 
Τ h e s ν s t e m a t i c a ρ ρ r ο a c h 
Briefly some notes which can underline the most important 
determinant factors in act at the moment on irregular 
work. We shall distinguish the national and the regional 
level, because some f; 
and not at larger scale. 
- At regional le v e 1 
At regional level there are some factors which operate on 
characteristics that irregul air work presents in industry. 
In traditional industries where we find irregular work: 
there are three factors which are present. First of all 
there is some kind of ancien informal agreement between 
small employers and the families by which low wages paid 
to salaried workers are "compensated" with work offered 
to other members of the family either at home or in the 
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plants of the enterprise (working by the hour, temporary, 
part-time,etc.). On the basis of this agreement, small 
firms can face competition, sometimes international 
competition (toys, footwear, textiles) and families can 
reach a considerable level of consumption. One of the 
main basis of regional or local development is this 
structure of small enterpri' 
But this situation is possible in part, because of the 
role traditionally played by the family. Small 
enterprises can survive and accept the conditions imposed 
by big firms and by the market, using their family 
workforce: head of family, housewife, sons, relatives in 
a very flexible way (part-time, weekends, summer time) 
and specially with low cost. But at the other end of that 
informal compromise, housewifes can work for the 
industry, because they do it in a very flexible way by 
which they integrate household respansabi1 i ti es and 
complementary external work. Therefore some kind of 
social acceptance in front of irregular forms of working 
is developed. 
In third plaice there is no tradition of social control on 
the conditions in which workfoce is used in small 
enterprises. There is no unions control;'the inexistence 
of free unions in Franco's regime and the present 
weakness of unionism in small firms is am undeniable 
fact. Tax control by the administration also was light in 
the past because of political reasons —francoism looked 
for some kind of soci ail support in this sector— and it is 
at present, beeing these enterprises an importein t facetar 
in the full employment crisis. 
In summary in some regional and local labour markets 
supply and demand join in a certain area of interest ¿ind 
tuait creates a very favorable climaite to irre>gu'isir foms 
of working. 
In primary sector. agriculture, irregular work is not 
based on any kind of informal agreement, but in simple 
imposition of dominant interests. In latifundia zones, 
with excedentary supply of labour force, black work was a 
simple way of reducing labour costs; in Franco's era no 
intervention against that was iniciated by the 
government; recently official tolerance is to be 
explained in the context of massive rural unemployment. 
In minifundio areas, irregular work was some kind of tax 
evasion for survival's sake which government tolerated. 
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— At national level 
At national level we can identify factors having 
different degree of influence; some of them have 
developed in the last years some are traditional. 
Some scholars have insisted in the excessive pression of 
tax system and in the rigidity of the labour market as 
the main factors explaining irregular work in Spain; with 
other words, employers would use irregular work to face 
competition they cannot do if they follow laws and 
regulations in the two mentioned questions. These factors 
explain th?ngs at subjective a.nó inmediate level - that 
is, a small entrepreneur can react to the high prices he 
finds in the market only by escaping from legal taxation 
or legsil cost of the laibour force. But behind these 
inmediate factors there are some others we have to 
under li rie as the maiin determinants. 
First of all the market has been traditionally controlled 
by big firms, national or i nternati onsil , in textile, 
electronics, toymaking, footwear, wood, transport and, 
more recently, commerce, catering and others; these big 
firms impose final prices which oblige small ones to make 
irregularly sanie of their activities. In the last decade 
the accentuated process of decentralisation has increased 
this subordinated rel ationshiρ. 
In second place Spanish entrepreneurs are traditionally' 
used to obtain important profit margins amo because of 
this have only with difficulty rea-idapted to the 
requirements of welfare state: high taxation, basic 
guaranteed social conditions. 
Furthermore because of the characteristics cf the labour 
market, the enterprises have found always many people 
"ready" to be engaged almost at any condition. The low 
tax of activity means that many women socially "trapped'' 
at home are ready to work some hours, often irregularly. 
The nigh tax of unemployment, without benefit, means an 
important contingent of "free" work force to be engaged. 
Multiple job is a long tradition in sectors like civil 
servamts and others. All these elements· together with no 
existence of free unionism during decades and the lack of 
collective laboral claims in these groups, accentuate the 
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disponibi1 i ty of all these potential workers to work in 
any condition and, of course irregularly. 
But si general increase 
during last decades is 
factor of irregularity; 
report on thais issue. 
of labour market segmentation 
to be considered as the main 
I'll come back later in this 
Finally the last déterminât factor to be kept in mind is 
the role played by the state. During francoism laboral 
laws, decrees and reglamente were many and very complex. 
But the official decisions to implement these regulations 
were weaker. Regulsition was not ai result cf social 
compromise and because of that there was no social 
control on its i mpl ementai t i on neither by unions ar other 
sociaal organisations nor by the state. State intervention 
in the last years is oriented to produce a lighter 
regulation —new forms of contract­ imposed reglamentary 
not negotiated with the social, actors. 
We have to add some other factors less directly 
interveining over the phenomenon and more over the 
general context in which irregular work is developed; 
w ' 11 call t li em sociological f actor s. 
Very briefly w'll mention four of them. In the last 
decades there is an increased stimulus to consume as a 
main cultural tra­.it in our society; in reaction to that, 
people need higher incomes.. Paralleli to that, 
ρ o s s ι b i 1 i t i e s o f w o r k ing ir r e g u 1 a­, r 1 y part­time, 
occasionalyyetc. are increased, specially in big urban 
areais. A third t accor­ to be t._ υ n s i d car e d t In e t r ad i t i o n a 1 
ai n d g e n e r ai 1 i ζ e ci m i s t r u. s t in front of the st aite and its 
­ a ρ a b i 1 i t y of balancing s o c i ai I d i f f e r e n c e s ; be c a u s e o f 
chis reason tax evasion is considered more a sign of 
abi 1 itv than some kind of pubi ι n m or­al 11. Tl 
f acto r w e s p >..j k ε 
this report i s 
il ready 
t ¡n e 
¡out 
soci al rol 
η d i f f e r e π t moment 
ι v p. ri by t I I tí Τ dill 1 
ι η a 1 
ι η 
the 
family functioning as a unit and the the socio­cultural 
subordinated position of some of its members provides 
subordinate work: f or c e to the; labour market, which very 
easily' c a. n be irregular, the main members of the family 
having a regulair position. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
a). Government attitude on irregular work 
Government actions have distinguished two different 
levels in this phenomenon: irregularity in terms of 
declaring income and irregularity in terms of declaring 
wor k. 
At the first level there is, in last years, an increased 
control particularly in relation to special groups: 
liberal professionalis, employers, sei f — empì oyers who in 
their tax evasion can hide irregular work. 
At the second level, the most important for our present 
purpose, official politics are more ambiguous. Irregular­
work has been condemned by government officials as a form 
of fraud and "unfair competition", but, at the same time, 
presented as the way of working by which many people can 
escape unemployment. In this sense we can epeak not only 
of officiai! passi vi1 acceptance, but also a conception 
according to which this way of working can be different 
but is the only possible way for many people. 
From 1930 there is some regulation of one of the main 
forms of irregular work, the work at home (Estsituto dé­
los Trabajadores, art. 13). Some kind of contract could 
be signed between the enterprise and the workers at home, 
according to this article; but in fact some ini ci ati ves 
coordinated by unions in this di reaction never got to an 
end, because of the opposition declared by enterprises, 
without any officiai! pression for the law to be enforced. 
But there are official politics in front of the irregular 
work in the i ars t years: the purpose of transforming 
irregular wor'ri in legal work:. The way are the new forms 
of contract we spolie about in precedent pages, 
ρ a r t i c u lari y t e m ρ ο r a r y w o r k:. I r 19 8 5, 1986 a n d 19 3 7 
more t h ai η three million contracts per y e air 'were signed; 
of course, beeing very short contracts, the same worker 
can be enqsiged severa! times ¿i yeair or the same contract 
can be "occupied" by different workers during a year 
(rotation). But there is no evidence to conclude that 
this government option can diminish irregular work:; on 
thc^  contrary, this new dinamyc of the labour market is 
attracting people at present inactive (msirried women) and 
"discouraged" (young people, students) i ncreaisi ng more and 
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more the available workforce to work at any condition, 
also irregularly. 
b) Irregular work and labour market segmentation 
Labour market segmentation is, in my opinion, the last 
line to explain irregular work. This segmentation seems 
to be increasing and consolidating in the last years due 
to three factors I have mentioned sometimes in precedent 
pages and now I'm going to present more systematically. 
First of ail 1 there is a big process of decentralisation 
facilitated by the existence of a traditional extensive 
network of small enterprises in regions like Catalonia 
and Valencia and with the emergence of many small firms 
of services in large urban areas. The main instrument in 
this process is subcontratation of some productions or 
services from big to small firms. So si hierarchical 
segmentation is created by which workforce in low sectors 
is less qualified, more mobile, not at all organised, 
cheaper; all of them conditions which propici aite all 
kinds of irregular work. In fact most of the new 
registered contracts are in enterprises under 100 
workers, but also most of diemisssil s continue to be in 
this fringe of enterprises; here is a demonstration of 
flexibility. 
Legal framework has accentuated the tendency towards 
workforce segmentation and flexibility. We spoke already 
about new forms of contract producing temporary and part-
time employment; almost 907 of new contrasts officially 
registered (INEM) aire precarious —many of them have some 
kind of deduction in the cost enterprise has to satisfy-
to Social security- in last years: between 1£!7. smci 207., 
according different staiti sti cal sources, of the personnel 
in all kind of enterprises is already temporary- in 1987 
with an increase in 5 points over 1986. Dismissal has 
been the most importam t way of reestructurang personnel 
in enterprises. From 1978 to 1986, over 8 million 
salaried workers, more tham 2,6 million have been 
dismissed through different mechanisms: Labour Tribunals, 
Expedients to Regulate Empii oyment, Institute of 
Mediation. In 1988 unemployment benefit covers under 307 
of unemployed so more than 2 million workers are in 
disposition to be contrated at any condition. 
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But actors' strategies are also to be considered. 
Employers look for a more flexible labour market and for 
a double level in enterprises, stable workers and 
temporary workers; the last can easly be used as flexible 
factor in front of fluctuations of production. In some 
way unions have helped to consolidate segmentation 
concentrating their efforts in the strongest groups of 
workers. 
c) Irregular work and innovations in tehcnology and work 
organi sati on. 
Irregular work, with few exceptions ­could be the case in 
electronics (Benton, 1936) and some services to 
enterprises­ is not accampani ed in Spain with am high 
degree of technological innovation. But there are two 
kinds of innovation we have to consider. The first is 
related to changes in work organisation, because 
irregular work allows to brake the rigid traditional 
taylorist organisation, concentrating and doing more 
autonomous very parcelled tasks. The second has to do 
with quail i f i cat i on of workers, because in many new 
enterprises, in particular in services, these 
qualifications are fully used; of course, many operations 
in irregular activity, parti cui 1 ari y in industry, are 
tettai y dequali f i ed. 
4. EVALUATION 
a) Wh ai t to do in front of the irregular work 
N e i t h e r a m e r e i y r e ρ r e s s ι ν e ρ o s i. t i ο n nor­ a passive 
ai c c e ¡o t ai t i o n s e e m s t o b e; t h e r i g h t w a y to f ai c e ir r e g u 1 a r 
w o r !­■:. I n m y ο ρ ι n i o n s o n ie of t n e f o 11 o w i n g mesures could 
b e m o r e e f f e c t i v e . 
First of all control can be reinforced and accepted by 
the public opinion in relation to the multiple 
jobholders, in particular liberal professionaxis and civil 
servants; in this sense labour inspection may receive 
some mor e inter vei n i n g powers. But also Commmi t tees an d 
personnel Delegsites in all enterprises may have more 
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intervention, and also more instruments, in order to get 
stronger control on overtime. 
New farms of temporary or part­time contracts could 
stimulate irregular work to emerge only with some 
conditions; if contracts last not less than 6 months and 
workers have the right to get unemployment benefit for 
the same period if the contract is not renewed, obtaining 
a stable employment after a rasonable period ; if these 
temporary or part—time workers obtain all laboral and 
sindical rights as the others. 
In order to gaurantee the replacement of unemployed or 
the first job for young people, some elements are very 
important: professional training more solid and closer to 
the real process of work; efficient retraining; to raise 
substanti ail 1 y unemployment benefit in terms of money and 
of people covered by it; to facilitate the presence of 
unions when new contracts are signed. 
In the other hand the presence of workers representatives 
­in particulate unions­ might be reinforced in 
enterprises, specially in small firms, giving them the 
passi bil il ty of having some kind of control on 
decentralisation process. But unions themselves have to 
be more conscious of this necessity, undestanding that 
the boundaries between which conditions of work are 
decided are less and 1 ess those fitting with the firm and 
more aind more a more vast terri torv. 
b) New proposals for research 
An important question to be studied could be the 
relationship between irregular work an new jobs availaible 
(temporary, part—time, sei f­empioyment,etc. ) in the sense 
of comparing conditions of work and social conditions of 
people beeing in irregular situation and people in new 
jobs¿; the main hypothesis to be tested would be the read 
significance of the legal faictor. 
Mor ε ρ ar t i c u 1 air 1 y t. his r esear c h sh ou 1 d be c ar ried on 
small firms (under 100 empioyees),because it is in this 
group of enterprises where traidi ti onsil l y more irregular 
work: was found and at the present more precarious jobs 
are available. 
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Another perspective of research is referred to the 
relationship between irregular work and unemployment, not 
to test the level of fraud, apparently very low in every 
country, but the new conception of work developed in 
people (young people) who have never worked in a 
traditional way: stable job, fixed salary,etc. 
Finally research could advance in understanding irregular 
work and other transformations of work today, studying 
the rol played by the family in labour market 
segmentati on. 
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TABLE 1.- RATE OF ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT BY AGE AND SEX. 
GROUPS OF AGE ACTIVITY UNEMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT 
M+F TOTAL 
LESS THAN 25 Y. 
25 AND MORE 
FROM 16 TO 19 Y. 
FROM 20 TO 24 Y. 
FROM 25 TO 54 Y. 
FROM 55 AND MORE 
M TOTAL 
LESS THAN 25 Y. 
25 AND MORE 
FROM 16 TO 19 Y. 
FROM 20 TO 34 Y. 
FROM 25 TO 54 Y. 
FROM 55 AND MORE 
F TOTAL 
LESS THAN 25 Y. 
25 AND MORE 
FROM 16 TO 19 Y. 
FROM 20 TO 24 Y. 
FROM 25 TO 54 Y. 
FROM 55 AND MORE 
49.25 
54.07 
48.02 
38.03 
67.23 
G8.12 
20.12 
67.20 
56.98 
70.05 
38.74 
71.98 
93.82 
33.19 
32.50 
50.96 
28.18 
37.26 
62.16 
42.87 
9.69 
20.21 
42.00 
13.95 
48.35 
39.05 
15.14 
8.35 
16.06 
35.50 
11.65 
41.97 
32.64 
12.20 
9.28 
28.22 
49.76 
19.09 
55.48 
46.97 
21.48 
5.81 
39.30 
31.36 
41.32 
19.64 
40.98 
57.81 
18.44 
56.41 
36.75 
61 '.89 
22.48 
48.48 
82.38 
30.11 
23.33 
25.60 
22.80 
16.59 
32.97 
33.66 
9.13 
INE. Encuesta de Población Activa. Principales Resultados. 1o trimestre 
de 1.988. 
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TABLE II.- VORKING POPULATION BY TIPE OF CONTRACT, VORKING HOURS AND SEX 
VORKING HOURS 
TOTAL 
SALARIED VORKERS 
REGULAR 
CONTRACT 
TEMPORAL 
CONTRACT 
NOT 
CLASSIFIED 
BOTH SEXES 
TOTAL 
FULL TIME 
PART TIME 
NOT CLASSIF 
MALES 
TOTAL 
FULL TIME 
PART TIME 
NOT CLASSIF 
FEMALES 
TOTAL 
FULL TIME 
PART TIME 
IED 
:IED 
NOT CLASSIFIED 
8172.6 
7799.2 
356.5 
7.8 
5726.0 
5643.3 
76.5 
6.1 
2446.6 
2155.9 
289.0 
1.7 
6438.1 
6251.2 
186.9 
-
4610.8 
4578.9 
31.9 
-
1827.4 
1672.3 
155.0 
1726.6 
1548.0 
178.6 
-
1109.1 
1064.5 
44.6 
-
617.5 
483.5 
134.0 
7.8 
7.8 
6.1 
6.1 
1.7 
1.7 
INE. Encuesta de Población Activa. Principales Resultados. 1o trimestre 
de 1.988. 
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TABLE III.­ STABILITY OF EMPLYMENT, IN GENERAL 1.987 
Stable 
Temporary 
80.1 
19.9 
Source: INE. Encuesta de Población Activa. 4o trimestre de 1.987 
TABLE IV.­ STABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT BY SIZE OF ENTERPRISE 1.987 
Stable 
Tempore ry 
6­10 
79 
21 
11­50 
77 
23 
51­100 
80 
20 
101­500 
85 
15 
501 
And more 
91 
'9' 
Average 
82 
18 
Source: Ministerio de trabajo. "Encuesta Sobre Política de Contratación 
y Formación de los Empresarios Españoles"; en Coyuntura Laboral 
rio. 25, Abril 1.988. Ministerio de Trabajo, Madrid. 
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TABLE V.- HOURS WORKED IN THE WEEK OF REFERENCE IN THE MAIN AND SECONDARY 
ACTIVITIES. 
SEX HOURS WORKED IN THE WEEK OF REFERENCE 
TOTAL MAIN ACTIVITY SECOND ACTIVITY 
BOTH SEXES 41.3 41.2 17.6 
MALES 
FEMALES 
42.4 
38.8 
42.2 
38.7 
17.7 
17.2 
INE. Encuesta de Población Activa. Resultados Detallados. 3o trimestre 
de 1.987 
TABLE VI.- WORKING POPULATION BY SECTOR AND RELATIONSHIP WHIT IRREGULAR 
WORK. 
(Thousands) 
Econom.Sectors Total Working Studied Working Irregular 2/1 
Population Population Working P. % 
Agriculture 
Others 
Industry 
Building 
Services 
Not classified 
2.059 
9.579 
2.870 
885 
5.824 
625 
1.550 
8.487 
2.590 
790 
5.107 
292 
479 
1.712 
406 
148 
1.158 
70 
30.9 
20.2 
15.7 
18.7 
22.7 
24.0 
TOTAL 12.260 10.328 ï. 258 21.9 
Ministerio de Economía, 1.985. 
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TABLE VII.- POPULATION STUDIED BYFAMILY ROLES AND RELATIONSHIP TO 
IRREGOLAR WORK. 
Heads of Family 
Thousands % 
Other Members 
Thousands % 
TOTAL WORKING P. 7.193 100,0 .5.067 100,0 
POPULATION STUDIED 6.497 
Declared Working P. 5.713 
Irregular Working P. 779 
90,4 
79.5 
10.0 
3.829 
2.362 
1.467 
75.6 
46.6 
29.0 
NO STUDIED 696 9.6 1.238 24.4 
Ministerio de Economía, 1.985. 
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TABLE VIII.- WORKINS POPULATION BY REGIONS AND RELATIONSHIP WHIT 
IRREGULAR WORK. (Thousands) 
REGIONS 
Andalucía 
Aragón 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Casti11a-
-La Mancha 
Castilla-León 
Cataluña 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 
Pais Vasco 
Ri oja 
TOTAL 
WORKING 
POPULATION 
1.853 
427 
353 
240 
433 
155 
574 
857 
2.200 
304 
97G 
1.484 
319 
163 
1.175 
655 
94 
POPULATION 
STUDIED 
(2) 
1.538 
356 
304 
210 
367 
134 
45/ 
706 
1.912 
251 
776 
1.208 
279 
146 
1.013 
592 
79 
IRREGULAR 
WORKING 
POPULATION 1) 
445 
51 
46 
32 
75 
21 
125 
120 
449 
59 
181 
180 
89 
25 
248 
97 
14 
2/1 BY 
% 
28.9 
14.3 
15.1 
15.2 
20.4 
15.7 
27.4 
17.0 
23.5 
23.5 
23.3. 
14.9 
31.9 
17.1 
24.5 
16.4 
17.7 
TCTAL 12.260 10.328 2.258 21.9 
Ministerio de Economía, 1.985. 
TABLE IX.­ WORKING POPULATION BY REGIONS, EMPLOYMENT SITUATION AND RELATIONSHIP WHI" 
(Thousands) 
REGULAR WORK. 
REGIONS 
Andalucía 
Aragón 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla­La Mancha 
Castilla­León 
Cataluña 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
Com. Valenciana 
Pais Vasco 
Rioja 
TOTAL 
SALARIED WORKERS 
Total Studied 
1.195 
252 
209 
165 
295 
98 
321 
455 
1.525 
183 
462 
1.142 
214 
113 
801 
511 
59 
8.001 
(1) 
1.165 
247 
204 
161 
289 
95 
315 
442 
1.480 
178 
449 
1.027 
210 
111 
765 
503 
57 
7.698 
Irregulars 
(2) 
296 
29 
21 
23 
46 
14 
94 
68 
29ο 
'42 
83 
104 
67 
15 
183 
74 
10 
1.460 
2/1 (%) 
25.4 
11.7 
10.3 
14.3 
15.9 
14.7 
2 9. Ρ. 
15.4 
19.6 
23. ϋ 
18.5 
10.1 
31.9 
13.5 
23.9 
14.7 
17.5 
19.0 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
Total Studied 
394 
112 
105 
52 
VA 
42 
147 
272 
443 
73 
339 
192 
70 
37 
258 
95 
23 
2.735 
(1) 
375 
109 
99 
50 
70 
39 
143 
263 
432 
72 
327 
180 
69 
34 ' 
248 
88 
21 
2.620 
jgulars 
.2) 
149 
22 
25 
9 
29 
7 
31 
52 
I59 
17 
98 
76 
22 
10 
65 
23 
'4 
'93 
2/1 (%) 
39.7 
20.2 
25.3 
18.0 
37.2 
17.9 
21.7 
19.8 
36.8 
23.6 
30.0 
42.2 
31.9 
29.4 
26.2 
26.1 
19.0 
30.4 
-F-
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TABLE X.- WORKING POPULATION BY WORKING PLACE AND RELATIONSHIP WHIT 
IRREGULAR VORK. 
WORKING 
PLACE 
TOTAL POPULATION IRREGULAR 2/1 BY 
WORKING STUDIED WORKING 
POPUL. (1) POPULATIONS) % 
At Home 957 710 311 43.8 
Outside Home 10.979 
Fix Place 8.310 
No Fix Place 2.067 
Both Modalities 602 
9.500 
7.281 
1.818 
481 
1.935 
1.277 
547 
111 
20.2 
17.5 
30.1 
23.1 
Not Classified 324 35 12 34.3 
TOTAL 12.260 10.328 2.258" 21.9 
Ministerio de Economía, 1.985 
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PART I 
CASE STUDIES 
Informal work in Portugal has only been studied directly between 1982 and 1985 
—after which there have only been indirect approximations—, and almost entirely 
through general studies, without focus on specific sectors or districts. This not only 
means that the number of cases studied is limited —we have ourselves made summary 
sketches in some new cases—, but that there is relatively little contrast been the existing 
studies as such. 
The information available to us on the multiple nature of informal work in Portugal 
is thus considerably more approximative and tendential than is the case for Spain. Differ-
ent writers have produced fairly detailed studies of three cases: construction, agriculture, 
and at-home work in the textile industry in the north of the country. We have studied a 
further two cases —clandestine juvenile work and informal work in personal services, 
particularly in catering and tourism—, although only at the level of initial estimates in-
volving not only Portuguese data but also similarities with the situation in Spain a few 
years ago. 
1. Clandestine Employment of Minors1 
The employment of minors has aroused considerable debate in Portugal, mostly at 
the instigation of unions in the industrial districts. This debate has brought light to bear on 
a phenomenon which is nevertheless by no means recent. If attention has once again been 
focused in this direction, it is not mainly due to the possibly distressing conditions in 
which minors work —which the unions also regard as possibilities—, but because of loss 
of scholarity and the considerable level of educational failure which may be attributed to 
the phenomenon. 
Extent of the Problem 
The legal minimum working age in Portugal is still 14, whereas the compulsory 
education age was, until 1987, only 12. This implied an incentive for adolescents who 
were not continuing their education, or for their parents, to devote these two years to 
clandestine work. 
Some studies estimate that about 190,000 children were working at the beginning 
of the 1980s, 136,000 of which were in agriculture. 
According to the National Statistics Institute, the 1987 employment rate for chil-
dren of between 10 and 14 years of age was still 6.7% of the total age group population, 
although the tendency was towards decline (the rate was 9.7% in 1983). 
Working minors are mainly to be found in three sectors. The foremost of these is 
agriculture, where there is a long tradition of juvenile employment, particularly in small-
scale farming districts. This work normally involves children employed on their parents' 
properties as family help. The fact that this phenomenon is hardly present at all in the 
large-scale farming districts of the south is partly due to the degree of control resulting 
from strong unionisation. 
This work does not however concern full-time continuous employment, but is 
performed on an hourly basis, except in periods when certain farm jobs require greater 
urgency. 
Another context in which there is considerable employment of minors is that of 
personal services. There are two kinds of juvenile work here. During the year, minors are 
employed as family help in small businesses in which all family members participate 
(father, mother, children), distributing their work over the day or over the year to their 
convenience; and in special periods like moments of sales increases or the tourist season, 
the employment of minors takes on some of the features of full-time work. In both these 
cases, the employment of minors tends to be concentrated in small businesses where there 
is almost no control over the kind of labour used. 
A third area in which there is evidence of juvenile employment is industry, partic-
ularly the manufacturing industry of the north of the country. Although the employment 
of minors here would appear to be the most important new feature of the general 
phenomenon, there has been no sociological study of this development. Most of the work 
of minors in manufacturing and other sectors is however related to at-home employment 
as assistants to adults —generally housewives— who actually carry out the jobs con-
cerned. Once again we find the family playing a decisive role in the existence of juvenile 
employment. 
Determining Factors 
The experts we have consulted indicate three kinds of factors determining this type 
of informal work. Reference must firstly be made to the legal aspect, namely the gap be-
tween the age at which a child could end compulsory education and the minimum age at 
which employment may be undertaken. Having given up on education beyond the com-
pulsory level for a variety of reasons —including the poor quality of the education system 
itself—, parents then find themselves obliged to facilitate the employment of their adoles-
cent children who would otherwise have nothing to do. But the lack of confidence in the 
education system goes beyond this: in certain areas of the country many children do not 
even finish compulsory education because their parents, as well as general public opinion, 
consider it more important to learn a trade than to go to school. A final factor would then 
be the importance of traditions of family use of juvenile labour, traditions which still sur-
vive in certain sectors and districts of the country. 
Market Features 
It would seem that we are concerned with a fairly closed market. Although there 
are no studies on the subject —and it could be useful to have some—, the indications are 
that juvenile work is circumscribed in certain social sectors: the families of farmers, farm-
labourers and poorly qualified industrial workers, families which are moreover those with 
the most limited access to schools of acceptable quality. 
Political Action 
We should finally point out that, at least in the opinion of union officials, there has 
been very little public concern about ending this kind of employment until recently. The 
new law which raises the compulsory education age to 14 may reduce the opportunities 
for illegal employment, but only for a short period. It is thus to be hoped that the mini-
mum legal working age in Portugal will be raised to 16, as it is in the other EEC coun-
tries. 
Taking the above determining factors as a whole, we may predict that the elimina-
tion of the employment of minors will be very closely related to basic education reforms 
and cultural transformations. 
2. At-Home Work in the Industrial North2 
The north of Portugal, particularly the Braga district, has a long industrial 
tradition, mainly in textile manufacture, although there is still a fairly high level of 
agricultural activity. Informal work is mainly carried out in the manufacturing and 
footwear sectors, which require only a low level of technology and yet highly skilled 
labour which facilitates its considerable export capacity. 
Quantification 
Statistics from the 1981 Census, compared with the business survey (see Part I), 
show that 20% of the informal work in this sector is informal. This figure nevertheless 
rises to 45% in the Braga district, and to 23% around Setúbal. Although the cited study 
considers that this is not the sector with the highest percentage of informal work, the so-
cial importance of the phenomenon is explained by the fact that this same sector neverthe-
less has the highest number of informal workers (some 15,000). 
Determining Factors 
A very considerable percentage of the manufacturing and footwear firms operating 
along the north coastal region and centre of the country are not only export oriented, but 
are in fact foreign firms using the cheap, highly skilled and traditionally trained labour 
available in this part of the country for the production of quality items. 
These firms are thus able to keep their labour costs down, and most labour is of-
fered by family groups who fit this work in alongside agricultural or industrial work (not 
only in the same district, but also in other parts of the country and abroad). According to 
some researchers, there is an implicit agreement or a certain convergence of interests be-
tween employers and employees, with the workers gaining the flexibility needed to fit 
agricultural work in with outside or at-home industrial work whilst maintaining the tradi-
tional system of social relations, and the firms gaining an abundant and flexible labour 
supply which is both cheap and sufficiently skilled. 
Features of the Market 
As may be deduced from the above points, this is a fairly closed labour market in 
which family structure, the integration of agriculture with industry and the traditional 
handing down of skills are key elements. We may hypothesise that as long as this market 
remains as particular and as impermeable to outside influence as it is, informal work will 
continue to be an important form of exchange. 
Typology of Labour 
This case presents two basic kinds of labour. One the one hand, there is the labour 
related to the reproductive tasks of the family, mainly housewives who do both domestic 
work and at-home industrial work. This is socio-culturally "adapted" labour (through the 
social conception of the role of married women) which is mostly informal and will proba-
bly continue to so. On the other hand, there is the labour which is employed partly in 
agriculture and partly in industry, dominated by men although there are also women in 
this category. The informality may in this case be partial (the work done in one of the two 
sectors may not be declared) or may take the form of undeclared overtime. 
Work Conditions 
We have already pointed out that the salaries paid for informal work are not high, 
although a family's standard of living may be comfortable thanks to the existence of sev-
eral sources of income. 
Women who work at home are able to earn an acceptable income by dedicating 
enormous numbers of hours to their work. Their most onerous work condition is thus 
their working day which, when their productive and reproductive tasks are added to-
gether, may be very long indeed. But one should also note a deterioration in the hygiene 
and sanitary conditions due to the mixing of work contexts —which sometimes require 
the storing of unhealthy materials or substances in small houses— and the context of ev-
eryday family life. 
The working days of those employed in industry and agriculture also go well be-
yond the normal hours. 
Political Attitudes 
The Portuguese government's clearest general attitude towards informal work is 
one of tolerance —probably also due to the inefficiency which many experts attribute to 
the bureaucracy—, but this is particularly true in the case we are presently considering. 
There are basically two reasons for this. Firstly, the fact that formal and informal modes 
of work have been able to co-exist has given the district a certain degree of social peace 
which the various governments have been interested in maintaining. Secondly, the con-
tinued existence of informal work helps the competitivity of European exports of Por-
tuguese products which would otherwise have to compete against other countries under 
difficult conditions. 
3. The Construction Sector3 
Construction is and has traditionally been the sector in which most informal work 
is found in Portugal, probably because of its status as a bridge between the primary and 
secondary sectors. 
Quantification of Informal Employment 
At the beginning of the 1980s the number of informal workers in the construction 
sector was about 200,000, well above the other sectors and representing about 50% of the 
total construction labour force. This high proportion is to be found is all regions of 
Portugal, but is most notable in the least industrialised areas, where construction is one of 
the main non-agricultural activities. 
Features of the Labour Market 
The nature of the construction industry's labour market varies widely between in-
dustrial areas, where most work tends to be regular, and non-industrial districts, where it 
is mostly informal. 
The reasons for this difference may be that the non-industrial areas have less offi-
cial and union control over employment, are dominated by small firms and have high lev-
els of multiple employment, particularly in the combination of construction and agricul-
ture. 
In other words, the labour employed in the construction industry in industrialised 
areas comes from a more general market which includes all lesser skilled workers. In the 
less industrialised areas, on the other hand, construction labour comes from a far more 
closed market largely determined by its association with agricultural work. 
Determining Factors 
The factor determining the extent of informal work in this sector could be the drive 
to reduce labour costs. But this should in turn be explained within the context of the Por-
tuguese economic structure and labour market of the past two decades. 
Firstly, the urban middle class demand for second houses has increased consider-
ably since the beginning of the 1970s. This kind of construction project can be undertaken 
by small firms and may moreover avoid not only all forms of employment regulation, but 
also the town planning and building regulations which were formerly quite strict. 
Secondly, above all in the less industrialised regions of the centre and north, con-
struction firms have been able to rely on a highly specific supply of labour: that of part-
time farm workers. Researchers have put the number of farm workers employed in con-
struction at more than 50,000, and the total number of people constituting the families in 
these conditions at more than 100,000, most of which would be working in the construc-
tion industry on an informal basis. 
The interests of the construction firms thus coincide with those of certain labour 
sectors, notably farm workers who seek to add to their agricultural incomes. This is a 
very flexible labour supply, the employment of which both unions and government find 
extremely difficult to control. 
To complete this general overview, we should finally point out that wider use of 
fixed-term contracts has produced a certain tendency towards a reduction in the degree of 
informal work over the past few years. 
Typology of Informal Labour 
Statistical studies indicate the existence of a large amount of permanently em-
ployed informal labour. But several researchers have shown that this does not account for 
all informal labour, and that the high proportion of illegal construction sites to be found in 
the more industrialised districts —a proportion far higher than that of the lesser industri-
alised areas, which nevertheless have higher percentages of informal workers— would 
rather indicate that a different kind of labour force is involved. 
This is labour employed in other industrial sectors which works in construction on 
a part-time basis or on weekends as self-employment, family help, help to friends and ac-
quaintances, etc. 
4. Informal Agriculture4 
The main feature of Portuguese agriculture in recent years has been the slowing 
down of the rural exodus of the 1950s and 1960s and its substitution by a partial reduc-
tion of agriculture through part-time farming. 
Typology of Part-Time Agriculture 
There are two main types of agricultural activity in which a certain degree of informal 
work can be detected: that which we might call residual agriculture, and that which we 
shall define as part-time agriculture. 
The first type includes the activities of people in rural areas who although they re-
ceive pensions, either old-age or for handicaps which impede work, continue to cultivate 
their land —generally small and not highly productive farms— as a way of generating 
income. This category also includes emigrants who have the farm work done by family 
members throughout the year, and then work the land themselves during vacations. This 
is a case in which the generation of income is combined with formal work carried out on 
holidays by people who may not always be included in the work force. 
The second type includes people who have two activities, the first in agriculture 
and the second in construction, industry or the service sector. Such people may be either 
heads of families or other family members. In what follows, we shall focus our attention 
on this second type. 
Quantification of the Phenomenon 
There are no studies on the extent of informal agricultural work. The general 
opinion of researchers is however that most of the almost 340,000 people with more than 
one job who were working in agriculture at the beginning of the 1980s were carrying out 
either the agricultural or the non-agricultural job on an informal basis. The fact that 72% 
of them dedicate less than 50% of their time to agriculture allows us to assume that this 
work is difficult to control through regulations. Most multiply employed workers, 
74.4%, do not work in agriculture as a secondary activity, whereas 26.6% are engaged in 
agricultural work as a second activity. 
Determining Factors 
We must once again refer to the Portuguese economic and social structures —es-
pecially to the family structure— in order to explain the extent of informal work in this 
sector. 
Leaving aside residual agriculture, in which informal work is simply an additional 
means of survival, we find that much of the agriculture on lands of less than 20 ha. is in 
fact in the industrial and tourist areas of the north-east (industry, construction and ser-
vices). It is not simply that these areas have a supply of extra-agricultural work, but also 
that agriculture itself, which in these cases has attained a certain degree of technological 
development, has released its excess of labour (for example, the small farmer who previ-
ously spent several weeks working his land or picking fruit etc., can now do it in a few 
hours by hiring a tractor or other kinds of machinery). 
But it is above all the family as a flexible and cheap mode of supplying collective 
agricultural labour that allows some of its members to engage in other activities on a part-
time basis, without them having to rely on those activities for an income adequate to the 
family's consumption. 
In these areas, the farmer-industrial worker combination would seem to represent 
a long-lasting solution to the crisis in traditional agriculture. Part-time farming is thus riot 
a step towards the giving up of agriculture altogether, but is rather an integration of multi-
ple different incomes into the rural domestic group. 
The sons of these farmers may nevertheless leave agriculture, depending on the 
extent to which they can "capitalise" on gaining enough education to make the jump. The 
situation of the rural educational system does however make this difficult to achieve. 
Politics and Public Opinion 
The persistence of this mode of work, often irregular, is based on the solidity of 
the rural social structure. In many factories in rural areas, workers are in fact picked up in 
the morning by buses which often travels many kilometers around the district, returning 
the workers to their small rural communities in the afternoons. 
In addition to not penetrating certain rural ways of life, this mode of multiple ac-
tivity guarantees the worker-farmers a relatively high standard of living. The second, non-
agricultural activity is thus seen as being quite normal and there is no pressure at all 
against double employment, the absence of which would result in considerable reductions 
in living standards. 
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5. Informal Work in the Service Sector5 
Informal service-sector work is found in the country's more developed and ur-
banised districts: Lisbon-Setúbal, the Algarve and the north-east coast. It has been in-
creasing over the past few years, yet nevertheless remains at a lower level than the extent 
of informal work in agriculture, construction and industry. 
Quantification of the Phenomenon 
Here we should once again return to data from the beginning of the 1980s which 
suggest that the recent tendency could be towards a decline in informal work due to new 
forms of employment contracts. 
We are mainly referring to commerce, catering, transportation, various forms of 
repair work and personal services in general. The rate of informal work is between 17% 
and 25%, but reaches much higher levels in certain subsectors like domestic services, 
various kinds of repair work, teaching services, etc. 
Typology of Informal Work 
Within the wide range of services, we can distinguish between the two most no-
ticeable kinds of informal work. 
Firstly, self-employed workers, especially in at-home repairs and automobile re-
pairs (as well as repairs to other domestic appliances like televisions, radios, etc.), do-
mestic services, etc., are able to undertake this kind of employment either because they 
also have another job, usually full-time, or because they have to carry out their own do-
mestic work (as is the case with women who work at home). Self-employed workers may 
thus be highly qualified or not qualified at all. This kind of work is extremely difficult to 
control, and it is socially admitted that it is carried out on an informal basis. 
Secondly, full-time or main-income informal work found in catering, retailing, 
etc. presents some of all of the following features: the workers are female, young and 
poorly qualified. This labour is generally employed in small businesses in the respective 
sectors, since the union presence in large firms makes informal labour difficult, even 
though it may not impede informal work itself. 
Determining Factors 
The considerable growth in the Portuguese tourism and commercial sectors, to-
gether with the availability of labour which accepts employment conditions inferior to 
those negotiated legally —mainly with respect to salaries and working weeks— may ex-
plain this significant level of informal work. Small businesses look for competitivity 
based on lower salaries and greater flexibility, and the size and relative social uncontrola-
bility of businesses would thus appear to go some way towards explaining the extent of 
informal work. 
As with other sectors, reference should also be made here to multiple employment 
which, especially in tourist areas, combines agriculture with service sector work and thus 
constitutes a further concealing factor. 
With respect to self-employed workers, especially those with multiple employ-
ment, growth in the level of informal work has to do both with the desire to increase fam-
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ily incomes and the difficulty which the Portuguese government has traditionally had in 
exercising fiscal control over this kind of activity. 
We should nevertheless point out that part of the informal work in these sectors 
has been replaced in recent years by unstable forms of employment based on fixed-term 
contracts. 
Work Conditions 
Informal work in services like catering and retailing connotes conditions far infe-
rior to those of legal work. This above all involves lower salaries, longer working weeks 
and poorer and less controlled sanitary and hygienic conditions. 
NOTES 
1. Interviews realised to different researches. 
2. Fernández Sá, J. Manuel. La industria del valle del Ave. Tesis doctoral. Escuela de 
Urbanismo, Universidad de Oporto, 1987 
3. Sousa Lobo, M.Isabel. Construção não formal, Contribuçao para uma análise 
quantitativa a nivel regional. IACEP. Estudos Urbanos e regionais. 1986. 
4. Villaverde Cabral. "A economia subterranea vem ao de Cima: estrategias rurais 
perante a industrialização e a urbanização". Analise Social. XIX (76), Lisboa, 1984. 
5. Interviews to researchers and unionist. 
PART II 
QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS 
Introduction 
Studies of the informal economy have only been carried out very recently in Por-
tugal and date from a very limited period (1980-1985). There has been relatively little 
research into the phenomenon and most of the academic investigations and debates 
concern theoretical problems of formulation and definition. Although the few studies 
attempted focus on these theoretical aspects and do not concentrate specifically on 
Portuguese cases, those that do deal with such cases mostly deal with quantitative 
aspects. This means that the present report is able to include some data on the extent of 
irregular work and the informal economy in general. The methods used and the aims of 
the various studies also provide bases —although to a lesser extent— for research into the 
factors determining the case of Portugal, the elaboration of typologies of irregular work 
and study of the political and institutional actions of the various social actors involved. 
The rhythm of social and economic development in Portugal in the 1970s, and 
especially the political and social transformations following 25 April 1974, have created a 
new social dynamic which involves, on the one hand, rupture with traditional forms of 
economic, political, social and industrial relations together with access, somewhat 
impetuous and little structured, to certain benefits of the welfare state, and, on the other, 
the appearance of international economic recession, which had especially acute effects on 
peripheral countries like Portugal. 
Oliviera Neves indicates that adaptation to these new conditions on the part of 
various economic agents and above all the government did not involve any planning of 
global strategies. Actions were restricted to different sectors and were highly polarised. 
More importantly, these actions essentially explain the appearance and structuration of 
many of the activities presently carried out within the informal economy. 
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1. Quantification and Nature of the Economy 
and of Informal Work 
Quantification 
Albano Santos, working on a study for the Ministry of Work and using the 
monetary method of Peter Gutman, has estimated that in 1981 the informal economy 
accounted for about 22% of the Portuguese GDP. This estimate is based on the construc-
tion of monetary circulation series going from 1950 to 1981, reaching the conclusion that 
the informal economy was practically irrelevant prior to the 1970s. This hypothesis is 
challenged by several researchers who insist on the importance of traditional at-home 
work in Portugal, and especially on the importance of agricultural economies involving 
unregistered self-consumption (A. Santos, 1983). 
Santos moreover hypothesises that the productivity of work in the informal 
domain is comparable to that carried out officially, and thus estimates that there are some 
800,000 workers contributing to undeclared production. 
Oliveira Neves considers that the monetary variables used by Santos are not 
significant enough in the case of Portugal, does not accept the hypothesis of equal 
productivity in the official and informal sectors and thus cannot accept the resulting esti-
mate of the number of informal workers (A. Oliveira, 1984). 
Rosario Cocco and Emanuel Santos work along the same "monetary" lines as A. 
Santos but use a more sophisticated methodology in winch the informal economy is basi-
cally explained by taxation levels, with fiscal pressure being the key to explaining infor-
mal production (R. Cocco, E. Santos, 1984). 
Cocco and E. Santos observe that before 1974 the informal economy represented 
no more than 7% of the GDP, but rose to 10.3% in 1975 and then up to 11.2% in 1981. 
The methodology used enables them to estimate the extent of tax evasion associated with 
the informal economy, which their maximising hypothesis puts at about 300 million 
"contos" (billions of escudos) for 1981. As can be seen, this estimate by no means coin-
cides with that given by A. Santos. 
One of the more recent studies we have received is that carried out by the Instituto 
de Pesquisa Social Damião de Gôïs (Various, 1984). After describing the above dispari-
ties, this research approaches the analysis and quantification of the informal economy in 
Portugal from a wider perspective, with particular emphasis on study of the labour force 
and abandoning methodologies which, based on monetary variables, calculate the extent 
of the informal economy in terms of percentages of the GDP. 
In this case, the number of undeclared workers is given by the difference between 
the total number of people the "Recenseamento Geral da População" registered in 1981 as 
exercising a profession (as salaried workers) and the total number of workers registered 
in Ministry of Work statistics, the latter being assumed to be working within the formal 
economy. The following results were obtained for the industrial sector: informal labour 
accounted for 16.9% of the total labour force employed in transformation industry, with 
11.8% of these figuring as undeclared salaried workers and 5.1% as self-employed 
workers or unpaid family help. 
Analysing these results in greater detail, Isabel de Sousa (1985) outlines the 
following structure of Portuguese industry: 
a. With respect to central and intermediary transformation industries, which are the 
most modern and employ the highest numbers of workers, those defined as central 
account for 11.7% of the total declared workers, with intermediary industries employing 
22.1%. 
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b. Peripheral transformation industries, which include all the industries of the 
traditional formal sector, employ 49.3% of the total declared workers. 
c. As we have seen, informal or marginal transformation account for 16.9% of the 
total number of workers employed in industry. 
With respect to the regional distribution of the phenomenon, and without going 
into the detailed statistics of De Souza's study, it is clear that the regions of the interior 
and the south have proportionally higher levels of informal economic activity, with 
between 1/3 and 2/3 of workers in the districts of Bragança, Vila Real and Viseu being 
undeclared. In the more industrialised coastal districts —Braga, Porto, Aveiro, Coimbra, 
Lisbon and Setúbal— the numbers of workers considered to be employed within the 
informal economy are remarkably homogeneous, varying between 13% and 16%, just 
below the national average. The first of these regional variations may partly be explained 
by the relative lack of economic development in those parts of the country (resulting in 
greater resistance to the dissolution of more primitive capitalist forms of production, and 
the greater preponderance of artisanal activities, self-employed work and small busi-
nesses) and, in the case of the Algarve, probably by the extent of seasonal activity in the 
food-processing industry and the tourist sector. 
De Sousa nevertheless considers that the industrial structure alone cannot entirely 
explain the different degrees reached by the informal economy. For example, how can it 
account for the fact that in Setúbal, where central transformation industry is dominant 
(45% of workers) and concentrated (78% of workers are employed by firms with more 
than 100 employees), the extent of irregular work is equivalent to that of Aveiro, where 
the traditional and small-scale industries are predominant? 
Nature 
In order to explain this phenomenon, De Sousa then introduces a new explanatory 
variable: multiple employment involving both agriculture and industry. This factor not 
only reveals a feature distinguishing between the north and the south, but also allows a 
redefinition of the regional distribution of the informal economy. Two working hypothe-
ses are constructed on the basis of the above calculation of the number of informally em-
ployed industrial workers. The first hypothesis is maximising and is given by the sum of 
the previous estimate and the number of agricultural workers (including individual pro-
ducers) registered in the 1979 Agricultural Census, independently of the numbers of 
hours worked in agriculture and industry .The minimising hypothesis then only includes 
those who are employed in agriculture for more than 50% of their working week and thus 
have only secondary industrial jobs. These latter cases are very probably at-home work-
ers, self-employed workers, family help, etc. 
The new estimates for the percentage of the work force employed in informal 
transformation industries, corrected in terms of the levels of multiple employment, are 
thus 28.1% according to the maximising hypothesis and 18.1% for the minimising 
hypothesis. 
These new estimates also give us an idea of the importance of agricultural work as 
a complement to undeclared jobs. 
De Sousa finally incorporates these new hypotheses into a territorial structuration 
of the informal economy in Portugal. Regionally, the irregular industrial work-force 
(PAJLM in the Portuguese abbreviation) may be characterised as follows: 
a. In the North Coastal (except Viana do Castelo), Central Coastal and Lisbon 
Interior areas, where the initial estimate was between 14% and 20%, thè PAIM is in fact 
much higher if simultaneous industrial and agricultural employment is taken into account. 
These are the three sub-regions with the highest levels of multiple employment in the 
country, in both absolute and relative terms. This phenomenon may be explained by the 
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zone's specific industrial sector (small businesses, family capital) and by the nature of its 
labour market (abundant labour supply, low degrees of unionisation and unstable work 
conditions). 
b. In the Lisbon Coastal area, including the districts of Lisbon and Setúbal, the 
levels of multiple agricultural-industrial employment are, in relative terms, the lowest in 
the country. The initial estimates thus change little with the introduction of the multiple 
employment factor: the previous figures of between 14% and 16% rise to between 17% 
and 19% when multiple employment is taken into consideration. In this area, the PAIM is 
mainly constituted by undeclared industrial workers who have no secondary job outside 
of industry. 
c. In the North Interior, Central Interior and the district of Viana do Castelo, 
despite the different levels of development involved, self-employment and unpaid family 
help tend to reach levels which are greater than or at least equal to the level of undeclared 
work. There is considerable agricultural activity in these areas, but the lack of industrial 
development means that very few agricultural workers have secondary jobs in industry. 
The informal economy does not have the same significance in these interior zones as it 
does in more industrialised coastal zones, since the preponderance of the primary sector 
and the importance of subsistence economies and artisanal activities mean that a consider-
able part of the production and work in not monetarised. 
d. The area of Alentejo is similarly characterised by the fact that there are not only 
considerable numbers of irregular salaried workers but also irregular self-employed 
workers and family help which, together, make up more than 50% of the PAIM. The 
differences here are due to different land and property ownership structures which go 
some way towards explaining why multiple employment in industry and agriculture is 
almost insignificant in this area. 
e. In the Algarve, the district of Faro presents several specific features. Although 
the PAIM is very extensive (50%), it is mainly made up of undeclared salaried workers 
and part-time workers who are employed in seasonal activities such as the tourist and 
food-processing industries. 
Sectors 
To complete this report on the extent and nature of irregular work in Portugal, we 
shall give a brief analysis of the extent of the phenomenon in the various economic 
sectors. Isabel De Sousa presents the following breakdown: 
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Undeclared Workers 
in Relation to the Global Structure of the Transformation Industry Workforce 
Activity 
Food 
Textiles and Footwear 
Wood and Furniture 
Paper and Graphic Arts 
Oil and Plastics 
Ceramics and Glass 
Basic Iron and Steel 
Metal Mechanics and 
Transport 
Other Transformation 
Industries 
Total Workforce 
100,206 
299,206 
113,782 
48,898 
75,185 
65,003 
30,388 
218,489 
32,779 
% 
10.2 
30.4 
11.6 
5.0 
7.6 
6.6 
3.1 
22.2 
3.3 
Undeclared Workers 
9,777 
38,051 
23,250 
3,863 
6,621 
-1,011 
6,475 
8,663 
20,238 
% 
8.4 
32.8 
20.1 
3.3 
5.7 
-0.9 
5.6 
7.5 
17.5 
TOTAL 983.998 100.0 115,927 100.0 
Note: The negative value corresponding to "Ceramics and Glass" is to be attributed to differences between 
the statistical sources used. 
This table clearly indicates that the traditional sectors are the most vulnerable to 
irregularisation processes involving undeclared work. This may be explained by the fact 
that these industries are labour intensive and easily decentralised so as to locate production 
processes in areas where the labour supply is abundant or has not yet fully been formed 
into a proletariat. 
Within the constraints imposed by the relative lack of available studies, we have 
thus tried to give an idea of the extent and nature of the informal economy in Portugal. 
The level of Portuguese research does not allow us to assume that the cited sources are 
any more precise with respect to quantitative estimates than is the case in other European 
countries, but there is also a minority of studies which deal with more qualitative features 
and are based on in-depth interviews with experts in the field. These studies to some 
extent confirm the quantitative estimates put forward in the above-mentioned research, but 
one should not forget that these calculations are based on official data. A more in-depth 
survey based on a wide sample would no doubt reveal informal activities which cannot be 
quantified through manipulation of different census statistics. The importance of the 
primary sector, artisanal activities and pre-capitalist production processes, which often do 
not enter the monetary circuits, especially in the rural areas of the interior, suggests that 
the informal economy in Portugal is more extensive than has been recognised in the above 
studies, and reveals the possible existence of a whole range of irregular economic 
dynamics which could only be explained in terms of the country's specific features. 
We have already indicated some of the factors which Portuguese researchers and 
experts consider as determining informal processes. In the following section we shall 
attempt to present these factors in a somewhat more systematic way. 
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2. Determining Factors 
The research available to us for the case of Portugal does not include any exhaus-
tive attempt to stud) the factors determining the informal economy. Albano Santos 
presents certain structural and temporary factors as having direct influences on irregulari-
sation processes. The structural factors include economic, legal and what he terms socio-
logical features. The most important of these would be elements like fiscal pressure, 
considerable structural unemployment and the legal norms regulating the labour market, 
as well as cultural factors which influence the ways people divide their time between work 
and non-work. Amongst the temporary factors listed —which would be the most impor-
tant for our own purposes, since they refer to specific features of Portuguese society— 
are balance of payments debts, inflation and unemployment. 
There can be no doubt that the factors listed by Santos are of extreme importance, 
but they fail to give an idea of the concrete features of the case of Portugal. 
As has already been indicated, all researchers agree that 25 April 1974 is a key 
date for understanding the recent social and economic development of the country. In the 
middle of the 1970s, with the entry of Portugal into the sphere of modern capitalist coun-
tries, the Portuguese labour market underwent important changes with respect to the legal 
structure and industrial relations at the same time as western capitalism entered a deep 
recession. The Portuguese government's attempts to stimulate the economy and to adopt 
certain measures of social welfare required higher taxation rates which paralleled high 
inflation and unemployment rates. 
Villaverde Cabral (1984) attaches great importance to these strategies of industri-
alisation and urbanisation and attempts to describe some of the relations between the 
development of irregular economic strategies and the real workings of Portuguese society, 
not only with respect to the economy but also on the political and ideological levels. He 
considers it especially important to investigate the relation between, on the one hand, the 
economic recession and the crisis of the welfare state, which as we have pointed out had a 
very late and partly inefficient development in Portugal, and on the other, the use of indi-
vidual strategies for maximising profits and redefining working hours. 
Villaverde Cabral lists a range of negative economic effects resulting from political 
changes which introduced a certain rigidity into the labour market as a consequence of 
union demands for job security. 
The generalised economic recession also influenced irregularisation processes, 
giving rise to individual strategies which were materialised within the unofficial economy. 
The same author regards rural areas as a privileged domain for the setting up and 
proliferation of these kinds of strategies, and notes that "everlasting family agriculture" is 
structured like a series of small local businesses that facilitate processes of decentralisation 
of production. He thus reaches the conclusion that industrial decentralisation and irregular 
work are clear examples of a "process running parallel to the deregulation of economic 
relations in general and of the labour market in particular". 
The relations between socio-economic policies and the informal economy form the 
key determining factor dealt with in a study carried out by M. Figueiredo et al. for the 
Instituto de Pesquisa Social Damião de Gois. There are two basic types of these relations: 
1. The mainly temporary nature of economic and social policies has in recent years 
resulted in the adoption of contradictory or poorly formulated measures whose lack of 
internal coherence has generated numerous loopholes and presented economic agents with 
profitable opportunities such that it is possible to talk about hard financial calculations as a 
basis for irregularisation. Institutional measures of support for the prerogatives of the 
economic policies (subsidies, fiscal exemptions, special credit facilities, export quotas, 
importation licenses, etc.) have lent themselves to fraudulent practices which have more-
over rarely been penalised. 
<?) 
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2. At the same time, the increasing transfer of economic resources to the informal 
economy has seriously distorted the official statistics used for the formulation of macro-
economic measures and has thus led to errors in the application of those measures. 
The study carried out for the Instituto Damião de Gôïs indicates that the present 
erosion of purchasing power, the extent of clandestine work and economies of self-
consumption have tended to play a compensatory role offsetting the negative effects of 
economic policies. The intensification of clandestine labour markets in sectors where use 
of this kind of labour is viable similarly tends towards a greater degree of labour-force 
flexibility with respect to production units, and thus improves their capacity to adapt to 
market variations. This greater flexibility is presented as an easy alternative to situations in 
which the salary and social security norms introduced after April 1974 became impossible 
to maintain in a climate of economic recession. 
This study holds that the extension of clandestine work in its multiple forms, 
together with a general liberalisation of the labour market, constitutes a response to the 
real situation of the Portuguese economy in the absence of any clearly active policy 
focused on restructuring the production apparatus and responding to the relative rigidity 
of industrial relations without implying recourse to irregularity. 
In summary, the determining factors which have been listed reveal the importance 
of elements which are also to be found in the case of Spain and indeed in Europe in 
general: the influence of the economic recession, the employers' need for flexibility in the 
labour market, increasing fiscal pressure, small-scale industrial structure, etc. In the case 
of Portugal, the main additional factors explaining the proliferation of informal work 
would be the economic policies carried out over the past fourteen years and the consider-
able importance of the Portuguese primary sector. 
In the wake of these last factors, special reference should be made here to the role 
of the family. The structure of the Portuguese family allows incomes to be pooled so that 
some members may undertake complementary activities which, in themselves, would not 
be enough to live on. The social role of women also makes female labour cheap and 
flexible, especially with respect to the many women employed in the industries of the 
north of the country. 
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Tradition and modernity 
Precedent explanations, different according to different 
researchers, give us a ­fragmented vision of the ­factors 
which may explain the phenomenon o­f irregular work in 
Portugal. O­f course they are valid, i ­f we keep in mind 
the low volume o­f research avalaible to the moment in the 
country, but in spite o­f that shortage, a more general 
explanation, as a hypothesis o­f work, can be proposed. 
In spite o­f the importance that in this, as in other 
questions, April 25th presents, as a moment in which new 
actors and new politics are de­fined, we can't ­forget the 
traditional ­forms of work as a main ­factor α­f recent 
changes in the phenomenon we are studying, during the 
last years. The development of new forms of work in last 
15 years has something to do with important social and 
political changes, but it would be incomprensible without 
considering a tradition which, in our opini on,presents a 
threefold manifestation. 
First of ¿­.Il we have to consider the characteristics of 
work in agriculture as a real basis of irregularity in 
other economic sectors; two different types of 
agricultural activity can illustrate our statement: that 
which we might call residual agriculture and that which 
we shall define as part­time agriculture. The most 
important for our purposes is, of course, the second, 
including people who have two activities one in 
agriculture the other in industry, construction or 
services; normally, part­time activity in agriculture, 
carried on by the head of family or by other family 
members, set a minimum basis to work irregularly in other 
sectors, basis which was important years ago and which is 
at present; sometimes, of course, part­ ime in 
agriculture is also irregular. 
In second place there is a tradition of working 
irregularly in some industries, parti cui 1 ari y in textile 
and clothing industries, in the North. Most of irregulars 
in this case are housewives working at home, but other 
family members can also be involved. The basis of 
irregularity here is defined by a labour market where 
family and social relations are key elements: that is, 
most labour is offered by family groups who fit this work 
in alongside agricultural or industrial work (not only in 
the same place but also in other parts of the country). 
Zo 
Finally, irregular work is a constant in building sector; 
the main reason, once more, is that construction firms 
have been able to rely on a hi'ghly specific supply of 
labour: that of part-time agricultural workers, who have 
already some way of subsistence. 
These three manifestations show the existence of a labour 
market in which family structure and social relations 
based on it, some kind of integration between agriculture 
and other sectors and an important supply of labour 
(migrations) are substantial traits. New elements emerge 
after april 25th, but beeing influenced by this precedent 
reality. These elements are specially modernisation of 
labour market and new legal framework. 
Important changes are registered in labour market, 
particularly: the presence of a strong and autonomous 
unionism at least in big enterprises and in proletarian 
(industrial. or agricultural) regions together with an 
important employers' association movement gives a new 
image and a new force to social partners; a new impulse 
and extension to collective bargaining, unions beeinq 
very interested in covering the whole market with a 
bargaining in which they could play a chief role. These 
two factors reinforce social gaurantees -reinforce 
regulation- in areas where they operate, but their lack 
of presence increase deregulation -and because of that, 
irregular work- in weaker areas, that is, where unions 
are weak or don't exist or where small firms are 
predominant. In this sense, but only in this sense, we 
can say that irregularity is also a consequence of 
stronger regulation. 
During the last years a new element is playing a role in 
the labour market,having also an influence in the volume 
and nature of irregular work: the new f or ins of contracts. 
In the beginning of 80' these forms of contract were used 
only to cover occasional work, now they are related to 
any kind of work but on temporary basis. Thanks to this 
new legal framework, employments which were irregular 
before now have became legal; but their social conditions 
have not changed so much. 
We are then facing a process of labour market 
segmentation, where low segments, years ago ilegal now 
legal, are playing an irregular role, at least in social 
terms, if we compare them with the situation of other 
workers in Portugal. 
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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Social actors' attitudes 
If we evaluate attitudes of social actors (state, unions 
and employers) having in mind a similar question related 
to Spain, we can underline the following traits: 
According to different key informants (unionists, 
researchers, teenies in the public ad.Tii ni strati on) 
interviewed, dominant government attitude in relation 
with irregular work is tolerance. The reasons of this 
tolerance are three. First of all, and in the case of 
irregular work in some traditional industries, tolerance 
is explained because irregular work helps the Portuguese 
products to compete in a market where regular conditions 
are very difficult to Portugal; in this hypothesis no 
public intervention is helpful except for some kind of 
"legal deregulation" through special forms of 
contractâti on we have already mentioned. Secondly there 
is a social reason in a country where "welfare" is lowly 
developped: the fact that formal and informal work 
coexist, particularly in regions where agricultural 
activity might be part-time —because of minifundism or 
because other reasons- gives to many families a level of 
income impossible of obtaining at regular level; to some 
extent social peace is based on this irregular 
opportunity to work opened to different members of the 
family. Finally there is also an instrumental reason; 
inspection of work is inefficient an no government has 
tried to correct, this way of f unet i onni ng. 
But no other social actor has presented concrete and 
clear alternatives to irregular work. Unions oppose the 
government tolerance, particularly when clandestine 
employment of minors is involved and criticise government 
decrees which open the door to new forms of contract; 
sometimes they call on legal represión, but without 
proposing different social or economic ways of organising 
this labour. 
Public opinion on irregular work 
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Irregular work is accepted by Portuguese society as a 
"normal" way of working, maybe more than in the case of 
Spain. Traditionally for many people the alternatives 
were to emigrate to other countries or work irregularly 
and, often, occasionaly. Nowadays things are not so 
different, in spite of new perspectives opened by the 
entrance in EEC. 
EVALUATION 
Because of the similarity with Spanish situation, a 
similar evaluation can be made. Anyway there are two 
questions we have to underline. 
First of all, competi ti vi ty in front of other countries 
could justify irregular work and, in consequence of low 
labour costs, low wages, only if there is a public action 
to compensate -in form of a different tax politics, for 
instance- the market conditions of these workers. 
Secondly, part-time farming as a basis to engage 
irregularly in many c>her employments is a structural 
condition which needs same kind of intervention in modern 
terms: agrarian reforms, improve social services in rural 
areas, facilitate acces to quality education and so on. 
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APPENDIXES 
I. STATISTICAL DATA 
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TABLE 1.- Work Force, Passive Population and Activity Rate (in thousands) 
M=F 
M 
F 
Total 
Population 
9755,53 
4706,28 
5049,23 
Work 
Force 
4510,68 
2606,38 
1904,25 
Inactive 
Population 
5116,98 
2025,60 
3095,08 
Work Force 
Rate % 
46,24 
55,38 
37,31 
TABLE 2.- Working Population,Unemployed and Unemployment Rate 
M+F 
M 
F 
Working Population 
4191,05 
2467,08 
1723,95 
Unemployed Population 
319,58 
139,30 
180,33 
Unemployed Rate (%) 
7,08 
5,34 
9,47 
TABLE Working Population by Employment Situation 
Employers Self-Employed Employees Family Help 
Without Staff 
TOTAL 149,3 974,1 2850,7 207,3 
Source: Ministerio do Trabalho e Segurança Social. 
Dpto. de Estudos e Planeamento. 1.987. 
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TABLE 4.- Working and Unemployed Population, by Sex and Age Group 
15-24 25-44 45-54 
WORKING M+F 788,40 1854,40 818,88 
(thousands) M 454,75 1048,38 501,03 
F 333,65 805,95 317,83 
M+F 
(%) M 
F 
UNEMPLOYED M+F 
(thousands) M 
F 
M+F 
(%) 
50,06 
55,53 
44,13 
77,17 
91,55 
64,06 
67,77 
86,92 
50,28 
152,00 
66,20 
85,30 
118,15 
43,80 
74,30 
26,88 
14,80 
12,08 
16,16 
12,71 
20,46 
5.P9 
4,01 
8,44 
3,18 
2,87 
3,66 
Source: Ministeriö...1.987 
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TABLE 5.- Working Population, by Employment Duration and Sex 
(in thousands) 
M+F 
M 
F 
TOTAL 
4191,1 
2467,1 
1724,0 
REGULAR 
4122,2 
2432,0 
1690,2 
SEASONAL 
18,7 
4,9 
13,8 
OCCASIONAL 
50,1 
30,2 
19,9 
TABLE 6.- Working Population by Duration of Employment in a liven week 
TOTAL FROM FROM FROM FROM FROM 
1 a 15 16 a 25 26 a 35 36 a 40 41 a 45 Hours 
M+F 4191,1 98,1 194,9 259,3 949,4 1478,0 
M 2467,1 30,0 64,0 131,2 555,5 1008,4 
F 1724,0 68,1 130,9 128,1 393,9 469,5 
FROM FROM 
46 a 50 51 + Hours 
459,8 481,8 
271,7 254,3 
188,1 227,0 
Source: Ministerio ... 1.987. 
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TABLE 7'.- Work Force in Marginal Transformation Industries. 
( corrected according to levels of pluriactivity in agriculture-
-industry) 
DISTRICT TOTAL WORK FORCE 
Maximumising Minimising 
Hypothesis Hypothesis 
MARGINAL WORK FORCE (%) 
Maximumising Minimising 
Hypothesis Hipothesis 
Aveiro 
Beja 
Braga 
Bragança 
Castelo Bran. 
Coimbra 
Évora 
Faro 
Guarda 
Leiria 
Lisboa 
Portalegre 
Porto 
Santarém 
Setúbal 
Viana do C. 
Vila Real 
Viseu 
TOTAL 
142.339 
4.936 
132.017 
4.164 
23.362 
43.178 
11.089 
15.024 
16.027 
54.739 
216.631 
7.510 
271.695 
49.592 
88.575 
15.55 
7.35. 
22.712 
1.136.650 
113.957 
4.416 
114.308 
3.237 
19.030 
32.766 
9.888 
13.268 
12.355 
48.980 
210.764 
6.701 
249.350 
39.477 
85.305 
12.007 
5.474 
15.982 
998.265 
33,5 
56,2 
26,9 
76,6 
31,4 
38,3 
35,9 
56,8 
35,0 
40,4 
19,1 
37,0 
23,3 
35,0 
15,6 
38,7 
49,8 
54,2 
23,1 
16,9 
50,5 
15,9 
69,9 
15,8 
18,7 
28,2 
51,1 
15,6 
21,3 
16,9 
28,4 
16,4 
18,3 
13,9 
20,6 
32,5 
34,9 
18,1 
Note: Maximising and minimising hypotheses establised by Isabel de Sousa. 
Souces: Recenseamento Agricola, INE 1.979. Recenseamento geral da População 
INE 1.981. Quadros do Pessoal, Ministerio do Trabalho, 1.981. 
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